Equality of opportunity for all?: An assessment of the effectiveness of the Anti-discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) as a tool for the delivery of equality of opportunity in education to people with impairments by Dickson, Elizabeth Anne
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL? 
 
An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) as a Tool for the Delivery of 
Equality of Opportunity in Education to People with Impairments 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
ELIZABETH ANNE DICKSON 
 
BA (Hons) LLB (Hons) Dip Ed 
University of Queensland 
 
TC Beirne School of Law 
University of Queensland 
 
May 2007 
ii
DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE 
 
I DECLARE THAT the work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my 
knowledge and belief, original and my own work, except as 
acknowledged in the text, AND THAT the material has not been 
submitted, either in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any other 
university 
 
ELIZABETH ANNE DICKSON 
 
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I thank my parents, Barbara and Dugald Macmillan, for their encouragement, help 
and good humour. 
 
I thank my husband, Ross Dickson, and my children, Kathleen, James, John and 
Peter, for their love and patience. 
 
I thank my colleague, Joy Cumming, for her wise words and friendship. 
 
I thank my supervisors, Reid Mortensen and Tamara Walsh, for their always astute 
commentary on my research and writing. 
 
iv
PUBLICATIONS RELEVANT TO THE THESIS 
 
Refereed Articles 
 
Dickson, Elizabeth, ‘Disability Discrimination in Education: Purvis v New South 
Wales (Department of Education and Training), amendment of the education 
provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the formulation of 
Disability Standards for Education’ (2005) 24(1) University of Queensland Law 
Journal 213 
 
Dickson, Elizabeth, ‘Disability Discrimination, the Unjustifiable Hardship Exemption 
and Students with Disability Related Problem Behaviour’ (2004) 9(2) Australia and 
New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 37
Dickson, Elizabeth, ‘Disability Standards for Education and the Obligation of 
Reasonable Adjustment’ (2006) 11(2) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law and 
Education 23 
 
Dickson, Elizabeth, ‘Understanding Disability: An Analysis of the Influence of the 
Social Model of Disability in the Drafting of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) 
and in its Interpretation and Application’ (2003) 8 Australia and New Zealand 
Journal of Law and Education 45 
 
Case notes and Commentary 
 
Dickson, Elizabeth, ‘The Instruction of Students with Hearing Impairments in Auslan: 
Hurst and Devlin v Education Queensland’ (2005) 10(1) Australia and New Zealand 
Journal of Law and Education 95.  
 
Dickson, Elizabeth, ‘Coping, Complying and Indirect Discrimination: Hurst v State of 
Queensland’ (2006) 10(2) &11(1) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law and 
Education 103  
vABSTRACT 
 
The primary object of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) is to ‘promote 
equality of opportunity for everyone by protecting them from unfair discrimination in 
certain areas of activity, including work, education and accommodation’.  The aim of 
this thesis is to determine whether the QADA has been an effective tool for delivering 
equality of opportunity in education to Queensland people with impairments. A 
communitarian context is adopted as the conceptual framework for this evaluation.  
Communitarians recognise that each citizen is, prima facie, entitled an ‘inclusive’ 
education in the mainstream community.  The thesis canvasses recent Queensland 
education policy which emphasises, consistent with communitarian theory, that an 
‘inclusive’ education should be made available to students with impairments 
encompassing both access to a regular education in a mainstream classroom and 
access to the full range of educational opportunities open to other citizens.  The thesis 
contends that this kind of inclusion is an important benchmark of ‘equality of 
opportunity’.  The policy of inclusion is informed by a shift in the understanding of 
the nature of disability and of the place of people with disabilities in the wider 
community.  Disability, the social restriction experienced by people with 
impairments, is now widely regarded as, to a large extent, a social construction.  
Disability flows from the failure of society to accommodate the different needs of 
people with impairments.  Moreover, the accommodation of people with impairments 
is now asserted as a rights issue rather than a welfare issue. People with impairments 
claim the same basic rights as people without impairments, including a right to 
educational opportunities.  The terms of the QADA, it is argued in the thesis, have 
been influenced by these developments in disability theory.  Evidence of education 
practice and the body of case law that has gathered over the 16 years since the QADA 
was enacted, however, suggest that the implementation of ‘inclusive’ education policy 
has met with resistance from those charged with providing educational opportunities 
to students with impairments.  It has proved particularly difficult to deliver inclusion 
to students with certain types of impairments, particularly intellectual and behavioural 
impairments.  To this extent, the thesis identifies a dissonance between education 
policy and practice and suggests that the legislation has not delivered an unfettered 
right to equality of opportunity for people with impairments.  Analysis of 
discrimination in education cases decided under the QADA, and under similar 
legislative regimes in other Australian jurisdictions, demonstrates that respondent 
education institutions have utilised a variety of strategies constructed from the terms 
of the legislation in attempts to defeat claims of discrimination and to defend prima 
facie discriminatory practices.  The thesis analyses the elements of these strategies 
and how they have been promulgated in the cases.  A number of limits on the right to 
equality of opportunity are extrapolated from the cases.  Overt limits arise when 
inclusion of a student with impairment compromises the health and safety of others in 
the education community or has a detrimental effect on the learning environment.  An 
overt limit also arises in respect, particularly, of tertiary institutions which are entitled 
to exclude students who cannot maintain legitimate academic standards.  Another 
overt limit, albeit narrower, is acknowledged when the financial cost of inclusion 
compromises the viability of the education provider or, in some circumstances, 
prejudices other students in the education institution.  The thesis also identifies a 
series of covert limits which, although not made explicit in the cases, may be inferred 
from the reasoning which informs them.  At this level, the financial cost of inclusion 
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may be detected as an issue behind the overt health and safety and learning detriment 
limits identified above.  It appears that courts and tribunals are also less likely to 
recognise a right to inclusion when a student does not take appropriate steps to 
mitigate his or her disability.  Finally, there is some suggestion that a right to a 
mainstream education will not be recognised where a court or tribunal considers there 
to be no objective ‘benefit’ to the student arising from the inclusion.  The thesis 
considers the legitimacy of the limits to equality developed in the cases and of the 
strategies underpinning the limits, in communitarian terms, and in terms of 
contemporary disability theory.  
 
The law as stated in the thesis is current to 28 February 2007. 
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I THE AIM OF THE STUDY 
The education of people with impairments is a contentious issue.  Students and their 
families, teachers and policy makers hold a variety of different views as to the kind of 
education which should be made available.  In respect of the compulsory years of 
education, the primary point of disagreement would appear to be whether people with 
impairments should be educated in a special setting or in their local mainstream 
school.1 In respect of tertiary education, the controversy has been to what extent 
education standards and procedures should be modified to accommodate students with 
impairments.  
 
Recent Queensland education policy has emphasised that an ‘inclusive’ education 
should be made available to students with impairments encompassing both access to a 
regular education in a mainstream classroom and access to the full range of 
educational opportunities open to other citizens.  This policy is informed by a shift in 
the understanding of the nature of disability and of the place of people with 
disabilities in the wider community.  Disability, the social restriction experienced by 
people with impairments, is now widely regarded as, to a large extent, a social 
construction.  Disability flows from the failure of society to accommodate the 
different needs of people with impairments.  To use a simple example, a person with a 
 
1 The term ‘mainstream’ is used as a tag to identify the hundreds of ‘regular’ classrooms in ‘regular’ 
schools which cater to ‘regular’ students. The term ‘regular’, in turn, is used to mean non-segregated or 
mainstream.  The term ‘regular’ is frequently used by educationists to describe non-segregated or 
mainstream schools and classes as distinct from schools and classes with a special purpose or clientele.  
See, for example, Evidence to Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Brisbane, 6 September, 2002, 444 (Dr John Enchelmaier). 
2mobility impairment may be ‘disabled’ from entering a building not because he or she 
uses a wheelchair, but because the building has no wheelchair access.  Moreover, the 
accommodation of people with impairment is now asserted as a rights2 issue rather 
than a welfare issue.  People with impairments claim the same basic rights as people 
without impairments, including a right to educational opportunities.   
 
The terms of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA), it can be argued, have 
been influenced by both the social model of disability and by a perception of 
disability as premised on a rights rather than a welfare discourse.  The Act was 
intended to ‘promote equality of opportunity for everyone by protecting them from 
unfair discrimination in certain areas of activity, including work, education and 
accommodation’.3 Evidence of practice that has accumulated over the 16 years since 
the QADA was enacted, however, suggests that the implementation of ‘inclusive’ 
education policy has not been without problems.  It has met with resistance from 
those charged with providing educational opportunities to students with impairments. 
It has proved particularly difficult to deliver inclusion to students with certain types of 
impairments, particularly intellectual and behavioural impairments. 
 
The aim of this study is to determine whether the QADA has been an effective tool for 
delivering equality of opportunity in education to people with impairments.  
Certainly, students with impairments have used the QADA to challenge what they see 
as their discriminatory exclusion from educational opportunities.  Indeed, the first 
 
2 Here, and throughout the thesis, unless otherwise stated, the use of the term ‘right’ is intended to 
imply its generic, ‘dictionary’ meaning as ‘a benefit or claim entitling a person to be treated in a 
particular way’ and is not intended to imply a meaning consistent with any particular theoretical 
framework. For the adopted definition see Peter Butt (ed), Butterworth’s Concise Australian Legal 
Dictionary (3rd ed, 2004) 381. 
3 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) s 6(1). 
3Australian impairment discrimination case in the education field was a Queensland 
case involving a primary school student with intellectual impairments who had been 
excluded from her mainstream primary school.4 Analysis of discrimination in 
education cases decided under the QADA, and under similar legislative regimes in 
other Australian jurisdictions, suggests that respondent education institutions could 
attempt a variety of strategies constructed from the terms of the legislation both to 
defeat claims of discrimination and to defend prima facie discriminatory practices. 
The thesis considers the utility and legitimacy of these strategies in terms both of 
communitarian thinking, and of contemporary disability theory.  
 
A communitarian context has been adopted as the conceptual framework for this 
study of the effectiveness of the QADA. Communitarianism, while a relatively 
recently badged philosophy, has been embraced by many major political figures of the 
last decade, including Bill Clinton,5 Tony Blair,6 and, it has been more controversially 
suggested, George W Bush.7 On the Australian political stage, communitarian 
rhetoric, emphasising a need to balance individual rights against community welfare, 
emanates from both sides of politics.  Mark Latham, for example, Labor candidate for 
Prime Minister at the 2004 federal election, has explained his communitarian ideals in 
his more serious and influential political writings.8 The communitarian catchphrase 
‘mutual responsibility’ has become identified with many policy initiatives at both the 
 
4 L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 207. 
5 Communitarian theorist William Galston was an adviser to Clinton during his term as President of the 
United States of America. See also, Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Third Way is a triumph’, New Statesman,
(London) (1996), 25 June 2001, 25.  
6 ‘Tony Blair: A Communitarian in the Making?’, The Times (London), 21 June 1997, 20.  
7 Dana Milbank, ‘Needed: Catchword for Bush Ideology; “Communitarianism” Finds Favor’, The 
Washington Post, (Washington), 1 February 2001, A1. See also, Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Third Way is a 
triumph’, New Statesman, (London) (1996), 25 June 2001, 25.  
8 See, for example, Mark Latham, Civilising Global Capital: New Thinking for Australian Labor 
(1998).  
4state and federal level of politics.9 Moreover, in relation, specifically, to education 
policy, there has been a recent emphasis on both ‘values’ and ‘citizenship’ education 
which is clearly aligned with a communitarian emphasis on the citizen’s obligation to 
contribute to the good of society.  In Australia, the Federal Government has passed 
legislation which aims to ensure that a minimum standard of citizenship education is 
provided for all.10 At  the state level, the rhetoric of education for citizenship 
permeates Education Queensland policy documents.11 There is a clear emphasis on 
the development of ‘active and productive citizens in a just and democratic society’.12 
II  THE SCHEME OF THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT 1991 (QLD)
As noted above, the purpose of the QADA is plainly stated.  It is ‘to promote equality 
of opportunity for everyone by protecting them from unfair discrimination in certain 
areas of activity, including work, education and accommodation’.13 The QADA is 
generic as opposed to subject specific anti-discrimination legislation such as the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) or the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). It 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of a variety of protected areas, including 
impairment,14 in a variety of protected areas, including education.15 Impairment is 
generously defined to encompass physical, sensory, intellectual and behavioural 
 
9 Consider, for example, the approach of both the Federal Coalition Government and the Queensland 
Labor Government to indigenous affairs. For a recent news report linking Australian indigenous affairs 
policy to the notion of ‘mutual responsibility’ see Nicolas Rothwell, ‘Remote Control’, The Australian,
September 30, 2006. 
10 See the Schools Assistance (Learning Together – Achievement through Choice and Opportunity) Act 
2004 (Cth) and the companion Schools Assistance (Learning Together – Achievement through Choice 
and Opportunity) Regulation 2005 (Cth) Schedule 1, Part 4.  Federal funding of schools is linked to the 
meeting of performance targets including student performance on assessments of ‘civic knowledge and 
understanding’ and ‘citizenship participation skills and civic values’. 
11 Relevant documents are analysed in Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
12 See Education Queensland, Inclusive Education Statement (2005) < http://education.qld.gov.au/  
studentservices/learning/docs/inclusedstatement2005.pdf> at 12 January 2007. 
13 QADA s 6(1). 
14 QADA s 7(h). 
15 QADA Division 3. 
5impairments.16 The Act acknowledges that discrimination can occur both in the 
enrolment process17 and after a student is enrolled at an education institution.18 
The Act recognises and prohibits two distinct forms of discrimination.19 First, ‘direct’ 
discrimination on the basis of a protected attribute, such as impairment, occurs when a 
person with the protected attribute is treated ‘less favourably’ than a person without 
the protected attribute in ‘circumstances which are the same or not materially 
different’.20 In the context of the education of people with impairments, direct 
discrimination might arise if a person is denied enrolment 21or denied an educational 
opportunity22 on the basis of an impairment. Secondly, ‘indirect’ discrimination arises 
when a condition is imposed upon a person with a protected attribute that he or she 
cannot comply with and a higher proportion of people without the attribute can 
comply.23 These conditions are seldom expressly stated and imposed.  Instead they 
are inferred from the treatment of the person with the protected attribute.  A person 
with a mobility impairment, for example, may not be able to comply with a condition 
that he or she be able to climb steps in order to participate in a graduation ceremony, 
 
16 QADA Schedule Dictionary.  See also Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education 
and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92.  The meaning of ‘impairment’ and the related term ‘disability’ are 
considered in detail in Chapter 5, The Meaning of Disability. 
17 QADA s 38. 
18 QADA s 39. 
19 QADA s 9. 
20 QADA s 10(1). The operation of the direct discrimination provision is further considered in Chapter 
8, Strategies for Exclusion: The Comparator and Chapter 11, Strategies for Exclusion: Less Favourable 
Treatment.  
21 See, for example, the QADA case L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) 
[1995] 1 QADR 207. 
22 See, for example, the QADA case I v O’Rourke and Corinda State High School and Minister for 
Education for Queensland [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) (‘I’). 
23 QADA s 11(1). Indirect discrimination is considered in detail in Chapter 12, Strategies for Exclusion:  
Indirect Discrimination. 
6while a higher proportion of people who have no mobility impairment could climb the 
steps.24 
It should be noted that the Act purports to prohibit only ‘unfair’ discrimination.25 To 
this extent, the Act recognises that there are circumstances where discrimination will 
not be unfair and, therefore, will not be unlawful.  A scheme of exemptions operates 
to excuse prima facie cases of discrimination in circumstances the parliament 
recognises as legitimising the ‘less favourable’ treatment of people with a specified 
protected attribute.26 The most significant exemption relevant to impairment 
discrimination is the unjustifiable hardship exemption.27 An educational authority 
may defeat a claim of discrimination against a person with an impairment by proving 
that to accommodate that person would cause unjustifiable hardship.28 The hardship 
may be financial or merely circumstantial arising from the disruption caused to staff 
or other students by the inclusion of a person with an impairment.29 Similarly, an 
educational institution may defeat a claim of indirect discrimination by proving that a 
prima facie discriminatory condition imposed on a person with impairment is 
‘reasonable’.30 The reasonableness enquiry is into ‘all the relevant circumstances’ 
and involves a balancing of the interests of the community as well as the complainant 
and the respondent.31 
24 See the QADA case Kinsela v Queensland University of Technology [1997] HREOC No H97/4 
(Unreported, Commissioner Atkinson, 27 February 1997). 
25 QADA s 6(1). 
26 QADA exemptions are considered in detail in Chapter 6, Strategies for Exclusion: Exemptions. 
27 See, in relation to the protected area of education, QADA s 44. 
28 QADA ss 5, 44 and 205. 
29 See, for example, the QADA case K v N School (No 3) [1996] 1 QADR 620. 
30 QADA ss 11(1)(c) and 206.  The reasonableness enquiry is considered in detail in Chapter 12, 
Strategies for Exclusion: Indirect Discrimination. 
31 QADA s 11(2) and I [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, President Copelin, 31 January 2001).  See also, 
Elizabeth Dickson, ‘Disability Standards for Education and the Obligation of Reasonable Adjustment’, 
(2006) 11(2) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 23. 
 
7III  LEGAL MATERIALS32 
The primary focus of the thesis is Queensland anti-discrimination legislation and case 
law set in the wider context of Australian discrimination law jurisprudence.  All 
relevant legislation and all available case law from all Australian jurisdictions are 
canvassed for the purpose of highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the QADA 
as a tool for the delivery of equality of opportunity in education to people with 
impairments.  Because of the strong similarities between the terms of the QADA and 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA), the DDA is a constant focus of 
the thesis.  It is important to note, of course, that as federal legislation with Australia-
wide application, the DDA also makes remedies available to Queenslanders 
complaining of discrimination in education, in ‘competition’, perhaps, with the 
QADA.
Where appropriate, and for the purpose not of explaining the law in those places, but 
of illuminating potential deficiencies in the protection of Queensland people with 
disabilities, comparisons have been made between the development of this area of the 
law in Australia and in other similarly situated jurisdictions.  The United Kingdom 
and the United States have proved particularly fruitful sources of contrasting 
approaches to some of the difficult issues which have perplexed Australian legislators 
and judges.  
 
While the United States pioneered anti-discrimination law, generally it approaches the 
education entitlements of people with disabilities through a different matrix.  A right 
for ‘individuals with disabilities’ to a ‘free and appropriate education in the least 
 
32 The law as stated in the thesis is current to 28 February 2007. 
8restrictive environment’ is enshrined in legislation.33 A recurring issue in the thesis is 
the legal response to the inclusion of students with impairment related behavioural 
problems.  It is useful to compare and contrast the approach taken by US legislators 
and courts to this issue with the approach taken in Australia. 
 
The United Kingdom legislated for protection from discrimination in education some 
years after Queensland and had the benefit, perhaps, of considering the development 
of discrimination law jurisprudence in other countries when determining the scope of 
that protection.34 The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) is different in some 
important respects from the relevant Australian legislation.  It creates, for example, a 
positive duty to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ for students with disabilities.35 There 
are also, however, many fundamental similarities with Australian legislation like the 
QADA and, especially in the fact that it is attribute-specific legislation, with the DDA.
It is of particular interest that the similar language of the UK and Australian 
legislation has been interpreted differently by English and Australian courts.  The 
divergence in approach is particularly stark and particularly significant in relation to 
what has proved to be, perhaps, the most controversial issue in Australian 
discrimination law: the nature of the comparator for the purpose of proof of less 
favourable treatment, and, thus, direct discrimination.36 
33 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 2004 20 USC § 1400. 
34 Education was became a protected area in the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) in 2002.  See 
the Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001 (UK). 
35 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) s 28C.  The issue of reasonable adjustment is considered in 
detail in Chapter 7: An Implied Duty of Reasonable Accommodation. 
36 See Chapter 10: The Comparator.  
9IV  THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The body of the thesis is arranged in three sections.  The first section details the 
theoretical context underpinning the evaluation of the effectiveness of the QADA.
The second section considers evidence of the failure of the QADA to deliver equality 
of opportunity in education to people with disabilities.  The third section comprises 
analysis of the various strategies for exclusion of people with disabilities which have 
been constructed from the terms of the QADA.
A The Theory Informing the Thesis 
As noted above, a communitarian context is the general conceptual framework used 
for evaluating the effectiveness of the QADA and other disability discrimination 
legislation. Disability theory, however, is also significant to this evaluation.  The 
operation of the Act is tested against a framework of what communitarians would 
accept as legitimate education policy and practice.  It must also be tested against a 
framework of the appropriate social response to disability. It is interesting also to 
consider Queensland education policy, both for its resonance of communitarian 
rhetoric and of the social model of disability and for the purpose of comparing the 
policy with the reality of what occurs in Queensland education institutions.  
 
1. Chapter 2: Communitarian Education 
In this chapter the communitarian theory of education is explained.  Communitarians 
emphasise the significance of both the ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ curricula of schools in 
the character formation of citizens. The explicit curriculum comprises what is 
formally taught to students in the class room. Communitarians are adamant that all 
people are entitled to explicit instruction in the core knowledge necessary to allow 
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them to function within the community as effective citizens.37 This information will 
vary from community to community but will include both the history of the 
community and its political structure and, importantly, the values shared by the 
community. The implicit curriculum is that which is communicated to students by 
their experience of the way a school is structured and operated. In fact, Etzioni 
regards the ‘experiences school generates’ as more important than the explicit 
curriculum, as the ‘single most important factor that affects education’.38 Ideally, the 
way a school is managed and its enrolment demographics should both model the 
values taught explicitly in that school.  In this context, the values of tolerance and 
inclusivity are particularly important.39 
There is a lack of communitarian writing expressly on the issue of the education rights 
of people with disabilities. Indeed, there is a lack of writing on this issue by authors of 
any theoretical persuasion. The delay of the development of theory in this area is 
attributable to a number of factors. First, the education of people with disabilities has 
only recently come to be treated as a rights rather than as a merely technical issue. 
Secondly, people with disabilities cannot be treated as an homogenous group for the 
purpose of the articulation of policy as each individual’s experience of impairment 
and resulting disability is different.  Finally, it is not advisable, or perhaps, even 
possible, to extrapolate a theory of education for people with disabilities from theories 
developed in relation to other historically ‘oppressed’ groups.  This is because the 
inclusion in mainstream institutions, like education institutions, of people with 
 
37 See, for example, Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 
198, 203; William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State (1991) 
252. 
38 Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda 
(1993)115. 
39 See, for example, Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship 
(1998) 8. 
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disabilities, imposes material costs on the community of a kind which are not imposed 
when people of a particular race, sex or religion are included. Expensive, special 
facilities and services are frequently required to support the inclusion of people with 
disabilities.  
 
A communitarian theory in relation to the education of people with disabilities is 
nevertheless postulated from more general communitarian writing. It is argued that 
communitarians would see people with disabilities as possessing a prima facie right to 
education on the same terms as people without disabilities. This right, however, 
would be required to yield when its exercise threatened the good of the community as 
a whole.   
 
2 Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability 
Over the course of recent decades disability has become a contested term and a 
contested concept. Although many sources use the terms interchangeably, 
‘impairment’ and ‘disability’ are best regarded as having quite distinct meanings. This 
thesis adopts, in respect of these terms, the meanings which have come to be preferred 
by the disability lobby.40 ‘Impairment’ refers to the underlying physical, intellectual 
or psychiatric condition which affects a person.  ‘Disability’ is the social restriction 
which attaches to that condition. It is worth noting that the text of the QADA is 
 
40 See Mike Oliver and Colin Barnes, Disabled People and Social Policy: From Exclusion to Inclusion 
(1998) 13 ff.  Oliver and Barnes provide a thorough summary of the meanings attributed to the terms 
impairment and disability by a variety of institutions including the UN and various organisations 
‘controlled and run by disabled people’. 
12
consistent with this usage of the terms in that it creates ‘impairment’ as the protected 
attribute and defines it in fundamentally medical, technical terms.41 
Different ‘models’ of disability have been postulated to explain the environmental and 
functional restrictions experienced by people with disabilities. While it is not the main 
focus of the present research to identify and to explain these theories, some 
elaboration is necessary because their influence can be detected in both the terms of 
the QADA and in the strategies for exclusion constructed from its terms. With the 
emergence of the disability rights movement came a new and influential model of 
disability. The ‘social model’ of disability locates the source of disability in the failure 
of society to adapt to accommodate the different demands made by different 
impairments. It rejects the view that disability is caused by the failure or the inability 
of a person with an impairment to adapt to their environment.  Under the social 
model, the cause of disability is not an individual person’s deficiency or difference, 
but society’s failure to be flexible, tolerant and inclusive.   Further, the solutions to 
disability are not so much medical and technical as social and political. 
 
An assessment is made of the suitability of the social model for analysis of the QADA 
and of its influence on that legislation. The role of anti-discrimination legislation as a 
tool for compelling a social response to impairment and, thus, towards the elimination 
of disability is also examined. 
 
41 QADA Schedule Dictionary.  Contrast the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) which 
defines ‘disability’ in almost identical terms to the QADA definition of ‘impairment’.  See DDA s 4. 
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3 Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy 
Queensland Education policy has been influenced by both communitarian theory and 
the social model of disability. This chapter examines policy documents which have 
shaped the delivery of education services in Queensland at the time that complaints of 
discrimination against students with impairment began to proliferate.  They set an 
interesting context for the comparison of policy ‘guarantees’ of equal access to 
education services for people with disabilities with what services are  actually 
delivered.42 Legislation is shaped by and reflects government policy and, as such, the 
text of both the QADA and the Education (General Provisions) Act 1986 (Qld)43 are 
scrutinised for evidence of any underpinning policy. What various courts and 
tribunals called upon to interpret the legislation have inferred about its policy is also 
examined.  
 
Perhaps the most significant policy examined in this chapter is the policy revealed in 
the documents generated by the institutions that deliver education services in 
Queensland. Education Queensland, the government department responsible for the 
delivery of such services in Queensland, is the largest provider of those services 
through its state-wide network of schools.  Education Queensland policy documents 
relating to education in general and, specifically, to the education of students with 
disabilities, are readily accessible.  It is more difficult, however, to locate relevant 
policy from the independent school sector.  
 
42 See for a ‘guarantee’ of ‘inclusiveness’ Education Queensland, Queensland State Education 2010 
(2000) (QSE-2010) 13.
43 In late 2006 the Education (General Provisions) Act 1986 (Qld) was replaced by the Education 
(General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld). Most provisions of the new Act came into force on 30 October 
2006. While reference is made to the 2006 Act and comparisons made with the 1986 Act, analysis in 
the thesis focuses primarily on the 1986 Act which provided the legislative context in Queensland at 
the time the education case law discussed in the thesis was developing. 
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An important preliminary point raised in this chapter is that, although education 
policy documents invariably acknowledge that an ‘inclusive’ service is provided, 
what is meant by ‘inclusive’ and related terms is not always clearly articulated. The 
statement that a school or school system is ‘inclusive’ implies that students of 
different sexes, ethnicities, religions and abilities are all to be educated together. It is 
difficult, however, to rely on any promises of inclusion in mainstream schools that 
appear to be offered to students with disabilities in these documents, because the 
terminology of inclusion is used so loosely.  It is deployed to encompass a range of 
enrolment options from ‘full inclusion’ in a mainstream class room to the occasional 
visit to a mainstream campus. There is an inference to be drawn from these 
documents that the ‘fashionable’ rhetoric of inclusion, which has come to be regarded 
as the ‘prevailing orthodoxy’, 44 is exploited as a strategy to improve the ‘image’ of an 
education provider. 
 
B Evidence of the Impact of the Legislation 
1 Chapter 5: The Impact of the Legislation 
This chapter considers a number of different indicators which suggest that the QADA,
and other similar Australian statutes, have not delivered an unfettered right to equality 
of opportunity in education to people with impairments. Perhaps the most persuasive 
evidence of the impact of the legislation lies in the outcomes of the cases brought 
under its authority. Statistical evidence from Education Queensland is also relevant 
for the insight it gives into the enrolment options accessible to people with 
impairments. 
 
44 See Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Education of students with disabilities (2002) (‘Senate Report’).  The Senate Report concluded that 
‘inclusive practices’ have become the ‘prevailing orthodoxy’ in Australia in regard to the education of 
students with disabilities: 29, [3.1]. 
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The education of people with disabilities has been a focus in numerous recent reports. 
Most comprehensive, perhaps, are the reports of the Senate enquiry into the education 
of students with disabilities45 and the Productivity Commission enquiry into the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA).46 Both enquiries took 
comprehensive submissions from education institutions, peak disability groups and 
individuals with disability, and both reports suggest problems with the operation of 
anti-discrimination legislation in Australia.  
 
It is also significant that the Federal Government has acted unilaterally to introduce 
the Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) under the authority of the DDA.47 
The introduction of these standards, which must be met by education institutions in 
order for them to satisfy their obligations under the DDA, is designed to improve 
access to educational opportunities for people with disabilities.  The question is 
whether their introduction implies, therefore, that legislative regimes such as the 
QADA are failing to deliver in this respect. 
 
C Strategies for Exclusion 
The QADA expressly acknowledges that there will be some situations where 
discrimination will be tolerated by creating a scheme of exemptions which, if proved, 
will excuse behaviour which potentially offends the Act.  Respondents in education 
discrimination cases have been quick to invoke the protection of these exemptions.  
They have also, however, attempted numerous other strategies to avoid liability in 
these cases.  Some courts and tribunals, for example, have been invited to find an 
 
45 Ibid. 
46 Productivity Commission, Australian Government, Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 
1992, Report No 30 (2004) (‘PC Review’). 
47 See DDA ss 31-34. 
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implied duty of reasonable accommodation contained in the terms of the QADA and 
similarly, in the DDA. The definitions of impairment and disability have also been 
manipulated in attempts to edit certain classes of impairment from the protective 
scope of the legislation. The elements of both direct and indirect discrimination have 
been scrutinised for loopholes which would allow the discriminatory treatment of 
people with disabilities. 
 
1 Chapter 6: Exemptions 
It is consistent with communitarian theory that individual rights are limited when their 
assertion would jeopardise the well-being of the community. It is potentially, valid, 
therefore, for a scheme of exemptions, such as that found in the QADA, to limit an 
individual’s right to education. While the QADA exemptions are, prima facie, 
informed by a need to protect community interests, this chapter considers whether 
there are problems with their construction and application in the case law and whether 
they have been argued in circumstances outside what would seem to be their intended 
scope.   
 
2 Chapter 7: An Implied Duty of Reasonable Accommodation 
Legislation in similarly situated jurisdictions, such as the United States of America 
and the United Kingdom, places a positive duty on education institutions to take 
reasonable steps to accommodate students with impairments.48 There is no similar 
duty expressly contained in the terms of any of the Australian anti-discrimination 
statutes.49 This chapter investigates whether such a duty may nevertheless be inferred 
from the terms of such legislation. It also explores whether a duty of reasonable 
 
48 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 2004 20 USC § 1400; Education Act 1996 (UK) s 316. 
49 Or, indeed, in the terms of any Australian education act. 
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accommodation may operate as a shield as well as a sword in the context of 
discrimination law disputes.  
3 Chapter 8: The Definition of Impairment 
A dramatic challenge to liability for discriminatory treatment of students with 
impairments has been to argue that the treatment has not been because of any 
impairment recognised by anti-discrimination legislation.  This strategy was 
promulgated in what has proved, perhaps, to be the most significant Australian anti-
discrimination litigation in the field of education to date, the Purvis case.50 In that 
case, the complainant exhibited problem behaviour caused by a brain damage.  
Nevertheless, it was argued that the behaviour was not part of his ‘disability’ for the 
purpose of the legislation. This chapter scrutinises the authenticity and 
appropriateness of this strategy in the contexts, particularly, of the stated purpose of 
anti-discrimination legislation and of disability theory.  
 
4 Chapter 9: The Comparator 
Proof of direct discrimination requires evidence of less favourable treatment.51 This 
necessitates a comparison of the treatment of the complainant with the treatment of 
another person, a ‘comparator’, without the complainant’s impairment. Great 
controversy has surrounded the issue of the nature of the required comparison when 
the complainant has been excluded from some opportunity as a result of problem 
behaviour caused by impairment.  This chapter examines the approach taken by the 
 
50 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117; New 
South Wales (Department of Education) v Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (2001) 
186 ALR 69 (Federal Court); Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) 
(2002) 117 FCR 237 (Full Court of the Federal Court); Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department 
of Education and Training) (2004) 217 CLR 92. 
51 See, for example, QADA s 10 (1), DDA s 5(1). 
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courts to the construction of the comparator and the ramifications of that approach for 
the remedial scope of Australian anti-discrimination legislation. 
 
5 Chapter 10: Causation 
Several strategies for exclusion have been extrapolated from the requirement that 
there be a causal link between the impairment of a complainant and his or her less 
favourable treatment.  It has sometimes been possible to prove, for example, that any 
detriment suffered by a complainant has been caused by the nature of his or her 
impairment and not by the respondent’s treatment.52 This chapter considers whether 
the success of this strategy reveals a problem with the social model of disability which 
explains disability as resulting from institutional failure to accommodate difference.  
 
Other causation-related strategies for exclusion, explored in this chapter, like the 
comparator strategy, depend on a problematic teasing out of the complainant’s 
behaviour as a factor separate from his or her impairment. Can it be legitimately 
argued that the complainant’s treatment was not ‘on the ground’ of impairment but of 
the behaviour related to it? Another controversial situation has arisen when a 
respondent is aware of the complainant’s behaviour but not of the impairment which 
causes it. Can it be said in that situation that less favourable treatment caused by 
behaviour is also caused by the undisclosed impairment? 
 
52 See, for example, A School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 55 ALD 93; 
Brackenreg v Queensland University of Technology [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 
December 1999), Chung v University of Sydney [2001] FMCA 94 (Unreported, Driver FM, 20 
September 2001), Reyes-Gonzalez v NSW TAFE Commission [2003] NSWADT 22 (Unreported, 
Ireland J, Members Silva and Strickland, 3 February 2003). 
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Arguments about motive and intention have also been important.  While the QADA 
expressly provides that motive is not relevant to the determination of discrimination, 
this chapter examines whether it is, nevertheless, relevant to proof of a causal link 
between impairment and treatment.  
 
6 Chapter 11: Less Favourable Treatment 
In an argument that seems to oppose the policy of inclusion, respondents in several 
Queensland cases have asserted that complainants excluded from their mainstream 
schools have not been treated less favourably than other students.53 Respondents have 
claimed that the treatment of those students has, rather, been ‘individualised’ 
treatment, the ‘best’ treatment or even ‘more favourable’ treatment, in that special 
services and facilities have been offered to them at special schools.54 This chapter 
investigates what argument of this kind suggests about litigants’ views of the nature 
and purpose of education, and how these views fit with the communitarian conceptual 
framework of the nature and purpose of education.  
 
7 Chapter 12: Indirect Discrimination 
Indirect discrimination is explicitly limited in scope in that it must be ‘not reasonable’ 
before it will be prohibited by the legislation.  The reasonableness enquiry involves 
consideration of all the relevant circumstances including the impact on the 
complainant of allowing the discrimination and on the community of removing the 
discrimination.  This chapter examines how the reasonableness enquiry has affected 
the educational opportunities of people with disabilities.  A further focus of this 
 
53 See, for example, L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 
207, P v Director-General, Department of Education [1995] 1 QADR 755. 
54 All three arguments were advanced in P v Director-General, Department of Education [1995] 1 
QADR 755. 
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chapter, however, is whether technical aspects of proof of indirect discrimination, 
such as proof of the imposition of a ‘term’ and of inability to comply with that term, 
have been manipulated as strategies to deny liability. 
 
8 Chapter 13: Conclusion 
The final chapter addresses the question upon which the thesis is based: is the QADA 
an effective tool towards delivery of equality of opportunity to Queensland people 
with impairments? Limits to equality of opportunity are extrapolated from the case 
law and their legitimacy tested against the frameworks of communitarianism and 
disability theory. Consideration is given to whether strategies for exclusion adopted 
by litigants have undermined the purpose of disability discrimination law and whether 
law reform is required so that the QADA may more effectively serve the people with 
impairments it promises to protect 
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CHAPTER 2 
COMMUNITARIAN EDUCATION 
 
In order to contextualise an examination of the effectiveness of the QADA in 
delivering equality of opportunity in education to students with disabilities, the 
theoretical framework of a communitarian view of the purpose and function of 
education will be adopted. The fundamental purpose of this chapter is to outline that 
communitarian view.  An attempt is also made to explain the lack of clearly 
developed and articulated theory in relation to the education entitlements of people 
with disabilities. A communitarian theory of those entitlements is then postulated. 
 
I COMMUNITARIAN THEORY OF EDUCATION 
Communitarians regard the school1 as one of the most significant social institutions.  
The school is a community within a community.  It is both a microcosm of the wider 
community and a place of transition from the family to the wider community.  If 
schools fill the intermediate space between family and society, they fill also the 
intermediate time between infancy and adulthood.2 Members of society spend their 
childhood, adolescence and, often, early adulthood in schools.  Indeed, contact with 
schools begins increasingly early as large numbers of children attend preschools and 
childcare centres with both explicit and implicit education programmes.  Contact with 
schools also lasts increasingly longer as governments emphasise the retention of 
students to Year Twelve as an indicator of the State’s commitment to and success in 
 
1The term ‘school’ is used generically to encompass the range of education institutions from pre- to 
post-compulsory education. The role of the tertiary education institution is, however, considered 
explicitly at Part I C, below. 
2 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 198. 
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educating its citizens.  Further, many students are embracing what Australian 
communitarian and former federal Opposition Leader, Mark Latham, in his more 
substantial political writings, sees as the future of education - ‘life-long learning’ - 
thus extending their exposure to education institutions well into adulthood.3
Etzioni articulates a common but controversial communitarian belief that families, 
generally, have abandoned their traditional role of imparting character and morality to 
children.  Families have been disempowered and impoverished by divorce, by 
demanding workplaces and by the drive for individual achievement. They ‘have been 
dismembered, or the parents are overworked or consumed by other concerns and 
ambitions’.4 Schools, therefore, must fill the void and teach the lessons once taught 
by parents and community elders: ‘If the moral infrastructure of our communities is to 
be restored, schools will have to step in where families, neighbourhoods and religious 
institutions have been failing’.5 Schools, therefore, have the primary responsibility – 
above family, above neighbourhood, above church – for building citizens who are 
equipped to create a strong, free, democratic society. 
 
Schools of every kind have this responsibility: ‘all educational institutions from 
playgroups and nurseries to schools and universities need to accept that they have a 
vital responsibility for the character formation of the young’.6 Communitarians 
regard education as the co-operative responsibility of the whole community – not just 
 
3 Mark Latham, Civilising Global Capital: New Thinking for Australian Labor (1998). Latham 
expounds a communitarian philosophy in an Australian context. 
4 Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda 
(1993) 89. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship (1998) 8. 
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of teachers or of the government.  Tam envisages the school as a hub of community 
action and interaction: 
In conjunction with family centres, schools should also provide a focal point for 
community action.  Parents and their children should have the opportunity to experience 
with other families diverse approaches to improving their communities’ way of life… 
 
Community groups should operate through schools to identify and target support 
towards those who are most in need of their help.  School grounds provide a 
common meeting place for families to give each other support. 7 
Communitarianism is, perhaps, still to reach the point where it could be described as a 
coherent philosophy.  Etzioni claims to have ‘invented’ communitarianism a mere 
decade ago: ‘We adopted the name Communitarianism to emphasise that the time had 
come to attend to our responsibilities to the conditions and elements we all share, to 
the community’.8 Its roots can be traced back centuries, however, to the philosophy 
of Aristotle.9 More recent roots can be traced to the writings of prominent American 
philosopher, John Dewey.10 However, while communitarianism may still be 
evolving, common themes on the role of schools are repeated in the writings of 
individual communitarian theorists.  There are, perhaps, two dominant theories.  First, 
schools have an explicit role of teaching students the practical and moral information 
they need to function as citizens.  Secondly, schools have an implicit role of 
modelling to students the structure and shape of democratic society. 
 
Communitarians see social reform not as a revolutionary but as an evolutionary 
process.  The education policy and practice they advocate may not bring instant 
improvement but will deliver results as today’s children mature to virtuous adulthood: 
 
7 Ibid 201. 
8 Etzioni, above n 4, 15. 
9 Eg Walzer, above n 2, 179; Markate Daly, Communitarianism: A New Public Ethics (1994) xiii. 
10 Eg Walzer, above n 2, 179; Daly, above n 9, 154ff. 
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‘The purpose of such actions is to help to develop the next generation as responsible 
citizens even if it is too late for some members of the present generation’.11 
A The Explicit Role of the School 
Communitarians repeatedly refer to two kinds of knowledge which must be an 
element of the explicit curriculum of the school.  The first of these is the ‘common 
knowledge’ needed by citizens to belong to and to function effectively within the 
community.  The second is perhaps a subset of the first, the core values of the 
community. 
 
1 Citizenship Education 
Communitarians regard it as right that a community secure its own future by 
introducing new members to the core knowledge which unites and distinguishes that 
community.  Responsibility for determining the scope and content of this core 
knowledge lies, presumably, with the State as the ‘community’ within which all 
smaller communities ‘nest’.  In Queensland the core curriculum which must be 
studied in all recognised education institutions from pre-school to year twelve is 
determined by the State.12 Communitarians, while insisting that core knowledge must 
be identified and passed on from generation to generation, do not spell out in specific 
detail the content of that core knowledge.  It is right, perhaps, that they do not, for the 
details will surely vary from State to State, from region to region, even from 
community to community. 
 
11 Tam, above n 6, 76. 
12 It should be noted, however, that the Federal Government has displayed increasing interest in 
influencing the content and administration of the core curriculum and particularly in respect of values 
education.  See Schools Assistance (Learning Together through Choice and Opportunity) Act 2004 
(Cth).  Via this act and associated regulations, which are presently in draft form only, the adoption of 
core values strategies by individual schools has been made a pre-requisite to federal funding.  
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Walzer insists that ‘simple equality’ demands that all future citizens need an 
education.  Further, students must learn to be ‘citizens first’.  Any differences in the 
treatment of students related to their different destinations in life – worker, manager, 
professional – should be postponed until ‘shared knowledge’ of the information 
‘citizens need to know’ is achieved: ‘Everyone studies the subjects that citizens need 
to know’.13 The goal of teachers here is not to provide equal chances but to achieve 
equal results.  Mastery of the subject matter is crucial: ‘common work’ for a ‘common 
end’.14 Walzer admits, however, that it is not at all clear just how long it takes to 
learn one’s ‘social catechism’ or what knowledge is included in ‘knowing one’s way 
around a modern city’.15 Required knowledge does include, however, ‘the history and 
law of their country’.16 
Galston describes civic education as ‘the formation of individuals who can effectively 
conduct their lives within, and support, their political community’.17 Civic education 
cannot be ‘homogeneous and universal’: ‘It is, by definition, education within, and on 
behalf of a particular political order’.18 Galston claims that civic education is based 
more on rhetoric than on rationality.  The aim of such education is the creation of 
citizens who embrace, perhaps without question, core knowledge as ‘valid and 
binding’.19 According to Galston, the responsibility, indeed the right, of the state is to 
pass on this core knowledge even if it is at odds with parental beliefs.20 
13 Walzer, above n 2, 203. 
14 Ibid 206. 
15 Ibid 207. 
16 Ibid 215; William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State 
(1991) 252. 
17 Ibid 243. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid 244. 
20 Ibid 252. 
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Mark Latham, speaking as a political theorist rather than as a politician, echoes 
communitarian rhetoric in an Australian voice.  He opines that the state must give its 
people, via education, a ‘platform of citizenship on which to stand’, a platform from 
which they can pursue economic and social opportunity and freedom.21 The ‘platform 
of citizenship’ supports, however, not only individual opportunity and freedom but 
also collective wellbeing. The ‘quality and equality’ of our society and, indeed, the 
‘capability’ of the nation, are threatened when people do not learn the core knowledge 
which underpins ‘social connectedness’.22 
For writers such as Walzer, Galston, Tam and Latham, mastery of core knowledge is 
a pre-requisite for citizenship.  Through inculcation of this core knowledge, the state 
not only ‘reproduces’ itself, it also produces citizens who both belong to society, in 
that they share knowledge of its history and adopt its key beliefs, and are equipped to 
participate in and to contribute to community life. 
 
2 Values Education 
Values education is an aspect of education for citizenship – shared principles are 
integral to shared citizenship.23 Communitarians, dispelling fear that the articulation 
and inculcation of core values is exclusionary and authoritarian, insist that it is both 
possible to identify values which are common across cultures, which prevail ‘beyond 
all our differences’,24 and to impart those values without infringing essential 
freedoms. 
 
21 Latham, above n 3, xi. 
22 Ibid xii. 
23 Galston, above n 16, 245. 
24 Ibid. 
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Communitarians seem less reluctant to spell out the values that ought to be taught 
than the rest of the content of core knowledge.  The Responsive Communitarian 
Platform – a document drafted by Etzioni, Galston, Glendon and supported by many 
other prominent communitarians – spells out the ‘values Americans share’ and which 
schools ‘ought to teach’: 
 … that the dignity of all persons ought to be respected, that tolerance is a virtue and 
discrimination abhorrent, that peaceful resolution of conflicts is superior to violence, 
that generally truth telling is morally superior to lying, that democratic government is 
morally superior to totalitarianism and authoritarianism, that we ought to give a day’s 
work for a day’s pay, that saving for one’s own and one’s country’s future is better 
than squandering one’s income and relying on others to attend to one’s future needs.25 
Supporters of the platform dismiss as ‘farfetched’ the ‘fear that our children will be 
“brainwashed” by a few educators’.26 
Tam, writing from a British perspective, distils from a decade of communitarian 
thinking four key values: love and compassion for others, the critical quest for truth, 
the pursuit of fairness and personal fulfilment.  Tam regularly uses the ‘shorthand’ 
terms: love, wisdom, justice and fulfilment.27 Tam addresses ‘the myth that the 
teaching of common values must involve authoritative assumptions’.28 He advocates 
teaching methods which involve ‘co-operative inquiry’ into, and the modelling of, 
principled behaviour as superior alternatives to authoritarian ‘chalk and talk’.29 
Analysts of communitarian thinking have also attempted to identify and enumerate 
communitarian values.  Frazer, for example, compiled a useful list of what she claims 
 
25 Etzioni, above n 4, 258-9. 
26 Ibid 259. 
27 See for example, Tam, above n 6, 15, 59-62, 234-5. 
28 Ibid 66. 
29 Ibid. 
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to be ‘communitarian values’ for a NUD.IST30 analysis of ‘the corpus of “political 
communitarianism”’.31 The analysis was conducted as a research strategy in the 
preparation of her critique, The Problems of Communitarian Politics. Frazer 
distinguishes ‘political’ communitarians such as Etzioni and Tam from ‘philosopher’ 
communitarians such as those involved in the ‘liberal v communitarian debate’, for 
example Walzer and MacIntyre.32 Frazer’s list of communitarian values is as follows: 
‘civic spirit, solidarity, equality, democracy, voluntary service, social capital, 
common good, participation, political power, cleanliness, responsibility, self-
discipline, mutuality’.33 
Supporters of the Communitarian Platform and Tam identify a lack of values in 
education as dangerous.34 Galston reiterates what he claims to be a ‘basic fact of 
liberal sociology’: ‘the greatest threat to children in modern liberal societies is not that 
they will believe in something too deeply, but that they will believe in nothing very 
deeply at all’.35 An absence of overt values education does not mean an absence of 
values education altogether.  No individual, no social institution is morally neutral.  
Each person, each organisation, each administration reveals a moral code – or lack of 
it – through behaviour tolerated, decisions made, actions taken. The Responsive 
Community Platform is clear on this theme: 
 In effect, the whole school should be considered a set of experiences 
generating situations in which young people learn the values either of civility, 
 
30 NUD.IST is a computer software program which is used to analyse text and data.  It allows 
researchers to identify the incidences in text of a particular word or phrase. The program was 
developed by Sage Publications Software and is distributed by Scolari. NUD.IST is an acronym for 
non-numerical unstructured data indexing searching and theorizing.  
31 Elizabeth Frazer, The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict (1998) 246.  
32 Daly, above n 9, xi. Note that MacIntyre is reluctant to align his philosophy with communitarianism:  
see, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘I’m not a communitarian but…’ (1991) 1(3) The Responsive 
Community, 91. 
33 Frazer, above n 31, 249. 
34 Etzioni, above n 4, 259; Tam, above n 6, 57. 
35 Galston, above n 16, 255. 
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sharing, and responsibility to the common good or of cheating, cut-throat 
competition and total self-absorption. 36 
The values education implicit in the ‘set of experiences’ which is school will be 
considered in detail below.37 
Values education need not be a discrete subject within the school curriculum.  Values 
can be taught and learned across the curriculum; explanation and discussion of values 
can be integrated into every existing subject.  It should not matter, therefore, which 
subjects students are interested in, which subjects they choose to study.38 
It could be argued that the immersion of the curriculum in values in this fashion better 
represents the role of values as underpinning a community’s way of life.  Values 
become a part of every aspect of learning and of life, not simply a separate ‘subject’ 
to be timetabled into the busy individual’s schedule. 
 
B Implicit Content of Schooling 
Communitarians regard the school culture as imparting important lessons to students.  
These lessons are not studied, rather they are absorbed, simply by ‘being’ at school.  
Etzioni, for example, regards the ‘experiences school generates’ as the ‘single most 
important factor that affects education’, placing it above both the explicit curriculum 
and teaching strategies.39 Experiences, says Etzioni, are ‘more effective teachers than 
lectures’.40 Walzer makes a similar claim: ‘the content of the curriculum is probably 
 
36 Etzioni, above n 4, 259. 
37 See Part I B. 
38 Tam, above n 6, 59. 
39 Etzioni, above n 4, 115. 
40 Ibid 103. 
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less important that the environment in which it is taught’.41 Latham explains that 
schools are institutions where students learn not only from teachers but also from their 
interactions with each other.  He argues that people are more likely to learn ‘right and 
wrong’ from each other than from ‘the top-down creation of public laws’.42 
Schools have the opportunity to model the democratic community for students in two 
ways: first, how a school is managed can model core democratic values in action; 
secondly, the demographic structure of a school can model the inclusive nature of 
democratic society. 
 
1 School Management 
Etzioni argues the first step in enhancing the role of the school as a ‘moral educator’ 
is to ‘increase the awareness and analysis of the school as a set of experiences’.43 His 
implication is that the school culture should not simply evolve, it should be 
deliberately constructed.  While students may learn lessons from school management 
unconsciously, those lessons should be consciously formulated: 
Ideally, the teachers and principals of each school should at least once every three 
years engage in an extensive ‘retreat’.  Here they would spend a weekend, in some 
secluded place, drawing on professional facilitators, examine the experiences their 
school generates.  They would agree to set aside cognitive questions about the 
curriculum… and focus on one question: what experiences do we fashion? 44 
Schools, says Etzioni, are not simply ‘a collection of teachers, pupils, classrooms and 
curricula’.45 What happens in the car parks, cafeterias and corridors is an equally 
 
41 Walzer, above n 2, 215; Tam, too, makes this point, above n 6, 63. 
42 Latham, above n 3, 307. 
43 Etzioni, above n 4, 105. 
44 Ibid 106-7. 
45 Ibid 105. 
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important ingredient of the education experience. The school must maintain fairness 
and discipline in those places as well as in the classroom. 
 
Students will thus be given a consistent message of the importance of self-discipline 
and of respect for others.  Etzioni is particularly critical of schools which treat 
students as mini-adults who are ‘pleased’ rather than ‘cultivated’ or ‘enriched’.47 
There is an implied criticism of extreme liberalism here, of the ‘I’m OK, you’re OK’ 
approach to life choices which communitarians regard as having undermined the 
moral substructure of society.  Students must be shown, fearlessly, that there are 
‘rules’ and that not all behaviour is tolerable.  Tam is equally critical of tolerance of 
‘do-as-you please individualism’: 
In the absence of any consistent guidance about what is to be done for the good of all, 
the young could easily grow up with the impression that one choice is as good as 
another and that in making their choices they do not owe a duty to the wider 
community.48 
A school can identify particular lessons which need to be imparted and manipulate the 
school environment to enhance that lesson.  In this way the implicit curriculum can be 
made to support the explicit curriculum.  Etzioni cites the famous ‘blue-eye/brown-
eye’ experiment conducted by Iowa teacher, Jane Elliott, in 1968, to explain how 
experiences can be deliberately generated to teach important lessons.49 While Elliot’s 
lesson was conducted in the classroom, similar lessons can be deliberately generated 
outside the classroom.  Etzioni gives his own example of how ‘self imposed ghetto 
 
47 Ibid. 
48 Tam, above n 6, 59. 
49 Etzioni, above n 4, 157.  in response to the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jane Elliott exposed 
her students to experience as a ‘minority group’ by conducting a class room experiment where her 
students were labelled and treated as inferior or superior according to eye colour.  For further detail see 
Jane Elliott’s Blue Eyes Brown Eyes Exercise <http://www.janeelliott.com> at 13 January 2007. 
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like behaviour’ by different racial groups within a school can be combated by the 
planning of interracial activities, meetings and events: ‘whatever the school tries, it 
should be aware that its actions, and the experiences they generate, go further in 
affecting the moral conduct of the students than most lectures or exhortations’.50 
Etzioni suggests that students should also be encouraged to examine their behaviour 
with a view to understanding and then improving it.  Another coincidence of the 
explicit and implicit curricula occurs here.  For Tam, such coincidence is ideal.  The 
‘real challenge’ of moral education, according to Tam, is ‘to enable pupils to develop 
the skills and confidence in exploring how these [values] are best realised in 
practice’.51 
Although theorists such as Etzioni and Tam do not spell it out, the clear implication is 
that there should be a high degree of conformity between the explicit and implicit 
moral lessons learned at school.  If what happens at a school is not consistent with the 
moral code expressly advanced by that school, then the only ‘values’ lessons learned 
by students will be, first, cynicism and, secondly, that there is no coherent moral order 
which informs the community. 
2 School Demographics 
Democratic society purports to be inclusive.  Communitarians insist that democratic 
schools should, similarly, be inclusive.  The role of the school is not merely to mirror 
the community at large, however.  The school has the opportunity to model inclusive 
policies and practices to the broader community, teaching both students and their 
parents that such policies and practices are essential in a genuine democracy. 
 
50 Ibid 107. 
51 Tam, above n 6, 60. 
33
The rationale for inclusion is not only that it is just.  Inclusion enables both the 
experience of collective action and the personal growth necessary to develop as an 
effective citizen: 
Inclusive communities enable all members to participate in the collective processes 
affecting their lives … Human beings need to relate to others on a substantial basis to 
develop their experience of love, collaboration in the discovery of truths, establish 
justice and expand their opportunities for genuine fulfilment.  Only inclusive 
communities which respect their members as having equal shares of the overall 
power for determining collective action, and welcome their exercise of that power, 
can ensure that what people need for common life will be sustained in practice.52 
Tam asserts than an inclusive community would not tolerate schools which 
encouraged or even allowed ‘supremacy’ in access to education based on ‘wealth, 
race, religion, sex, or any form of group allegiance’.53 Further, it is vital that citizens 
learn to work together.  As such, ‘differentiation according to a narrow range of 
academic abilities would produce citizens who are ill at ease with co-operating with 
others who possess different skills and abilities’.54 Inclusive schooling, therefore, is 
both just and a training for citizenship. 
 
Walzer stresses the characteristic normative structure of the education process, 
emphasising that ‘education distributes to individuals not only their futures but their 
presents as well’.55 If students – in their present – are to belong to and be accepted in 
the community they must be accepted in school as well.  The structure of the school 
is, however, a potent agent for reform of the structure of society.  Walzer refers to 
Dewey’s notion of the school as a ‘special social environment’ protected – to some 
extent – from external social and economic pressures.56 The school has the 
 
52 Ibid 8. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Walzer, above n 2, 198. 
56 Ibid 199. 
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opportunity to organise itself according to principles of equality and the power to 
model equality as a desirable social good. 
 
For Walzer ‘simple equality’ is not the ultimate goal but a good basis for building true 
social justice, ‘complex equality’.  For Walzer, ‘simple equality’ in the ‘sphere’ of 
education is achieved by the provision of equal access to education for all: ‘The 
simple equality of students is relative to the simple equality of citizens: one 
person/one vote, one child/one place in the educational system’.57 
The embedding of the school in the neighbourhood is also acknowledged as important 
by Walzer.  In principle ‘neighbourhoods have no admission policies’.58 Moreover, 
when a community comes to regard a school as its own, ‘its existence may serve to 
heighten feelings of community’.59 Walzer draws the following conclusion: ‘The 
democratic school, then, should be an enclosure within a neighbourhood, a special 
environment within a known world where children are brought together as students 
exactly as they will one day come together as citizens’.60 Walzer admits that no 
educational system can ever be the ‘same for all’61 and that ‘neighbourhood schools 
will never be the same across different neighbourhoods’.62 As such, the simple 
equality of ‘one child/one place in the education system’ is not the end of the story of 
justice in the sphere of education, but it is, nevertheless, a good start: 
 
57 Ibid 202-3. 
58 Ibid 224. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid 225. 
61 Ibid 202. 
62 Ibid 225. 
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… I think it is fair to say that when neighbourhoods are open (when racial or 
ethnic identity is not dominant given membership and place) and when every 
neighbourhood has its own strong school, that justice has been done. 63 
C Tertiary Education 
The function of tertiary education institutions within a communitarian education 
system is not clearly explained by communitarian theorists.  It is possible, however, to 
postulate from other more general education writings the proposition that some form 
of specialisation requiring some form of legitimate selection process is acceptable at 
the tertiary level. 
 
McIntyre identifies one of the major roles of modern education systems to be ‘to fit 
the young person for some particular role and occupation in the social system’64 and 
this view would seem to strike a chord with current expectations of the tertiary 
education sector held by government, employers and even, or perhaps especially, 
students. Similarly, Walzer acknowledges that some students are better suited to a 
more ‘specialised education’.65 Indeed, he claims that as the community needs 
‘leaders’, there is a ‘need for a selection process aimed at locating within the set of 
future citizens, a subset of future experts’.66 Walzer sees such ‘specialised education’ 
as a kind of ‘office’ to be earned.  It is the ‘monopoly of the talented’ but, 
nevertheless, a ‘legitimate’ monopoly.67 Walzer counsels, however, that the early 
identification of future ‘specialists’ and the ‘tracking’ of them through the education 
 
63 Ibid. 
64 Alasdair MacIntyre et al, Education and Values: the Richard Peters Lectures (1987) 17. 
65 Walzer, above n 2, 208-220. 
66 Ibid 208. 
67 Ibid 211. 
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system should be avoided.68 This is for two clearly ‘communitarian’ reasons: first, 
education as a citizen must come first: ‘if the community that one wants to defend is a 
democracy … no form of recruitment can precede the ‘recruitment’ of citizens’.69 
Secondly, to ‘pick out the future specialists early on’ denies others the ‘chance at 
inspiration’.70 An inclusive foundation of citizenship education for all, of ‘common 
work for a common end’, therefore, must precede ‘specialised education’.  It can be 
postulated, then, that if specialisation and the skilling up of ‘experts’ is to be delayed, 
its appearance is most appropriate at the tertiary level of post-compulsory education 
by which time there has been maximum exposure for all to the essential lessons of 
citizenship.  
 
Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler and Tipton, however, are suspicious that too close 
a focus on academic achievement has undermined the American schools’ role in 
education for citizenship: ‘on the whole Americans have done better in developing 
their educational resources for the transmission of specialised knowledge and skills 
than they have for citizenship’.71 They are critical of the competitive American 
approach to education, an approach which resonates in Australia:  
Life … is a competitive race to acquire the objective markers (College Boards, 
admission to the right school, GPA, LSAT, advanced degree, entry into the right 
organisation, promotion to high-echelon positions) that give access to all the good 
things that make life worthwhile (attractiveness to a desirable mate, purchase of an 
appropriate home, American Express gold card, vacations in Europe).72 
The authors’ ironic words reinforce the clear implication that obsession with the 
‘competitive race’ comes at the cost of a life with ‘larger moral meaning’ and of 
 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid 220. 
71 Robert Bellah et al, The Good Society (1991) 175. 
72 Ibid 436. 
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‘contribution to the common good’.73 It is notable that they suggest that 
institutionalised obsession with academic achievement threatens not only the 
socialisation of the intellectually ‘feeble’ via their exclusion, but also the socialisation 
of the intellectually ‘strong’ by blinding them to the moral dimension of their actions.   
 
Bellah, and his co-authors, insist that even at – perhaps particularly at – the university 
level, ‘education can never merely be for the sake of individual self-enhancement.  It 
pulls us in to the common world or it fails altogether’.74 Change must occur 
‘particularly in our economic and government institutions’ which ‘show that we 
understand education less obsessively in terms of ‘infrastructure for competition’ and 
more as an invaluable resource in the search for the common good’.75 While for 
Walzer, then, citizenship education provides a common foundation which precedes 
the ‘office’ of ‘specialised education’ for future ‘experts’, for Bellah and his co-
authors, citizenship education is an imperative which must be paramount throughout 
all levels of education. 
 
II  THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE RIGHT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES TO AN 
INCLUSIVE EDUCATION 
While communitarians have written prolifically and specifically on the role of 
education in the community and on the role of the school in providing education, they 
have produced little on the specific issue of education for people with disabilities.  
This lack of theory is not a deficiency of communitarianism alone.  There is little 
explicit description of the education entitlements of people with disabilities or 
analysis of the theoretical basis for such an entitlement provided by any school of 
 
73 Ibid 43. 
74 Ibid 176. 
75 Ibid 175. 
38
philosophy.76 By contrast there appears to be almost universal acknowledgement, at 
the level of education policy, of a ‘right’ to inclusion in mainstream classes for people 
with disabilities.77 As the moral basis of this right, however, is not articulated, it 
could be argued that policy amounts to little more than what Barton calls ‘romantic 
visions and idealistic rhetoric’78 and what Slee calls ‘fashionably inclusive 
discourse’.79 Further, the term ‘inclusion’ is itself vague, subject to different 
interpretations to match different policy agenda.80 
It is clear that education for people with disabilities is a complex issue which requires 
a considered theoretical response.  The formulation of a considered response, 
however, has been hindered by a variety of historical, political and definitional 
factors. 
 
People with disabilities are, perhaps, the last historically oppressed group to assert a 
right to ‘social justice’.  Indeed, it was not until the 1980s that the claim of oppression 
was made. It was not until then that people with disabilities began to group as a 
political force, demanding self-determination and control of the policy and research 
agenda relating to disability issues.81 Before the emergence of the ‘politics of 
 
76 Fazal Rizvi and Bob Lingard, ‘Disability, education and the discourses of justice’ in Carol 
Christensen and Fazal Rizvi (eds), Disability and the Dilemmas of Education and Justice (1996) 9, 23.  
77 Inclusion policy in the Queensland context will be considered in Chapter 4: Queensland Education 
Policy. 
78 Len Barton, ‘Disability and the Necessity for a Socio-Political Perspective’ in Len Barton, Keith 
Ballard and Gillian Fulcher (eds), Disability and the Necessity for a Socio-Political Perspective (1992) 
2.  
79Roger Slee, ‘Special education and human rights in Australia: How do we know about disablement, 
and what does it mean for educators?’ in Felicity Armstrong and Len Barton (eds), Disability, Human 
rights and Education: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (1999) 125. 
80 For analysis of the different readings of ‘inclusion’ and related terms see Part I, Chapter 4: 
Queensland Education Policy. 
81 Jane Campbell and Mike Oliver, Disability Politics: Understanding our past, changing our future 
(1996); Mike Clear (ed) Promises Promises: Disability and Terms of Inclusion (2000). 
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disablement’82 the disability sector was dominated by charity organisations and 
disability policy was dominated by a charity rather than a rights discourse.  Provision 
for people with disabilities was predicated on the benevolence of society rather than 
on the rights of individuals.83 
The dominance of the ‘medical model’ of disability,84 whereby disability is 
constructed as an individual problem growing from an individual pathology, a 
problem to be solved via expert diagnosis and treatment, reinforced the benevolent 
charity approach to people with disabilities. Under this model, disability is seen as 
confined to the medical/technical arena and excluded from the rights arena. 
 
Slee85 argues that not only educators, but also ‘middle Australia’, persist in seeing 
educational disablement as a ‘technical’ issue rather than as a human rights issue and, 
as a result, the claims of people with disabilities continue to fail to have an impact on 
Australia’s political agenda. Slee highlights one aspect of ‘middle Australia’ which 
has, perhaps, contributed to a delay in the recognition of rights for people with 
disabilities – ignorance about disability.  A powerful mythology surrounds disability.  
On the one hand there is the image of the ‘hero’ triumphing over adversity to succeed 
in the ‘normal’ world.  Campbell, ironically, calls this the image of the ‘super crip’.86 
On the other hand, there is the image of the victim of a cruel fate who is to be, at best, 
pitied, or, at worst, feared and avoided. The public has relegated responsibility for 
 
82Oliver coined this phrase as the title of his book which postulates disability as oppression: Mike 
Oliver, The Politics of Disablement (1990). 
83 For more detailed analysis of disability policy see Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
84 Different models of disability and their implications are analysed in Part II, Chapter 3: The Meaning 
of Disability. 
85 Slee, above n 79, 121. 
86 Campbell, an activist for rights for people with disabilities in Britain, is, herself, a person with a 
disability.  
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people with disabilities to ‘experts’ for so long that there is a profound ignorance in 
the general community of the interests of people with disabilities. Community 
attitudes are informed by stereotype and misinformation rather than by any objective 
understanding of the realities of disability. 
 
Another factor which has contributed to the delay in the emergence of the ‘politics of 
disablement’ is the diversity of disability.  People with disabilities are not a group 
defined by some common genetic or cultural feature.87 There is a large number of 
different kinds of disability.  Each variety of disability makes its own demands of the 
person with that disability and of society.  Further, disability affects a person to 
differing degrees according both to that person’s individual pathology and to that 
person’s role and place in society.  Each individual’s experience of disability is 
unique. To this extent, it is impossible to articulate ‘norms’ of disability, hazardous to 
generalise about the nature of disabilities, and difficult to formulate the appropriate 
social response to disabilities. Thus, the articulation of theory in this area is 
constrained. 
 
The diversity of disability has created problems even within the disability lobby.    
Oliver concedes that there is not uniformity of purpose or ‘equality of opportunity’ 
within various disability action groups within Britain.  He acknowledges that, at least 
at first, disability politics was dominated by ‘white wheelchair users’.88 Simone 
Apsis, a British campaigner for inclusive education, argues that people with 
 
87 It is increasingly recognised in relation even to issues of sex, race and class that it is essential to 
recognise the diversity of interests within groups typically regarded as homogenous. O’ Brien, for 
example, refers to the phenomenon of the ‘commatisation’ of difference – sex, comma, race, comma,
class, comma – to describe this failure to account for the differences within and the intersections 
between different groups: M O’Brien, ‘The commatisation of women; Patriarchal fetishism in the 
sociology of education’  (1984) 15 (2) Interchange 43.    
88 Campbell and Oliver, above n 81, 193. 
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disabilities who do not have ‘learning difficulties’ avoid collaboration with people 
who do have learning difficulties because of fear they will be labelled ‘stupid, thick, 
mental and mad by the non-disabled public’.89 Evidently, the mythology of disability 
is powerful even among some people with disabilities. 
 
Finally, it is not possible simply to extrapolate a theory of disability discrimination 
from theoretical statements made in relation to sex, race or religious discrimination.  
This is because the removal of discrimination against people with disabilities imposes 
‘costs’ on the community which are not imposed in the removal of discrimination 
against a sex, race or religious group. These costs may be financial in that 
environments and procedures and facilities must be modified to accommodate the 
needs of the people with disabilities.  Where a number of people with disabilities, 
each with different needs, are to be accommodated, the number of modifications 
which must be made is multiplied and so too is the cost. 
 
The accommodation of people with disabilities in schools, for example, may mean 
that ramps and lifts must be installed, learning materials supplied in Braille or in 
audio form, learning assistants employed and so on. Different teaching strategies 
tailored to different learning styles and learning capabilities may need to be developed 
and implemented. 
 
The inclusion of some students with disabilities may impose emotional and even 
physical costs on other members of the school community.  The case of Purvis90 
illustrates that such costs may be significant.  The complainant in that case was a 
 
89 Quoted in Ibid 97. 
90 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2004) 217 CLR 92. 
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thirteen-year-old boy who had been excluded from South Grafton High School as a 
result of his ‘problem’ behaviour.  Daniel’s behaviour was caused by and a 
consequence of brain damage sustained during infancy as a result of an infection with 
encephalitis. Over the course of the 1997 school year Daniel was suspended several 
times and ultimately excluded for repeated verbal abuse and violence which included 
kicking not only furniture and school bags but also other children and teaching staff. 
A majority of the High Court held that Daniel’s exclusion did not offend the DDA.
How these costs are to be absorbed by the community is not directly addressed by the 
disability lobby, except to the extent that they imply that the costs are a perception 
rather than a reality, arising from ingrained prejudice. Oliver, for example, is of the 
opinion that it is difficult for the community to cope with people with disabilities 
‘emerging from…passive, safe stereotypes and becoming powerful human beings’.91 
Christiansen asserts that many of the problems or costs perceived to be created by the 
inclusion of people with disabilities in ‘mainstream’ schools are instead attributable to 
an inflexible school system which has not been structured to cater for individual 
difference.92 Slee calls for the current school system to be disbanded and ‘the 
reconstruction of schooling which takes all comers and supports pride in difference’.93 
While the source and extent of the costs flowing from the inclusion of people with 
disabilities in ‘mainstream’ schools may be contested, how such costs are to be 
accommodated must be a consideration in theory development in this area. 
 
91 Campbell and Oliver, above n 80, 192. 
92 Carol Christensen, ‘Disabled, handicapped or disordered: “What’s in a name?’” in Carol Christensen 
and Fazal Rizvi (eds), Disability and the Dilemmas of Justice and Education 63.  
93 Slee, above n 79, 121. 
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There has been some effort, retrospectively and historically, to analyse the theoretical 
underpinnings of the inclusion movement.  Rizvi and Lingard, for example, after 
claiming that the field of ‘special education’ is ‘largely devoid of any discussion of 
the moral premises upon which it is based’, attempt to fill the vacuum.94 It could be 
argued, however, that they have merely shopped from a variety of theories in order to 
postulate what is needed in disability theory, resulting in a melange of sometimes 
incompatible ideals: ‘What is required now is a ‘complex equality’ construction with 
a strong recognition of cultural rights within a broad redistributive framework’.95 
Thus, Rizvi and Lingard have combined the ‘best’ of communitarianism, cultural 
recognition theory and liberalism. 
 
Christensen96 asserts that a right to inclusion is best understood in terms of a Rawlsian 
redistribution of social goods: social justice requires the ‘equal distribution of primary 
social goods…unless unequal distribution is to the advantage of the less favoured’.97 
Christensen also points, however, to deficiencies in redistributive approaches, such as 
that of Rawls, which account for the fact that although inclusion is repeatedly 
promised, it has not yet been delivered to an extent satisfactory to people with 
disabilities.98 Christensen claims that redistributive approaches which leave intact 
social structures and attitudes that marginalise people with disabilities will not deliver 
justice to people with disabilities.99 It is a problem of redistributive approaches that 
 
94 Rizvi and Lingard, above n 76, 23. 
95 Ibid 25. 
96 Christensen, above n 92, 70. 
97John Rawls, A Theory Of Justice (1971). 
98 See Chapter 5: The Impact of the Legislation for an appraisal of the status of ‘inclusion’ in Australia. 
99 See Christensen, above n 92, 71.  It could be argued, however, that to imply criticism of Rawls in 
this respect is to misunderstand and to misrepresent his approach to the redistribution of social goods. 
Rawls’ two principles of justice acknowledge that before any distribution of goods takes place, basic 
liberties must first be guaranteed to each person. The basic liberties include freedoms specified by the 
liberty and integrity of the person.  Further, Rawls held that, within his second principle of justice, fair 
equality of opportunity (including freedom from social discrimination) must also be assured before 
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they require the ‘labelling ‘of a person as ‘less favoured’ before they attract a 
distribution.  In the context of disability, where the very meaning of disability is 
contested, such labelling serves, Christensen claims, to entrench the stereotyped view 
of people with disabilities as ‘deficient’.100 
Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard and Henry imply a similar criticism of redistributive 
approaches. They argue that such approaches fail to acknowledge that a simple 
distribution of goods, expressed in the context of education as, say, equal access to 
schooling for people with disabilities, will not deliver social justice if the school 
culture remains the same.  They argue that for genuine inclusion to be delivered, 
‘policies must demand cultural and symbolic changes to the ways schools are 
structured’.101 
Slee, too, joins the chorus of criticism of Rawls:  ‘this new calculus of redistributive 
justice…fails to confront disablement as an issue of cultural politics’.102 Chiefly, it 
does not recognise the ‘cultural disrespect’ shown to people with disabilities.  Slee 
calls for ‘sorry books’ to be made available for signing as a step towards 
reconciliation of people with disabilities with non-disabled people.103 
there was any redistribution of social goods.  See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993) 4-6 and 291-
3. 
100 Ibid 72. 
101 Sandra Taylor, Fazal Rizvi, Brian Lingard and Miriam Henry, Educational Policy and the Politics 
of Change (1997). 
102 Slee, above n 79, 125. 
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Writers such as Christensen, Taylor, Rizvi and Slee are attracted to the ‘politics of 
recognition’, espoused by feminist theorists such as Fraser and Young,104 and which 
emphasises the sources of injustice and oppression as cultural domination, non- 
recognition and disrespect.  While the calls of these writers for the complete 
destructuring and restructuring of the existing school system have been dismissed by 
some as ‘ideological’105 and, generally, fail to acknowledge the considerable costs, 
both financial and in terms of social disruption, which would accrue to such a project, 
the acrimony which swirls around the issue of inclusion suggests that their emphasis 
on the need for cultural as well as economic solutions to the problems of delivering 
justice to people with disabilities is valid. 
 
III  A COMMUNITARIAN THEORY OF EDUCATION FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 
While communitarian writers have published little work explicitly on inclusive 
education for people with disabilities it is possible to extrapolate a theory from their 
general theory of education combined with their comments directly on point.  It is 
clear that communitarianism offers the best features of both liberal and feminist 
theory in relation to treatment of people with disabilities.  It acknowledges both that a 
redistribution of goods is necessary to people with disabilities and that such ‘simple 
equality’ alone cannot deliver justice.106 Further, in their emphasis on democracy as 
inclusive, communitarians recognise the entitlement to respect as citizens and the 
right to self-determination of people with disabilities which are also at the heart of the 
‘politics of recognition’.  Communitarianism offers a solution to another problem with 
 
104 Nancy Fraser, ‘From redistribution to recognition:  dilemmas of justice in a “post-socialist” society’ 
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the Rawlsian version of liberalism.  The fundamental Rawlsian ideal of ‘fair equality 
of opportunity’ fails to account for the right to their share of social goods for some 
people with disabilities.  Howe, speaking in the context of education, explains that 
some students ‘by the nature and severity of their disabilities…are precluded from 
enjoying equality of educational opportunity’ and argues that some other ‘rationale’ 
must be advanced for educating such students.107 Communitarianism offers such a 
rationale via emphasis on education not so much as an instrument of opportunity as of 
inclusion.  The fundamental purpose of education is not to provide opportunities to 
students but to provide the information students need to belong to and to participate in 
the community. 
 
Although communitarians are suspicious of ‘rights talk’ and regard the creation of 
new rights as an excess of liberalism and expensive to the community,108 it is clear 
that inclusion in society is a right for all citizens.  Tam puts this bluntly: ‘democratic 
society is inclusive’.109 While most communitarian writing on inclusion relates to 
themes of sex, race and religious discrimination, there are some statements which 
extend the right to inclusion explicitly to people with disabilities.  Tam, demonstrating 
some sensitivity to the ‘politics of disablement’, says that citizens vulnerable to 
discrimination because of disability ‘should have confidence that society as a whole is 
on their side, and should not be made to feel isolated as troublemakers who refuse to 
accept their lot’.110 It is the role of the community not merely to care for people with 
disabilities, but to empower them to play an active part in the determination of their 
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futures and to preserve their dignity and responsibility.111 Isaacs makes a similar 
point, explaining that people with disabilities are citizens within a community entitled 
to be recognised as ‘active and autonomous participants in society’.112 Their 
membership of the community presupposes both their recognition as citizens and their 
entitlement to inclusion and support.  Hauerwas stresses the interdependence of 
community and the need for correlation between beliefs and actions.  He observes that 
people without disabilities learn and grow from their interactions with people with 
disabilities, highlighting one way that people with disabilities can demonstrate 
‘mutual obligation’, can give back to the community.113 
Of the communitarian theorists, MacIntyre has produced the most comprehensive 
analysis of the ‘place’ of a person with a disability within the community.  
MacIntyre’s rhetoric focuses more on recognition and respect than on rights and 
obligations, importing, perhaps, some of the ideas of writers like Fraser and Young 
into communitarian theory.  He implies that respect from others and self-respect are 
important aspects of this place.  Recognition from the community is fundamental to 
this respect and self-respect.  Fundamental to community recognition is the 
understanding that ‘each member of the community is someone from whom we may 
learn and may have to learn about our common good and our own good, and who 
always may have lessons to teach us about those goods that we will not be able to 
learn elsewhere’114 Unlike many writers about disability, MacIntyre confronts the 
issue that some forms of disability will limit the opportunities of those ‘afflicted’.  He 
speaks of those ‘whose extreme disablement is such that they can never be more than 
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passive members of the community, not recognising, not speaking or not speaking 
intelligibly, suffering but not acting’.115 However, like Hauerwas, MacIntyre 
emphasises that even those members of the community who cannot actively 
participate in community life, have the important – if passive – role of providing 
others with the opportunity to learn through caring and giving.  MacIntyre 
emphasises, further, that as teachers of the vital virtue of ‘just generosity’, people with 
disabilities are entitled to ‘political recognition’ in the form of respect from the 
community.116 
As the school is both a microcosm of and the model for the wider community it 
follows that the communitarian school is inclusive.  Walzer has emphasised the 
relationship between school and neighbourhood.  It is important that all children have 
access to their neighbourhood schools.117 Further, while it is impossible and probably 
pointless to insist that a school’s student body reproduce a pattern which exactly 
replicates a democratic social pattern, it is ‘crucial’ that schools ‘aim at a pattern of 
association anticipating that of adult men and women in a democracy’.118 Walzer 
elaborates: ‘one could not conceivably organise a democratic society without bringing 
together people of every degree and kind of talent and lack of talent’.119 
Yet, communitarians clearly recognise that access to school does not necessarily 
equate with inclusion.  Walzer sees equality of access to education as delivering 
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‘simple equality’ to students, but he is quick to point out that ‘simple equality’ is soon 
lost – for no educational system can ever be the ‘same for all’.120 
Equal access to school does not guarantee equal treatment or opportunity at school.  
Like Slee and Christiansen, communitarians acknowledge that the school culture, and 
not only its enrolment policies, must be inclusive.  The school is the training ground 
for citizenship – students learn both from the explicit curriculum and from the implicit 
curriculum – the school culture – the information they need to function as citizens. 
This information includes the virtue of not only tolerance but also respect for 
diversity.121 Tolerance and respect for diversity must be apparent not only in the 
lessons taught in the classroom but also in the demographics and governance of the 
school.  Reform of school culture is necessary for genuine inclusion to occur.  Unlike 
the more radical methods of reform advocated by Slee and Christiansen, however, 
communitarians regard reform as an evolving process: while benefits may not be 
delivered to the present generation of learners, incremental cultural changes can 
deliver benefits to future generations.122 
Communitarians emphasise the interdependence of community: self is constructed not 
only from individual traits but also from membership of the community.  This is the 
main reason, perhaps, that inclusion is of such importance to communitarians – if a 
person is excluded from society, he or she is excluded from the opportunity not only 
of complete citizenship but also of complete development as a person.  The 
community provides both emotionally and physically for each citizen but does so on 
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the basis of mutual obligation and, as such, each citizen must be ‘responsive’, must 
give to the community to balance what they take.  Slee’s cogent criticism of 
contemporary society is that people with disabilities trade in a currency which is not 
recognised as valuable.123 That is, people with disabilities are commonly regarded as 
having little or nothing to contribute to the community.  For communitarians, one 
purpose of inclusive education is for the various members of a community to learn 
from and through our relationships with others.124 
A Limits on the right to an inclusive education 
Whilst inclusion is a fundamental tenet of communitarianism, communitarian theory 
does imply some limits to the right to an inclusive education.  A corollary of the 
principles of mutual obligation and of community interdependence is that when the 
‘hard cases’ arise, that is, when problems of competing rights and obligations arise, 
these problems are resolved in the manner which will benefit the wider community 
rather than the individual.  The Responsive Community Platform rationalises this 
preference on the basis that individual rights and freedoms are best protected in a 
strong community: ‘neither human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained 
for long outside the interdependent and overlapping communities to which we all 
belong…The exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social 
environments on which we all depend and is destructive to our shared experiment in 
democratic self-government’.125 It can be extrapolated from this preference for 
community welfare over individual ‘rights’ that when problems of competing rights 
and obligations arise in respect of the inclusion of people with disabilities in 
 
123 Slee, above n 79, 128. 
124 See, for example, Hauerwas, above n 113, 149ff.  See also Alasdair MacIntyre, above n 114.  
125 Etzioni, above n 4, 258. 
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mainstream schools, the right to inclusion must in some circumstances be surrendered 
for the good of the community.  Competing rights and obligations are most acutely 
apparent in the case of the inclusion of students with intellectual and neurological 
disabilities in mainstream schools where the disability causes behaviour which 
compromises the quality and the safety of the learning environment for other students 
and the working environment for staff. 
 
Walzer cautions that when it comes to the ‘difficult’ distributive problem of deciding 
who goes to which school and with whom, it must be remembered that ‘it isn’t only 
[school] places that are distributed to children; children themselves are distributed 
among the available places’.126 Not all children can study together in the one class or 
even at the one school.  Different decisions, ‘political’ decisions, must be made 
allocating students to places. 
 
While communitarians tend to focus on education as socialisation for citizenship, 
others, particularly employers and even parents and students themselves, focus on 
education as preparation for the workplace, as a means of sorting students into boxes 
for life.  MacIntyre identifies one of the major roles of modern education systems as 
‘to fit the young person for some particular role and occupation in the social 
system’.127 What happens, however, when the ‘socialisation’ and the ‘sorting’ roles 
of education clash?  What happens if, before a child’s ‘socialisation as a citizen’ is 
complete, that child’s intellectual ability – or disability – determines the time has 
come for him or her to be ‘sorted’ into a ‘special’ school or out of school altogether?  
What happens when the inclusion of some hinders the development of others? 
 
126 Walzer, above n 2, 214. 
127 MacIntyre, above n 64. 
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Communitarian writers, particularly Tam and Walzer, reveal some sensitivity to the 
moral and social difficulties raised in attempting to answer such questions. 
 
Tam and Walzer do contemplate that some form of ‘streaming’ may be necessary to 
accommodate the different abilities of students.  Streaming, says Tam, has ‘the 
advantage of developing pupils with diverse potentials’.128 Walzer admits ‘there are 
educational reasons for separating out children who are having special difficulties 
with mathematics, for example’.129 The best inference to be drawn from their 
‘streaming’ comments is that it should result in the accommodation of some students 
in separate classes at their neighbourhood school rather than in their relocation to a 
different school altogether.  This inference is supported by the fact that both Tam and 
Walzer are adamant that a policy of total segregation of students with learning 
difficulties is not only undemocratic, it is counterproductive for the community.  Tam 
cautions that ‘total segregation could mean that a culture of co-operative citizenship 
could be seriously undermined’.130 Walzer argues that segregated schools could 
reinforce inequality in the wider community: 
… there are neither educational nor social reasons for making such distinctions across 
the board, creating a two-class system within the schools, or creating radically 
different sorts of schools for different students When this is done, and especially 
when it is done early in the education process, it is not the association of citizens that 
is being anticipated but the class system in roughly its present form.131 
Tam is wary of parents who, wanting the ‘best’ for their own children, selfishly insist 
on segregating from the mainstream those students whose needs are perceived as 
interfering with the academic progress of their peers.  The ‘best’ course for some 
individuals may have as its corollary the ‘worst’ course for other individuals, and for 
 
128 Tam, above n 6, 68. 
129 Walzer, above n 2, 221. 
130 Tam, above n 6, 68. 
131 Walzer, above n 2, 221. 
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the community as a whole: ‘the admission policy of schools must ultimately help to 
meet the needs of the community as a whole and not just some parents who do not care 
about the needs of others’.132 Walzer wryly points out that ‘the adult world is not 
segregated by intelligence’.133 Segregation, Walzer reiterates, is practically and 
politically wrong: ‘in a practical sense we are required by our work to mix up and 
down the status hierarchy; further, democratic politics requires that we mix with a 
wide range of people’.134 
As noted earlier, Walzer also nods to the ‘sorting’ role of education by acknowledging 
that not only are some students better suited to a more ‘specialised education’, it is 
also in the community’s interests to provide it to them.135 Such specialised – and 
potentially exclusive – education, however, must be delayed until the foundations of 
citizenship have been laid for all.  
 
Walzer also makes one curious comment which suggests a clear limit to the right to 
an inclusive education: ‘Except for a total incapacity to learn, there are no reasons for 
exclusion that have to do with the school as a school’.136 Unfortunately, Walzer does 
not elaborate on how the ability or inability to learn is to be assessed.  Further, 
Walzer’s comment is somewhat contradictory in light of the communitarian insistence 
that many lessons – often very valuable moral lessons – are absorbed not by conscious 
intellectual effort but by experience. Walzer’s comment also fails to account for the 
strong assertion of such communitarians as Hauerwas and MacIntyre that we learn 
 
132 Tam, above n 6, 74. 
133 Walzer, above n 2, 221. 
134 Ibid 221. 
135 Ibid 208ff. See above n 65. 
136 Ibid 221. 
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essential life lessons from shared experiences with people with disabilities.137 It 
should, however, be acknowledged, that Hauerwas and MacIntyre do not explicitly 
contemplate the class room as the context for that learning or the difficulties that 
might attend the meshing of formal instruction and the informal lessons learned 
through interaction with people whose impairments impact on the learning 
environment.  Walzer’s throwaway line suggests, perhaps, that where there is a clash, 
the communitarian ideal of the classroom as model of democratic society yields to the 
communitarian ideal of the classroom as a place of explicit instruction in the skills 
prerequisite to citizenship. 
 
While Walzer’s ‘total incapacity to learn’ comment is problematic and lacks, perhaps, 
the detail of mature theory, it, at the very least, indicates a willingness to confront the 
hard case of the student with severe intellectual or behavioural disability who asserts a 
right to education at his or her neighbourhood school – the hard case which continues 
to challenge the Australian legal system and legal systems worldwide.  This is a case 
writers such as Slee and Christiansen seem reluctant to address explicitly.  To this 
extent, their rhetoric seems as vague and illusory as the empty rhetoric of inclusion 
that they deride. 
 
It should be noted at this point that communitarian writers have not directly addressed 
the issue of whether the allocation of extra resources to support the inclusion of 
students with disabilities prefers the good of the individual student to the good of the 
community.  There is no explicit set of guiding principles, therefore, to inform an 
assessment of whether or when community spending to support inclusion of people 
 
137 See, for example, Hauerwas, above n 113, 149ff; MacIntyre, above n 114. 
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with disabilities threatens to compromise the welfare of the whole community.  The 
lack of explicit writing in this area is, no doubt, symptomatic of the general lack of 
writing in disability theory.  Nevertheless, it may be speculated that, as it is a basic 
tenet of communitarianism, the good of the community prevails over the good of the 
individual citizen, and where spending on a minority threatens the good of the 
community as a whole, that spending may be justifiably curtailed.  Whether ‘cost to 
the community’ arguments should be allowed to justify the exclusion of a student 
with a disability from a mainstream school, and by implication exclusion from access 
to citizenship and participation in community, however, remains unclear. 
 
IV CONCLUSION: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNITARIAN 
APPROACH TO EDUCATION FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 
Several principles underpinning the communitarian approach to education for people 
with disabilities can be postulated from communitarian writings in the area.  First, 
communitarian education is inclusive in the sense that there is a prima facie right for 
any student – regardless of sex, race, culture, religion or ability - to education in a 
mainstream setting.  The fundamental rationale for such inclusion is that 
communitarian society is inclusive and school is both a microcosm of and a model for 
communitarian society.  Further, every student must have access to necessary lessons 
which must be learned before he or she is equipped to function effectively as a citizen. 
The necessary lessons are learned through both the explicit curriculum of the school 
and the implicit curriculum which comprises its environmental and administrative 
culture. 
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Secondly, the right to inclusion in the mainstream setting for people with disabilities 
is of particular importance because some necessary lessons are best learned alongside 
those with disabilities.  By providing the opportunity for others to learn, students with 
disability are contributing to the good of the community and, as such, entitled to be 
accorded the respect of the community. 
 
Thirdly, communitarians acknowledge that there may be a limited place for the 
‘streaming’ of students according to ability where that streaming is appropriate to 
achieve specific desirable education outcomes.  One such appropriate situation may 
arise in relation to the education of students with disabilities.  The ‘streaming’ of 
classes, however, should not justify the exclusion from a mainstream community 
school of students with disabilities.  ‘Streamed’ classes can be provided within a 
mainstream setting to maximise the opportunities for development of an inclusive 
culture.   
 
Fourthly, another place where students with disabilities may legitimately be 
‘streamed’ out of educational opportunity is at the level of the tertiary institution. 
McIntyre has acknowledged that an important purpose of education is to fit students 
for work and in our society the tertiary education institution is where that kind of 
education typically takes place.138 Walzer has described the kind of specialised 
education which is characteristic of tertiary education as an office to be earned and as 
the legitimate monopoly of those with the requisite talent.139 As such, if a person with 
a disability cannot meet the genuine educational requirements of a tertiary course they 
may rightfully be excluded.  
 
138 MacIntyre, above n 64. 
139 Walzer, above n 2, 211. 
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Fifthly, it is a basic tenet of communitarian philosophy that in a competition between 
what is good for the community and what is good for the individual citizen, 
community prevails.  Therefore, where the inclusion of a student with a disability in a 
mainstream education setting compromises the ability to learn of the majority of 
students, it may be necessary for the exclusion of that student from the mainstream 
setting.  Similarly, where the inclusion of a student with an impairment compromises 
the safety of other members of the school community the exclusion of that student 
may be warranted.  While communitarians have not expressly considered, for 
example, the implications of the inclusion of students with problem behaviour for the 
educational opportunities and the safety of others, it is clearly consistent with 
communitarian principles that majority rights should prevail in such a case.  Whether 
the financial cost to the community of supporting students with disabilities in 
mainstream schools, however, is ever sufficient to compromise the general good, and 
thus to justify the exclusion of such students remains unclear. 
 
Finally, and most controversially, at least one writer, Walzer, has suggested that the 
exclusion from a school altogether may be allowable where a student, by reason of 
impairment, demonstrates a ‘total incapacity to learn’.140 This assertion, however, 
fails to account for the more dominant communitarian view that students with a 
disability have a teaching as well as a learning role.  Thus, there is a clear rationale for 
the inclusion of even those students who lack the capacity to learn on the basis that 
they have the capacity to teach. 
 
140 Ibid 221. 
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In summary, although communitarians are suspicious of ‘rights’ talk, it may be 
postulated that in a communitarian society a student with a disability has a prima facie 
right to inclusion in a mainstream school.  The communitarian preference for the good 
of the community above the good of the individual, however, means that 
communitarians will concede a ‘thicker’ set of limitations on individual rights and 
freedoms than would be the case under, say, a liberal analysis.  The individual’s right 
to inclusion, therefore, will yield to the extent necessary to protect the rights of others 
in the community.  In this situation the benefit to the community of a learning 
environment which models and promotes inclusion is displaced by a detrimental 
disruption to others in that learning environment.  Complete exclusion from a 
mainstream school, however, is justified only when the inclusion of a student with a 
disability compromises the ability to learn or safety of the other students at the school.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MEANING OF DISABILITY 
 
The meaning of disability and of related terminology is contested.  Similarly, a range 
of theories has been advanced as to the cause of disability and as to how it may be 
mitigated.  The dominant competing theories of the cause and management of 
disability are the ‘medical model’, which postulates disability as a medical problem to 
be ‘solved’ by medicine and technology, and the ‘social model’ which postulates 
disability as arising from the failure of society to adjust to the difference of a person 
with impairment.  The underlying premise of anti-discrimination legislation is that 
disability is, at least to some extent, a ‘social construct’, and that, as such, disability 
can be reduced or even removed by social adjustment.  There is clear evidence of the 
‘social model’ of disability in the terms of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) 
(QADA) and of similar Australian legislation.  The legislation does contain, however, 
some explicit limits to liability1 which curb the social response required to some 
impairments.  As such, they allow the disability of some complainants to continue 
without amelioration.  These limits suggest that only discrimination which is ‘unfair’2
will be sanctioned, with ‘fairness’ to be determined by a balancing of the rights to 
inclusion of the complainant with impairment against competing rights held by the 
wider community.  The balancing expressly contemplated by the legislation, is, prima 
facie, consistent with the approach taken to ‘rights clashes’ by communitarian 
 
1 The most significant explicit limits are the unjustifiable hardship exemption and the requirement that 
an indirectly discriminatory term be ‘not reasonable’:  See Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA)
ss 5, 10(5), 11(1)(c).  These limits are discussed later in the present Chapter and in detail in Chapter 6:  
Exemptions and Chapter 12: Indirect Discrimination. 
2 See QADA s 3.  The removal of ‘unfair’ discrimination is a primary objective of the QADA: see 
QADA  s 6(1). 
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theorists who insist that the greater good of the community must prevail when 
threatened by individual rights claims advanced by individuals.3
I THE LANGUAGE OF DISABILITY 
The terms ‘impairment’ and ‘disability’ have been subject to a variety of readings.4 It 
is important to be careful in the use of these terms, and allied terms such as 
‘handicap’; language is ‘political’ and the way these terms are employed can reveal 
and reinforce stereotypical ideas of disability.  Indeed, Barton argues that language 
contributes to ‘discriminatory practices’: ‘our definitions are crucial in that they may 
be part of and further legitimate disablist assumptions’.5 Oliver and Barnes claim that 
there is increasing awareness that the social response to a group is both reflected and 
reinforced by the language used to define that group and cite, as examples, the 
pejorative implications that have come to accompany terms such as cripple, spastic 
and Mongol.6
With heightened awareness of disability as a human rights issue, and not merely as a 
medical issue, came a need to distinguish between the meanings of the words 
impairment and disability, in order to reinforce the fact that a ‘medical’ condition 
could and should be distinguished from its social ramifications.  An attempt was made 
 
3 See, for example, Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 
(1991); Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian 
Agenda (1993) 258.  Analysis in later Chapters will demonstrate, however, that the application of 
express limits to liability may not always be made consistently with either the objects of anti-
discrimination legislation, disability theory or communitarian theory.  See, particularly, Chapter 6:  
Exemptions, Chapter 12: Indirect Discrimination and Chapter 13: Conclusion. 
4 See Mike Oliver and Colin Barnes, Disabled People and Social Policy: From Exclusion to Inclusion 
(1998) 13 ff.  Oliver and Barnes provide a thorough summary of the meanings attributed to the terms 
impairment and disability by a variety of institutions including the UN and various organisations 
‘controlled and run by disabled people’. 
5 Len Barton, ‘Introduction’ in Len Barton (ed) Disability and Society: Emerging Issues and Insights 
(1996) 8. 
6 Oliver and Barnes, above n 4, 13.  
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by the World Health Organisation, in 1980, to impose clarity and consistency of 
usage.  The WHO document, ‘The International Classification of Impairment, 
Disability and Handicap,’7 defined impairment as ‘any loss or abnormality of 
psychological, physiological or anatomical structure or function’;8 disability as ‘any 
restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to perform an activity in a 
manner or within the range considered normal for a human being’9 and handicap as ‘a 
disadvantage for a given individual, resulting from an impairment or disability, that 
limits or prevents the fulfilment of a role that is normal’.10 The WHO definitions 
were influential, but were criticised as founded on assumptions about the existence, 
and the desirability, of ‘normality’.11 Further, the use of the term ‘handicap’ has been 
abandoned for its controversial connotations of begging, ‘cap-in-hand’.12 
The readings which have come to be preferred by people with disabilities,13 and  by 
organisations associated with them, restrict ‘impairment’ to meaning the physical, 
intellectual or psychiatric condition which affects a person.  ‘Disability’ refers to the 
social restriction experienced by a person with an impairment.14 These are the 
 
7 World Health Organisation, International classification of impairments, disabilities and handicaps: A 
manual of classification relating to the consequences of disease (1980). 
8 Ibid 47. 
9 Ibid 143. 
10 Ibid 180. 
11 See, for example, Oliver and Barnes, above n 4, 15: ‘Clearly, this typology is founded on 
assumptions about the existence and nature of intellectual and physical ‘normality’.  WHO has 
developed a new regime to replace that developed in 1980:  International Classification of 
Functioning, Disability and Health, WHA54.21, 9th plen mtg (2001). This regime instead of defining 
disability and related terms, ‘is a classification of health and health related domains that describe body 
functions and structures, activities and participation’ which are ‘classified from body, individual and 
societal perspectives’ and also take into account environmental factors: see International Classification 
off Functioning, Disability and Health: Introduction <http://www3.who.int/icf/icftemplate.cfm? 
myurl=introduction.html%20&mytitle=Introduction> at 20 July 2005. 
12 See, for example, Oliver and Barnes, above n 4, 17.  Oliver and Barnes refer the reader to other 
commentators who make the same point.  See also Julie Smart, Disability, Society, and the Individual 
(2001) 59.  
13 See Oliver and Barnes, above n 4, 16-19. 
14 The cause of this social restriction is, in turn, subject to debate. This issue is considered at Part II, 
below. 
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definitions adopted for the present research.  The phrases, ‘person with an 
impairment’ and ‘person with a disability’, will also be used instead of the phrases, 
‘impaired person’ and ‘disabled person’.  This usage is consistent with that of 
Queensland Government departments, such as Disability Services and Education 
Queensland, and with a widespread preference for emphasising that people with 
disabilities are ‘people first’.15 
These readings have been adopted for this research to aid clarity and consistency of 
analysis, but it must be acknowledged that it is almost impossible to avoid some 
degree of confusion in that these readings are not adopted uniformly by researchers 
and commentators on disability.  Indeed, common usage is such that the terms 
‘impairment’ and ‘disability’ are used almost interchangeably with little appreciation 
of conceptual differences between the two.  It is notable, for example that although 
the QADA prohibits discrimination on the ground of ‘impairment’, in the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA), the protected attribute is ‘disability’.16 The 
definition of ‘impairment’ in s 4 QADA is, however, essentially the same as the 
definition of ‘disability’ in s 4 DDA.17 There is further potential for confusion in the 
failure of those involved in the making, interpreting and applying of anti-
discrimination law to make their understanding of the words explicit, or to use them 
in a consistent manner.  The second reading speech in support of the Anti-
 
15 It is evidence of the shifting sands underlying language usage in the area of disability studies, 
however, that Oliver and Barnes prefer the phrase ‘disabled person’ claiming that it better represents 
both the disabling effect of society upon a person with an impairment, and disability as a political 
identity.  They argue that the phrase ‘person with a disability’ reinforces the stereotype that disability 
belongs to and is the problem of an individual person and is not, therefore, a matter which can or 
should be addressed by social reform.  Oliver and Barnes stress that such niceties of language usage are 
not merely ‘semantics’ or ‘political correctness’ but are ‘an attempt to inject an important and 
meaningful voice into an exclusionary process’.  See Oliver and Barnes, above n 4, 19. 
16 The definition of impairment in the QADA is considered at Part IV, below. 
17 The differences between the QADA and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
(DDA) definitions are considered Part IV, below. 
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Discrimination Bill 1991(Qld), and the debate following, for example, do not 
explicitly acknowledge, or, by inference, reveal an understanding by the parliament, 
that different readings may be attached to the terms impairment and disability.18 
II  DISABILITY MODELS 
If the term disability is contested, then so too is the concept.  Different ‘models’ of 
disability have been postulated to explain the environmental and functional 
restrictions experienced by people with disabilities.  It is not the main focus of the 
present research to identify and to explain these theories, except to the extent 
necessary that their influence can be detected in the legal response to problems with 
the creation and protection of the right to education of people with disabilities.  There 
are, however, two dominant models of disability which should be explained to inform 
the present research – these can be called the ‘medical model’ and the ‘social model’.  
A The Medical Model19 
Disability has not always been regarded as a sociological issue.20 Sociologists, along 
with most members of society, accepted that disability was a medical issue. Under the 
medical model, impairment, whether physical, intellectual or psychiatric, imposes 
limitations on those it ‘afflicts’.  Impairment is equated with inferiority and 
abnormality.  Not only the treatment of the impairment, but also the management of 
the resultant disability, is the domain of medical doctors and other ‘experts’.  The 
 
18 It is clear, however, in the decision to choose ‘impairment’ rather than ‘disability’ to describe the 
protected attribute, that those responsible for the drafting of the bill were informed about these 
differences and their significance.  
19 See Deborah Marks, Disability: Controversial Debates and Psychological Perspectives (1999) 
Chapter 3 for a comprehensive discussion of the scope and impact of the medical model. Oliver calls 
the medical model the ‘individual model’ to emphasise that the effect is to cast disability as the 
problem and responsibility of individuals rather than of society. 
20 See Barton, above n 5, 8. 
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medical model casts people with impairments as dependent rather than independent, 
and views the allocation of resources to people with impairments as determined by 
needs rather than rights.  Thus, the model is associated with a ‘charity’ rather than 
with a ‘rights’ approach to the provision of health, educational and care facilities for 
people with impairments.  Further, people with impairments are routinely excluded 
from mainstream society because they, supposedly, cannot adapt to a ‘normal’ 
environment or function as ‘normal’ students, workers or citizens.  If the ‘miracles’ of 
modern medicine and technology cannot cure or control impairment, then a ‘sufferer’ 
must bear his or her limitations stoically, if not heroically. 
 
The medical model has attracted criticism as perpetuating the myth – or, some may 
claim, the reality – of ‘normal’ society where difference justifies marginalisation, if 
not exclusion.21 It has been further criticised as creating a culture of dependency 
among people with disabilities, denying them both the right to and the skills to 
demand self-determination.22 Perhaps the most persuasive criticism of the medical 
model is that it fails to acknowledge the disabling effect on people with impairments 
of a society built to cater for norms of ability and behaviour.23 Thus, the solutions to 
 
21 See, for example, Len Barton, The Emerging Field of Disability Studies:  a view from Britain (2000) 
14 < http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/archframe.htm> at 25 August 2006; Mike 
Oliver, The Individual and Social models of Disability (1990) 4-5.  
< http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/archframe.htm> at 25 August 2006; Roger Slee, 
‘Special education and human rights in Australia: How do we know about disablement, and what does 
it mean for educators?’ in Felicity Armstrong and Len Barton (eds), Disability, Human rights and 
Education: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (1999) 121. 
22 See, for example, Felicity Armstrong and Len Barton, ‘Is there anyone there concerned with human 
rights?’ in Felicity Armstrong and Len Barton (eds) Disability, Human Rights and Education (1999) 
212; Marks, above n 19, 63-5; Oliver, above n 21, 6. 
23 See, for example, Neil Crowther, A future without disability? (2006) 9 < http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ 
mdisability-studies/archiveuk/archframe.htm> at 25 August 2006; Oliver, above n 22, 3; Richard K 
Scotch, ‘Foreword’ in Len Barton, Keith Ballard and Gillian Fulcher (eds) Disability and the Necessity 
for a Socio-Political Perspective (1992) vii-ix. 
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disability posited under the medical model are medical and technical, not social and 
political.24 
Barton points out that criticism of the medical model must not be taken as suggesting 
that people with impairments do not need medical support.  Criticism is targeted at the 
cultural effects of an unquestioning acceptance that impairment and disability are no 
more than medical, technical issues: 
What is being challenged are the social conditions and relations in which such 
[medical treatment] encounters take place, the enveloping of their identity in medical 
terms, the importance of their voice being heard and a much more effective 
participation in decisions which affect them. 25 
B The Social Model26 
The social model of disability is fundamentally different from the medical model in 
that it postulates the source of disability as the failure of society to adapt to 
accommodate the different demands made by different impairments. It rejects the 
view that disability is caused by the failure or the inability of a person with an 
impairment to adapt to their surroundings.  Thus, under the social model, the cause of 
disability is not an individual person’s deficiency or difference, but society’s failure to 
be flexible, tolerant and inclusive.  Disability is not so much a ‘personal tragedy’ as 
society’s creation.  Strategies for the management of disability are not so much 
medical and technical as social and political. Resources such as health care, 
 
24 For an Australian critique of the medical model which raises the criticisms identified, above, see 
Gillian Fulcher, Disabling Policies? A comparative approach to education policy and disability (1989) 
27-8. 
25 See Barton, above n 5, 9.  See also Barton, above n 21, 6. 
26 A recent assessment of the current status of the social model as disability theory is provided by C 
Tregaskis, ‘Social Model Theory: the story so far…’ (2002) 17 (4) Disability and Society 457-70. 
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accommodation and education are allocated not according to objectively ascertained 
need, but as rights. 
 
It has been argued that the treatment of disability as a medical rather than as a social 
issue amounts to oppression of people with disabilities.27 The rise in acceptance of 
disability as a social construct has been accompanied by the emergence of action 
groups dedicated to raising awareness of disability as a social and political issue, and 
a human rights issue.  It can be argued that legislation, such as the QADA and DDA, is 
evidence both of acceptance that the provision of services and facilities to people with 
disabilities is a rights issue and, that an agenda to protect such rights is necessary. 
 
The social model of disability has attracted some criticism.28 The principal criticism 
is, perhaps, that it does not acknowledge the individuality of impairment or the pain 
and limitation which flows from the impairment itself.  It is interesting in this context 
to note the genesis of the social model, as acknowledged by Oliver.29 While Oliver is 
regarded as the first to name and explain the ‘social model’, he claims inspiration 
from the distinction between impairment and disability adopted by the British 
disability action group, Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation 
(UPIAS).  The social model was first conceptualised, therefore, in the context of the 
experiences of people with physical impairments.  It is difficult to explain how the 
social model accounts for all of the limitations experienced by people with 
 
27 See, for example, Colin Barnes, Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination:  a case for anti-
discrimination legislation (1991), Barton, above n 5, Jane Campbell and Mike Oliver, Disability 
Politics: Understanding our Past, Changing our Future (1996), Mike Oliver, The Politics of 
Disablement (1990), Mike Oliver, Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice (1996). 
28 For detail of the criticism see Marks, above n 19. 
29 Mike Oliver, Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice (1996) Chapter 3. 
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disabilities, and, particularly, by those with intellectual disabilities.30 It is, therefore, a 
potentially valid challenge to the social model that in the case of some types and 
degrees of impairment, no amount of social adjustment or accommodation or 
attitudinal change will deliver equal opportunity.  Oliver acknowledges this criticism 
of the social model and concedes that ‘most disabled people’ can cite examples of 
how their impairment has created restrictions.  Oliver insists, however, that the 
existence of personal limitations should not deflect attention from the ‘social barriers 
of disability’.31 
Smart32 suggests that the two models of disability should be regarded as intersecting.  
While her claim that ‘no one today subscribes to a single disability model’ ignores the 
political standpoint of writers such as Barnes, Oliver and Barton, the implication that 
no one model can account for all instances of disability is perhaps valid. It will be 
seen that it is the difficult task of tribunals and courts, charged with the responsibility 
of applying anti-discrimination law, to determine the threshold between disability 
which is an aspect of an individual’s impairment and disability which is a social 
construct.33 The scheme of the legislation, and its application in the courts, suggests 
that it is only the latter which may be prevented by the law.  
 
30 Simone Apsis suggests that even within the disability movement there is ‘discrimination’ against 
people with ‘learning difficulties’.  She suggests that there is a tendency among people with physical 
impairments to apply the ‘medical model’ to those with intellectual impairments, to believe that the 
problems experienced by people with intellectual impairments are more individual and more likely to 
be caused by  impairment than by disabling social barriers. Quoted in Jane Campbell and Mike Oliver, 
above n 27, 97. 
31 Oliver, above n 29, 38. 
32 Julie Smart, Disability, Society, and the Individual (2001) 59.  Smart provides a slightly different 
schema of disability models from the one explained here. She adopts the medical model and the social 
model, as described above, but identifies a third influential model, the ‘functional model’, which 
focuses on the impact of the functions of an individual on his or her disability.  This model explains the 
fact, for example, that an amputated finger would not be considered a disability for most people, but it 
certainly would be a disability for a concert pianist.  See 38-40. 
33 See particularly, Part I, Chapter 10: Causation. 
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III  DISABILITY AND THE FUNCTION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 
Barton claims that to be disabled is to be discriminated against, to be isolated and 
restricted.34 Barton advocates anti-discrimination legislation as a necessary weapon 
in the ‘struggle’ to combat discrimination against people with disabilities.  Anti-
discrimination legislation is ‘public confirmation that discrimination against disabled 
people is not acceptable’.35 Barnes also suggests that anti-discrimination legislation is 
essential as it emphasises the cultural and political shift towards viewing provision for 
people with disabilities as ‘rights’ rather than ‘needs’.36 Like Barton, Barnes suggests 
that a principal effect of anti-discrimination legislation is to demonstrate that 
discrimination will not be tolerated, but Barnes also regards as important the 
establishment of a legislative framework to enforce inclusivity – enforcement 
provisions back rhetoric with action. 
 
It can be argued that the underlying premise of anti-discrimination legislation is that 
disability is a social construct.  The legislation makes discrimination against people 
with impairments unlawful.  Therefore, it is an acknowledgement that the attitudes 
and actions of others can infringe upon the rights of people with disabilities. It is 
acknowledgement that limitations faced by people with disabilities flow from their 
treatment and not merely from their impairment.  Their limitations, therefore, are a 
social construct rather than a ‘personal tragedy’.  Legislation is also acknowledgement 
that disability is a social and not merely an individual problem and that ‘solutions’ to 
the limits attached to disability must come from society as a whole and not only from 
the individual with the medical ‘problem’ – ‘solving’ disability will not be achieved 
 
34 Barton, above n 5, 13.  See also Armstrong and Barton, above n 22, 212. 
35 Barton, above n 5, 13.   
36 Barnes, Colin, Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination:  a case for anti-discrimination 
legislation (1991) 232. 
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only through medical treatment and management of impairment but through 
attitudinal and behavioural change.  The scope of the protected areas in anti-
discrimination legislation – education, employment, accommodation, goods and 
services - reveals acceptance that discrimination and, by implication, disablement, 
exist as institutional and not merely individual phenomena. 
 
Lindsay, however, speaking in the context of Australian anti-discrimination 
legislation, identifies a conceptual clash between the objects of the legislation and the 
scheme it creates to promote those objects.37 While the policy underpinning the 
legislation reflects the rhetoric of social justice and inclusion, the making of an anti-
discrimination claim involves a complex and technical legal process which reinforces 
difference and objectifies the experience of the complainant.  Lindsay is particularly 
critical of the legislative requirement that a comparison be made between the 
treatment of the complainant and the treatment of those without impairment, claiming 
that such a comparison emphasises the difference of the complainant.38 While a 
comparison is explicitly required in the proof of direct discrimination, a comparative 
element is also at the heart of proof of indirect discrimination, where the effect of the 
discriminatory term on the complainant must be compared with the effect on people 
without the impairment.39 
37 This point, and others referred to below, was made in an address to the ANZELA conference, 
Brisbane 2-4 October, 2002.  Lindsay was speaking to her conference paper co-authored by Mary 
Keefe Martin: K Lindsay and M Keefe-Martin ‘Issues in Australian Disability Discrimination Case 
Law and Strategic Approaches for the Lawful Management of Inclusion’ (Paper presented at the 
Australia and New Zealand Education Law Association Conference on Legal Risk Management, 
Safety, Security and Success in Education, Brisbane, September 2000). 
38 See QADA s 10; DDA s 5. 
39 See QADA s 11; DDA s 6. 
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Lindsay’s argument gels with Christensen’s critique of the ‘labelling’ of people with 
disabilities as reinforcing their difference and justifying their isolation.40 To bring an 
anti-discrimination claim it is necessary to prove that the complainant is ‘impaired’ or 
‘disabled’ – to bring such a claim therefore, is to submit to a labelling which denies 
individuality and which is predicated on a system of norms.  Christensen calls for a 
reconstruction of the education system and, by implication, of society, to 
acknowledge that ‘all students are…different, complex and whole’.41 In a system 
which recognised and valued diversity and difference, the labels ‘disabled’ or 
‘impaired’ would cease to have currency or relevance.  Lindsay concedes, however, 
that it is difficult to conceptualise a legislative system for the prevention of 
discrimination on the ground of impairment or disability which is not premised on the 
proof of impairment or disability, suggesting that the present scheme may be ‘the best 
we can do’.42 
IV EVIDENCE OF THE SOCIAL MODEL OF  
DISABILITY IN THE DRAFTING OF THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT 1991 (QLD)
Under the scheme of the QADA, discrimination, on the basis of impairment, is 
prohibited.43 ‘Impairment’ is defined as follows:  
a) the total or partial loss of the person's bodily functions, including the loss of a 
part of the person's body; or  
b) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of the person's body; or  
c) a condition or malfunction that results in the person learning more slowly than a 
person without the condition or malfunction; or  
d) a condition, illness or disease that impairs a person's thought processes, 
perception of reality, emotions or judgment or that results in disturbed behaviour; 
or  
e) the presence in the body of organisms capable of causing illness or disease; or  
 
40 Carol Christensen, ‘Disabled, handicapped or disordered: “What’s in a name?’” in Carol Christensen 
and Fazal Rizvi (eds), Disability and the Dilemmas of Justice and Education (1996).  
41 Ibid 77. 
42 Lindsay, above n 37. 
43 QADA s 7(1)(h). 
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f) reliance on a guide dog, wheelchair or other remedial device; whether or not 
arising from an illness, disease or injury or from a condition subsisting at 
birth, and includes an impairment that--  
g) presently exists; or  
h) previously existed but no longer exists.  
 
If the meaning of impairment explained above44 is accepted, then it must also be 
accepted that the legislation prohibits discrimination on the basis of a medical 
condition.  The definition of impairment provided in QADA45 supports this 
interpretation.  The definition is ‘medical’, recognising impairment that is physical, 
intellectual, psychiatric and biological.  The definition recognises that impairment can 
be caused by a number of factors – illness, disease, injury, malfunction, malformation, 
disfigurement and infection.  In the context of what has come to be the widely 
accepted meanings of impairment and disability, it is appropriate that the term 
impairment rather than disability is attached to such a definition. 
Not only does the QADA create impairment as a protected attribute, its operation is 
also such that it recognises that disability flows from the social response to 
impairment.  Thus, it can be argued that Queensland legislation recognises that 
disability is, or at least can be, a social construct.  Discrimination – different treatment 
on the ground of impairment – is the disabling agent. Equal opportunity to enjoy 
‘rights’ such as education and employment is curtailed, for the impaired person, not 
only by the impairment and its physical, intellectual or psychiatric effects, but also by 
the actions or failures of others.  The QADA prohibits not only direct discrimination, 
differential treatment, it also prohibits indirect discrimination, the imposition of a 
term with which a person with an impairment cannot comply, but with which a higher 
 
44 See Part I, above. 
45 QADA s 4. 
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proportion of people without the impairment can comply, and which is not 
‘reasonable’.46 Through this prohibition on indirect discrimination, the QADA also 
recognises that institutions and programs designed for ‘normal’ citizens can have a 
disabling effect for those with an impairment.  
 
Further evidence of recognition of the social model can be found in the fact that the 
QADA prohibits discrimination not only on the basis of characteristics the impaired 
person actually has, but also on the basis of characteristics which are presumed of or 
imputed to him or her.47 Thus the Act is alive to the fact that socially entrenched 
stereotypes of an impairment can influence how a person with that impairment is 
treated by others.48 Similarly, QADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of past as 
well as present impairment, 49 reflecting awareness that any stigma associated with an 
impairment can linger even after the physical or psychiatric effects of that impairment 
no longer exist.50 
Still further evidence of recognition of the social model is found in the Act’s 
explanation of the meaning of direct discrimination: ‘in determining whether a person 
 
46 QADA s 11. 
47 QADA s 8(b) and (c). 
48 That discrimination can arise out of attitudes is acknowledged in the second reading speech by the 
Attorney General, Dean Wells, supporting the Anti-Discrimination Bill 1991 (Qld). Queensland, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 November 1991, 3195 (Dean Wells, Attorney- 
General). 
49 QADA s 8(d). 
50 It should be noted that, in one respect, the Queensland definition (and that of the Equal Opportunity 
Act 1984 (SA) s 5, the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 4, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT) s 
4 and the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 4) is less generous than that in the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA), the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 5AA, the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) and the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (‘NSWADA’).  The 
Commonwealth, ACT and Tasmanian legislation prohibit discrimination on the basis not only of 
present or past disability but also on the basis of a disability that may exist in the future.  NSW 
legislation prohibits discrimination on the basis of a disability that a person will have, or that it is 
thought a person will have in the future (NSWADA s 49A(c)). The DDA definition was tested in Beattie 
v Maroochy Shire Council [1996] HREOCA 40 (Unreported, Carter P, 20 December 1996).   
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treats, or proposes to treat a person with an impairment less favourably than another 
person is or would be treated in circumstances that are the same or not materially 
different, the fact that the person with the impairment may require special services or 
facilities is irrelevant’.51 This provision recognises that the elimination of 
discrimination may require positive action by others to accommodate the needs of the 
person with the impairment.  Thus, the Act suggests that managing impairment is not 
the responsibility solely of the person with that impairment but also of society at 
large.52 
Another example of the influence of the social model of disability is found in the 
express provision, in relation to indirect discrimination, that ‘it is not necessary that 
the person imposing, or proposing to impose the term is aware of the indirect 
discrimination’.53 It is the very nature of indirect discrimination that it follows from 
policies and practices which are geared to mainstream society. Thus, indirect 
discrimination is the product of a ‘disabling’ society which does not accommodate 
difference.  While there is no equivalent provision in relation to direct discrimination, 
there is little doubt that in that situation, too, there need not be awareness by the 
discriminator that the treatment complained of is discriminatory.  It is expressly 
provided that ‘it is not necessary that the person who discriminates considers the 
treatment less favourable’.54 It is also provided, in relation to direct discrimination, 
 
51 QADA s 10(5). 
52 How this section has been parlayed into a positive duty to make ‘reasonable accommodation’ of a 
person who is impaired will be considered in Chapter 7: An Implied Duty of Reasonable 
Accommodation. 
53 QADA s 11(3). 
54 QADA s 10(2). Note that there is no equivalent provision in the DDA. The meaning of the term ‘less 
favourable’ was considered in the QADA context in L v Minister for Education for the State of 
Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 207 (‘L’), and in P v Director-General, Department of Education 
[1996] 1 QADR 755 (‘P’). See Chapter 11: Less Favourable Treatment. 
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that the discriminator’s ‘motive for discriminating is irrelevant’.55 This provision 
suggests that there is no need to prove an intention to treat the complainant ‘less 
favourably’ on the ground of disability.56 Collectively, these sections address the fact 
that disabling attitudes and policies exist at a subconscious level among members of 
society and within social institutions.  The approach intrinsic in these provisions is, 
therefore, consistent with the attribution of disability to the social response to 
impairment. 
 
V LEGISLATIVE LIMITS ON THE SOCIAL RESPONSE TO DISABILITY 
The QADA does provide express limits on the responsibility of society to remove 
discrimination and, therefore, to diminish disability.  Such limits, generally, require a 
balancing of the competing interests of the person with impairment and the rest of the 
community.  Most significantly, the Act creates the ‘unjustifiable hardship’ 
exemption57 applicable only to cases of alleged unlawful discrimination on the ground 
of impairment.58 It is stated in the second reading speech, delivered by the Attorney-
General, Dean Wells, in support of the Anti-Discrimination Bill 1991 (Qld), that one 
of the functions of exemptions in the proposed Act is ‘to balance the complex needs 
of society’.59 It is, therefore, explicitly contemplated that there will be occasions 
 
55 QADA s 10(3). Note that there is no equivalent provision in the DDA.
56 For a detailed discussion of the relevance of motive and intention to proof of discrimination see 
Chapter 10: Causation. 
57 Although ‘unjustifiable hardship’ is often characterised as a defence, technically, it is created as an 
exemption in the QADA.  Consideration of ‘unjustifiable hardship’ arises only after a determination 
that a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination is made out.  Proof that special services or facilities 
are required by the complainant, and that the provision of those services or facilities would impose 
‘unjustifiable hardship’ on the respondent, then has the effect of exempting the respondent from the 
operation of the Act in the case under consideration.  This sequence is spelt out in P [1996] 1 QADR 
755. For further consideration of the unjustifiable hardship and other exemptions to unlawful 
discrimination see Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
58 In relation to educational institutions, the unjustifiable hardship exemption is created in s 44 QADA s
44.  Unjustifiable hardship is defined in QADA s 5. 
59Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 November 1991, 3195 (Dean Wells, 
Attorney-General). Part 5 of the QADA contains several general exemptions for discrimination.  Some 
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when the rights of people who are impaired will be required to yield to the rights of 
others.  The unjustifiable hardship exemption is raised when special services or 
facilities are required in order to avoid discrimination against a person with an 
impairment, and the provision of those services or facilities imposes, or would 
impose, unjustifiable hardship on the person or institution that would be responsible 
for their provision.  The exemption, as such, is linked to the definition of direct 
discrimination which, as noted above, expressly contemplates that special services or 
facilities may be required to be provided in order to avoid discrimination.60 Some of 
the circumstances relevant to a determination of whether unjustifiable hardship is 
established are set out in the Act itself: 
a) the nature of the special services or facilities; and 
b) the cost of supplying the special services or facilities and the number of                      
people who would benefit or be disadvantaged; and 
c) the financial circumstances of the person; and 
d) the disruption that supplying the special services or facilities might cause; 
and 
e) the nature of any benefit or detriment to all people concerned61 
The list is not closed, leaving a tribunal or court the discretion to consider other 
factors presented as relevant by the parties to a particular case. 
 
The definition of indirect discrimination is similarly qualified by the rider that, for the 
discriminatory term to be unlawful, it must be ‘not reasonable’.62 The Act states that 
 
of these also have the potential to limit the circumstances when impairments must be accommodated.  
Both the public health (QADA s 107) and workplace health and safety (QADA s 108) exemptions, for 
example, have been advanced by respondents in cases of alleged impairment discrimination. Both these 
exemptions apply in situations where the accommodation of people with disabilities may impinge on 
the safety of others, requiring the law to provide for a balancing of competing rights and freedoms. See, 
for example, L [1995] 1 QADR 207, P [1996] 1 QADR 755 and the DDA case, Beattie  v Maroochy 
Shire Council [1996] HREOCA 40 (Unreported, Carter P, 20 December 1996). 
60 QADA s 10(5). 
61 QADA s 5. 
62 QADA s 11(1)(c).  
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whether a term is reasonable depends on all the circumstances of the case.63 It 
specifies some relevant circumstances, but, again, the list is not closed: 
a) the consequences of failure to comply with the term; and 
b) the cost of alternative terms; and 
c) the financial circumstances of the person who imposes, or proposes to 
 impose, the term 
 
There is some overlap between the relevant circumstances for establishing 
unjustifiable hardship and the relevant circumstances for determining whether a 
discriminatory term is reasonable.  Cost to the alleged discriminator and their 
financial circumstances are specified as relevant for both determinations.64 In relation 
to unjustifiable hardship the Act explicitly requires consideration of ‘the nature of any 
benefit or detriment to all people concerned’;65 that is, a balancing of the competing 
interests of the person with the disability and of others affected by his or her 
accommodation.66 
The legislated limits outlined above recognise that the ‘cost’ of removing 
discrimination is such that it would place an unacceptable burden on the community. 
As such, they reflect the preference for majority rights over individual rights that 
underpins communitarian theory.  ‘Rights talk’, communitarians argue, cannot be 
allowed to dominate a responsible weighing of the entitlements of the individual 
citizen against the good of the whole community.67 As Etzioni has cautioned, ‘[t]he 
exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on 
which we all depend and is destructive to our shared experiment in democratic self-
 
63 QADA s 11(2). 
64 Re unjustifiable hardship see QADA s 5(b) and (c); re indirect discrimination see QADA s 11(2)(b) 
and (c).   
65 QADA s 5(e). 
66 A more thorough comparison of the unjustifiable hardship exemption and the reasonableness enquiry 
is provided in Part III C, Chapter 12:  Indirect Discrimination. 
67 See Glendon, above n 3. 
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government’.68 The express limits in the QADA contemplate and seek to guard 
against an ‘erosion’ of social networks such as those found at educational institutions. 
 
VI  CONCLUSION 
While there is strong and consistent evidence of the influence of the social model of 
disability embedded in the terms of the QADA, the Act does not guarantee the 
elimination of all social restrictions and conditions which impinge on the right to 
inclusion in mainstream society of people with impairments. Indeed, the Act’s 
primary purpose is to eliminate only what is cryptically described as ‘unfair’ 
discrimination.69 The unjustifiable hardship exemption and the requirement that an 
indirectly discriminatory term be ‘not reasonable’ have the clear potential to limit the 
social response required to impairment, and, therefore, to erode the right of a person 
with an impairment to ‘equality of opportunity’. It will be seen in later chapters that, 
in many instances, the potency of the legislative demands made of citizens and 
institutions, in order that people with impairments are not to be disabled by 
discriminatory social responses, is diluted by the effect of these two exculpatory 
provisions.70 Later chapters will also demonstrate, however, that  many strategies in 
addition to  those expressly contemplated by the legislation have been employed to 
deny liability for discrimination, to limit the scope of the social response required to 
disability and, thus, to limit the opportunity for people with impairments to be 
educated alongside other citizens at the neighbourhood school.  
 
68 Etzioni, above n 3, 258. 
69 QADA s 6. 
70 The operation of the unjustifiable hardship exemption and relevant case law are considered in detail 
in Part V, Chapter 6: Exemptions. The operation of the reasonableness requirement in relation to 
indirect discrimination and related case law are considered in detail in Part III, Chapter 12: Indirect 
Discrimination. 
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CHAPTER 4 
QUEENSLAND EDUCATION POLICY 
 
A number of different sources are available which provide insight into Queensland 
policy on inclusive education. Queensland government policy on inclusive education 
can be inferred from the text of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA), the 
Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld) (Education Act)1 and in 
interpretations of that legislation by judges and tribunal members.2 More overt 
statements of policy are to be found in documents produced by the government 
department responsible for the administration of State education, Education 
Queensland.  Although policy documents are not, generally, readily made available by 
private institutions, the policies of a variety of independent schools that do publicise 
their stance on inclusion are also available to be examined.  It is submitted that 
legislative and institutional policy will influence the scope of the right of people with 
disabilities to an inclusive education.  A clear understanding of policy is, however, 
complicated by competing models of inclusion and by differing understandings of the 
terminology associated with inclusion. 
 
1 In late 2006 the Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld) was replaced by the Education 
(General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld). Most provisions of the new Act came into force on 30 October 
2006. While reference is made to the 2006 Act and comparisons made with the 1989 Act, analysis in 
the thesis focuses primarily on the 1986 Act which provided the legislative context in Queensland at 
the time the education case law discussed in the thesis was developing.  See particularly Part II A, 
below. 
2 Only explicit comments of judges and tribunal members are considered.  Analysis of any policy, 
preconception or ideology implicit in the text of judgments and decisions is beyond the scope of this 
enquiry. It is acknowledged, however, that there is a growing science of such textual analysis of and 
application of linguistic theory to judicial statements.  See, for example, Lawrence M Solan, The 
Language of Judges, (1993) and Susan U Philips, Ideology in the Language of Judges: How Judges 
Practice Law, Politics, and Courtroom Control (1998). 
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I WHAT IS INCLUSION?
Analysis of the implications of policy documents on education for people with 
disabilities is hampered by the problem that different authors use the terms ‘inclusion’ 
and ‘inclusive education’ to mean different things. There is room, therefore, for 
confusion if policy documents are relied on as indicating what a school or school 
system offers in practice to students with a disability.3
On one end of the scale, inclusion can be taken to mean the inclusion of people with 
disabilities in mainstream classes, on a full time basis. ‘Mainstream’ may be used as a 
tag to identify the hundreds of ‘regular’ classrooms in ‘regular’ schools which cater to 
‘regular’ students.4 Fulltime inclusion in such a class may be seen as symbolic of the 
fact that a student with a disability, too, is acknowledged as a ‘regular’ student.  This 
kind of inclusion may be tagged ‘full inclusion’ and, perhaps because of its symbolic 
importance, it is the preferred option for many families of a student with a disability. 
It is also, probably, the most expensive variety of inclusion, as special facilities, 
 
3 This problem was highlighted in the recent report of the Senate enquiry into education for people with 
disabilities: Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Education of students with disabilities (2002) (‘Senate Report’) 29-34 [3.1]-[3.19]. The 
Senate Report identifies two ‘basic positions in regard to inclusion’, 30 [3.5].  The first is explained as 
‘a single educational setting where students with disabilities are taught, for the most part, in regular 
classes and where special needs are assessed and supported, as far as possible, within this setting’, 30 
[3.6]. Under this model, however, ‘there may be provision for partial withdrawal of individuals or 
groups depending on needs and individual programs’, 30 [3.6].  The second position on inclusion 
‘assumes complete inclusion, with all students in the same classroom all the time’, 30 [3.7].  The 
Senate Report regards this second position as ‘utopian’, 30 [3.7].  Nevertheless it is the understanding 
of inclusion preferred by many parents and educationists who champion inclusion in a mainstream 
setting as a ‘human right’.  The first position on inclusion, the Senate Report asserts, would be better 
described as ‘integration’, 30 [3.6], in that it does not contemplate the complete inclusion of a student 
in a mainstream setting.  The Senate Report finds that ‘inclusion practices in Australian schools lean 
strongly to an integration model’, 30-1 [3.8]. The report is discussed further in Part IV C, Chapter 5: 
The Impact of the Legislation. 
4 ‘Regular’ is used to mean non-segregated or mainstream.  The term ‘regular’ is frequently used by 
educationists to describe non-segregated or mainstream schools and classes as distinct from schools 
and classes with a special purpose or clientele.  See, for example, Evidence to Senate Employment, 
Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of Australia, Brisbane, 6 September, 2002, 
444 (Dr John Enchelmaier). 
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resources and personnel are almost invariably required to support a student with a 
disability in a mainstream classroom.  
 
On the other end of the scale, inclusion may be used to describe the inclusion of 
people with disabilities in mainstream classrooms on a flexible, part time basis.  Such 
an arrangement is common when one school campus incorporates both mainstream 
classrooms and ‘special education’ classrooms.  ‘Special education’ students may 
mingle with ‘regular’ students during breaks.  They may participate in some 
mainstream classes and then relocate to ‘special education’ classrooms for special 
purpose classes.5 This form of inclusion is less expensive to implement as facilities, 
resources and personnel required to support a particular disability may be clustered at 
a school designated to cater to students with that disability.  The term ‘inclusive 
curriculum’ is also frequently used in policy documents.  ‘Inclusive curriculum’ is a 
somewhat nebulous phrase used to imply that a school promotes, through its teaching 
and organisation, a culture of tolerance and inclusion of people of different abilities, 
genders, races and religions.  The fact that a school or school system is described as 
having an ‘inclusive curriculum’ should not be taken as any guarantee that it includes 
students with disabilities in mainstream classes.  
 
The problem is, therefore, that when an education system or institution promotes 
itself, usually in fulsome terms, as committed to inclusion, inclusive education or an 
inclusive curriculum, it is not necessarily clear whether it is committed to full 
inclusion in a mainstream class, or to some hybrid mainstream class-special class 
 
5 It should be noted that some school systems, such as Education Queensland, may offer full inclusion 
to some students and a part time arrangement to others dependant on both the individual circumstances 
of a student and the facilities available at schools in that student’s area.  See the discussion of 
Education Queensland placement policy at Part III B, below. 
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arrangement, or simply to the encouragement of a culture of inclusion among its 
students.  The problem is compounded by an irresistible inference, in some cases, that 
an institution may market itself as ‘inclusive’ to attract the prestige of conforming 
with what has come to be regarded as the ‘prevailing orthodoxy’,6 while never 
explicitly promising, or intending to be held to a promise of, ‘full’ inclusion.  The 
practice of Queensland education institutions in relation to inclusion of students with 
impairments, as distinct from their policy on inclusion, is considered in Chapter 5. 
 
II QUEENSLAND LEGISLATION 
A Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld)7
In Australia, there is no constitutional right to education or specific legal protection of 
a right to education. Further, there is no legislative framework designed specifically to 
provide for the inclusive education of people with disabilities.8 There is, however, 
legislation which renders education compulsory for children within specified age 
 
6 The Senate Report concluded that ‘inclusive practices’ have become the ‘prevailing orthodoxy’ in 
Australia in regard to the education of students with disabilities: Senate Report, above n 3, 29, [3.1]. 
7 In late 2006 the Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld) was replaced by the Education 
(General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld). See above n 1.  A review of the 1989 Act commenced in October 
2004 with the release by the Education Minister of the consultation paper Education Laws for the 
Future. Queensland Parents for People with a Disability (QPPD) called for parents of students with 
disabilities to provide feedback on the consultation paper and published a guide to structuring such 
feedback: Queensland Parents for People with a Disability,  Review of the Qld Education Act 1989 
<http://www.qppd.org.au/Issues/Ed%20Act%20Review.pdf> at 13 March 2005. The consultation 
paper foreshadowed the insertion of an object clause into a new Act which would include a ‘guiding 
principle of providing education programs to suit the learning needs of individual students, including 
those who may be educationally disadvantaged on the basis of culture, linguistic background, gender, 
disability, location or socioeconomic status’: Queensland Government, Department of Education and 
the Arts, Education Laws for the Future (2004) 6.  This object clause has not, however, been inserted 
into the new Act. The Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) retains many of the provisions of 
the Education General Provisions Act 1989 (Qld) including, in substance, those discussed, below: s 
114 (see 2006 Act s 176), s 24 (see 2006 Act s 50), s 14 (see 2006 Act s 12),  
8 In this respect the Australian approach can be contrasted with the approach in the United States of 
America.  While there is no constitutional right to education in the United States (See San Antonio 
Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1 (1973)), there is specific legislation suggesting a 
commitment to inclusion which provides that students with disabilities are entitled to a ‘free and 
appropriate public education’ in the ‘least restrictive environment’: Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act 2004 20 USC § 1400. Similarly, in the UK, since 2001, there has been a prima facie 
‘duty to educate children with special educational needs in mainstream schools’: see Education Act 
1996 (UK) s 316. The Education Act 1996 (UK) was amended to create the duty by the Special 
Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001 (UK) C 10, s 1. 
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groups.9 Further, a free education, provided by the State, is notionally available to 
all.10 In Queensland, the Education Act spells out the entitlement to education of 
Queensland students as follows: 
 Provision of State Education  
(1) For every student attending a State educational institution…there shall be 
provided an educational program in such subjects and of such duration as the Minister 
approves that--  
(a) has regard to the age, ability, aptitude and development of the student concerned;  
(b) is an integral element within the total range of educational services offered with   
the approval of the Minister first had and obtained;  
(c) takes account and promotes continuity of the student's learning experiences;  
 (d) recognises and takes account of the nature of knowledge;  
 (e) has regard to whether enrolment is compulsory or non-compulsory.  
 
(2) The duration of the educational program must be based on the basic allocation to a 
student. 11 
The Education Act can be read as providing for the education of students with 
disabilities in state schools, particularly by its direction that ‘an educational program’ 
‘has regard to the age, ability, aptitude and development of the student concerned’.  In 
respect of non-state schools the Act specifies that the Education Minister ‘may 
provide, or contribute, special education for persons with a disability’.12 The 
entitlement to education of any student with a disability is limited to the ‘basic 
allocation’13 of 24 semesters.14 
The unwillingness of Education Queensland to extend the schooling available to a 
student with a disability was displayed in the case of a visually impaired student, 
Dean Hashish, who was refused the opportunity to continue his schooling at the 
 
9 In Queensland, Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld) (‘Education Act’) s 114 (See 
Education Act 2006 (Qld) (‘Education Act 2006’) s 176). 
10 In Queensland, Education Act s 24 (see Education Act 2006 s 50). 
11 Education Act s 14 (see Education Act 2006 s 12).  
12 Education Act (Qld) s 15 (see Education Act 2006 s 420). 
13 Education Act (Qld) s 5 (see Education Act 2006 s 11(1)). 
14 Education Act (Qld) s122, s 123 (see Education Act 2006 s 60). 
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Narbethong School for the Visually Handicapped beyond his eighteenth birthday.15 
Hashish complained of impairment discrimination under the QADA but, ultimately, 
the case was decided on the basis of the scope of his entitlement to ‘special education’ 
as provided for in the Education Act. While a majority of the Queensland Court of 
Appeal16 ultimately found that the Education Minister was authorised by the 
Education Act to terminate the complainant’s enrolment at Narbethong, the Education 
Act was subsequently amended to clarify the entitlement of students to the ‘basic 
allocation’ of 24 semesters.17 
B Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (Qld) (QADA)
As there is no specific provision mandating the inclusion of students in mainstream 
schools in Queensland legislation, people seeking to assert a right to inclusive 
education must rely on anti-discrimination legislation.  They must bring a complaint 
under the relevant legislation – in Queensland, the QADA – that they have been 
treated ‘less favourably’ than people without disability.  The argument frequently 
advanced by people with disabilities is that people without disabilities attend 
mainstream schools and, therefore, to deny people with disabilities inclusion at 
mainstream schools is to treat them less favourably.  This section considers whether 
any policy of inclusive education can be detected in the terms of the QADA.
15 Hashish v Minister for Education QADR [1997] QCA 13 (25 February 1997) (Fitzgerald, P, 
McPherson JA, Thomas J). Contrast State of Victoria v Bacon & Ors [1998] 4 VR 269 where the 
Victorian Court of Appeal found that the Victorian Education Department's policy of excluding 
funding to all children in State run schools of 18 years or over, unless enrolled for a Victorian  
Certificate of Education (VCE) course, amounted to indirect discrimination against persons with an 
intellectual disability.  See Part II B, Chapter 5: The Impact of the Legislation. 
16 The termination of enrolment was held by McPherson JA and Thomas J to be lawful on the basis that 
via the Education Act as it then was structured the Minister had a ‘duty’ to terminate the enrolment of a 
student at a special school once the student turned 18.  This was because, via the operation of the then s 
13 of the Education Act, special schools were established for the education of ‘disabled persons’.  The 
Act in the then s 3 defined ‘disabled person’ as a disabled person who ‘has not attained the age of 
eighteen years’. When the complainant turned eighteen, therefore, he ceased to be a disabled person 
within the meaning of the Act and his entitlement to a special education as a disabled person ceased.  
17 Education and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld) s 11. 
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The objects of the QADA are generic rather than specific to people with disabilities, as 
the Act addresses discrimination on a wide range of grounds in addition to what the 
Act calls ‘impairment’.18 The long title of the Act states the intention of the 
Queensland Parliament as follows: ‘to promote equality of opportunity for everyone 
by protecting them from unfair discrimination in certain areas of activity and from 
sexual harassment and certain associated objectionable conduct’.  The protected areas, 
where discrimination on the ground of a protected attribute is unlawful, include work 
and goods and services as well as education. 
 
The cautious phrase ‘unfair discrimination’ from the long title warrants comment as it 
suggests a limit on the ‘protection’ afforded by the Act.  It naturally implies that there 
are circumstances when discrimination will not be actionable as ‘unfair’.  Further, it 
foreshadows the creation under the Act of exemptions which render behaviour which 
is prima facie discrimination, lawful.19 
Parliament’s statement, at reason 6(c), is particularly interesting in the context of the 
present thesis: ‘The Parliament considers that…the quality of democratic life is 
improved by an educated community appreciative and respectful of the dignity and 
worth of everyone’.  This statement is intended to be read, no doubt, as a rationale for 
the education of the community to respect people regardless of their ‘difference’, and 
to cease discrimination against people because they are different.  It also suggests 
acknowledgement of community resistance to the recognition of ‘rights’ for people 
protected by the Act and that the community may need to be ‘taught round’ to 
 
18 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) s 7(1). 
19 The effect of these exemptions on the provision of education to people with disabilities will be 
analysed in Chapter 6: Exemptions.  
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acceptance of the Act. The QADA expressly contemplates education programmes for 
the community ‘to promote the purposes of the Act’.  The Anti-Discrimination 
Commission is vested with that function.20 
It is tempting to read the statement at reason 6(c) as sympathetic to the communitarian 
rationale for education – communitarians would agree that education of citizens in 
core vales such as inclusiveness, or what the QADA describes as appreciation and 
respect of ‘the dignity and worth of everyone’ must necessarily improve the ‘quality 
of democratic life’.21 
The reasons for enacting the QADA also include, at reason 6(a), ‘[t]he Parliament 
considers that…everyone should be equal before and under the law and have the right 
to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination’.  As noted 
above, there is no express recognition of a right to education, let alone of a right to an 
inclusive education for people with disabilities.  This is only to be expected, as there 
is no constitutional right to education or specific legal protection of a right to 
education in Australia.22 The QADA acknowledges, however, the ratification by the 
Commonwealth of an assortment of international human rights instruments, many of 
which do recognise rights to education.23 
Although the QADA does not refer to or create an express right to education, it does, 
explicitly, make discrimination in the provision of education unlawful.  Section 38 
 
20 QADA s 235(d). 
21 See Part I A 2, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
22 See above n 8. 
23 See, for example, Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 6 of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Disabled Persons. 
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relates to access issues, and makes it unlawful for an educational authority to 
discriminate in failing to accept an enrolment, in processing an enrolment, in the 
setting of criteria for enrolment or in the imposition of terms on enrolment.  Section 
39 relates to discrimination against students once they are enrolled; an educational 
authority must not discriminate by varying the terms of a student’s enrolment or by 
denying or limiting access to a benefit, or by exclusion, or by treating a student 
unfavourably in any way in connection with training or instruction.  The broad terms 
of s 39 reveal that the Parliament acknowledges the potential for discrimination not 
only at the point of enrolment but also during the course of enrolment.  The wording 
of ss 38 and 39 reveals an understanding of a fundamental tenet of inclusive education 
– inclusion of students involves more than their admission to school; it requires their 
inclusion also in the day to day events and experiences of the whole school 
community. 
1 Judicial Readings of the Policy of Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
Commissioner Atkinson, of the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (QADT), 
stated, in relation to the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA), that the 
‘undoubted goals’ of that Act are ‘inclusiveness, access and availability’.  She made 
this comment in her decision in Kinsela v QUT, 24 a case alleging discrimination in 
the area of education.  Kinsela’s complaint was brought under the DDA rather than 
the QADA. At the time of hearing, an agreement existed, between the Federal 
Government and the Queensland Government, that complaints under the DDA,
originating in Queensland, as well as complaints under the QADA, would be heard by 
the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal.  The purpose of the DDA, though 
 
24 Kinsela, Bradley John v Queensland University of Technology [1997] HREOC No H97/4 (24 
February 1997). 
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specific to people with disabilities, is similar in its terms to the QADA.25 Kinsela’s 
case arose out of a complaint of discrimination by a student in a wheelchair that he 
could not participate fully in his university graduation ceremony because of access 
problems associated with the venue where the graduation ceremony was scheduled. 
His complaint of discrimination was upheld by Commissioner Atkinson who found 
that it was not a ‘trivial matter’ to be able to sit with fellow graduands and to 
‘process’ to the stage with them for the actual degree presentation. 
 
Generally tribunal members and judges have been able to decide cases without 
needing, or choosing, to comment explicitly on the issue of whether the QADA, or 
similar Australian legislation, promulgates a policy of ‘inclusion’ in education.  There 
is some tangential reference to the issue by Commissioner Keim, in the QADT case P,
in his finding that people with disabilities have ‘a prima facie right to choose to be 
educated in their local school’.26 Commissioner Innes of the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (HREOC), in his decision in the case of Purvis v State of 
New South Wales,27 also entered the inclusion debate when he stated that segregated 
education for students with disabilities is ‘by its nature, discriminatory’.28 While the 
statements of Commissioner Keim and Commissioner Innes imply a ‘right’ to 
inclusion, the source of such a right is not directly attributed to legislation. Indeed the 
 
25Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) s 3(a)(1): ‘To eliminate, as far as possible, 
discrimination against persons on the ground of disability in the [area] of…education’; compare with 
the QADA long title: ‘by protecting them from discrimination’; DDA s 3(b): ‘to ensure, as far as 
practicable, that persons with disabilities have the same rights to equality before the law as the rest of 
the community’; compare with the QADA long title: ‘to promote equality of opportunity for everyone’, 
and with parliament’s reason 6(a):’everyone should be equal before and under the law and have the 
right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination’; DDA s 3(c): ‘to promote 
recognition and acceptance within the community of the principle that persons with disabilities have 
the same fundamental rights as the rest of the community; compare with Parliament’s reason, QADA 
reason 6(c): ‘the quality of democratic life is improved by an educated community appreciative and 
respectful of the dignity and worth of everyone’. 
26 P v Director-General, Department of Education (Qld) 1 QADR 755, 783. 
27 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117. 
28 Ibid 75178 [7.2]. 
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source of such a right is not clearly articulated at all.  It could, perhaps, be inferred 
that tribunal members make such claims based on their perception of a community 
acceptance of such a ‘right’ or, more controversially, based on their own belief in 
such right.  It is significant, in the sense that ‘rights talk’ does not mean that rights 
will be enforced – ultimately the student complainants in both P and the Purvis case 
were lawfully excluded from their school of choice.29 It is clear, therefore, that 
despite acceptance of a right to inclusion, that right to inclusion is seen as having 
limits.  
 
The decision of the High Court allowing the exclusion of the complainant in Purvis 
represents the most complete examination of the inclusion issue by an Australian 
court to date. Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ found that any discrimination against 
Daniel Hoggan was not unlawful and only commented generally, in support of their 
interpretation of the DDA, that the international treaties which legitimise its enactment 
and inform its objects are ‘aspirational’ documents.30 Gleeson CJ,31 McHugh and 
Kirby JJ32 and Callinan JJ,33 however, all made some explicit comment on whether 
and to what extent there is a right to a ‘mainstream’ education available to students 
with disabilities.  
 
29 Commissioner Innes, at first instance, did find that the complainant, Daniel Hoggan, had been the 
subject of unlawful discrimination. The Federal Court, the Full Federal Court and a majority of the 
High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ and Callinan J) all held, however, that there 
had been no unlawful discrimination. See State of New South Wales (Department of Education) v 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2001) 186 ALR 69; Purvis v New South Wales 
(Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237; Purvis v State of New South Wales 
(Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92. 
30Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92 
(‘Purvis’) 153 [197] and 156 [206].  The constitutional validity of the DDA derives from 
Commonwealth ratification of international human rights treaties (specified in the DDA) under the 
external affairs power: see Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) s 51 (xxix); DDA s 
12 (8).  
31 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 98-9 [6]. 
32 Ibid 94 [123]. 
33 Ibid 164 [238].  
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There is a measure of overlap in the analyses of these four judges, despite the fact that 
McHugh and Kirby JJ ultimately found, in a minority judgment, that Daniel Hoggan 
had been the subject of unlawful discrimination. All four implied that the source of 
any right to inclusion could be traced to the international rights treaties behind the 
DDA.34 All four agreed that a mainstream education may not be available where the 
inclusion of a student impinged on the safety of other students and staff.  Three 
implied that a further limit may arise when educational opportunities of other students 
are adversely affected.  Although these limits are not limits which have been 
expressly considered by communitarians, they are consistent with the communitarian 
contention that the right of an individual may be required to yield to the greater 
good.35 
Gleeson CJ located the limit to inclusion as occurring when the safety of others is 
threatened by the inclusion.  He made the clear point that the Purvis case concerned a 
clash between competing rights: ‘The present case illustrates that rights, recognised 
by international norms, or by domestic law, may conflict. In construing the Act, there 
is no warrant for an assumption that, in seeking to protect the rights of disabled 
pupils, Parliament intended to disregard Australia's obligations to protect the rights of 
other pupils’.36 Gleeson CJ implied that school students – and, indeed, staff – have a 
right to safety which school administrators have a duty to protect.  He questioned 
whether Parliament is constitutionally entitled to enact legislation which does not 
allow competing rights to be reconciled:  
 
34 Their discussion of international rights treaties as the source of Australian rights, however, was to be 
expected in that the constitutional validity of the DDA derives from Commonwealth ratification of such 
human rights treaties:  see above n 30.  
35 See Part IV, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
36 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 98 [6]. 
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…a contention that the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament extends to 
 obliging State educational authorities to accept, or continue to accommodate, pupils 
 whose conduct is a serious threat to the safety of other pupils, or staff, or school 
 property, would require careful scrutiny.37 
In discussing the scope of the unjustifiable hardship exemption to unlawful 
discrimination which could have been raised by the respondent school to refuse an 
application for enrolment by Daniel Hoggan, McHugh and Kirby JJ, like Gleeson CJ, 
found that ‘the Act provides for a balance to be struck between the rights of the 
disabled child and those of other pupils and, for that matter, teaching staff’.38 Like 
Gleeson CJ, they found that a limit on the right to inclusion of students with 
disabilities would arise when the safety of others was put at risk: ‘The nature of the 
detriment likely to be suffered by any persons concerned, if the student was admitted, 
would comprehend consideration of threats to the safety and welfare of other pupils, 
teachers and aides’.39 Arguably, however, they implied a further limit by stating that 
‘any negative impact that may be caused by the presence of a student with disability 
in a mainstream class is a proper matter to be considered when making a decision on 
whether that individual student can be admitted’.40 The vague phrase ‘any negative 
impact’ may be broad enough to encompass an adverse impact on the educational 
opportunities of others in a classroom. 
 
Callinan J was prepared to make explicit the limit implied by McHugh and Kirby JJ.  
Citing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, he found 
that any right to inclusion of students with a disability must be weighed against the 
37 Ibid 99 [6]. 
38 Ibid 94 [123]. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid.  
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‘the right of everyone to education’.41 That universal right, he found, ‘could be 
adversely affected by an insistence that the education to which a disabled person is 
equally entitled should be provided in circumstances which cause disruption to the 
education of others’.42 Callinan J was also concerned that the right to safety of others 
must be paramount.  Emphasising the ‘quasi-criminal’ nature of Daniel Hoggan’s 
behaviour, he, like Gleeson CJ, cast doubt on the constitutional validity of legislation 
which would compel States to ignore State criminal laws by excusing or allowing 
violent behaviour, even when caused by disability, to continue to pose a threat to 
others.43 
Although the full impact of the decision of the High Court in Purvis is yet to be 
assessed and understood, and although the case comprehends only a limited 
discussion of inclusion policy, it is clear from the case that the High Court of 
Australia has not been prepared to find that an unfettered right to inclusion is policy 
of the DDA. Although there are constitutional issues relevant to the interpretation of 
the DDA44 which are not relevant to the interpretation of the QADA, the QADA relies 
on the same ‘aspirational’ international instruments as the DDA to inform its 
objectives.  Thus, it is likely that the limits to inclusion recognised by the High Court 
in Purvis would be recognised by a subsequent court as applicable to the QADA.
41 Ibid 164 [238] n 166. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid 172-3 [266] and 174 [271]. 
44 See 28. 
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III EDUCATION QUEENSLAND POLICY 
Since the implementation of the QADA, Education Queensland has generated several 
dedicated policy documents on inclusive education and other more general policies 
relevant to inclusive education.  Policies specifically addressing the education of 
people with impairments have recently been updated in response to recommendations 
of the Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education.45 In 2005, an Inclusive 
Education Statement46 was released and this statement, in conjunction with the new 
Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld), which substantially came into force 
in October 2006, informed the development of a revamped inclusive education 
policy,47 also released in the second half of 2006. The Inclusive Education Statement 
and policy document both commit Education Queensland ‘to enhancing equitable 
educational opportunities and improved outcomes for all students’.48 It is too early to 
ascertain whether this commitment has or will result in positive action to support a 
culture of inclusion of students with impairments. A more significant focus for this 
study is the policies that were replaced in 2006,49 as they represent the policy 
 
45 See Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education (students with disabilities) (Queensland), Report,
June 2004.  The Taskforce, established in March 2002, reported in June 2004. The Taskforce found 
‘that current policy statements, developed and added to over time, now carry incongruencies that need 
to be addressed by a comprehensive review to align them with projected new directions on inclusive 
education’: Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education (students with disabilities) (Queensland), 
Report, June 2000, 11.  The ‘new directions’ referred to relate to the revamping of the ascertainment 
process which determines the level of support needed by each student with disability.  See below n 79.  
See also Minister for Education and the Arts (Queensland), The Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive 
Education (students with disabilities): Government Response, June 2004, 4. The Taskforce Report and 
Government Response are discussed in Chapter 5: The Impact of the Legislation, Part IV A. 
46 R Slee, Inclusive Education Statement – 2005: Inclusive Education is for everybody and is 
everybody’s business (2005) Education Queensland <http://education.qld.gov.au/ studentservices/ 
learning/docs/inclusedstatement2005.pdf > at 21 January 2006. 
47Education Queensland, Inclusive Education (CRP-PR-009) Education Queensland  
<http://education.qld.gov.au/strategic/eppr/curriculum/crppr009/ >  at 10 November 2006.    
48 See R Slee, Inclusive Education Statement – 2005: Inclusive Education is for everybody and is 
everybody’s business (2005) Education Queensland <http://education.qld.gov.au/studentservices/ 
learning/docs/inclusedstatement2005.pdf> at 21 January 2006; Education Queensland, Inclusive 
Education (CRP-PR-009) Education Queensland <http://education.qld.gov.au/strategic/eppr/ 
curriculum/crppr009/ >at 10 November 2006.    
49 Education Queensland, ‘Curriculum Studies 05: Education Provision for Students with Disabilities’ 
Department of Education Manual (‘CS-05’); Education Queensland, ‘Curriculum Studies 15: 
Principles of Inclusive Curriculum’, Department of Education Manual (‘CS-15’). 
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framework which supported those administrative actions by Education Queensland 
staff which have given rise to complaints of discrimination in education since the 
enactment of the QADA.
A Queensland State Education 201050 
Queensland State Education 2010 (QSE-2010) is the current lead policy document of 
Education Queensland.  QSE-2010 is a contemporary vision for education in the year 
2000 and beyond.  It sets out the ‘future strategy’ for Queensland State Education.  
The Queensland Premier, Peter Beattie, has suggested that QSE-2010 is ‘a broad 
description of the future for Education Queensland, not a detailed road map of how to 
get there’.51 It must be acknowledged, therefore, that QSE-2010 sets out policy; it 
does not, necessarily, describe current practice. 
 
QSE-2010 provides a detailed consideration of the purpose of education.52 It is stated 
that a clear purpose must be articulated which ‘acknowledges different, legitimate 
views and interests in a negotiated and harmonious community settlement’.53 A clear 
purpose must be articulated so as not to leave the education system ‘vulnerable to 
purpose by default’.54 The ‘central purpose’ determined by Education Queensland as 
its guiding aim is as follows: 
… to create a safe, tolerant and disciplined environment within which young people 
prepare to be active and reflective Australian citizens with a disposition to lifelong 
learning.  They will be able to participate in and shape community, economic and 
 
50 Education Queensland, Queensland State Education 2010 (2000) (QSE-2010). 
51 Ibid forward. 
52 Ibid 11-13. 
53 Ibid 11. 
54 Ibid 11. An interesting comparison can be drawn, here, with the communitarian view that no 
institution is morally neutral and that an absence of overt values education at a school does not mean an 
absence of values education altogether, as values are implicit in the school culture: See Amitai Etzioni, 
The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda (1993) 259; Henry 
Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship (1998) 57. 
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political life in Queensland and the nation.  They will be able to engage confidently 
with other cultures at home and abroad. 55 
Clear communitarian themes are identifiable in this purpose.  Etzioni can be heard in 
the call for a ‘safe, tolerant and disciplined environment’,56 Tam in the quest for 
‘active and reflective’ citizens,57 Latham in the recognition of the ideal of ‘lifelong 
learning’58 and Walzer in the aim of producing students who ‘participate in and 
shape’ their society.59 The image of ‘nested’ communities, also familiar in 
communitarian theory,60 is reflected in the aim to prepare students for life in 
‘Queensland’, the ‘nation’ and ‘abroad’. 
 
In the explication of this central purpose, communitarian themes are further 
developed.  An ‘Australian identity’ must be distilled in a ‘multi cultural’ society and 
world.  In working to achieve the Australian identity, citizenship is stated to be the 
‘central organising idea’: 
… citizenship as a part of a shared democratic culture which emphasises participatory 
political involvement and which strives to avoid social disadvantage that denies 
individuals full participation in society.  Education will lead to the development of 
free, active and equal Australian citizens who have the capacities to choose their 
identities, entitlements and duties within the prevailing political and legal 
framework.61 
This passage reveals a clear communitarian ideal of education for all as providing 
access to citizenship for all and a clear communitarian belief that both duties and 
rights attach to citizenship.62 
55 QSE-2010, above n 50, 12. 
56 Amitai Etzioni, above n 51, 259. 
57 Henry Tam, above n 54, 134. 
58 Mark Latham, Civilising Global Capital: New Thinking for Australian Labor (1998). 
59 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 202-3, 225. See 
also Tam, above n 54, 8. 
60 See, for example, Walzer, above n 59, 224-5. 
61 Ibid. 
62 See, for example, Etzioni, above n 54, 258-9; Stanley Hauerwas, Sanctify Them in Truth: Holiness 
Exemplified (1998) 151. 
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QSE-2010 recognises, as do communitarians, that schools can influence the structure 
of community and enhance a sense of community: 
Preparing students as citizens … means they should acquire the ability and 
motivation to participate in and shape … community life, which values civil society – 
that network of relationships, neither government nor market, through which diverse 
groups interact on a basis of trust for the common good, and social capital – the fuel 
of civil society.   This is the basis for social cohesion and fairness. 63 
QSE-2010 reveals a strong emphasis on inclusion as a strategy which is both just and 
sensible – the social ideal of equality demands inclusive schools but so too does the 
need to develop cohesive communities and informed citizens.  Thus, as 
communitarians have argued, inclusion is both for ‘individuals’ and for the ‘common 
good’: 
[schools] will seek to add value to individuals and the common good by giving the 
opportunity to all, irrespective of background or circumstance, to reach the highest 
levels of schooling and attainment. 64 
QSE-2010 goes so far as to state that ‘inclusiveness … is guaranteed’.65 The 
document acknowledges as ‘fundamental’ to a ‘fair society’ that even the ‘least able’ 
and those ‘adversely affected by social and economic change’ should have access to 
the knowledge needed to ‘be active in the life of the community’.66 
QSE-2010 makes it clear that, ideally, inclusive schools should be embedded in 
neighbourhoods: 
… schools must work directly with … diversity and complexity to make sure all 
students have a successful experience of school.  In short, the approach taken by 
different schools must match the characteristics of their communities, schools must 
be flexible enough to accommodate the individual learning needs of different 
students, and the curriculum must be sufficiently forward looking to anticipate their 
future pathways and needs schools need to differentiate.67 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid 13. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid 9. 
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Schools are envisaged as ‘community assets’ that can be developed via ‘community 
partnerships’.68 Individual schools are expected to devise school specific policies 
which respond to the needs not only of students and their parents but also of local 
communities.   School based management, which devolves administrative and budget 
decisions to the individual school level, is, as such, integral to the achievement of 
schools embedded in communities.  There is also the opportunity under some of the 
preferred management models for members of the community to be consulted on 
school development issues and even to be represented on the school council and thus 
influential in the administration of the school.  A variety of models is postulated 
including ‘community hubs in full service schools that through links to other 
government and community services provide a focus for community service delivery 
and community development’.69 This has much in common with Tam’s model of the 
school as a community meeting place70 and reflects the communitarian ideal of the 
school as both resourced by and resourcing the community in which it is based. 
 
Finally, the rhetoric of QSE-2010 indicates that while schools are perhaps 
immediately accountable to parents, they are ultimately accountable to the 
community: ‘Accountability for schools, in a pluralist democracy, is negotiated with 
their communities’.71 A plea is made that schools ‘should not be held accountable for 
systematic or social problems’.72 Such a plea amounts, perhaps, to a tacit 
acknowledgement of the potential of schools to shape both individual lives and 
communities. 
 
68 Ibid 19. 
69 Ibid 9. 
70 Tam, above n 54, 78. 
71 QSE-2010, above n 50, 11. 
72 Ibid. 
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B Curriculum Studies 05: Education Provision for Students with Disabilities73 
While QSE-2010 sets the guiding policy agenda for Education Queensland for the 
present decade, Curriculum Studies 05 (CS-05) relates specifically to policy in respect 
of people with disabilities.  Although this document contains a commitment to 
‘providing equitable educational opportunities’74 to students with disabilities, and 
acknowledges a ‘system- wide commitment to inclusive schooling’,75 its rhetoric is 
not as confident, or as comforting, perhaps, to people with disabilities as the assurance 
in QSE-2010 that ‘inclusiveness is guaranteed’.  Indeed, CS-05 is commonly known 
within Education Queensland as the ‘placement policy’,76 revealing the departmental 
orthodoxy that a variety of ‘placement’ options is available for students with 
disabilities.  CS-05 states that ‘a flexible model of delivery of educational services is 
essential’77 and anticipates ‘the provision of a range of flexible curriculum options 
that allow access and participation and which ensure that educational outcomes are 
maximised’.78 The document is guided, therefore, not only, nor even, perhaps, 
principally, by commitment to a right to inclusion in mainstream schools.  There is a 
clear emphasis on the attainment of ‘educational outcomes’.  A ‘horses for courses’ 
policy approach is constructed whereby a student is matched to the ‘curriculum 
option’ which will ‘maximise’ his or her ‘educational outcomes’.  This policy 
underpins placement practice in Queensland schools for students with disabilities.  
Education for students with disabilities is available in a variety of settings.  The ‘most 
 
73 Education Queensland, ‘Curriculum Studies 05: Education Provision for Students with Disabilities’ 
Department of Education Manual (‘CS-05’).  (Replaced in mid-2006 by Education Queensland, 
Inclusive Education (CRP-PR-009) Education Queensland <http://education.qld.gov.au/strategic/ 
eppr/curriculum/crppr009/ >at 10 November 2006.  See above nn 45 and 47). 
74 Ibid para 1.1. 
75 Ibid para 1.5. 
76 Queensland Government, Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education (students with disabilities) 
Report (2004) 11.  The Taskforce is critical of CS-05’s ‘dissonance’ with a policy of inclusive 
education: Queensland Government, Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education (students with 
disabilities) Report (2004) 11. 
77 CS-05, above n 73, para 1.2. 
78 Ibid para 1.5. 
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inclusive’ option is placement in a ‘regular’ class at a ‘regular’ school.  The next 
option is placement at a special education unit (SEU) attached to a ‘regular’ school.  
The ‘least inclusive’ option is placement at a ‘special school’ located on its own 
campus. 
 
The ‘flexible model’ strategy is supported by a process called ‘ascertainment’: each 
student is assessed in order to ascertain his or her special education needs. The 
ascertainment process is outlined in the policy document Student Management 15:
Ascertainment Procedures for Students with Disabilities 1998 (‘SM-15’).79 The 
process identifies both the ‘support needed’ by a student80 and the ‘programs which 
can support this need’.81 One of six levels of ‘specialist educational support’ is 
recommended and the recommended level ‘must be considered when discussing 
program options with parents and caregivers’.82 SM-15 is frank in stating that ‘[i]t is 
not expected that the expertise to support these students will exist in every school’.83 
Placement proceeds on the basis of whether the level of support ‘recommended’ is 
available in a particular school.  The practical outcome of the ascertainment process, 
 
79 Education Queensland, ‘SM-15: Ascertainment Procedures for Students with Disabilities’, 
Department of Education Manual (1998) (‘SM-15’).  A new scheme, designed to replace ascertainment, 
is to be phased in over a three year period commencing in January 2005. See ‘New program supports 
students with disabilities’ (2005) 14(1) Education Views< http://education.qld.gov.au/ marketing/ 
publication/edviews/html/art-2005-01-04.html> at 20 February 2005; Education Queensland, 
Education Adjustment Program Implementation Key Dates Timeline. <http://education.qld.gov.au/ 
students/disabilities/adjustment/docs/key_dates_timeline.doc.> at 20 February 2005.  The new scheme, 
the Education Adjustment Program, has been developed as part of the Queensland Government’s 
response to the Report of the Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education, and is premised on the 
same six disability categories used for ascertainment. The aim of the program is to determine, in a 
consultative process (EAP process) between school staff, parents and disability specialists, the 
adjustments necessary to the school program and environment to support the student with disability. An 
Education Adjustment Program profile (EAP profile) will replace the present IEP. See Queensland 
Government: Department of Education and the Arts, Education Adjustment Program: Guidelines and 
Procedure<http://education.qld.gov.au/students/disabilities/adjustment/pdfs/eapguidelines-may05.pdf> 
at 21 June 2005. 
80 SM-15, above n 79, para 1.2(b). 
81 SM-15, above n 79, para 1.2(c). 
82 SM-15, above n 79, para 1.4. 
83 SM-15, above n 79, para 3.2. 
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therefore, is that despite the rhetoric of inclusion, inclusion in a mainstream school of 
the students’ choice is not available as a ‘right’ to students with disabilities but only 
when the ‘recommended’ support is available at that school.  
 
The  ‘flexible model’ policy of CS-05 also underpins the strategy of ‘clustering’ 
which further erodes any ‘right’ to inclusion in the mainstream school of their choice 
for students with disabilities.  Action Plan: Educational Provision for Students with 
Disabilities 1998-200284 is a document informed by CS-05 which describes how 
Education Queensland puts the policy stated in CS-05 into practice.  This plan 
describes clustering as ‘an effective means of meeting the unique needs of students 
with disabilities within a reasonable proximity to their homes’.85 Clustering involves 
the grouping of students with disabilities who have been ascertained as having 
‘similar education needs’.86 Different schools are resourced to support different 
‘special needs’ and as such, only specific schools will cater to a particular cluster of 
students.  While clustering may be a cost effective measure for the accommodation of 
the ‘special needs’ of students, its practical result is that students are excluded from 
schools which do not cater to their disability.  Further, the scope of difference within 
and therefore the inclusiveness of schools are reduced. 
 
The ‘flexible model’ policy and its emphasis on education services which enable 
students with disabilities to ‘maximise their outcomes’ explains, perhaps, Education 
Queensland’s emphasis in cases such as L v. Minister for Education for the State of 
 
84 Education Queensland, Action Plan: Educational Provision for Students with Disabilities 1998-2002 
(1998) (‘Action Plan’). 
85Ibid 6. 
86 Ibid. 
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Queensland87 and P v. Director-General Department of Education88 on the setting 
and measuring of education goals for the students in those cases.  While the parents in 
L and P insisted on a right to inclusion in mainstream classes for their children, 
Education Queensland insisted on placing the students in schools suited to their 
ascertained ‘support needs’.  For the complainants in these cases it is clear that school 
is as much, if not more, about social interaction and community acceptance than 
achievement of ‘academic’ milestones.  For the respondent schools, however, the 
focus is on ‘maximising outcomes’.  The clash of expectations and emphases is clear 
in the rhetoric of P, for example.  P was a primary school student with Down’s 
syndrome.  It was acknowledged in that case that the respondent, Education 
Queensland, was troubled by P’s mother’s ‘insistence on her model of inclusion’.89 It 
argued that ‘the complainant’s mother had insisted on physical inclusion when this 
was neither satisfactory nor conducive to P’s educational needs’.90 The respondent 
led evidence that ‘the gap between P and his classmates was widening’91 and argued 
that P should be placed at a ‘special school’ on the basis that it could provide an 
appropriate setting to assist P in achieving his ‘educational goals’.92 
C Curriculum Studies 15: Principles of Inclusive Curriculum93 
Curriculum Studies 15 (‘CS-15’) is not specific to students with disabilities, but is 
nevertheless relevant to their situation in that it sets out the principles of inclusive 
 
87 L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 207 (‘L’). 
88 P v Director-General, Department of Education (1996) 1 QADR 755 (‘P’). 
89 Ibid 759. 
90 Ibid 767. 
91 Ibid 761. 
92 P (1996) 1 QADR 755, 765. 
93 Education Queensland, ‘Curriculum Studies 15: Principles of Inclusive Curriculum’, Department of 
Education Manual (‘CS-15’).  (Replaced in mid-2006 by Education Queensland, Inclusive Education 
(CRP-PR-009) Education Queensland <http://education.qld.gov.au/strategic/eppr/curriculum/crppr 
009/ > at 10 November 2006.  See above nn 45 and 47). 
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curriculum which ‘all educators must apply’ in meeting the needs of the ‘full range of 
social and cultural groups’.94 This policy statement reveals some sensitivity to the 
argument that physical inclusion is not all that is required for the genuine inclusive 
education of students with disabilities.  It recognises that the learning processes 
adopted in schools must also be inclusive by addressing ‘barriers that limit students’ 
opportunities, participation and benefits from schooling’95 and by promoting 
strategies which ‘include, value, and use as a basis for learning, the full range of 
social and cultural groups’.96 Further, educators are directed to develop a curriculum 
which encourages students to ‘question how disadvantage has developed’, ‘challenge 
rather than accept social injustice’ and ‘empower people to participate as equals’.97 
Whilst the sentiments of this document accord with communitarian ideals in relation 
to the ‘education for citizenship’ of students, it could be argued that the strategies of 
ascertainment and clustering operate to produce an education system in Queensland 
where the demographics of a school may be edited of difference, with the result that 
the implicit curriculum of that school may not reinforce its explicit curriculum in 
respect of what is taught about the virtues of tolerance and respect for diversity. 
 
IV EDUCATION POLICY IN QUEENSLAND INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS 
Although Education Queensland documents necessarily influence policy in 
independently owned Queensland education institutions, in that independent schools 
must report to the Minister for Education on their provision of ‘special education’ in 
 
94 Ibid, Accountabilities. 
95 Ibid, Policy Statement para (a). 
96 Ibid, Policy Statement para (b). 
97 Ibid, Policy Statement para (c). 
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order to operate within the law,98 independent schools routinely develop their own 
policy documents.  Indeed, it could be argued that each independent school strives to 
develop, and even to market, a unique character as part of its strategy to attract 
students.  Most independent schools publish ‘mission statements’ which purport to 
encapsulate the ethos of the school.  It may be surmised that these statements are 
intended to inform the policy direction of the school.  Policy statements specific to the 
treatment of students with disabilities or even specific to enrolment and management 
issues are, generally, not made available to the public.  This may be because such 
policies are not in place or, because such policies are kept private to the school 
community.  
 
Some of Queensland’s larger operators of independent schools have published 
statements of policy relevant to inclusive education, if not specifically to people with 
disabilities.  Some insight is available into the policies of schools operated by the 
Lutheran Church of Australia, the Anglican Church of Australia, the Uniting Church 
in Australia and the Catholic Church.99 In general, while their policies suggest a 
commitment to the inclusion of students with disabilities, consistent with the tenets of 
the Christian faith, there is little explicit detail provided of the character of that 
inclusion.  Specifically, there is no stated commitment to provide a mainstream 
education to students with disabilities.  
 
98 Education Act (Qld) s 15. 
99 It should be noted that none of the Queensland schools operated by these churches has been involved 
in litigation involving allegations of disability discrimination.  To date there has been only one case 
brought under the QADA against a Queensland independent school – K v N School (No 3) [1995] 1 
QADR 620. In that case a small Christian independent school in Brisbane successfully raised the 
unjustifiable hardship exemption to resist a complaint of unlawful discrimination brought by a student 
with an intellectual disability who had been excluded from the school. See Part V D, Chapter 6: 
Exemptions. There have been cases in other jurisdictions involving independent schools, including the 
DDA cases Hills Grammar School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2000) 100 
FCR 306 and  Catholic Education Office v Clarke (2004) 138 FCR 121. 
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Information on the inclusion policy of Lutheran Schools in Queensland100 comes from 
an unusual source – an application for an exemption from the education provisions of 
the DDA. The Queensland District of the Lutheran Church of Australia was refused 
an exemption which would have allowed it to institute potentially discriminatory 
procedures for the assessment of the needs of students with disabilities enrolled or 
applying for enrolment at their schools.101 Although the Lutheran school system does 
not make publicly available any dedicated policy on the education of students with 
disabilities, such a policy was referred to in affidavit evidence provided to HREOC in 
support of the exemption application: 
It is part of the education policy of the Lutheran Church to provide equal opportunity 
to students, whether enrolled or potential applicants, irrespective of any particular 
attribute or disability held by the student. The Lutheran Church of Australia 
Queensland District By-Laws Part B, Schedule IV (relating to College Councils) 
states at clause 7 that: 
‘Subject to the power of management vested in the Council, the College shall be open 
to persons without discrimination to class, race or belief’. 
Further, we have a discrimination policy which formalises our longstanding approach 
to affected classes of student.102 
The Anglican Schools Commission of the Diocese of Brisbane103 has published a 
‘Summary Ethos Statement for Anglican Schools in the Province of Queensland’.104 
100 There are 47 Lutheran schools in Queensland, ranging from childcare centres to secondary schools: 
Lutheran Education Australia, Schools Directory: Queensland <http://www.lea.org.au/ qld/ school. 
asp?ssid=10&state=5> at 27 June 2005. 
101The application was for an exemption under DDA s 55. See Notice of HREOC exemption decision 
re: Lutheran Church of Australia Queensland District (10 June 1997) <http://www.hreoc.gov. 
au/disability_rights/exemptions/Lutheran_Schools/Lutheran_schools.html> at 27 June 2005. The 
substance of the exemption application is considered in Part IV Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
102 See Notice of HREOC exemption decision re: Lutheran Church of Australia Queensland District 
(10 June 1997) 2.2 (6).  The relevant affidavit was provided by Kenneth Albinger, Director of Schools, 
Lutheran Church of Australia, Queensland District.  
103 Anglican schools in the Diocese of Brisbane include St Margaret’s, St Aidan’s and the Anglican 
Church Grammar School. 
104 Anglican Schools Commission for the Diocese of Brisbane, Summary Ethos Statement for Anglican 
Schools in the Province of Queensland < http://www.aso.qld.edu.au/views_ethos.html> at 16 
September 2002. 
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Like communitarian writings, the document emphasises the importance of ‘civilised 
community’, stating that ‘Anglican schools should be characterised by tolerance and 
respect for difference’.105 The document also makes a commitment to a ‘service 
ethic’ and to ‘social justice’ and pronounces the ‘willingness of Anglican school 
communities to serve God and His people in the wider community as critical 
participants’.106 The statement ‘seeks to define the normative features of an ideal 
Anglican school’107 but its effect is persuasive rather than prescriptive.  The 
Commission operates in an advisory capacity only, and each school is governed by its 
own council which is free to set its own policy agenda and to generate its own policy 
documents.  
 
The Queensland Synod of the Uniting Church in Australia commissioned a review of 
Church schools108 in Queensland in the late 1990s.  The Schools Review Task Force 
published its findings in July 1999.  The Report shows a sensitivity to the need for 
schools to be inclusive, but does not directly address the inclusion of students with 
disabilities.  It makes a series of recommendations for the future direction of ‘Uniting 
Church-related’109 schools.  The Task Force reported having struggled with ‘the two 
basic issues of elitism and accessibility’.110 Concern is expressed that the fees 
charged by many church schools render them inaccessible to many and create a 
perception that they are elitist.  The Task Force acknowledged that ‘[t]his is a very 
serious matter as it suggests our schools stand in contrast to the Gospel’s concern for 
 
105 Ibid 1. 
106 Ibid 2. 
107 Ibid 1. 
108Uniting Church Schools Review Taskforce, Report of the Schools Review Task Group (1999) 
<http://www.ucaqld.com.au/mission/sr/ucschool.pdf> at 16 September 2002. The Report related to 
eleven schools in Queensland including Clayfield College, Brisbane Boys’ College, Shalom College, 
Moreton Bay College and Scots PGC.  
109 Ibid 5. 
110 Ibid 17. 
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all people, which must include the outsiders, the poor and the underprivileged’.111 
The Task Force recommended that the Synod ‘affirms that all students have the right 
to receive the best education available to them’ and, further, ‘that all church schools 
should, in principle, be accessible to all students’.112 The Report makes clear the 
expectation that ‘[i]f a school is to be called a “church school”, it is to be expected at 
the least that the mission statement of the school will include the basic elements of the 
mission charter of the church’.113 However, as with the case of Anglican schools, 
Uniting Church-related schools are, generally, operated by autonomous school 
councils empowered to make their own policy.114 
The Catholic Church is the largest provider of education, apart from the State, in 
Queensland.115 It operates primary, secondary and tertiary education institutions. 
Unlike the Anglican and Uniting Churches, the Catholic Church does choose to direct 
policy for many Church affiliated schools.  A minority of Catholic schools are owned 
and administered by independent school councils or Catholic orders, but the majority 
by the Catholic Education Office.  The Catholic Education Council in Queensland 
document, Our Priorities for 2002-2006116 sets out the current priorities for the 
Queensland Catholic school community.  Unlike the Anglican and Uniting Church 
documents described above, this document does directly address disability issues.  It 
 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid 23. 
113 Ibid 16. 
114 It is interesting to note that ‘Educang’ an education provider established co-operatively by the 
Uniting and Anglican churches in Queensland recently established a separate ‘special education’ 
facility attached to Forest Lake College. It could be argued that this is evidence that both the Uniting 
and Anglican churches promulgate options other than inclusion in a mainstream school for students 
with disabilities. 
115 In the Archdiocese of Brisbane, for example, there are 130 Catholic schools administered by 
Brisbane Catholic Education: Brisbane Catholic Education, Schools <http://www.bne.catholic.edu.au/ 
pub/parents/schools.htm >at 27 June 2005. 
116 Catholic Education Council, Queensland, Our Priorities 2002-2006 (2002) <http://www.qcec.qld. 
catholic.edu.au/site/www/index.cfm> at 16 September 2002. 
106
is a comprehensive policy document intended to inform the future direction of 
Catholic education in Queensland.  There is a stated ‘intention’ to ‘enhance school 
based curriculum which is focused on improving developmentally appropriate student 
learning outcomes for all students of varying needs and abilities’.117 There are several 
further ‘expectations’ relating to the in-servicing of teaching staff and the resourcing 
of schools to cater to the needs of students with disabilities.118 It is notable that the 
rhetoric of the document is ‘technical’ – focussing on issues such as ascertainment, 
guidance, counselling and resources.  There are no general statements committing to a 
right to, or a policy of, inclusion.  There is, however, reference to ‘the Catholic 
commitment to social justice’ and the stated expectation that this commitment will be 
‘promoted and supported at the school and system level’.119 
A companion document, however, does contain specific detail on inclusion policy. 
Inclusive Practices in Queensland Catholic Schools indicates that Catholic schools in 
Queensland ‘celebrate the uniqueness of students within the learning community’120 
and that ‘inclusive practices…are foundational to the ethos of the schools’.121 There 
is, however, no specific commitment to the provision of mainstream education to 
students with disabilities; rather a commitment is made to ‘provide equitable access to 
the curriculum, offer maximum learning opportunities, and work towards meeting the 
educational and social needs of all students’.122 Brisbane Catholic Education 
acknowledges as policy, however, that resource issues may limit the availability of 
full inclusion to students with disabilities: ‘Brisbane Catholic Education will provide 
 
117 Ibid para I1.3. 
118 See ibid paras E1.9, E1.10 and E1.11. 
119 Ibid para E2.7. 
120 Catholic Education Commission, Inclusive Practices in Queensland Catholic Schools (2000) 1. 
121 Ibid 
122 Ibid. 
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an appropriate Catholic education for students with special educational needs 
according to the availability of physical, human and financial resources’.123 
V CONCLUSION 
Once policy documents have been collected and analysed, the interesting exercise of 
measuring ‘practice’ against ‘policy’ can be carried out.  Are policy promises of 
‘inclusion’, ‘equality’ and ‘social justice’ delivered to Queensland students?  
‘Practice’ can be determined from statistical and anecdotal evidence of the placement 
of students with disabilities, and from a variety of reports which consider the issue of 
inclusive education.  ‘Practice’ can also be inferred from the growing body of case 
law on discrimination in education.  Evidence of the ‘practice’ of inclusion in 
Queensland schools is considered in Chapter 5.  
 
123 Brisbane Catholic Education, Special Education: Policy.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE IMPACT OF THE LEGISLATION  
 
The Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA), and other similar Australian 
legislation, have not delivered an unfettered right to equal opportunity in education to 
people with disabilities.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the legislation has not 
significantly affected education opportunities for many students with impairments.1
The most persuasive indication of the failure of anti-discrimination legislation in this 
area, however, is to be found in the fact that most court proceedings against education 
providers initiated by people with disabilities, under the authority of the legislation, 
have been unsuccessful.2 A further indication of failure is the statistical evidence that 
a significant proportion of Queensland students with disabilities are still educated in 
segregated settings.  Several reports have also found that an inclusive education is not 
available to many students with disabilities in Queensland.  The probable inference to 
be drawn from these reports is that anti-discrimination legislation has not ‘solved’ the 
problem of exclusion of students with disabilities.  While some of these reports were 
commissioned by disability action groups, with an explicit agenda to promote 
inclusion, the Australian Senate3 and the Productivity Commission4 have also 
conceded a need for improvement.  
 
1 See Jennifer Barkman, Daring to Dream…Stories of Parent Advocacy in Queensland (2002). 
2 It is true that many claims of discrimination are conciliated without proceeding to trial.  It is also true, 
however, that they are conciliated in the legal context set by the decided cases.  In respect of apparently 
‘generous’ agreements it is important to note that conciliated outcomes do not set binding legal 
precedents.  Summaries of some conciliated Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA)
complaints are available at <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/disability_rights/decisions/conciliation.html>.  
The following ‘reminder’ precedes the summaries: ‘Conciliated settlements are usually made without 
admission of liability and may not provide firm precedents for the outcome in other cases’. 
3 Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Education of students with disabilities (2002) (‘Senate Report’). 
4 Productivity Commission, Australian Government, Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992,
Report No 30 (2004) (‘PC Review’). 
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It is of further significance that standards for the education of people with disabilities 
have recently been introduced by the Commonwealth in order to address perceived 
failures of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA), and by implication, of 
State legislation such as the QADA, to deliver equality of educational opportunity to 
students with disabilities.  
 
It must be acknowledged, however, that evidence of the failure of anti-discrimination 
legislation is complicated by the use of different measurements of the success of 
strategies to deliver equality of opportunity to students with disabilities and, 
particularly, by different understandings of the term ‘inclusion’.  As noted in Chapter 
3, the meaning of this word varies to match the agenda of its user.5 Although the 
inclusion of students with disabilities in regular6 classrooms is not accepted as 
desirable by all parties involved in the education process – administrators, teachers, 
parents, students – it is nevertheless the ‘prevailing orthodoxy’ underpinning 
education policy in Australia.7 Inclusion of people with disabilities in mainstream 
society – a ‘regular’ class in a ‘regular’ school may be considered a microcosm of 
mainstream society - is also a fundamental aim of anti-discrimination legislation8 and 
of disability services legislation.9 Furthermore, the inclusion in mainstream social 
settings of people with disabilities is seen by communitarian theorists as a corollary of 
citizenship and as a right which yields only when its maintenance impinges on the 
 
5 See Part I, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. See also an analysis of the different meanings of 
the term inclusion in Senate Report, above n 3, 29-34 [3.1]-[3.19].  The findings of the Senate Report 
are discussed below at Part IV C. 
6 See Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy n 4.  
7 Senate Report, above n 3, 29 [3.1]. 
8 See DDA s 3, Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) Parliament’s reasons for enacting this Act.  
See also the analysis of the policy of the QADA in Part II B, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
9 See Disability Services Act 1992 (Qld) ss 9 and 17.  Section 17 is particularly explicit:  ‘programs and 
services should be designed and implemented to promote the inclusion of people with disabilities in the 
life of the local community’.  
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greater good.10 For the purpose of analysis of the evidence presented in this chapter, 
therefore, equality of opportunity in education is taken to mean equality of 
opportunity to enrol in a ‘regular’ class in a ‘regular’ school.  Inclusion in this sense 
is, as such, adopted as the bold benchmark of equality of opportunity in education.  It 
is also acknowledged, however, that the legislation should protect a right to 
‘substantive inclusion’ as well as mere ‘physical inclusion’ by compelling adjustment 
to accommodate student impairment. 
 
I COMPLAINTS OF DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION 
The following table indicates that over the course of the last decade, complaints of 
discrimination in education on the ground of impairment have frequently dominated 
discrimination in education complaints accepted by the Queensland Anti-
Discrimination Commission: 
Table 1: Discrimination in Education Complaints, Queensland Anti-Discrimination Commission11 
1996-
1997 
1997-
1998 
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 
2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
Discrimination 
in education 
complaints 
22 16 15 16 48 11 27 35 21 
Discrimination 
in education 
on the ground 
of impairment 
complaints 
7 Not 
available 
8 11 23 6 Not 
available 
Not 
available 
Not 
available 
Percentage of 
total education 
claims 
32% 
(largest 
category) 
Not 
available 
53% 
 
69% 48% 
(largest 
category) 
55% Not 
available 
Not 
available 
Not 
available 
10 See Part III, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
11 See Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, Annual Report 1996-1997, Anti-Discrimination 
Commission Queensland, Annual Report 1997-1998,  Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, 
Annual Report 1998-1999,  Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, Annual Report 1999-2000, 
Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, Annual Report 2000-2001, Anti-Discrimination 
Commission Queensland, Annual Report 2001-2002, Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, 
Annual Report 2002-2003, Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, Annual Report 2003-2004, 
Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, Annual Report 2004-2005. 
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Although detailed complaints statistics are not available for the years 2002-2003, 
2003-2004 and 2004-2005 it is interesting to note that the ADCQ has reported that 
impairment complaints now represent the single largest category of complaints 
accepted.12 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) Australia-wide 
complaints data over the same period also suggest a readiness on the part of 
complainants to use the legislation to enforce a right to education: 
Table 2: Discrimination in Education Complaints, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
Commission13 
1996-
1997 
1997-
1998 
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 
2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
Total  DDA 
complaints 
received by 
area 
899 45 34 51 65 82 98 90 Not 
available 
Total  
discrimination 
in education 
complaints 
99 713 754 583 789 870 905 906 Not 
available 
Percentage of 
total 
complaints 
received by 
area 
11% 5% 4% 9% 8% 9% 11% 10% Not 
available 
Despite the fact that complaints data suggest a significant number of complaints of 
discrimination in education have been made under anti-discrimination legislation, 
very few of these complaints proceed to final hearing.  Complaints are often 
 
12 Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, Annual Report 2004-2005, 15 and 18.  In 2004-2005 
impairment complaints accounted for 27.1%. In 2003-2004 impairment complaints accounted for 
26.5% of all accepted complaints.   
13 Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual Report 1996-1997, Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual Report 1996-1997, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
Commission, Annual Report 1997-1998, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual 
Report 1998-1999, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual Report 1999-2000,
Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual Report 2000-2001, Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual Report 2001-2002, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
Commission, Annual Report 2002-2003, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual 
Report 2003-2004, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual Report 2004-2005.
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withdrawn, declined or settled via conciliation before hearing.14 HREOC publishes 
regular summaries of decisions to decline or terminate complaints15 and also of 
conciliated outcomes.16 These summaries do not, however, cover every case 
declined, terminated or conciliated by HREOC.17 
II  DECIDED CASES  
Although the QADA and the DDA have been in force for over a decade, and although 
anti-discrimination legislation was first enacted in an Australian jurisdiction (New 
South Wales)18 almost 30 years ago, there is still only a handful of tribunal or court 
decisions on point.  This can be explained, perhaps, by the clear message given by the 
decided cases that there is no clearly defined right to inclusion and, at least for many 
students with severe intellectual and behavioural impairments, there may be no right 
to inclusion.  It has even been claimed that rather than protecting a right to freedom 
from discrimination, anti-discrimination legislation has been used to ‘legitimise the 
very practices it is designed to overcome’.19 Jones and Basser Marks cite the cases L
v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland,20 and Hashish v Minister for 
Education for Queensland,21 both cases which, arguably, narrowed significantly the 
right to education of Queensland people with disabilities, in support of their 
 
14 QADA ss 139, 140, 158 and 159; DDA ss 71 and 74. 
15 See HREOC, Decline/termination decisions: Education 
<http: _rights/decisions/decline/decline_education.html> at 22 February 2005. 
16 HREOC, Conciliated Outcomes: Education <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/disability_rights 
/decisions/conciliation/education_conciliation.html> at 22 February 2005. 
17 See   HREOC   Conciliated Settlements, Introduction   <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/disability_rights/ 
decisions/conciliation.html> at 22 February 2005. 
18 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). 
19 M Jones and LA Basser Marks, ‘The Limitations on the Use of Law to Promote Rights: An 
Assessment of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), in Marge Hauritz, Charles Sampford and 
Sophie Blencowe (eds), Justice for People with Disabilities (1998) 60, 78. 
20 L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland [1995] 1QADR 207 (‘L’). 
21 Hashish v Minister for Education for Queensland [1998] 2 Qd R 18 (‘Hashish’). 
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proposition that ‘[r]elying on anti-discrimination measures to remedy social ills is a 
business fraught with danger’.22 
The few Australian decided cases do demonstrate that those ‘hard cases’ which 
proceed to trial or hearing are only rarely resolved in favour of the complainant.  In 
Queensland, of the cases which have proceeded to hearing under the QADA, only two 
have been resolved in favour of the complainant – I v O’Rourke and Corinda          
State High School and Minister for Education for Queensland 23 and I on behalf of BI 
v State of Queensland.24 In Corinda, the complainant, who had both intellectual and 
physical impairments, succeeded in proving only one of three allegations of 
discrimination arising from restrictions placed on her access to and enjoyment of a 
variety of school activities.  She was awarded $3000 damages and, on the basis of the 
mixed outcome of the trial, complainant and respondent were directed to bear their 
own costs.26 This costs decision, inevitably, further eroded the ‘victory’ of the 
complainant.  In the more recent case of BI, however, the complainant was awarded 
damages of $25 000 after he was excluded from school for absenteeism related to his 
schizophrenic illness. 
 
Australia-wide, despite the decisions in Corinda and BI, case law and tribunal 
decisions in favour of complainants suggest that the legislation operates to favour the 
inclusion of students with physical impairments over the inclusion of students with 
 
22 Jones and  Basser Marks, above n 19, 78.  
23 I v O’Rourke and Corinda State High School and Minister for Education for Queensland [2001] 
QADT 1 (31 January 2001) (‘Corinda’). 
24 I on behalf of BI v State of Queensland [2005] QADT 37 (Unreported, Dalton P, 14 December 2005) 
(‘BI’). 
26 Corinda [2001] QADT 2 (30 April 2001).  See QADA s 213 re the power of the Queensland Anti-
Discrimination Tribunal (QADT) to order a party to pay costs. 
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intellectual impairments.  This is even more clearly the case when a student’s 
impairment has the consequence of affecting the ability to control behaviour resulting 
in ‘disruption’ to the regular classroom routine.  It will be seen later in this chapter 
that the evidence from the decided cases conforms with other evidence that students 
with intellectual impairments are less likely to be accepted as students at regular 
schools.  
 
A Physical Impairment 
The DDA decided cases clearly suggest that likelihood of success is linked to variety 
of impairment.  To date almost all successfully litigated claims have been brought by 
people with physical or sensory impairments.27 In Kinsela v Queensland University 
of Technology28 the complainant used a wheelchair. In Finney v Hills Grammar 
School,29 the complainant had cerebral palsy and used a wheelchair.  In Travers v New 
South Wales,30 the complainant had cerebral palsy.  In Murphy and Grahl v the State 
of New South Wales,31 the complainant child had a physical impairment and used a 
wheelchair.  In Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor,32 and Hurst and Devlin v 
Education Queensland,33 the complainants had hearing impairments.  In Bishop v 
 
27 A few students with intellectual and behavioural impairments have conciliated some relief.  See the 
sample summaries of conciliated DDA complaints <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/disability_rights 
/decisions/conciliation/education_conciliation.html> at 22 February 2005. Of the 42 summaries 
provided one involved a student with psychiatric impairment, three involved students with intellectual 
impairments, nine involved students with developmental or behavioural impairments, such as 
Asperger’s syndrome, Autism and ADHD, and two involved students with intellectual and behavioural 
impairments.  
28 Kinsela v Queensland University of Technology [1997] HREOC No H97/4. 
29 Finney v Hills Grammar School (2000) EOC 93-087 (HREOC); Hills Grammar School v Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2000) 100 FCR 306 (‘Finney’). 
30 Travers v New South Wales (2001) 163 FLR 99 (Federal Magistrates Court). 
31 Murphy and Grahl v The State of New South Wales (NSW Department of Education) and Wayne 
Houston [2000] HREOC NoH98/73 (‘Grahl’). 
32 Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor [2003] FCA 1085; Catholic Education Office v Clarke 
(2004) 138 FCR 121. 
33 Hurst and Devlin v Education Queensland [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005) 
(Hurst and Devlin). The complainant Hurst succeeded only upon appeal to the Full Federal Court.  See: 
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Sports Massage Training School34 the complainant was not physically or 
intellectually impaired but had a learning disorder, dyslexia.  It should also be noted 
that these ‘successful’ cases are almost all concerned with allegations of a 
discriminatory failure to accommodate the needs of an enrolled student with a 
disability rather than with allegations of discriminatory failure to enrol or expulsion.  
 
‘Exclusion’ cases are most often brought by students with intellectual and or 
behavioural disabilities.  The first exception is Finney, which arguably set a 
benchmark in relation to the enrolment of students with a physical disability but with 
‘normal’ intellectual function.  In that case an independent Sydney school had argued 
that the enrolment of the seven year old Scarlet Finney would impose an ‘unjustifiable 
hardship’ on the school, particularly in that modifications to the school campus would 
be required to accommodate Scarlet’s wheelchair.  The Federal Court refused to 
interfere with a HREOC determination that any financial costs caused to the school by 
enrolling Scarlet would not support a finding that the unjustifiable hardship 
exemption should be available to the school.35 
The second exception is Grahl, which, it could be argued, involves the ‘constructive’ 
exclusion of a student.  The enrolment of Sian Grahl, a five year old child with the 
degenerative physical condition, Spinal Muscular Atrophy, but without intellectual 
disability, was initially, but reluctantly, accepted by the Bellingen Primary School in 
New South Wales. The subsequent treatment of Sian and her parents by the School, 
however, suggests an attempt to force them from the school community. Allegations 
 
Hurst v Education Queensland [2006] FCAFC 100 (Unreported, Ryan, Finn and Weinberg JJ, 28 July 
2006). 
34 Bishop v Sports Massage Training School [2000] HREOC No H99/55. 
35 Hills Grammar School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2000) 100 FCR 306. 
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of discrimination centred on the placement of an industrial bin in the ‘disabled’ 
parking space routinely used by Sian’s family and on the locking of the only entrance 
to the school grounds which was easily accessible by wheelchair.  These incidents 
were accepted by HREOC as evidence of ‘an unsympathetic, uncaring and negative, 
hostile environment or mindset which the school by its principal and some staff had 
created and demonstrated and as a result of which Sian was limited in her access to 
the wholesome benefits of a proper education and of a supportive educational 
environment’.36 It is interesting that HREOC noted that the particularly gross 
examples of discrimination found proven in this case were inconsistent with the 
relevant education authority’s policy to include students with disabilities.38 
Cases from other Australian jurisdictions decided for the complainant have also 
concerned physical or sensory impairment.  In Rocca v St Columba's College Ltd and 
Rogers39 the complainant, who had mild cerebral palsy, was granted an interim 
injunction by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) compelling the 
respondent school to keep open a place for her pending trial.40 The VCAT also found 
in Beasley v Department of Education and Training 41 that a student with hearing 
impairment had been both directly and indirectly discriminated against as a result of 
his school’s method of instruction not accounting for his impairment. In Krenske-
Carter v Minister for Education,42 two incidents of indirect discrimination were 
 
36 Grahl [2000] HREOC NoH98/73 [6.7]. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Rocca v St Columba's College Ltd and Rogers [2003] VCAT 774 (Unreported, Judge Bowman V-P, 
23 June 2003). 
40 It appears that the matter ultimately settled as it did not proceed to trial. 
41 Beasley v Department of Education and Training [2006] VCAT 187 (Unreported, McKenzie DP, 17 
February 2006).  The complainant was only partially successful and failed to prove some of his claims 
of discrimination. 
42 Krenske-Carter v Minister for Education (2003) EOC ¶93-256, 77143. 
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proved by a complainant with the auto-immune disorder, Lupus. She was awarded 
$4000 damages by the Equal Opportunity Tribunal of Western Australia.   
 
B Behavioural and Intellectual Impairment 
Australia-wide, there has been only one successful education discrimination case 
brought by a student with a behavioural impairment, to date.  While BI concerned a 
student with schizophrenia, however, his exclusion from school was premised not on 
any problem behaviour within school but upon his repeated and prolonged absences 
from school.  Dalton P of the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (QADT) 
noted, however, that Education Queensland policy was deficient to the extent that it 
did not provide for the development of programs for students with ‘mental illnesses’ 
and ordered that ‘the facts of this case be brought to the attention of relevant officers 
within Education Queensland’.43 
Australia-wide, to date, there have been only two successful cases brought by students 
with an intellectual impairment.  In the QADA Corinda case, however, the 
complainant was both intellectually and physically impaired and the focus of the 
successful complaint in that case was discrimination on the basis of physical 
disability.  The successful claim related to the complainant’s exclusion from an 
 
43 BI [2005] QADT 37 (Unreported, Dalton P, 14 December 2005).  Note that the complainant did not 
proceed with other complaints alleging discrimination arising out of, first, an earlier exclusion of the 
complainant for allegedly stealing a wallet and, secondly, the alleged failure of the respondent properly 
to identify the complainant’s disability and to ascertain his resultant special educational needs. See 
Pagura-Inglis v Minister for Education [2003] QADT 18 (Unreported, Member Roney, 23 October 
2003);  Pagura-Inglis v State of Queensland [2004] QADT 42 (Unreported, Member Roney, 7 
December 2004); I on behalf of BI v State of Queensland [2006] QADT 19 (Unreported, Dalton P, 
11May 2006) [3]-[5].  It is also interesting to note that the complainant used his award of damages to 
establish a scholarship fund to support the studies of a student with a psychiatric impairment at the 
Queensland Conservatorium of Music at Griffith University.  It is believed to be the first fund of its 
kind in Australia.  See Margaret Wenham, ‘Landmark fund for mentally ill’, The Courier Mail 
(Brisbane), 18 April 2007, 28.  
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excursion because of her use of a wheelchair. The complainants in State of Victoria v 
Bacon & Ors,44 a case brought under the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic), had 
sought continued access to special school education after reaching the age of 18.  The 
complainants were all intellectually impaired and had hoped to enter an ‘18+’ 
transition course at a special school operated by the respondent, but which the 
respondent proposed to close.  The Victorian Court of Appeal found that the Victorian 
Education Department's policy of excluding funding to all students of 18 years or over 
in State run schools, unless they were enrolled for a VCE course, amounted to indirect 
discrimination against persons with an intellectual disability.45 
By contrast, there have been numerous failed cases advanced by complainants with 
intellectual or behavioural disorders under both the DDA46 and various State anti-
discrimination statutes.47 After the decision in the QADA case, L, where the 
suspension and proposed exclusion of a complainant with a developmental disorder 
which manifested as disruptive behaviour was found not to be unlawful 
discrimination, there was a perception that the scope of any right to inclusion had 
been significantly narrowed.  The case excited extensive media coverage and 
 
44 Bacon v State of Victoria [1997] VADT 7 (Unreported, McKenzie P, 30 June 1997). 
45 State of Victoria v Bacon & Ors [1998] 4 VR 269. A similar case brought in Queensland failed on 
the basis of the exclusion found in QADA s 106: Acts done in compliance with legislation. QADA s 
106(1) (a) authorises an act done in compliance with an existing provision of another Act. See Hashish 
[1998] 2 Qd R 18. See also above nn 19 and 20 and Part II A, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
46 See, for example, Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92; Minns v State of New South Wales [2002] FMCA 60 
(Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) (‘Minns’). 
47 See for example L [1995] 1QADR 207; P v Director-General, Department of Education (1996) 1 
QADR 755 (‘P’); K v N School (No 3) [1995] 1 QADR 620 (‘K’); Brackenreg v Queensland University 
of Technology [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999) (‘Brackenreg’); S on 
behalf of M & C v Director General, Department of Education & Training [2001] NSWADT 43 
(Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members McDonald and Mooney, 21 March 2001) (‘M & C’); 
Lynch v Sacred Heart College (1995) EOC ¶92-724 (Victorian Equal Opportunity Tribunal) (‘Lynch’); 
Treloggen  v Department of Education [2003] TASADT 4 (Unreported,  Member Kohl, 11 July 2003) 
(‘Treloggen’). 
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polarised public opinion on the issue of inclusion.48 According to Queensland Parents 
for People with a Disability (QPPD) advocate, Donna Ball, Education Department 
resources available to support inclusion were reduced after the decision in L:
‘Following the anti-discrimination stuff I think there were a lot of people starting to 
not have as much.  The Education Department won, even though they said nobody 
won, all of a sudden they had the ability to turn people away’.49 Mother of the 
complainant in L, Michelle O’Flynn, lamented the administrative ramifications of her 
daughter’s case: ‘So now of course students with disabilities and their families have to 
contend with a range of restrictive policies one being the enrolment and placement 
policy’.50 Queensland Advocacy Incorporated (QAI), which had funded L’s case 
before the QADT, argued that the case confirms that in inclusion cases ‘litigation 
remains a last resort’ because of ‘the time and cost involved’.51 In fact, after L, QAI 
made a policy decision ‘not to take on any further inclusion education legal matters in 
the near future’.52 It was decided that there were ‘other areas where we should be 
directing our resources’.53 The similar QADA behaviour impairment cases of P and 
K, heard shortly after L, were also decided against the complainants.  No such 
‘behaviour’ case has since proceeded to final hearing before the QADT.  
 
Similarly, the Victorian Equal Opportunity Tribunal in Lynch, the New South Wales 
Anti-Discrimination Tribunal in M and C, the Federal Magistrates Court in Minns,
48 Barkman, above n 1, ch 13. See, for example, Mark Oberhardt, ‘School Integration Policy Under 
Fire’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane) 15 December 1995, 5; Denis Atkins, ‘A Question of Hardship’, The 
Courier Mail (Brisbane), 15 December 1995, 15; Genevieve Butler, ‘QC Defends All Pupils’ Rights’, 
The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 16 December 1995, 6; Denis Atkins, ‘Commonsense Win or Rights 
Setback?’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane) 19 January 1996, 2; Genevieve Butler, ‘Row over Disabled 
Students’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane) 23 January 1996, 3. 
49 Barkman, above n 1, 19. 
50 Ibid. 
51Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, Newsletter, March, 1996. 
52 Queensland Advocacy incorporated, Annual Report 1995-1996. 
53 Ibid. 
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and the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal of Tasmania in Treloggen have all authorised 
the exclusion from mainstream education of students with problem behaviour caused 
by disability.  The position in relation to complainants alleging discrimination on the 
basis of disability induced behaviour has been recently clarified by the decision of the 
High Court of Australia in Purvis.54 In that case, a majority of the Court held that the 
exclusion of the complainant was lawful even though his problem behaviour was 
caused by his various impairments.  
 
C Tertiary Students and the Failure to Meet Course Requirements 
Several cases involving tertiary students have demonstrated the difficulty of proving 
that exclusion on the basis of failure to meet course requirements because of disability 
is unlawful discrimination.  In the QADT case, Brackenreg, the complainant had a 
disorder affecting the spinal cord, syringomyelia, had been treated for cervical cancer, 
and most significantly, perhaps, in terms of her capability as a student, had been 
diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).  The complainant 
was excluded from her Bachelor of Laws degree course at Queensland University of 
Technology as she was ‘in breach of both the double fail rule and the progression 
rule’.55 President Copelin, of QADT, decided in that case that ‘[t]here is no 
obligation on the respondent to pass a student just because they have a disability’.56 In 
a similar case, W v Flinders University of South Australia,57 brought under the DDA,
the complainant, who had an undisclosed psychiatric condition, was excluded after 
failing to meet the course requirements of her teaching degree.  Like the QADT, 
 
54 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92 
(‘Purvis’). 
55 Brackenreg [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999). 
56 Brackenreg [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999) [4.2.2.4 iv]. 
57 W v Flinders University of South Australia [1998] HREOCA 19 (Unreported, Commissioner 
McEvoy, 24 June 1998) (‘W’). 
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Commissioner McEvoy of the HREOC emphasised in W that a university is ‘not 
obliged to forgo the academic requirements of its course for people with disabilities’. 
In both Brackenreg and W it was found that the respondents had acted appropriately 
and to the extent required by law to accommodate the disability of the complainants.58 
Similar claims have failed under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).59 The 
recent case of Hinchliffe v University of Sydney60 has added another layer of 
complexity to the status of the rights of tertiary students with a disability and 
demonstrates in a different context that it is difficult for tertiary students to prove 
unlawful discrimination.  In that case, a student with a visual impairment claimed that 
 
58 In a more recent DDA case the Federal Court and the High Court of Australia have refused leave to 
appeal applications brought by a student with a depressive illness excluded from university after failing 
to meet course requirements. Driver FM of the Federal Magistrates Court had found that the 
complainant was not discriminated against on the ground either of disability or of race, as the 
complainant had alleged, and that the nature of the complainant’s depressive illness was that he was 
unable to accept the justice of the university’s decision to exclude him: Chung v University of Sydney 
[2001] FMCA 94 (Unreported, Driver FM, 20 September 2001); Chung v University of Sydney [2002] 
FCA 186 (Unreported, Spender J, 21 November 2002); Chung v University of Sydney [2002] HCA 
S87/2002 (Unreported, Gaudron, McHugh JJ, 5 November 2002). See also the DDA litigation 
involving the dismissal by the Federal Court of a complaint of disability and race discrimination by 
Charles Pham after his failure to appear at trial: Pham v University of Queensland [2001] FCA 1044 
(Unreported, Heerey J, 30 July 2001); Pham v University of Queensland [2002] FCAFC 40 
(Unreported, Drummond, Marshall, Finkelstein JJ, 1 March 2002); Pham v Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission [2002] FCAFC 353 (Unreported, Whitlam, North, Weinberg JJ, 6 November 
2002).  See also the DDA litigation surrounding the claim of Chandra Sluggett who was excluded from 
the University of South Australia after failure to meet course requirements.  A childhood infection with 
polio caused impaired mobility, and she claimed that she had been the victim of indirect discrimination 
in that she had access difficulties at the university campus. HREOC found that any indirect 
discrimination was reasonable and dismissed the claim. Upon review, the Federal Court could find no 
legal error in the HREOC finding.  An appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court was dismissed: 
Sluggett v Flinders University of South Australia [2000] HREOC No H96/2 (Unreported, 
Commissioner McEvoy, 14 July 2000); Sluggett v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission 
[2002] FCA 987 (Unreported, Drummond J, 9 August 2002); Sluggett v Flinders University of South 
Australia [2003] FCAFC 27 (Unreported, Spender, Dowsett, Selway JJ 5 March 2003). See also the 
recent refusal of the Federal Court to grant an extension of time to file her application and claim under 
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) to failed doctoral student, 
Stanislawa Bahonko, on the basis of a lack of evidence to support her claims that examiners had failed 
her because of her race and an imputed disability: Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology 
[2006] FCA 1325 (Unreported, Weinberg J, 11 October 2006). 
59 See Harding v Vice-Chancellor, University of New South Wales [2003] NSWADT 74 (Unreported, 
Hennessey D-P, Members McDonald and Weule, 15 April 2003)  where complaints of impairment, age 
and sex discrimination were dismissed under NSWADA s 111 as lacking in substance and because of 
the complainant’s failure to appear. See also Reyes-Gonzalez v NSW TAFE Commission [2003] 
NSWADT 22 (Unreported, Ireland J, Members Silva and Strickland, 3 February 2003). 
60 Hinchliffe v University of Sydney [2004] FMCA 85 (Unreported, Driver FM, 17 August 2004). 
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she had been the victim of discrimination in that the University of Sydney had failed 
to provide course materials to her in an accessible form.  The case is interesting 
because, unlike other university cases, the complainant was not failing subjects.  On 
the contrary, she achieved a distinction, two credits and four passes in her first 
semester of studies in Occupational Therapy at the University of Sydney and a high 
distinction, three distinctions, a credit and four passes in the second semester.61 By 
her own admission her results would ‘probably not be perceived as being poor’.62 Her 
claim was, nevertheless, that her academic future had been compromised by what she 
presented as the University’s failure to provide her with course materials in an 
acceptable format which accommodated her disability.  She was not successful, 
however, in proving her case of indirect discrimination, with Driver FM finding that 
the actions of University disability support staff were ‘sufficient and adequate’.63 
III STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
A Productivity Commission Review of the DDA 
The Productivity Commission Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (PC 
Review), released in April 2004, is a voluminous analysis of the social impact of that 
legislation in the decade following its implementation.  The Commission received 373 
submissions and conducted hearings in all capital cities.  The hearings were attended 
by 190 individuals and organisations.67 The findings of the PC Review relevant to 
disability discrimination in education will be discussed below.68 However, the PC 
 
61 Ibid [66]. 
62 Ibid [25]. 
63 Ibid [121]. 
67 PC Review, above n 4, G1. 
68 See Part IV D. 
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Review is also useful as the most comprehensive source of recent Australian data 
relating to the education of people with disabilities. 
 
1 Vocational Education and Training (VET) 
Since 1994 VET students have been asked to identify their disabilities on enrolment 
forms. Although such reporting is voluntary and, as such, not ‘completely reliable’69 
data collected suggest that participation rates in the VET sector have increased 
substantially over the last decade.  The number of students with self-identified 
disabilities grew at an average rate per annum of 11.2%, while the student population 
grew at an average rate of 5.2%.70 Statistics suggest that students with a wide range 
of disabilities are accessing VET.  Enrolment forms provide for students to report a 
disability which is physical, hearing, visual, intellectual, a chronic illness or ‘other’. 
The most common disabilities reported in 1996, 1999 and 2000 were physical, visual 
and intellectual, but more than 30% of VET students who reported having a disability 
did not specify the nature of the disability.71 Data suggest, however, that students 
with a disability were less likely to be enrolled in specific job related courses, such as 
engineering or business studies, and more likely to be enrolled in generic courses, 
such as study skills and job-seeking skills.  In 1996, 47% of students with disabilities 
were enrolled in generic courses.  By 2000, however, this proportion had lessened to 
27%.72 
Notably, students with a disability were less likely to complete their selected subjects 
than other students.  In 1996, for example, 71.2% of students with a disability 
 
69 PC Review, above n 4, B7. 
70 Ibid Table B7, B13. 
71 See Ibid Table B2, B8. These are the three years compared in the table. 
72 Ibid B9. 
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successfully completed subjects for which they were enrolled, compared with 76.8% 
of all students.   In 2000 the comparable figures were 74.3% and 80.1%.73 
2 University 
Nationally consistent information relating to the participation of students with 
disabilities at the university level has been collected since 1996.74 Like VET students, 
university students are required only to self-report disability on enrolment forms. 
Thus, like VET data, there is some question as to the accuracy of information.  
Between 1996 and 2003 the number of students self-reporting a disability increased 
from 1.9% of all enrolled students to 3.6% of all enrolled students.75 This figure of 
3.6% is approaching the participation target of 4% set by the Commonwealth’s 
Higher Education Equity Program in 1990.76 
University students report disability according to a different set of classifications from 
VET students – hearing, learning, mobility, visual, medical and other.  The largest 
number of students – 33.3% in 1996 and 33.6% in 2000 – reported a medical 
disability.  It is, perhaps, not unusual, in the context that university is the tertiary 
study destination of academically ‘elite’ students, that no student specified an 
intellectual disability.77 Data analysed by the Productivity Commission suggest that 
students with disabilities were more likely to study arts, humanities and social 
sciences than other students and less likely to study business, administration, 
 
73 Ibid Table B4, B10. 
74 Ibid p B.11. 
75 Ibid Table B5, B11. 
76 Ibid B11. 
77 Ibid Table B6, B11. 
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economics and engineering.  Similar percentages of students, however, enrolled in 
education, health, law and legal studies and sciences.78 
As with the VET sector, students with disabilities were found to be more likely to fail 
their courses.  In 2000, for example, 81% of students with disabilities passed their 
year’s studies while 87% of other students passed.79 Further, students with disabilities 
are less likely to pursue post-graduate studies than others.  In 2000, 15.7% of 
university students with a disability were enrolled in post-graduate studies compared 
with 20.5% of others.80 
3 Primary and Secondary Schooling 
The PC Review publishes some information relating to the primary and secondary 
years of schooling but, generally, it is not as comprehensive as that reported for the 
tertiary sector.  This is partly explained by the fact that, while data relating to tertiary 
studies have been quite comprehensively and uniformly collected across Australia, 
data relating to primary and secondary schooling are compromised by different 
disability definition categories and collection and reporting methods in different 
states.81 Particularly confusing are the statistics relating to the proportion of students 
with disabilities placed in mainstream as distinct from special schools.  
 
The Australia-wide data presented by the Productivity Commission suggest that a vast 
majority of students with disabilities attend mainstream schools.  In 2002, for 
example, 98,064 Full time Equivalent (FTE) students were enrolled in mainstream 
 
78 See Ibid Table B7, B13 for data from 2000. 
79 Ibid B13. 
80 Ibid Table B7, B13. 
81 See Ibid Box B1, B2.  
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schools and only 19,627 in special schools.82 The Productivity Commission 
concedes, however, that the classification ‘mainstream’ collapses into one category a 
variety of placement options, ranging from full-time placement in a mainstream class 
in a mainstream school through to placement in a special education unit attached to a 
mainstream school but with no guarantee of significant access to a mainstream 
environment.  The PC Review states that ‘[f]or students with moderate to severe 
disabilities in particular, the extent to which they are participating in mainstream 
classes, instead of separate ‘special education’ classes located within a mainstream 
school is not clear’.83 It is particularly important for the present study that placement 
statistics for students with disabilities reported by Education Queensland are 
disappointingly – it has even been suggested, deliberately – ambiguous. 84 Education 
Queensland placement policy and related statistics require closer analysis. 
 
B Education Queensland 
Clear statistical information on the placement of students with disabilities in 
Queensland schools is not easily accessible.  Independent schools do not publish 
statistics reporting on the number of students with disabilities enrolled,85 and it is 
 
82 See Ibid Figure B2, B4. These are Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished data 
from the Department of Education, Science and Training. 
83 Ibid B5.   
84 See below n 87. 
85 The Productivity Commission reported that, in 2002, 117,808 FTE students were identified as having 
a disability by their State or Territory government and that, of these, 83% attended Government 
schools, 12.6% Catholic schools and 5.4% Independent Non-Government schools. See PC Review,
above n 4, B3-B4. Australian Bureau of Statistics statistics for 2002 show that 69% of all students 
attended Government schools and 315 Non-Government schools: Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘2002 
Education and Training:  Primary and secondary education’, Yearbook Australia 2002 (2002).  
<http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/06FE53B35F00F26CCA256B3500187314> at 26 
February 2005. The evidence of the disparity between these two sets of statistics is that students with 
disabilities are more likely to enrol at a Government than at a Non-Government school.  It is tempting 
to suggest the additional implication that Non-Government schools have not been required, 
legislatively or otherwise, to accommodate students with disabilities to the same extent as Government 
schools. In this context it is interesting to consider the QADA case of K (1996) 1 QADR 620, where a 
small independent Brisbane school proved unjustifiable hardship in the cost of accommodating a 
student with an intellectual disability to defeat a prima facie finding that their exclusion of that student 
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difficult to generalise on independent school policy based on the anecdotal and case 
law information which is available.86 Education Queensland does make available 
some statistical detail of the placement of students with disabilities, but it will be seen 
that the published information is not sufficient to allow for complete analysis of the 
placement trends.  Indeed, it has been speculated that the withholding of information 
allows a public perception that more students with disabilities are included in regular 
schools than is, in reality, the case.87 
Despite the promise of ‘inclusion’ implicit in the policy rhetoric examined above,88 
Education Queensland, in practice, provides multiple options for placement of 
students with impairments.  They may be placed in a regular class within a regular 
school, with their special needs catered for by onsite or visiting specialist staff.  They 
may be placed in a special education unit which operates on or adjacent to the campus 
of a regular school and which allows, for students with impairments, a degree of 
inclusion in regular classes and activities.  Finally, students may be placed at a special 
school which operates independently of regular schools and which segregates students 
with impairments from regular schools and their students.  A further refinement of the 
placement system is that special schools and special education units within 
 
was discriminatory.  By contrast, QADT refused to find unjustifiable hardship, in the sense of financial 
hardship, in two cases involving State Schools: L (1995) 1 QADR 207; P (1995) 1 QADR 755. See 
Part V, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
86 Some detail of published policies of Anglican, Uniting Church, Catholic and Lutheran Schools is 
included in Part IV, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
87 Evidence to Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Brisbane, 6 
September 2002, 409 (Phillip Tomkinson, Vice-President, Queensland Parents for People with a 
Disability). See also the questioning by Senator Tierney of Michael Walsh, Acting Director, Inclusive 
Education Branch, Curriculum Directorate, Education Queensland: Evidence to Senate Employment, 
Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Brisbane, 6 September 2002, 494-8.  Senator Walsh 
was disappointed at the lack of statistical detail made available to the Inquiry on matters such as 
placement and staff training. His comments included, ‘You leave it at a bit of a disadvantage if you do 
not know such a fundamental fact’, at 491; ‘It should not be too hard to do the maths on this’ at 495; 
and, ‘I am amazed you do not know’ at 498.  The Senator asked Walsh to take several questions on 
notice. 
88 See Part III, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
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mainstream schools may cater for students with a range of different impairments or, 
instead, may focus on a particular impairment. 
 
In Queensland, at present, a student does not have unfettered freedom to enrol at the 
school of his or her choice.  The enrolment in a particular State school of a student 
with an impairment is, in theory, negotiated by the student’s parents with 
representatives of Education Queensland.  In theory, parents may choose any state 
school for their child.  Enrolment options are, however, in practice, limited by the 
kind and degree of impairment of the student, by the options available in the location 
where a student lives and by the services and facilities available at particular schools. 
Transport assistance, for example, may only be made available to a student to the 
nearest school deemed appropriate for that student by Education Queensland.  The 
withholding of transport assistance to other schools has created a financial pressure on 
parents to accept the Education Queensland preferred option.89 
In order to inform decisions about the placement and level of support to be provided 
to students, Education Queensland relies on a system of ‘Disability Categories’.90 
The categories ‘describe conditions of need which restrict student access and 
participation relating to learning environments and/or learning outcomes’.91 
Education Queensland focuses on the ‘impact upon educational matters’ whatever the 
cause of disability and acknowledges that no system of categories can 
 
89 Glenis Green, ‘Taylah’s mum just wants a fare go’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 22 August 2000, 8. 
90 Education Queensland, Defining students with Disabilities in Queensland State Schools: Discussion 
stimulus paper (2001), [3].  Categories supported under the ascertainment process are Physical, 
Hearing, Vision, Deafblind, Speech-Language, Autistic Spectrum and Intellectual. The following 
categories may attract funding via other mechanisms: Early Developmental, Specialised Health and 
Mental Health. Descriptions of these categories are provided at [3]. 
91 Ibid. 
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comprehensively cover the ‘full range of restrictions on learning’92 in that disability is 
a ‘broad term’.93 The claim is, therefore, that the system is based on the ramifications 
and not the cause of disability for a particular student, even though the system is 
based on the classification of students according to impairment type.  
 
In 2001 Education Queensland initiated a review of the ‘adequacy and accuracy’ of 
the disability categories as presently defined.94 It is noted that the reviewed policy 
and procedures documents retained the same five disability categories.95 More 
comprehensive definitions of each category have, however, been developed to be used 
in conjunction with detailed diagnostic criteria statements.96 Education Queensland 
acknowledges that a student may meet the criteria of multiple disability categories.97 
The real significance of the categories is that they are a feature of the ‘ascertainment’ 
process.98 This is the process of determining the level of support which will be made 
available to a student with a disability.99 The support provided is funded by a mix of 
state and federal government monies.  Students are classified as falling within a 
particular disability category and then are further classified according to the level of 
 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid preamble. 
95 Education Queensland, Ascertainment Policy and Revised Procedures: Students with Disabilities 
(2002) 4. 
96 Ibid 17-50. 
97 Ibid 4. 
98 It should be noted that ascertainment is also conducted by independent schools as a prerequisite step 
to accessing government funds to support students with impairments. See Education (Accreditation of 
Non-State Schools) Regulation 2001 (Qld) s 8.  As explained in Part III, Chapter 4: Queensland 
Education Policy, a new scheme, designed to replace ascertainment, is to be phased in over a three year 
period commencing in January 2005. An Education Adjustment Program profile (EAP profile) will 
replace the present IEP. The new scheme retains the disability categories applicable to the 
ascertainment procedure.  See Chapter 4:  Queensland Education Policy, n 45 and 79.   
99 For a detailed description of the ascertainment procedure and for pro forma examples of the requisite 
documentation see Education Queensland, Ascertainment Policy and Revised Procedures: Students 
with Disabilities (2002). 
101 Ibid 51. 
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their ‘support requirements’.101 The levels range from level 1, least support, to level 
6, most support.102 An Individual Education Plan (IEP) is prepared for students 
ascertained at levels 4, 5 and 6.103 An IEP is a plan, negotiated by parents, education 
professionals and the student, to determine the student’s needs and learning priorities 
for the next six months.  The reality is that students ascertained as requiring the higher 
levels of support – and, therefore, the most ‘expensive’ students to support – will have 
more limited placement options and therefore more limited access to ‘inclusion’ than 
students ascertained at the lower level of need.  This is because the support 
‘ascertained’ as necessary for a particular student may be made available only at a 
particular school or type of school.  Transport assistance is made available to a 
student with a particular type of disability to attend the nearest school equipped to 
provide resources for that disability.104 Although it is claimed by Education 
Queensland that parents can send their child to a school that does not have the 
specialist resources, and that Education Queensland ‘would provide some resources to 
that school in order to support the student’ and ‘would ensure that the student got a 
level of resources that was sufficient for them to be able to access the curriculum’, the 
anecdotal and statistical evidence suggests that most students ascertained at levels 4 – 
6 comply with the ‘aggregated resources’ approach and attend the school deemed 
most suitable by Education Queensland.  The evidence of QPPD Vice-President, 
Phillip Tomkinson, to the recent Senate Inquiry into the Education of People with 
Disabilities was that it was a ‘myth’ that students in segregated schools and units are 
there through choice: ‘We have evidence at QPPD around the placement policy of 
 
102 Ibid 69. 
103 Education Queensland, Individual Education Plans <http://education.qld.gov.au/curriculum/ 
learning/students/disabilities/practice/ieps/iep.html>  at 21 February 2003. 
104 Evidence to Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Brisbane, 6 September, 2002, 502 (Michael Walsh, Acting Director, Inclusive Education 
Branch, Curriculum Directorate, Education Queensland). 
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students in schools to show that in many instances parents are pressured to accept 
segregation.  The word parents frequently use to describe their negotiation with Ed 
Queensland over placement is “blackmail”’.105 
Statistics provided to the Senate Inquiry state that as of February 2002, 12,617 
students with disabilities, representing approximately 2.87% of the school age 
population, attended Education Queensland schools.106 Eighty percent of students 
with disabilities attended regular schools or schools with special education units, 
while 20% attended special schools.107 However, no further breakdown of the 80% 
figure, showing details of how many students were in regular classes and how many 
in Special Education Units (SEUs), or of the level of access to regular classes 
provided to students in SEUs, was provided in Education Queensland’s submission to 
the Inquiry or at the hearing, attracting the criticism of both the QPPD and of Senator 
Tierney, sitting on the hearing.108 An Education Queensland spokesman told the 
Inquiry, ‘There is no evidence or information available in relation to your question as 
to how many students can be integrated into a regular classroom’.109 The only clear 
statistic available, therefore, is that 20% of students attend special schools and, as 
such are segregated from regular classes, not ‘included’.110 
105 Evidence to Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Brisbane, 6 
September 2002, 409 (Phillip Tomkinson, Vice-President, Queensland Parents for People with a 
Disability). 
106 Ibid 483. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid  495. 
109 Ibid  493.  
110 There is an argument, however, advanced by the supporters of special schools that inclusion is not 
about location so much as attitude and that on this basis it is possible for a student with a disability to 
receive an ‘inclusive education’ in a segregated setting. 
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Evidence was provided to the Senate Inquiry that the number of special schools has 
declined from 87 in 1990 to 47 in 2002.111 There has been a concurrent increase, 
however, in the number of SEUs attached to regular schools.  Evidence to the 
Productivity Commission put the number of SEUs at 219 in 2001.112 Dr John 
Enchelmaier, Vice-President of the Australian Federation of Special Education 
Administrators, cautioned the Senate Inquiry that placement at an SEU was no 
guarantee of inclusion: ‘We have got to be careful that the establishment of units is 
not equated necessarily with inclusion.  Inclusive practices can be based on in such a 
dispersal of expertise and students, but it is not a given.  Unless there are some 
incentives and some environmental support for it, you will not get inclusion’.113 
Ms Fiona Connolly, QPPD representative on the Queensland Ministerial Taskforce on 
Inclusive Education, told the Senate Inquiry in relation to the 80 percent figure, ‘we 
do not know how many of their schools operate in a very exclusive manner, even 
within a regular setting.  They may well be in a unit that has six-foot fences and there 
is no traffic between those environments.  From that, we do not really know how 
many are included’.114 Michael Walsh, Acting Director of the Inclusive Education 
Branch of Education Queensland, suggested that the majority of students in special 
education units in regular schools would attend regular classes, but admitted that ‘it 
does not necessarily mean that if you are in a special education unit attached to a 
 
111 Evidence to Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Brisbane, 6 September, 2002, 443 (Dr John Enchelmaier, Vice-President of the Australian 
Federation of Special Education Administrators). 
112 PC Review, above n 4, B5. 
113Evidence to Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Brisbane, 6 September, 2002, 444 (Dr John Enchelmaier). 
114 Ibid 419 
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regular school you will at any point in time be in a regular classroom.  You can attend 
the unit and not attend regular classes’.115 
Other statistics published by Education Queensland, reporting 2004 data, provide 
more precise detail of the placement of students by disability.117 Statistics are 
available showing the placement in either ‘regular’ schools or special schools of 
students ascertained at levels 4, 5 and 6, according to variety of impairment.  Again, 
no distinction is made between placements in a ‘regular’ class at a ‘regular’ school or 
in an SEU attached to a ‘regular’ school, meaning that some students reported as 
attending ‘regular’ schools may, in fact, be spending a proportion of their time in a 
‘segregated’ setting.  The statistics do reveal, however, evidence of a hierarchy of 
stigma according to type of impairment, in that students with intellectual impairments 
are significantly more likely to be placed in a special school than students with 
physical impairments or sensory impairments.  The incidence of placement in a 
special school also increases in step with ascertainment level.  Thus, for example, of 
209 hearing impaired students ascertained at level 4 none were placed in special 
schools while of the 238 students classified at level 6 only 5 were placed in special 
schools.  Of the 405 students with physical impairments ascertained at level 4 none 
was placed in a special school and of the 382 students ascertained at level 6, 15 were 
placed in special schools.  The figures for students with intellectual impairments are 
markedly different.  While there is a similar level of inclusion for students ascertained 
at level 4, students ascertained at level 6 are significantly more likely to find 
 
115 Ibid 493. 
117 Education Queensland, Count and Full-time Equivalent of Students Ascertained at Levels 4, 5 and 6 
by Impairment Type, Gender and Year Level (2004) < http://education.qld.gov.au/schools /statistics/ 
pdfs/2005sec1tbl4-7.pdf> at 31 July 2006. 
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themselves in a special school than are students who are physically impaired or blind. 
Of the 255 students with intellectual impairment ascertained at level 4, none is placed 
in a special school, but, of the 3234 ascertained at level 6, 1919 are placed in special 
schools.  
 
The statistics also suggest a higher incidence of intellectual impairment than of other 
impairments.  This higher incidence is partially explained by the fact that students 
with multiple disabilities are reported once for each category and that students with an 
intellectual impairment frequently also have a physical or sensory impairment.  It can 
be deduced from this overlap in the statistical reporting that many of the students with 
physical and sensory impairments reported as placed in a special school will also have 
an intellectual impairment.  It is fair to speculate from these statistics that a majority 
of students indicated as placed in ‘regular’ schools who are placed in SEUs are likely 
to be students with intellectual impairments.  The evidence suggests a clear link 
between intellectual impairment and placement in segregated or partially segregated 
settings.  The evidence also suggests, therefore, that students with intellectual 
impairment face a higher level of stigma than students with physical or sensory 
impairments in that they are less likely to be included in regular classes.  Further, the 
table, below, demonstrates that when statistics from 2004 are compared with 
equivalent statistics from 2001118 it is clear that while there has been some 
improvement in terms of the mainstream inclusion of students with physical 
impairments since 2001, the same level of  improvement has not been evident for 
students with intellectual impairments: 
118 Education Queensland, Count and Full-time Equivalent of Students Ascertained at Levels 4, 5 and 6 
by Impairment Type, Gender and Year Level (2001) < http://education.qld.gov.au/schools /statistics/ 
pdfs/es01_04-05.pdf, > at 19 March 2003.  
135
Table 3: Education Queensland Special School Enrolments by Impairment 
Category by 
impairment 
2001 
number of 
students in special 
school/number of 
students 
2001  
percentage of 
students placed in 
a special school 
2004  
number of 
students in special 
school/number of 
students 
2004  
percentage of 
students placed in 
a special school  
Hearing 
impairment 
6/260 2.3% 5/238 2.1% 
Physical 
impairment 
43/374 11.5% 15/382 3.9% 
Intellectual 
impairment 
1766/2770 65.5% 1919/3234 59.3% 
If there is discrimination against some groups in that their placement options, despite 
policy pronouncements to the contrary, are limited, then this may suggest that anti-
discrimination legislation is not delivering ‘equality of opportunity,’ in terms of equal 
access to mainstream schools, to all people with disabilities.  Indeed, Senator 
Campbell, Chair of the Senate Inquiry, found it ‘odd that there have been so few 
prosecutions’ of complaints of discrimination in education in Queensland.119 In 
response to evidence from Dr Christina Van Krayenoord, Director of the Schonell 
Special Education Research Centre, that she believed that independent schools ‘may, 
in fact, seek ways of precluding students from attendance or enrolment in their 
schools, despite the antidiscrimination [sic] legislation’, Senator Campbell 
commented, ‘The obvious question follows, then: is this not a breach of the law?’120 
IV REPORTS 
During the last decade several reports from a variety of Australian jurisdictions have 
indicated that inclusion in mainstream schooling settings is not available as of right to 
 
119Evidence to Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Brisbane, 6 September 2002, 412. 
120 Ibid 458. 
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students with disabilities.  At first glance, the most comprehensive report appears to 
be based on a study conducted by Darrell Wills and Robert Jackson for the National 
Council on Intellectual Disability (NCID).  This study produced a ‘report card’ on 
inclusive education practices in Australia.121 This ‘report card’ was highly critical of 
Australian education policy and practice and recorded a ‘D’ grade for the inclusion of 
students with disabilities.  The value of the ‘report card’, however has been 
questioned by the Report of the Senate Inquiry into the Education of Students with 
Disabilities, which casts doubt on its claimed link with UNESCO122 and on its 
methodology,123 and implies it is driven by an ideology out of touch with the ‘more 
basic concerns’ of parents.124 The Senate Report concludes that the report’s findings 
‘appear to reflect the preconceptions of its researchers and authors and are of doubtful 
validity’.125 
Mike Clear, editor of an important assessment of the delivery of disability services in 
New South Wales,126 reviews several reports on the education of people with 
disabilities in that State which indicate continuing problems with the implementation 
of uniform access to inclusive education.127 Ultimately, he concludes that neither 
 
121 Darrell Wills and Robert Jackson, ‘Education for All: UNESCO Report Card on Inclusive 
Education in Australia’ (2000) 14 (3&4) Interaction. The ‘report card’ comprises the whole volume.  
122 Senate Report, above n 3, 36 [3.25]. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid 30 [3.4]. 
125 Ibid 45 [3.55]. 
126 Mike Clear (ed), Promises Promises: Disability and Terms of Inclusion (2000). 
127 Mike Clear, ‘The Forms of Promise: Policy and Service Developments’ in Mike Clear (ed), 
Promises Promises: Disability and Terms of Inclusion (2000) 58, 66-7. Reports reviewed are D 
McRae, The Integration/Inclusion Feasibility Study (1996); National Children’s and Youth Law 
Centre, Disability Discrimination in Schools: Students and Parents Speak Out (1997); New South 
Wales data from a draft report for the National Council on Intellectual Disability prepared by Inclusion 
National as part of the UNESCO study, Education for All: The Year 2000 Assessment – Thematic study 
on Inclusive Education. Note that the National Council on intellectual Disability data, in its published 
form, is the Wills and Jackson ‘report card’ criticised by the Senate Enquiry.  See above nn 110, 111, 
112, 113 and 114. 
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legislative nor policy initiatives have succeeded in delivering a ‘guaranteed’ equality 
of opportunity in education: 
Anti-discrimination legislation in New South Wales and State government policy 
initiatives in school education and significant efforts of TAFE education appear to 
have created greater awareness, some higher skills amongst staff and greater 
opportunities for disabled students to access and participate in the benefits of 
education, but they do not guarantee that educational structures will include and 
appropriately support a disabled person in any reliable way.128 
In her more recent assessment,129 again focussing on New South Wales,130 Katherine 
Lindsay finds that the evidence from the reports is ‘remarkably consistent’131 and 
suggests that while statistics for that State might indicate that ‘physical inclusion’ in 
mainstream classes is available for a ‘majority of students’, a mere physical presence 
in a mainstream classroom does not equate to equality of opportunity in education.132 
Lindsay is prepared to make the link between the failures of legislative protection and 
the failures of inclusion practice in New South Wales: ‘it is not apparent that the 
broad and deep objectives of inclusion are reflected in Australia’s disability 
discrimination laws, neither in their drafting nor in their interpretation’.133 
The principal focus of the present analysis is on reports with more specific or more 
recent relevance to Queensland: first, the report of the Ministerial Taskforce on 
Inclusive Education, tabled in June 2004;134 secondly, the QPPD report, There’s Small 
 
128 Mike Clear, ‘Personal Lives in Unaccommodating systems’, in Mike Clear (ed), Promises 
Promises: Disability and Terms of Inclusion (2000) 109, 116. 
129 Katherine Lindsay, ‘ “Asking for the Moon?” a critical assessment of Australian disability 
discrimination laws in promoting inclusion for students with disabilities’ (2004) 8 International 
Journal of Inclusive Education, 373-390. 
130 Ibid 373. 
131 Ibid 376.  Katherine Lindsay reviews D McRae, The Integration/Inclusion Feasibility Study (1996); 
National Children’s and Youth Law Centre, Disability Discrimination in Schools: Students and Parents 
Speak Out (1997); and Tony Vinson,  Inquiry into Public Education in New South Wales (2002). 
132 Lindsay, above n 129, 377. 
133 Ibid 387. 
134 Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education (students with disabilities) (Queensland), Report, June 
2004 (‘Taskforce Report’). 
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Choice in Rotten Apples;135 thirdly, the report of the Senate Inquiry into the Education 
of Students with Disabilities,136 tabled in December 2002; and, finally, the 
Productivity Commission Review of Disability Discrimination Act 1992,137 published 
in April 2004.  
 
A Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education (students with disabilities). 
The provision of education to students with disabilities was the subject of a recent 
Ministerial Inquiry in Queensland.  Early in 2002, the Education Minister announced 
a plan ‘designed to support inclusive education for all students enrolled in state 
schools’.138 The ‘seven-point plan’ involved the creation of a task force to report to 
the Minister, an action plan for students with disabilities, a staff college to provide 
professional development to the teachers of students with disabilities, a summit on 
inclusive education, the development of a strategic plan for a five-year capital works 
program to commence in 2003, the trial of a post-compulsory school education 
certificate to recognise the school achievements of students with disabilities and ‘the 
reorganisation of facilities within the department to ensure they are consistent with an 
inclusive education framework’.139 While it is perhaps too early to assess the impact 
of all seven points of this plan, the Ministerial Taskforce has completed its brief.  Its 
report tabled in June 2004, however, amounts to tacit acknowledgement that the 
 
135 Queensland Parents for People with Disabilities, There’s small choice in rotten apples:  an 
exploration of the process of parental decision-making around educational choice for parents of 
children with disabilities, (2003). 
136 Above n 3. 
137 Above n 4. 
138 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 February 2002, 14 (Anna Bligh, 
Minister for Education and the Arts). See also Evidence to  Senate Employment, Workplace Relations 
and Education Committee, Parliament of Australia, Brisbane, 6 September 2002, 483 (Michael John 
Walsh, Acting Director, Inclusive Education Branch, Curriculum Directorate, Education Queensland). 
139 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 February 2002, 14 (Anna Bligh, 
Minister for Education and the Arts).  
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Queensland Education system, to that date, had failed to deliver its ‘guarantee’140 of 
inclusion to students with disabilities in that it foreshadows new policies and ‘new 
directions on inclusive education’.141 Further, there is an implied criticism of the 
Government’s record on inclusion in its Recommendation 1, ‘[t]hat the Queensland 
Government publicly support the vision and benefits of an inclusive society’.142 Most 
damning, however, is their conclusion, in relation to students whose disabilities 
exhibit as problem behaviours,  that as some teachers and schools do not have the 
necessary expertise or support to deal with the behaviour, ‘it would appear that 
suspension and eventual exclusion of these students is becoming common practice’.143 
The Taskforce was briefed, in March 2002, to ‘provide advice on how to make the 
schooling system more inclusive for students at educational risk, in particular students 
with disabilities and learning difficulties’.144 The Report articulates firm support for 
inclusive education as an aspect of ‘human rights’.  Its rhetoric reflects a 
communitarian emphasis on education as providing access to citizenship: ‘The core 
social context that illuminates the plight of marginalised groups is the issue of human 
rights, which has at its centre the concept of human dignity, social justice and the 
achievement of full citizenship’;145 ‘The education of students with disabilities is 
central to the concept of human dignity and the achievement of full citizenship’.146 
140 In Education Queensland’s lead policy document, Queensland State Education 2010, the claim is 
made that ‘inclusiveness is…guaranteed’:  Education Queensland, Queensland State Education 2010 
(2000), 13. This policy document, and its promises, are analysed in Part III, Chapter 4: Queensland 
Education Policy. 
141 Education Queensland policy updates made in 2006 in response to the Taskforce Report are 
discussed in Part III, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
142 Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education (students with disabilities) (Queensland), Report, June 
2004 (‘Taskforce Report’) Recommendation 1. 
143 Ibid 11. 
144 Ibid 5. 
145 Ibid 10. 
146 Ibid 5. 
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The Report recommends change to both placement policy and practice identifying 
‘some organisational structures, and core beliefs and practices…that hinder the 
provision of quality curriculum and pedagogy for students with diverse learning 
needs’.147 It is particularly significant that the Report identified a ‘dissonance 
between policy and practice’148 and acknowledged that different understandings of 
terms such as inclusion lead to ‘inconsistencies in interpretation and expectation’.149 
It highlights the fact that existing policy documents, such as the ‘placement policy’, 
SM–18,150 ‘carry incongruities that need to be addressed by a comprehensive review 
to align them with projected new directions on inclusive education’.151 While the 
Report does not go so far as to recommend that the ‘new directions’ should 
comprehend mainstream education as a right for students with disabilities, it clearly 
implies that there should be greater access to the mainstream school.  It supplies its 
own definition of ‘inclusive education’ as ‘a process of responding to the uniqueness 
of individuals, increasing:  their presence, access, participation, and achievement in a 
learning society’.  While this definition is, perhaps, wide enough to embrace the 
existing range of placement options available in Queensland, it is clear that the 
Taskforce envisages fundamental change to that range:  
How can inclusive schools be created from the present arrangement of regular, social 
units/classes and special schools?  Many current and past initiatives to support 
students with disabilities have served to separate them (and their teachers) from their 
(respective) peers. Teachers who have taught students with disabilities in special 
schools and units have usually undertaken training programs different from those of 
other teachers.  In contrast, implementation of the vision requires provision of such 
specialist expertise to support diverse learners, their teachers and parents/caregivers, 
in inclusive education environments.152 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid 11. 
149 Ibid. 
150 This policy is analysed in Part III, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
151 Taskforce Report, above n 142, 11. 
152 Ibid 18. 
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In another tacit acknowledgement of past failures, the Minister for Education, 
responding to the Report, announced a 10 point plan ‘to boost inclusive education for 
students’.153 The plan includes the establishment of a ministerial advisory committee, 
the updating of syllabuses, the establishment of a research program, and the provision 
of additional funding, including funding for professional development for Education 
Queensland staff.154 It is anticipated that the institutional change required to deliver 
what the Taskforce called ‘the new vision of inclusion’ will not be rapid and that 
significant planning for that change will be required.  Indeed, the first concrete change 
to emerge from the Taskforce Report was the establishment of a Ministerial Advisory 
Committee briefed ‘to provide advice on strategies to promote inclusive programs and 
curriculum for students with disabilities’.  Cynics may claim that the ‘7 point plan’ 
and ‘Ministerial Taskforce’ of 2002 have produced, in 2005, a ‘10 point plan’ and 
‘Ministerial Advisory Committee’.  Nevertheless, the ‘10 point plan’ adopts all but 
one of the taskforce recommendations155 and does promise a change in culture which 
may well help more students with disabilities to enjoy inclusion in a mainstream 
school.  Perhaps the major (and most welcome), change, to date, to emerge from the 
‘10 point plan’ is the revamping of the controversial ascertainment program.  A new 
‘more flexible resourcing methodology’ is to be phased in over five years 
commencing in January 2005.156 Further, the Queensland Government has recently 
delivered on a commitment that ‘Education Queensland policies for students with 
 
153 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 June 2004, 1649 (Anna Bligh, 
Minister for Education and the Arts).  
154 Taskforce Report, above n 142, 18. 
155 The 12  recommendations relate to ‘leadership’, ‘community and family expertise’, improved 
accountability to families’, ‘an inclusive and responsive curriculum’, empirical support for the vision’, 
‘equitable use of resources’, and ‘a confident and capable workforce’. See Ibid 7-8. Recommendation 
3, ‘[t]hat the minister prepare and promulgate a green paper on Inclusive Education’, was not supported 
by the government on the basis that it may ‘slow the process of improvement’: Minister for Education 
and the Arts (Queensland), The Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education (students with 
disabilities): Government Response, June 2004, 3. 
156 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 June 2004, 1649 (Anna Bligh, 
Minister for Education and the Arts).  
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disabilities will be reviewed to ensure that processes and mechanisms for the 
inclusion of parents/caregivers in decision making and participation in their child’s 
education are made explicit’.157 New ‘inclusive education’ policy documents were 
released during 2006.158 As noted earlier, however, it is too early to judge the impact 
of these revamped policies on the education rights of Queensland students with 
disabilities.159 
B QPPD: There’s small choice in rotten apples 
QPPD is a federally funded advocacy organisation association for people with 
disabilities. The following ‘mission statement’ reveals its priorities: 
QPPD vigorously defends justice and rights for people with disabilities by exposing 
exclusionary practices, speaking out against injustices and promoting people with 
disabilities as respected, valued and participating members of society. 160 
QPPD has been an important advocate for inclusive education in Queensland and has 
made submissions to both the PC Review and the Senate Inquiry into the Education of 
Students with Disabilities. The QPPD report, There’s Small Choice in Rotten Apples,
publishes the results of a small survey conducted by the organisation into Education 
Queensland placement policies and the parental response to those policies.  The 
survey was self-selecting, with participants drawn from among people who had 
previously been involved in a QPPD ‘phone-in’ research project, QPPD members, 
members of other (unspecified) parent support organisations, and all schools in three 
(unspecified) Queensland Education Districts.161 Of the surveys distributed, 247 were 
 
157 Minister for Education and the Arts (Queensland), The Ministerial Taskforce on Inclusive Education 
(students with disabilities): Government Response, June 2004, 4. 
158 See discussion of these documents in Part III, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
159 See Part III, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
160Queensland Parents for People with Disabilities, There’s small choice in rotten apples:  an 
exploration of the process of parental decision-making around educational choice for parents of 
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returned, representing a response rate of 11%.162 Focus group discussions were held 
to draw out a narrative response to the survey issues and to ‘validate the survey 
data’.163 Although not stated explicitly, the implication of the Report is that both 
survey respondents and focus group participants were parents of children with 
disabilities.164 It is a basic premise of the QPPD platform that part of any right to 
education is the right of parents and their children to choose the school the children 
attend.  Moreover, this right to choose should be available to all students regardless of 
disability.165 Perhaps the major finding of the Report is that participants did not 
believe that there was a genuine choice of schooling options available for their 
children and that both the ascertainment process and Education Queensland placement 
policy were constraints on choice.  A majority (73%) of the participants in the 
research asserted that they would not send their child to their present school if it were 
not for the fact of the child’s disability.166 Participants reported feeling pressured to 
enrol their children at the Education Queensland recommended school: 
It is difficult to take the option which is not recommended by EQ.  Parents feel that 
they are punished for insisting on inclusion, whereas the recommended option laden 
with the incentives of resources, therapy, transport and other supports is sometimes 
very hard to resist.167 
The clear implication, therefore, of the Report is that the funding policies of 
Education Queensland limit the range of education options effectively available to 
 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 See the following statements for example: ‘In answer to the survey question asking parents to 
identify the age of their child with disability, 85% indicated that their child was in the 6 to 18 years of 
age bracket’ (15); ‘A range of criteria was used to select participants for the focus groups; 
geographical, is child of school age, does the child attend a private or state school, and the 
ascertainment type and level of the child’s disability’ (17). See also the summary of the focus group 
participants: Appendix B. 
165 Ibid 10-11. 
166 Ibid 17. 
167 Ibid 36. 
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students with disabilities: ‘This research exposes the non-sense of choice for parents 
of students with disability’.168 
While there is little explicit reference to the role of disability discrimination 
legislation in protecting a right to choice in education, there is a suggestion made that 
the unjustifiable hardship exemption has been instrumental in allowing schools to 
avoid the accommodation of students with disabilities.169 The authors of the Senate 
Inquiry into the Education of Students with Disabilities dismissed QPPD as having an 
agenda too ‘radical’ to attract wide community support.171 It will be seen, however, 
that the findings of QPPD’s report are, perhaps, not too different from the findings of 
the Senate Inquiry itself. 
 
C Senate Report 
The Senate Inquiry into the Education of Students with Disabilities arose from 
concerns about the effectiveness of Commonwealth programs affecting the teaching 
of students with disabilities and the effectiveness of the delivery of Commonwealth 
funds towards supporting such programs.172 The Senate Report acknowledges that the 
policy of inclusive education ‘is widely accepted as likely to lead to the most 
 
168 Ibid 38. 
169 Ibid 33 and 34.  The operation of the unjustifiable hardship exemption in the education context is 
discussed in detail in Part V, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
171 See Senate Report, above n 3, 37 [3.28]: ‘The QPPD agenda appears to be much wider than the 
immediate concerns of students with disabilities. It has much to do with transforming the 
administrative and pedagogical culture of schools as a catalyst for social change. In arguing that the 
education needs of students with disabilities are no different from the education needs of other 
students, QPPD is expressing a view that is unlikely, in the committee’s view, to find support in the 
education community as a whole’.  
172 Ibid Preface xix. 
145
desirable learning outcome for students’173 The Senate Report further contends that 
‘[i]nclusive education… recognises the human rights and equal entitlements of those 
with disabilities and embraces certain social responsibilities and ethical goals which 
are supposed to be consistent with a polity such as Australia’.174 The Report notes, 
however, the failure of anti-discrimination legislation to protect a right to equal 
opportunity in legislation as a matter of concern: 
Social justice demands that students with disabilities should have equal access to 
education.  Commonwealth, state and territory anti-discrimination legislation support 
this fundamental principle, yet there still appear to be marked disparities in the 
quality of educational opportunities offered to students with disabilities.176 
Like the QPPD report, therefore, the Senate Report suggests that there is a right to 
equal access to education options.  Unlike the QPPD report, however, the Senate 
Report implies that there should be limits on inclusion.  It is interesting that one of the 
limits implied in the Report coincides with a limit implied by communitarian 
commentators.  That is, where the inclusion of the student with disability interferes 
with the rights to education of other students, the rights of the majority (that is, of the 
other students) should prevail.  The Report notes that withdrawal from mainstream 
classes is indicated where a student with disability interferes with the ability to learn 
of other students or impinges on the safety of other students.177 In another respect, 
however, the Report countenances withdrawal from the mainstream setting in a wider 
range of circumstances relating to educational ‘benefit’ for the student with disability 
than, it seems, would be countenanced by communitarians.  While at least one 
communitarian commentator, Walzer, has suggested withdrawal only when a student 
 
173 Ibid Preface xxi. 
174 Ibid. 
176 Ibid Preface xix. 
177 Ibid Preface xxiii. 
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has demonstrated a complete incapacity to learn,178 the Report suggests withdrawal of 
students, either completely or partly, from the mainstream setting, where that setting 
is ‘not beneficial’ to the student.  This more flexible approach raises but does not 
address an issue which has perplexed some tribunals hearing complaints of education 
discrimination: does the legislation protect a right to access the same range of 
educational options as that available to ‘regular’ students or only a right to access 
what experts determine is the ‘best’ choice – in terms of educational benefit – for a 
particular student.179 This more flexible approach, too, excites but does not explicitly 
address the conflict among education commentators as to what is ‘best’ for students 
with disabilities.  The language of the Report does, however, suggest support for 
education ‘moderates’ who contend that an ‘inclusive’ education is possible in a 
segregated setting. The Report suggests, for example, that 
[i]nclusive education must continue to embrace a number of learning centre options, 
where required.  A small minority of students will need varying levels of withdrawal 
from the mainstream classroom, depending on the nature of their condition, if their 
needs are to be properly met.180 
The Report also suggests, in a review of the debate as to the meaning of ‘inclusion’,  
that while schools and their staff will have to be prepared to engage in ‘philosophical 
discussion’ with a view to reform of present placement practices, ‘full inclusion’ is 
‘utopian’.181 The Report also notes that ‘State education departments have maintained 
a pragmatic attitude to what constitutes inclusion’.182 The Report, therefore, 
concludes that while ‘full inclusion’ is not a reality in Australia, it is not achievable or 
 
178 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 221. 
179 See for example the QADA cases L [1995] 1QADR 207and P v Director-General, Department of 
Education (1996) 1 QADR 755, and the HREOC decision in Purvis v State of New South Wales [2002] 
HREOC No 98/127 (Unreported, Commissioner Innes, 13 November 2000).  See also Chapter 11:  
Less Favourable Treatment. 
180 Senate Report, above n 3, Preface xxi. 
181 Ibid 30 [3.7]. 
182 Ibid 34 [3.19]. 
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even desirable.  Nevertheless, the Report acknowledges that there is room for 
improvement and, particularly, that ‘physical inclusion’ of a student is not sufficient 
to deliver equality of opportunity in education.  The Report suggests that statistics 
which purport to show reduced numbers of ‘special’ schools and increased numbers 
of ‘special education’ students included in mainstream schools distort the reality that 
many students, represented as placed in mainstream schools, spend much of their time 
segregated from mainstream classes, in special education units or classes.183 
The Senate Report’s review of inclusion practice has a particular focus on 
Queensland.  The stated reason for this focus is that ‘its policy of “ascertainment” has 
been criticised as indicating a lack of commitment to inclusion’.184 This reason 
echoes the finding of the QPPD report.  The Senate Report acknowledges that there is 
some parental dissatisfaction with the placement practices not only in Queensland, but 
Australia-wide.185 Despite adverse comment made by members of the Inquiry about 
the obfuscation of Education Queensland officials during the Brisbane hearings of the 
Inquiry,186 however, the Report accepts that Education Queensland is committed to 
improving its service to students with disabilities and comments favourably on its 
plan to review the ascertainment process.187 
The understanding of inclusion preferred by the Report generally conforms to that 
postulated by education policy makers.  The Report is committed to a ‘flexible 
interpretation of inclusive education evolving in accordance with local circumstances, 
 
183 Ibid 31-2 [3.11]-[3.12]. 
184 Ibid 36-7 [3.27]. 
185 Ibid 44 [3.51]. 
186 See above nn 84 and 87. 
187 Senate Report, above n 3, 38 [3.31]. Detail of the ensuing review is provided in Part III, Chapter 4:  
Queensland Education Policy. See also Part IV A, above. 
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and in sympathy with broad opinions and attitudes which are influenced by improved 
knowledge and deeper understanding of the needs of students with disabilities’;188 that 
is an interpretation of inclusion which encompasses a range of educational options for 
students with disabilities, of which ‘full inclusion’ is but one.  Even against the 
benchmark of this ‘moderate’ understanding of inclusion, however, the Report 
acknowledges that education institutions have thus far not delivered the same quality 
or equality of opportunities to students with disabilities as to other students.  Non-
compliance with anti-discrimination legislation is highlighted as a reason behind the 
continued less favourable treatment of students with disabilities: 
Although the Disability Discrimination Act has been in force since 1992 it has 
become evident that, in its application to education, the objectives of the Act are yet 
to be fully realised. Evidence provided to the committee suggests that there is 
considerable variation in legislative compliance among the states and territories as 
well as differences in compliance between the government and non-government 
school sectors.189 
The Report does not offer a detailed explanation of how continued non-compliance is 
possible in light of the enforcement provisions of such legislation but does seem to 
accept evidence of a reluctance to rely on legislative remedies.  It cites the opinion of 
Queensland academic, Mary Keefe Martin, that reluctance is ‘because of complex 
complaint-based appeal processes, unwanted expense and publicity, the exemption 
clause of unjustifiable hardship and the stress of lengthy court cases’.190 The Report 
suggests that those most vulnerable to discrimination are those students with ‘less 
traditional disabilities’: 
 
188 Ibid [3.52]. 
189 Ibid 115 [7.21]. 
190 See Mary Keefe-Martin, ‘Legislation, case law and current issues in inclusion: an analysis of trends 
in the United States and Australia’ (2001) 6 Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 
33. 
192 Senate Report, above n 3, 116 [7.25]. 
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Of particular concern is the extent to which students with ‘less traditional disabilities’ 
are managed. The legislation relies on the concept of reasonable adjustment being 
made to provide substantive equality for students with disabilities. For some 
disabilities such as conductive hearing losses, learning disabilities, and some 
behavioural disorders this is clearly not happening in all instances.192 
‘Less traditional disabilities’, the inference seems to be, require substantial – and 
usually expensive – adjustments to the school environment and procedures, as well as 
attitudinal adjustment on the part of the school community.  Further, the Report 
acknowledges a clear link between funding allocations and placement outcomes for 
students with disabilities: ‘There is unambiguous evidence of under-resourcing of 
programs aimed at bringing students with disabilities into the mainstream of 
learning’.193 
The recommendations made in the Senate Report suggest that the Senate Committee 
sees the solutions to discrimination in education as administrative and fiscal and not 
simply as legislative.  The majority of the recommendations relate to the improvement 
of teacher training and of resourcing for the education of people with disabilities. 194 
One of the more significant recommendations and it will be seen, one of the 
recommendations acted upon promptly by the Commonwealth, is, however, for 
legislative action by the implementation of disability standards for education.195 The 
significance of the implementation of disability standards for education will be further 
considered below. 
 
193 Ibid, Preface xix. 
194 PC Review, above n 4, Recommendations xii-xv. 
195 Ibid, Recommendation 17, 118: ‘the committee recommends that the Attorney-General formulate 
the Disability Standards for Education 2002, under paragraph 31 (1) (b) of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992; it also recommends that the Commonwealth take the necessary legislative 
action to put the education standards beyond legal challenge’. 
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D Productivity Commission Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 
In 2003, the Productivity Commission was briefed to report on ‘appropriate 
arrangements for regulation’ taking account, among other things, of the following: 
[T]he social impact in terms of costs and benefits that the legislation has had upon the 
community as a whole and people with disabilities, in particular its effectiveness in 
eliminating, as far as possible, discrimination on the ground of disability, ensuring 
equality between people with disabilities and others in the community, and promoting 
recognition and acceptance of the rights of people with disabilities. 197 
The PC Review acknowledges that ‘exclusion from, and segregation in, education’ is 
‘[a]rguably, one of the most serious forms of disability discrimination (in terms of 
long-term effects on individuals)’.198 The PC Review finds that the DDA has ‘been 
reasonably effective in improving educational opportunity for tertiary students with 
disabilities, with mixed results in school education’.199 It implies, however, a 
hierarchy of disability implied also in other evidence considered in this chapter, 
stating that the DDA has been ‘more effective for people with mobility, sight or 
hearing impairments than for people with mental illness, intellectual disability, 
acquired brain injury, multiple chemical sensitivity or chronic fatigue syndrome’.200 
The PC Review starts from the premise, however, that this hierarchy may be justified 
in that ‘there is a limit to how far [the DDA] can address the disadvantages that some 
face’.201 Its view of anti-discrimination legislation is that it ‘benefits most those 
against whom discrimination is most unreasonable; that is, where the disability is least 
 
197 Ibid Terms of Reference 2(a), lv.  The Review was conducted pursuant to the Productivity 
Commission Act 1998 (Cth) s 11. 
198 PC Review, above n 4, 83. 
199 Ibid Overview xxxiii.  See also Finding 5.2, LVII: ‘The Disability Discrimination Act 1992 appears 
to have had some beneficial effects in education, although it has not been wholly successful in 
eliminating discrimination for students with disabilities.  It appears to have been reasonably effective in 
improving educational opportunities for tertiary students with disabilities with mixed results in 
schools’.   See Statistical Evidence, Part III, above. 
200 Ibid Overview xxxiii. 
201 Ibid.   
151
relevant (in degree or kind) to the circumstances’.202 The pragmatic, but somewhat 
controversial implication, in terms of disability theory, seems to be twofold: first, that 
the more severe the disability, the more ‘reasonable’ the discrimination;203 secondly, 
that some incurable disadvantage can be traced to a disability itself and not to any 
lacking in the social response to that disability.204 
The PC Review canvasses a range of evidence from the many submissions on 
education, some arguing that the DDA has benefited students with disabilities and 
some suggesting little beneficial impact.  The Productivity Commission seems to 
accept, however, that statistical data is a deceptive indicator of success, particularly in 
the context of ‘improved’ participation rates in mainstream education.  It cites the 
evidence of People with Disability Australia that these statistics pick up a range of 
students who have always been in the mainstream environment but who,  encouraged 
by present funding allocation arrangements, have been identified as having a 
disability in order to attract a greater level of support.  It also refers to the evidence of 
People with Disability Australia that enrolment in a mainstream environment does not 
guarantee social inclusion and that statistics reporting increased enrolments in 
mainstream schools are misleading because they include students enrolled at special 
education units attached to mainstream schools but who may, in fact, have little 
access to the benefits of that mainstream environment.  
 
202 Ibid xxxiv. 
203 How the courts have constructed ‘reasonableness’ in the context of indirect discrimination and the 
ramifications of this construction in terms of disability theory is considered in detail in Part III, Chapter 
12: Indirect Discrimination. 
204 PC Review, above n 4, xxxiii-xxxiv.  A similar issue, the finding by various courts and tribunals 
that detriment is caused by impairment itself and not by discrimination, and the ramifications of this 
finding in terms of disability theory is explored in Part I, Chapter 10: Causation. 
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The PC Review concludes that it is ‘difficult (or arguably impossible)’ to attribute 
improvements in outcomes for people with disabilities to the DDA ‘because so many 
other policies and factors also affect education experiences and outcomes’.205 
Presumably, however, the inverse is not necessarily true as the Review does identify 
specific failings of the DDA and makes specific recommendations as to how the 
effectiveness of that Act, and, by implication, the effectiveness of similar legislation, 
such as the QADA, could be improved.  In the context of education, the most 
important recommendations relate to the introduction of a general duty to make 
‘reasonable adjustments’,206 reform of the scope and application of the unjustifiable 
hardship exemption,207 extension of the definition of disability ‘to explain that 
behaviour that is a symptom or manifestation of disability is a part of the disability for 
the purposes of the Act’,208 shifting the burden of proof that indirect discrimination is 
reasonable from the complainant to the respondent,209 and clarification of the effect 
on the scope of the DDA,210and on State legislation, of the implementation of 
disability standards under the DDA.211 Although the PC Review does not explicitly 
set out how, the genesis of each of these reforms can be traced to the case law 
interpreting the DDA and similar State legislation.  Each of the proposed reforms will 
 
205 Ibid B21. 
206 Ibid, Recommendation 8.1.  Compare with finding 8.1 The DDA has been amended to make the 
unjustifiable hardship exemption available after enrolment: see DDA s 22(4); Disability Discrimination 
Amendment (Education Standards) Act 2005 (Cth).  See Chapter 7: An Implied Duty of Reasonable 
Accommodation. 
207 Ibid, Recommendations 8.2 and 8.3.  Compare with findings 8.2, 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5. See Part V, 
Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
208 Ibid, Recommendation 11.1.  Compare with findings 11.1, 11.2 and 11.3. See Chapter 8: The 
Definition of Impairment. 
209 Ibid Recommendation 11.3. Compare with finding 11.6.  See Part III, Chapter 12: Indirect 
Discrimination. 
210 Ibid Recommendation 14.1.  Compare with finding 14.1. 
211 Ibid, Recommendation 14.2. Compare with finding 14.3.  See Part V, below, and Part III, Chapter 7: 
An Implied Duty of Reasonable Accommodation.  See also Elizabeth Dickson, ‘Disability Standards 
and the Obligation of Reasonable Adjustment’ (2006) 11(2) Australia and New Zealand Journal of 
Law and Education 23. 
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be discussed, in detail, in the context of the relevant case law in later chapters of this 
thesis.212 
V DISABILITY STANDARDS 
Both the Senate Report and the PC Review clearly imply that the implementation of 
disability standards for education under the DDA should improve educational 
opportunities for students with disabilities.213 If disability standards are needed, it can 
be argued, then existing legislation does not have the ‘teeth’ to deliver equal 
opportunity to people with disabilities.  The DDA provides that the relevant Minister 
may formulate standards in relation to a range of service areas including the education 
of persons with a disability.214 The effect of standards is that compliance with them 
by a service provider will amount to compliance with the DDA.215 Standards for 
education were first mooted in 1995 with a taskforce of representatives from the 
Commonwealth and each State and Territory established to formulate draft standards.  
Draft standards were finalised in 2002, but although implementation of standards 
came to be regarded almost as inevitable, disagreement between the members of the 
committee, particularly in relation to the cost of implementation, meant that the 
process of implementation had effectively stalled.216 A frustrated Commonwealth 
Minister for Education, Science and Training, Brendan Nelson, announced, in July 
 
212 See above nn 205-210. 
213 See Senate Report, above n 3, Chapter 7; PC Review, above n 4, B28, B29.  See PC Review finding 
14.2. The PC Review summarises the findings of a cost-benefit analysis of standards commissioned by 
the Ministerial Council on Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) as part 
of the mandatory Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) process.  The Review concluded that the net 
impact of standards would be positive. See The Allen Consulting Group, The Net Impact of the 
Introduction of the Disability Standards for Education, Report to the Department of Education, Science 
and Training (Australia), (2003) 60. 
214 DDA s 31(1)(b). 
215 DDA s 34. 
216 See Senate Report, above n 3 , 114 [7.17]-[7.18] 
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2003, that the Commonwealth would act unilaterally to implement the standards.217 
They were enacted in 2005.218 
The Senate Report found that standards were a ‘necessary step’219 and likely to be a 
more successful means than legislation alone of delivering education opportunity to 
people with disabilities: 
The formulation of education standards is an essential part of the overall legislative 
scheme developed to reduce discrimination in education.  While existing law will be 
able to deal with matters contained in the standards, the committee has learnt that the 
Act by itself is not necessarily the most effective or efficient means of achieving this 
aim. 221 
The Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) (‘Standards’) cover the areas of 
enrolment, participation, curriculum development, accreditation and delivery, student 
support services and harassment and victimisation.  They set out the rights of students 
with disabilities in each area and the concomitant legal obligations of education 
authorities and providers.  They give examples of steps that must be taken by 
education authorities to amount to compliance.  Most significantly, perhaps, the 
Standards purport to extend the (then) scope of the DDA by making available the 
unjustifiable hardship exemption after enrolment and by introducing an obligation 
upon education authorities to make reasonable adjustment to student disabilities.222 In 
 
217 See Brendan Nelson, ‘Most State and Territory Education Ministers Vote Against Disability 
Standards’ (Press Release, 11 July 2003). 
218 Disability Discrimination (Education Standards) Act 2005 (Cth) (‘Standards’). 
219 See Senate Report, above n 3, 114 [7.18]. 
221 Ibid [7.19]. 
222 The fact that the DDA did not in its original form make the unjustifiable hardship exemption 
available to legitimise the exclusion of a student once enrolled was significant in the context of the 
Purvis case. See Elizabeth Dickson, ‘Disability Discrimination in Education: Purvis v New South 
Wales (Department of Education and Training), amendment of the education provisions of the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the formulation of Disability Standards for Education’ 
(2005) 24(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 213. 
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order to address concerns that these extensions may be ‘beyond power’,223 the DDA 
was amended, in February 2005, to provide them with clear legislative support.224 
How the Standards will interact with State anti-discrimination legislation is, however, 
still the subject of some controversy.  The Productivity Commission received 
conflicting legal advice on the issue.  One opinion was that subordinate Federal 
legislation, such as standards, could not displace State laws.225 A conflicting opinion 
was that, by the operation of section 109 of the Australian Constitution, standards, 
regardless of their status as subordinate legislation, would oust state legislation to the 
extent of any inconsistency.226 The debate is further complicated by the fact that the 
DDA seems to contemplate maximising the legislative protection from discrimination 
available to people with disabilities, providing that the DDA ‘is not intended to 
‘exclude or limit the operation of a law of a State or a Territory that is capable of 
operating concurrently with the Act’.227 The Queensland Anti-Discrimination 
Commission (QADC) suggested to the Productivity Commission that it may be 
desirable for the QADA to continue to be available, unimpeded by standards, to 
enforce ‘a higher level of compliance in some areas than that negotiated under 
disability standards’.228 The Productivity Commission considered it ‘inappropriate’, 
however, for State legislation to impose higher levels of compliance than those 
 
223 The issue was raised by McHugh and Kirby JJ in Purvis. See Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92, 125 [99].  
See also Brendan Nelson and Philip Ruddock, ‘Government Acts on Discrimination against Students 
with Disabilities’ (Press Release, 12 August 2004). 
224 Disability Discrimination (Education Standards) Act 2005 (Cth) Schedule 1 s 4.   
225 PC Review, above n 4, 414. 
226 See Australian Government Solicitor, Advice: Productivity Commission’s Inquiry into the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992, 10 February, 2004 < http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/DDA/advice/ags1 /ags1  
pdf. > at 16 March 2005. 
227 DDA s 13(3). 
228 PC Review, above n 4, 412-13. The QADC also submitted that compliance with a higher standard 
set by state legislation would amount to compliance with the DDA and, as such, there would be no 
inconsistency between state legislation and the DDA. See 414. 
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‘negotiated’ under standards.229 Its concern was that even if State regimes provided a 
greater degree of protection to people with disabilities, disparity between 
Commonwealth and State anti-discrimination regimes was nevertheless undesirable as 
it would create ‘uncertainty’.230 It is inevitable that the problem question of the 
interrelationship between Commonwealth and State legislation in this area will not be 
resolved until it is clarified by further legislative reform or considered by the High 
Court. The recommendation of the Productivity Commission is that the DDA be 
amended ‘to clarify that where disability standards and State and Territory legislation 
address the same specific matter, the disability standards should prevail’.231 Even if 
this should be done, however, it is likely that some period of confusion will ensue 
until the courts can clarify the extent of any inconsistency between the different 
regimes.  Indeed, further uncertainty is likely in that it remains to be seen not only 
whether the standards will improve education opportunities for people with 
disabilities but also whether they occasion new opportunities for litigation as 
complainants ask the courts to clarify the content of the newly expanded unjustifiable 
hardship exemption, the extent of the newly created obligation to make reasonable 
adjustment and what level of action amounts to compliance with the standards 
sufficient to oust the protection of the anti-discrimination provisions of the DDA.232 
229 Ibid 415. 
230 Ibid 414. 
231Ibid, Recommendation 14.2. 
232 The Allen Consulting Group cost-benefit analysis of the Standards found that their introduction may 
lead to ‘relatively small’ increased dispute costs for ‘private education providers for which it is unclear 
whether or not they will be able to claim…undue hardship’. See Allen Consulting Group, The Net 
Impact of the Introduction of the Disability Standards for Education (Report to the Department of 
Education, Science and Training (Australia), 2003) <http://www.dest.gov.au/ Research/ docs/ 
july_03/DDA_Standards.pdf.> at 6 December 2005.  See also Elizabeth Dickson, ‘Disability Standards 
and the Obligation of Reasonable Adjustment’ (2006) 11(2) Australia and New Zealand Journal of 
Law and Education 23. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
The best evidence available indicates that, in practice, there is no unfettered right to 
education available to Australian students with disabilities.  The evidence suggests 
that statistics which imply increased rates of enrolment in mainstream learning 
environments are a misleading indicator of improved options for people with 
disabilities.  The evidence also suggests that, post-enrolment, students may still be the 
victims of discriminatory policies and practices.  Finally, the evidence suggests that 
there may be a hierarchy of disability in terms of any right to education, with the 
content of any right contracting as the kind or level of disability becomes more 
severe.  While educational options for students with disability are affected by a 
complex interplay of administrative and policy as well as legislative considerations, it 
is surely the case that administrative and policy decisions must be made against a 
background determined by legislative obligations.  It remains for analysis, therefore, 
how legislation which appears full of promise for people with disabilities has failed to 
deliver on that promise. 
 
158
CHAPTER 6 
EXEMPTIONS 
 
The Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA), like most similar Australian 
legislation, provides for several exemptions to unlawful discrimination against 
students with disabilities.  Exemptions are available for acts which are authorised by 
other legislation,1 for acts ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect public health,2 and for 
acts ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect the health and safety of people at a place of 
work.3 A respondent may also seek to prove the ‘unjustifiable hardship’ exemption 
which renders lawful a prima facie case of discrimination.4 Finally, the Queensland 
Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (QADT) may grant a ‘special’ exemption where it sees 
fit.5
Although there are only a few cases on point, the decided cases suggest that these 
exemptions frequently operate to defeat claims of discrimination. Indeed, the fact that 
there are so few cases on point may, perhaps, be attributed to the success that 
respondents have experienced in the raising of exemptions.  The fact that exemptions 
are created by legislation acknowledges that there will be instances when the 
inclusion in mainstream institutions, such as education institutions, of people with 
disabilities will create an unreasonable burden for others.  As already noted 
exemptions operate to restrict the social response required to impairment and, as such, 
are express limits on the implied legislative approval of the social theory of 
 
1 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) s 106; cf Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
(DDA) s 47. 
2 QADA s 107; cf DDA s 48. 
3 QADA s 108.  There is no equivalent DDA exemption. 
4 QADA s 44; cf DDA s 22. 
5 QADA s 113; cf DDA s 55. 
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disability.6 Further, the availability of exemptions which allow discrimination where 
inclusion would interfere with the health or safety of others, or create some 
‘unjustifiable hardship’ is consistent with communitarian theory.  Exemptions 
authorise a balancing of competing considerations raised by the inclusion of people 
with disabilities and anticipate that any right to inclusion may yield to majority rights 
where that inclusion causes ‘hardship’.  Communitarian theory acknowledges that 
individual rights are not to be enforced when to do so would interfere with the rights 
of the majority.7 Analysis of how the exemptions have been interpreted and applied 
in the education cases, however, reveals several theoretical and technical problems 
with their scope and application.  In particular, decided cases suggest problems with 
the exemptions’ application to the situation of students with impairment-related 
problem behaviours. 
 
I ACTS AUTHORISED BY OTHER LEGISLATION 
The QADA creates an exemption for discriminatory acts done in compliance with or 
specifically authorised by an existing provision of another Act.  The theoretical 
underpinning of this exemption is that if parliament has specifically provided for a 
matter to be dealt with in a particular way in one piece of legislation, then it is not to 
be taken to be overriding that specific provision through the general terms of anti-
discrimination legislation.  This exemption is not, perhaps, within the compass of 
those exemptions which fit the communitarian view as to the interplay of human 
rights except to the limited extent that all legislation is, arguably, informed by a 
balancing of the competing interests of different sectors of the community.   
 
6 See Part V, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability.  
7 See Part III A, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
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Unlike the equivalent provision in the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
(DDA), 8 s 106 is not a ‘sunset clause’ and thus continued, at least until the 
commencement of the new Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld), in 
October 2006, to have the potential to counter any claim of discrimination by a 
student where the treatment complained of was apparently authorised by the then 
Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld).  A perhaps unanticipated 
consequence of the enactment of the new legislation is that, as it will not have been 
‘existing’ legislation at the time the QADA was passed, acts done in compliance with 
it may not be protected by QADA s 106.  It has proved to be a significant exemption 
for Education Queensland and has been successfully relied upon to defeat claims of 
discrimination as recently as 2007.9
The exemption was successfully raised in an impairment discrimination context in the 
QADT case, L v Minister for Education.10 L was a seven-year-old girl with an 
intellectual impairment and was enrolled in a Year Two class at her local state school. 
L’s teachers complained that they were having ‘difficulty managing her behaviour’ 
and, in particular, her ‘frequent crying…her lack of ability to concentrate on tasks, her 
failure to return to class after breaks, her limited vocabulary, and hygiene problems 
 
8 DDA s 47 creates exemptions for ‘anything done in direct compliance with a prescribed law’ and, for 
a period of three years from the commencement of the Act, for ‘anything done in direct compliance 
with another law’.  It is noted that the wording of the DDA provision is narrower than the wording of 
the QADA provision – s106 QADA: ‘an act that is necessary to comply with, or is specifically 
authorised by…an existing provision of another Act’. 
9 See Malaxetxebarria v. State of Queensland [2007] QCA 132 (Unreported, Williams and Keane JJA 
and Lyons J, 20 April 2007).  In early 2004, Education Queensland refused a request for the 
acceleration of Gracia Malaxetxebarria, then nine years of age, from Year Six to Year Nine.  Education 
Queensland argued, engaging QADA s 106, that this refusal was not unlawful age discrimination in that 
they were obliged by The Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld) s 12 to provide each student 
with an appropriate program of instruction which took into account a variety of considerations 
including age. 
10 L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 207 (‘L’). 
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revolving around her propensity to regurgitate and toileting accidents’.11 Staff were 
also concerned that a ‘disproportionate’ amount of time was spent on L, 
compromising the attention given to other students.12 The school guidance officer 
recommended that L be placed in a special school. Several meetings were held 
between Education Queensland staff and L’s parents but no agreement could be 
reached on a segregated placement for L.  Following the failure to negotiate a 
mutually satisfactory placement for L, she was suspended, and her exclusion 
proposed, on the grounds of ‘behaviours prejudicial to the good order and discipline 
of the school; and heightened health and hygiene risks to other students’.13 
The respondent contended that L’s suspension was authorised by s 24 of the 
Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld) (Education Act), a provision which 
was in existence at the commencement of s 106 QADA. The respondent argued that   
s 24(2) of the Education Act gave the Acting Principal of the school in question 
specific authority to suspend L and that, providing the Director of the Region then 
formed the opinion that a recommendation ought to be made for exclusion pursuant to 
s 25, s 24(5) required him to extend her suspension and that, as such, the allegedly 
discriminatory act of suspending L was, in fact, necessary to comply with s 24(5).  
The opinion that exclusion should be recommended had to be formed on the basis of a 
satisfaction that L had been guilty of ‘disobedience, misconduct or other conduct 
prejudicial to the good order and discipline’ of the school where she was enrolled.14 
11 Ibid 209. 
12 Ibid. 
13 L (1996) 1 QADR 207, 210. 
14 QADA s 25(2).  Compare Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) Part 4. 
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The scope of s 39(e) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984(Vic) (VEOA),15 worded in 
similar terms to the DDA provision, was considered by the High Court in the case of 
Waters v. Public Transport Corporation.16 Section 39(e) provided that the VEOA 
‘does not render unlawful…an act done by a person if it was necessary for the person 
to do it to comply with a provision of…any other Act’.  Mason CJ17 and Brennan, 18 
Deane, 19 Gaudron20 and McHugh21 JJ held that s 39(e) protected only acts that it was 
necessary to do in order to comply with a specific requirement directly imposed by 
the relevant provision and not acts done to comply with a requirement imposed by 
some person exercising a power granted under the relevant legislation.  Dawson and 
Toohey JJ22 read s 39(e) more widely, as excusing acts necessary to carry out specific 
directions given under statutory authority but not when the carrying out of the 
direction required an exercise of discretion and the discretion could be exercised in a 
non-discriminatory manner.  There was no support in the High Court, therefore, for a 
reading of s 39(e) as excusing discretionary acts authorised by other Acts.  
 
In L, Commissioner Holmes, considering the decision in Waters, focused on the fact 
that s 39(e) VEOA was worded differently, more narrowly, than s 106(1)(a) QADA 
and accepted the High Court’s decision in Waters as authority only for the proposition 
that such exemption clauses are to be read narrowly, in keeping with the objects of 
anti-discrimination legislation.23 Commissioner Holmes went on to find that the 
wording, ‘specifically authorised’, in s 106(1)(a) was clear and found no basis for the 
 
15 See now Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 69. 
16 Waters and Others v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349 (‘Waters’).  
17 Ibid 370. 
18 Ibid 381. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid 370. 
21 Ibid 414. 
22 Ibid, 389-90. 
23 L [1995] 1 QADR 207, 218. 
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argument that the section did not exempt discretionary acts.24 Accordingly, she found 
that the suspension of L, a discretionary act authorized by s 24 of the Education Act,
was an exempt act by the operation of s 106(1)(a) QADA.25 She found that, by 
analogy, any expulsion of L pursuant to the exercise of a power granted by s 25 of the 
Education Act would be similarly exempt.26 
It is interesting that while Commissioner Holmes did not acknowledge the potential of 
s 106 to undermine the effectiveness of the QADA to counter discrimination by 
facilitating the exclusion of students with impairments, particularly where those 
impairments manifested as problem behaviour, she did imply a criticism of a system 
whereby the school authorities relied on such draconian measures to effect their 
preferred placement for L:  
I have expressed some concern during the hearing of this case that the Department 
was in effect driven into a position where suspension and exclusion were the only 
means of achieving what it regarded as a proper placement for L, and that the 
procedure, being all that was available to achieve that outcome, was adopted.27 
Commissioner Holmes suggested that a complainant could contend that the decision 
maker’s opinion, required under s 24(5) of the Education Act, was not properly 
formed, and so bring the decision making process into issue, but such a contention 
was not advanced in L’s case.28 
There are some limits on the scope of s 106 to exclude students with disabilities.  
First, the combined force of the suspension and exclusion provisions of the Education 
Act and s 106 QADA will not be available to an independent school which seeks to 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid 218.  
28 Ibid. 
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discriminate against a student with an impairment.  Secondly, the suspension and 
exclusion provisions cannot be invoked to refuse enrolment to a student.  Therefore 
they cannot be used in conjunction with s 106 to justify discrimination at the point of 
enrolment.  Thirdly, the timing of a complaint by a student might pre-empt the 
availability of the exemption.  In P,29 for example, the complaint of discrimination 
was made before any action to suspend or exclude P and the school in question did 
not take such action after the complaint.  P’s mother withdrew him from school 
because of a proposal that he be relocated away from the regular school where he was 
enrolled to a special education unit.  The respondent indicated to the tribunal, 
however, that if P’s mother had continued to send him to his regular school, 
procedures to suspend and, ultimately, exclude P, under ss 24 and 25 of the Education 
Act, would have been commenced.  Somewhat ironically, the respondent argued, 
unsuccessfully, that as there had been no attempt to suspend or to exclude P there had 
been no ‘less favourable’ treatment of him by the school.30 Finally, it could be argued 
that it would be less likely that an opinion could be reasonably formed that a physical 
impairment – as distinct from an intellectual impairment causing behaviour problems 
- equated with ‘conduct prejudicial to…good order and discipline’ for the purpose of 
authorising suspension or exclusion pursuant to the Education Act.
II  ACTS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH 
Section 107 QADA exempts from liability potentially discriminatory acts which are 
‘reasonably necessary to protect public health’.  This exemption was also raised by 
the respondent in L. L had problems with toileting and regurgitation.  It was argued, 
 
29 P v Director-General, Department of Education [1995] 1 QADR 755 (‘P’).
30 Ibid 777-8.  The ‘less favourable treatment’ argument in P is further discussed in Part I, Chapter 11: 
Less Favourable Treatment. 
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despite evidence that L’s ‘hygiene problems’ had been well managed during her 
enrolment by ‘strict attention to cleaning procedures’, that the presence of L at the 
school created a public health risk.  This argument failed, Commissioner Holmes 
concluding that evidence of the risk provided by the respondent was too imprecise to 
prove the exemption.31 Commissioner Holmes also noted a fundamental hypocrisy in 
the respondent’s argument: ‘the very fact that the Respondent advocates a placement 
of L in an alternative educational institution suggests that it does not itself consider 
that L’s removal from contact with other students is necessary to protect public 
health’.32 The respondent sought to relocate L to a different school – one it 
considered better suited to her needs.  It was not seeking to exclude L from all 
schools.  This willingness to relocate L implies that the public health exemption was 
argued out of expediency rather that out of any genuine fear that the accommodation 
of L placed teachers and other students at risk.  Further, the raising of this exemption 
by Education Queensland, suggests an unfortunate and uninformed stereotyping of 
people with disabilities as ‘unclean’ and ‘contagious’.  Stereotyping such as this has 
been blamed as the root cause of discrimination against people with disabilities.33 
This exemption is likely to be established only in circumstances where there is an 
unusually high risk to public health posed by the accommodation of a particular 
student and where that risk cannot be effectively managed by regular routines of 
hygiene management and cleaning.  If it is established it is likely to justify exclusion 
from all schools and not just from regular schools.  An illustrative case, concerning 
 
31 L [1995] 1 QADR 207, 212. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See, for example, Roger Slee, ‘Special education and human rights in Australia: how do we know 
about disablement and what does it mean for educators?’ in F Armstrong and L Barton (eds), 
Disability, Human Rights and Education: Cross-cultural perspectives (1999) 123.   
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the equivalent DDA exemption,34 is Beattie v Maroochy Shire Council.35 In that case, 
two children who had not been vaccinated in accordance with the recommended 
childhood vaccination schedule were refused enrolment at childcare facilities operated 
by the respondent on the basis that they posed an infection hazard.  President Carter of 
the HREOC found that the failure to enrol the children was discrimination on the 
basis of ‘future disability’ but that the discrimination was not unlawful, under s 48 
DDA, because ‘it was reasonably necessary to protect public health’.36 
III  ACTS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF 
PEOPLE AT A PLACE OF WORK 
Section 108 QADA provides that ‘A person may do an act that is reasonably necessary 
to protect the health and safety of people at a place of work’.  This exemption was 
raised in P, though not pursued ‘with any great vigour’ by the respondent.37 P was a 
primary school student with Down’s syndrome.  The evidence was that P exhibited 
behaviour which was potentially of danger to others. P was prone to screaming, 
running away and splashing water.  More significantly, however, he had thrown 
chairs, books, building blocks and other equipment, hitting other children.  He had, on 
occasion, ‘head-butted’, pushed, shoved or slapped other children and adults.  One 
staff member had to take sick leave after P ran into her, injuring her back.  Teachers 
claimed that P’s inappropriate behaviour occurred ‘frequently’ throughout each day 
and complained of increased stress levels as a result of P’s inclusion.  A complaint of 
unlawful discrimination was made under the QADA when the Queensland Department 
of Education proposed to remove P from his mainstream school. 
 
34 DDA s 48. 
35 Beattie v Maroochy Shire Council [1996] HREOCA 40 (Unreported, Carter P, 20 December 1996) 
(‘Beattie’).   
36 Ibid [52]. 
37 P [1995] 1 QADR 755, 775.   
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Commissioner Keim considered the wording of the workplace health and safety 
exemption was broad enough to allow him to consider evidence of a safety risk to 
students as well as to workers at the school and canvassed the evidence which could 
be relied on for the purpose of establishing the exemption – P had thrown blocks and 
a chair, and had jumped onto desks and onto other children.  There was some 
evidence that teachers and children had been hurt by P.  One teacher was caused to go 
on sick leave after falling as the result of a collision with P.  Commissioner Keim 
cautioned against expecting a standard of behaviour from children with impairments 
that is not expected of students without impairment and found that ‘reckless and silly 
behaviour’ such as that attributed to P could be ‘ameliorated by good teaching 
methods’.  Commissioner Keim acknowledged that the ‘impulsive, careless or even 
reckless’ behaviour of any children posed a risk of injury to others.38 
Commissioner Keim was not prepared to find that the removal of P was ‘reasonably 
necessary’ to protect others and found that there were alternative strategies available 
to manage the risk which would allow P to stay at school.  He extended the reasoning 
of Commissioner Holmes in L, in relation to the public health exemption, to the 
present case – if a child were to be transferred to another school, it could not be 
convincingly argued that the child posed a risk to the safety of others. 
 
There is no equivalent of the workplace health and safety exemption in s 109 QADA 
available under the DDA and, as such, it could not be argued in the Purvis case.  In 
Purvis, however, the High Court signalled an interest in the impact of the inclusion of 
 
38 Ibid 789. 
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Daniel Hoggan not only on the safety of other members of his school community but 
also on the duty of the school to ensure the safety of all members of the school 
community.39 This issue was mooted in the Full Federal Court where it was noted 
that the respondent owed a duty of care to the staff and students of the Grafton High 
School and that compelling the school to accommodate a volatile student such as 
Daniel placed the school in a position where they could not easily discharge that 
duty.40 Ultimately, in the High Court, the judgment of Gleeson CJ, in particular, 
indicated concern about interference with the school’s obligations.  He emphasised 
the fact that the school owed a ‘duty of care’ to students and staff 41 and insisted that  
…there is no warrant for an assumption that, in seeking to protect the rights of 
disabled pupils, Parliament intended to disregard Australia's obligations to protect the 
rights of other pupils. Furthermore, a contention that the legislative power of the 
Commonwealth Parliament extends to obliging State educational authorities to 
accept, or continue to accommodate, pupils whose conduct is a serious threat to the 
safety of other pupils, or staff, or school property , would require careful scrutiny.42 
There are clear parallels between P’s behaviour and that of Daniel Hoggan.  In P,
Commissioner Keim cautioned that one ‘must remember that any group of young 
children impose [sic] dangers for members of that group and for those who seek to 
control and educate them’ in that children may cause injury to each other or teachers  
‘through impulsive, careless or even reckless behaviour’.43 While Commissioner 
Keim compared P’s behaviour with the usual boisterousness of childhood, however, 
the majority of the High Court emphasised the seriousness of Daniel’s behaviour, 
 
39 Transcript of Proceedings, Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and 
Training) (High Court of Australia, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Callinan JJ, 5 November 2002). 
40 Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 247-8 
[25]-[27]. 
41 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92, 99 
[7] (‘Purvis’). 
42 Ibid 99 [6].  McHugh and Kirby JJ also alluded to the duty of care issue at 123 [94].  Callinan J 
highlighted what he perceived as a potential clash between anti-discrimination law and criminal law at 
174 [271]. 
43 P (1996) 1 QADR 755, 789. 
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even suggesting it as having a criminal element.44 It is, no doubt, significant that 
while P was only nine years old at the time of his removal from his mainstream 
school, Daniel Hoggan was twelve years old and over the age of criminal 
responsibility.  Nevertheless, the risk of harm to others, which proved so persuasive to 
the courts in the Purvis litigation, is suggested by the facts of P. 
The potential for conflict between the obligations placed upon a school by statute, tort 
and contract law and the obligations placed upon it by anti-discrimination legislation 
is also demonstrated in the context of workplace health and safety legislation.45 The 
urgency of this conflict is apparent in the NSW case O'Sullivan v New South Wales 
(Department of Education and Training).46 In that case, the NSW Department of 
Education and Training was convicted of three offences arising from failures to meet 
their obligation under s 15(1) of the Occupational Health & Safety Act 1983 (NSW) 
to ensure the ‘health, safety and welfare at work’ of three employees at Kurrambee 
School for Special Purposes, a ‘school for children with physical, intellectual or 
psychological disabilities that preclude them from attending a normal school’.47 The 
prosecutions arose out of assaults on staff by two male students at the school.  The 
Tribunal found, in relation to the charges, that staff had not been provided with 
 
44 Gummow, Hayne, and Heydon JJ found that ‘Daniel’s actions constituted assaults’ but considered it 
‘neither necessary nor appropriate to decide whether he could or would have been held criminally 
responsible for them’: Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) 
(2003) 217 CLR 92, 161 [227].  Callinan J characterised behaviour such as that displayed by Daniel as 
‘criminal or quasi-criminal conduct’: Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and 
Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92, 174 [271]. 
45 Note that, in Queensland, QADA s 106, discussed above, could not be relied upon to allow legislative 
provisions obliging employers to ensure health and safety in the workplace (see, for example 
Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) s 28) to override competing obligations in the QADA 
because relevant Queensland legislation came into force after the QADA. This point was clarified by 
the QADT in McDonald v Queensland Rail [1998] QADT 8 (Unreported, Commissioner Keim, 1 May 
1998). 
46O'Sullivan v The Crown in the Right of the State of New South Wales (Department of Education and 
Training) [2003] NSWIRComm 74 (Unreported, Walton VP, 31 March 2003) [23].   
47 Maurice Michael O'Sullivan v The Crown in the Right of the State of New South Wales (Department 
of Education and Training) [2003] NSWIRComm 74 (Unreported, Walton VP, 31 March 2003) [23]. 
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adequate resources, equipment or information to prepare them to manage the 
behaviour of the students in question.  The Department was fined $160,000.48 
In light of the concerns raised about student and staff safety in the Purvis case, and in 
light of the decision in O’Sullivan, it is therefore possible that the s 109 exemption 
might be pursued with increased vigour in a future QADA case to excuse the 
exclusion of a ‘dangerous’ student.49 
IV  TRIBUNAL GRANTED EXEMPTION 
Section 113 QADA provides that the QADT may grant an exemption from the 
operation of the Act.  The grant of the exemption is discretionary and the legislation 
offers no guidance on the exercise of that discretion.  Cases emphasise, however, that 
the purposes of the QADA must be taken into account in the decision making 
process.50 While the primary purpose of the Act is to protect against ‘unfair 
discrimination’51 it is nevertheless anticipated that not all discrimination will be 
unfair, particularly in the provision of a range of exemptions.52 In relation to s 113, 
therefore, the best guidance available is that a tribunal should weigh the need to 
protect against ‘unfair discrimination’ against evidence that a specific instance of 
 
48 O'Sullivan v The Crown in the Right of the State of New South Wales (Department of Education and 
Training) [2003] NSWIRComm 303 (Unreported, Walton VP, 26 September 2003). 
49 Note, on this point, recent legislative change in this area which anticipates, perhaps, a greater 
reliance on health and safety concerns to authorise exclusion of students with ‘problem’ behaviour 
from state schools in Queensland.   The Education (General Provision) s Act 2006 s 162(4), which 
commenced 30 October 2006, provides that the Chief Executive [of Education Queensland] must 
decide to refuse to enrol a student if he or she poses ‘an unacceptable risk to the safety or wellbeing of 
members of the school community’ at the particular school to which the student has applied for 
enrolment.  See also ss 157-63.  Presumably, a refusal of enrolment at one school does not prevent the 
student concerned applying for enrolment at another, perhaps ‘special’, school. 
50 See for example Exemption Application re: Zig Zag Young Women’s Resource Centre Inc [2004] 
QADT 41(Unreported, Member Rangiah, 21 December 2004) [7]; Exemption application re: Golden 
Casket [2002] QADT 16 (Unreported, Member Tahmindjis, 26 August 2002). 
51 QADA s 6(1). 
52 QADA s 6(2). 
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discrimination is not unfair.  To date, the QADT has granted exemptions to a wide 
variety of enterprises including women-only gyms,53 a sexual assault counselling 
service for women,54 an organisation advertising for workers aged over a particular 
age55 and to Boeing Australia Holdings Pty Ltd who, for defence security reasons, 
was required by US regulations to employ only nationals of Australia and the United 
States.56 
While the QADT has not, to date, been asked to consider the exemption in an 
education context, the DDA equivalent of this exemption57 was sought by the 
Lutheran Schools of Queensland.58 The Lutheran Schools proposed to institute an 
assessment regime for students with disabilities seeking enrolment at their schools.  
They argued that such a scheme was necessary to allow them to determine what 
special services and facilities were required by applicants and whether they could be 
enrolled by a school without causing it unjustifiable hardship.  The scheme was 
potentially discriminatory in that only students with disabilities would be assessed.  
There is little doubt that the Lutheran Schools were motivated to make the claim 
because, at that time, the unjustifiable hardship defence was not available to excuse 
the exclusion of an already enrolled student.  The Lutheran Schools, therefore, were 
seeking to reduce the risk of enrolling a student who would ultimately prove difficult 
 
53 Exemption Application re: Fernwood Women's Health Club Pty Ltd [2003] QADT 27 (Unreported, 
Member Douglas, 27 November 2003); Exemption application re: Beach House Group P/L [2006] 
QADT 30 (Unreported, Commissioner Murphy, 19 July 2006). 
54 Exemption Application: re Zig Zag Young women’s Resource Centre [2004] QADT 41 (Unreported, 
Commissioner Rangia, 21 December 2004). 
55 Exemption Application re: Grey Army Gold Coast [2003] QADT 1 (Unreported, President Sofronoff, 
11 February 2003). 
56 Exemption Application re: Boeing Australia Holdings Pty Ltd & related entities [2003] QADT 21 
(Unreported, President Sofronoff, 19 November 2003). 
57 DDA s 55. 
58 Notice of HREOC exemption decision re: Lutheran Church of Australia Queensland District 
(Unreported, President Wilson, 10 June 1997). 
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to accommodate. HREOC refused to grant the exemption suggesting that the 
circumstances of the case were such that the ‘special measures’ exemption would be 
available to answer any claim that the proposed assessment regime was 
discriminatory.  The DDA authorises the taking of ‘special measures’ to ‘afford 
persons who have a disability or a particular disability, goods or access to facilities, 
services or opportunities to meet their special needs in relation to…education’.59 
The advantage of a tribunal granted exemption over the special measures exemption is 
that it operates to prevent claims of discrimination from being made against the 
exempt party in respect of the exempt behaviour – it is a ‘pre-emptive strike’.  The 
special measures exemption, however, can be raised only to resist a claim once made. 
The issue of the scope of s 55 DDA came before the High Court in the Purvis case.  It 
is interesting that McHugh and Kirby JJ found that a tribunal granted exemption could 
have been appropriately applied for in the circumstances of that case – that is after the 
complaint had been made.60 They expressly agreed with the view of Commissioner 
Innes of HREOC on this point and disagreed with the analysis of the Full Federal 
Court.61 
The Full Federal Court had found that the exemption was ‘ill-designed to deal with 
such an issue’ as the problem posed by the inclusion of a difficult student.62 They 
noted the ‘time, expense and staff disruption involved’ and were concerned that 
students and staff would ‘live with the threat of injury or abuse, may suffer actual 
 
59 DDA s 45(b)(i). Compare QADA s 104.  A significant difference between QADA s104 and QADA s 
113 is that the latter operates to prevent claims of discrimination from being made.  Section 104 is 
raised, by contrast, to resist a claim of unlawful discrimination. 
60 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92,129 [111]. 
61 Ibid. 
62Purvis (2002) 117 FCR 237, 247-8 [27]. 
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injury or abuse, and classes and other educational endeavours [would] be disrupted’63 
while the outcome of the application was awaited.  Further, the Full Federal Court 
was concerned that ‘the school would ultimately be subject to a discretionary 
judgment by a body which does not have the responsibility for managing the 
student’.64 All of these concerns are perhaps curious in that, presumably, the 
applicability of any exemption is an issue which may only be resolved subject to the 
costs and delays inherent in the legal process and to the scrutiny of a court or tribunal 
‘which does not have the responsibility for managing the student’. 
 
McHugh and Kirby JJ dismissed the concerns of the Full Federal Court and found that  
[t]he terms of the section indicate that it is flexible enough to apply to situations such as 
those that arose following the enrolment of Mr Hoggan. Indeed, the section seems wide 
enough to permit the grant of an exemption from the Act's provisions generally in all 
cases where the violent behaviour of students with a disability may pose a threat to other 
pupils or staff. And there is nothing to stop the making of an urgent application in respect 
of a particular student, if necessary.65 
V Unjustifiable hardship66 
The unjustifiable hardship exemption is available to respondents, in one form or 
another, in most Australian67 and many international68 statutes prohibiting 
 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92,129 [111]. 
66 It is interesting to note that QADA s 44 was amended in October 2006 to make it subject to the new 
Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld).  See Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) s 
512(1) sch 1. This amendment is consistent with a new emphasis in that act on authorising exclusion on 
the basis of ‘an unacceptable risk to the safety or wellbeing of members of the school community’ 
caused by student problem behaviour.  See above n 49. 
67 In respect of discrimination in education see Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 22, Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 49L(5), Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 44, Anti-
Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 48 (The Tasmanian legislation does not provide the exemption directly 
in respect of education but it is available in respect of the provision of access to premises and the 
provision of goods and services.  It may, therefore, be available to an education provider, in the sense 
that the provision of education involves the provision of access to premises and the provision of a 
service); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 66I(4); Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 51. Both the 
Victorian and the Northern Territory legislation have a different formula in that an exemption is created 
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discrimination on the ground of impairment or disability.  The usual formula is that 
where it can be demonstrated that the accommodation of a person with a disability 
would cause unjustifiable hardship to a respondent, a prima facie case of 
discrimination will be excused as lawful.  This exemption is, perhaps, the most 
commonly argued exemption in the context of claims of discrimination in education 
against people with disabilities, and the most controversial.  One parent, whose 
daughter was denied a remedy for discrimination on the basis of the exemption, has 
dubbed it a ‘lucky dip’.69 The discretionary nature of the balancing process required 
of hearing tribunals by the unjustifiable hardship enquiry was highlighted by 
Tamberlin J, of the Federal Court, as involving ‘the weighing of indeterminate and 
largely imponderable factors and the making of value judgments’.70 This discretionary 
element makes it difficult to be specific about the scope of the exemption.  Further, 
each case will turn on an individual set of facts.  As the Queensland Anti-
Discrimination Tribunal (QADT)) has pointed out,  
it is stating the obvious to say that questions of unjustifiable hardship can only be 
determined by reference to the peculiar features of the case in question. There is such 
a range of variables, including the type of disability, the characteristics of the school, 
and the attitudes of the people involved, as to make comparisons pointless.71 
Case analysis does, however, allow some generalisations to be made about when the 
exemption will be applied.   
 
where the provision of services or facilities is not ‘reasonable’.  See Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) 
s 39; Anti-Discrimination Act (NT) s 58. 
68 See, for example, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 USC §§12101-12213; Council 
Directive (EC) No 78/2000 of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework for Equal 
Treatment in Employment and Occupation [2000] OJL 303/16, Chapter 1, Article 5. 
69 Evidence to Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education References Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Brisbane, 6 September 2002, 412 (Michelle O’Flynn). Michelle O’Flynn is a 
member of the disability lobby group, Queensland Parents for People with a Disability, and the mother 
of the complainant in L [1995] 1 QADR 207.  
70 Hills Grammar School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2000) 100 FCR 306, 
314 [31]. 
71 L (1996) 1 QADR 207, 213 and 216. 
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A Proof of Unjustifiable Hardship 
The cases suggest a three-stage process is to be applied in determining whether 
inclusion of a complainant causes an unjustifiable hardship.72 The first step is to 
establish that special services and facilities are in fact required to accommodate the 
complainant.  ‘Services and facilities’ encompass, for example, specialist teaching, 
supervision by aides and modification to grounds and buildings.  Proof of this 
requirement has been an issue in some cases.  In L, for example, the complainant 
argued that there were no special services or facilities required as many students with 
disabilities are placed in regular schools – as such, the complainant argued there was 
nothing ‘special’ about her attendance at a regular school.  This argument was 
rejected with Commissioner Holmes finding that ‘L has in the past required, and in 
the future will continue to require, services and facilities of a distinct character 
individual to her’.73 The complainant also argued that there was no extra service or 
facility provided to L in that the respondent was obliged to provide special education 
to L.  Commissioner Holmes rejected this argument, too, finding that there is nothing 
‘mandatory’ about the power to provide special education, located in the Education 
(General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld); there is a discretion to supply ‘special 
education’ not an obligation.74 In the more recent QADA case of I v O’Rourke and 
Corinda State High School and Minister for Education for Queensland,75 which 
concerned allegations of discrimination against a student with physical and 
intellectual impairments, Education Queensland failed to prove the exemption in 
 
72 This process is recognised in other kinds of discrimination cases as the appropriate methodology for 
a tribunal to follow. See, for example, Cocks v The State of Queensland (1994) 1 QADR 43, a QADA 
case involving access to a public building, and Scott and Disabled Peoples International v Telstra 
(1995) EOC  ¶ 92-719, 78401, a DDA case involving access to telephone services by people with visual 
impairment. 
73 L [1995] 1 QADR 207, 216. 
74 Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld) s 12; L [1995] 1 QADR 207, 215. 
75 I v O’Rourke and Corinda State High School and Minister for Education for Queensland [2001] 
QADT 1 (Unreported, Commissioner Copelin, 31 January 2001) (‘Corinda’). 
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relation to the exclusion of the complainant from a school excursion because they 
failed to demonstrate that any special services or facilities would have been required 
to accommodate I’s needs on the excursion.76 
The second step is to establish the extent of the special services and facilities which 
are required.  Proof of extent has been controversial in the cases with parties 
providing competing cases of what inclusion of the complainant involves.  In the 
DDA case, Finney,77 for example, Commissioner Innes of HREOC concluded that 
many of the modifications deemed necessary by the respondent school were ‘clearly 
not services and facilities’78 in fact required by the complainant and that the 
respondent had overstated the extent of modifications and consequent expenditure 
necessary to accommodate her.  Scarlett Finney, a 7 year old student with spina 
bifida, had been refused enrolment by the Hills Grammar School because it claimed 
that her inclusion would necessitate expensive adjustments to the school buildings and 
grounds.  Commissioner Innes found that the school’s assessment of the extent of the 
services and facilities required to accommodate Scarlett, and their consequent 
decision to refuse to enrol Scarlett, was informed by ‘general or stereotypical 
 
76 The respondents relied on the exemption created in both the education area [QADA s 44] and the 
goods and services area [QADA s 51].  This suggests, of course, that education authorities are not only 
in the business of providing education, they provide services as well and attract obligations under the 
QADA via the performance of that function.  The excursion party was to travel to the island via barge, 
the ‘Tangalooma Flyer’, and the respondents also alleged that this means of transport was not safe for 
‘I’. They raised the workplace health and safety exemption but QADT found that this exemption was 
not available in that the ‘Flyer’ was not a ‘workplace’ of the complainant but a mode of transport for 
her [11.1.3.a]. There was a further finding that there was ‘insufficient expert evidence’ that the 
complainant’s health and safety would have been put at risk by travelling on the Flyer.  Indeed, there 
was evidence that students, similarly reliant on a wheelchair, had successfully taken part in the 
excursion in previous years [11.1.3.b]. The Tribunal found the direct discrimination claim proved and 
‘I’ was awarded $3,000 compensation for her exclusion from the excursion. 
77 Finney v The Hills Grammar School [1999] HREOCA 14 (Unreported, Commissioner Innes, 20 July 
1999). 
78 Ibid [7.5]. 
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assumptions rather than made about Scarlett in particular’.79 He was critical of the 
school’s failure to organize an adequate expert assessment of Scarlett’s need and the 
impact of those needs on the school.80 
The third step in proof of unjustifiable hardship involves a balancing of multiple 
considerations in order to determine whether any ‘hardship’, caused to the respondent 
by the provision of the services and facilities, is ‘unjustifiable’.  The balancing act 
required in the decision making process is, as emphasised above, highly discretionary 
– again allowing scope for individual beliefs to intrude.  The precise nature of the 
guidance provided in the legislation as to relevant circumstances in the unjustifiable 
hardship enquiry varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Generally, legislation 
countenances consideration of the financial cost of accommodating a particular 
student, any benefit and any detriment which would follow from that student’s 
inclusion and the nature or effect of the disability.  Further, legislation authorises 
consideration of the ramifications of inclusion for ‘all concerned’, not just the 
educational institution or authority.  The QADA relevant circumstances are as follows: 
 
(a) the nature of the special services or facilities; and  
(b) the cost of supplying the special services or facilities and the number of people 
who would benefit or be disadvantaged; and 
(c) the financial circumstances of the person; and  
(d) the disruption that supplying the special services or facilities might cause; and  
(e) the nature of any benefit or detriment to all people concerned. 81 
The DDA provisions differ from the QADA provisions, but it is clear that there are 
strong similarities between the two sets of relevant circumstances.  It is significant 
that both allow consideration of benefit or detriment caused ‘to all concerned’: 
 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 QADA s 5. 
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(a) the nature of the benefit or detriment likely to accrue or be suffered by any 
persons concerned; and 
 (b) the effect of the disability of a person concerned; and 
(c) the financial circumstances and the estimated amount of expenditure required to 
be made by the person claiming unjustifiable hardship; and 
(d) in the case of the provision of services, or the making available of facilities 
– an action plan given to the Commission under section 64. 82 
B The Scope of the Exemption 
The exemption is frequently argued on the basis of hardship arising from the financial 
cost of supplying the extra services and facilities which may be required to 
accommodate the impairment of a person.83 In cases involving the provision of 
education to a student with an impairment another ground which is repeatedly raised, 
however, is the ‘hardship’ created for the school community by problem behaviour 
caused by a student’s impairment.  Although the exemption could not be raised in the 
context of the Purvis case,84 McHugh and Kirby JJ suggested that this variety of 
hardship to class mates and teachers could attract the exemption.  A line of decisions 
under the QADA, L,85 K v N School,86 and P,87 however, suggests problems with the 
applicability of the unjustifiable hardship exemption in the situation where the 
hardship is alleged in the ‘detriment’ caused to staff and students who work and study 
alongside the student with the challenging behaviour.  
 
82 DDA s 11. 
83 See, for example, Hills Grammar School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
(2000) 100 FCR 306. 
84 See Part V C, below.  
85 L (1996) 1 QADR 207. 
86 K v N School (No. 3) (1997) 1 QADR 620 (‘K’). 
87 P (1997)1 QADR 755.  
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C Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) 88 
Under, the DDA, the unjustifiable hardship exemption, to date, has only been litigated 
in the education context in respect of a student with a physical impairment seeking 
enrolment.89 The operation of the unjustifiable hardship exemption as created in the 
DDA has, however, been the recent subject of discussion by the High Court in the 
disability discrimination in education case, Purvis. The DDA differs from other 
Australian legislation in that, until recently, the exemption was only available to 
educational institutions to resist an allegation of discrimination arising from a refusal 
to enrol a student with a disability.90 The exemption was not available to resist 
allegations of discrimination arising from the treatment of a student after he or she is 
enrolled.  Amendments to the DDA which extend the scope of the exemption to the 
post-enrolment context came into force in August 2005.91 At the same time, the long 
anticipated Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) came into force.92 The 
Standards also make the unjustifiable hardship exemption available both to resist an 
enrolment and to justify the exclusion of an enrolled student.93 
88 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92. 
89 Hills Grammar School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2000) 100 FCR 306.  
90 It was comprehensively aired in this context in Finney v Hills Grammar School (2000) EOC 93-087 
(HREOC) (digest and extract); Finney v The Hills Grammar School [1999] HREOCA 14 
(Commissioner Innes, 20 July 1999). Note, however, that an educational institution may have been able 
to raise the exemption after enrolment where discrimination was framed in terms of denial of access via 
DDA s 23(2) – access to premises. See Sluggett v Flinders University of South Australia [2000] 
HREOC H96/7 (Unreported, Commissioner McEvoy, 14 July 2000). 
91 Disability Discrimination Amendment (Education Standards) Act 2005 (Cth) s 3. 
92See Philip Ruddock and Brendan Nelson, ‘Improved opportunities for students with disabilities’ 
(Press Release, 15 June 2004). Explanatory memoranda to the DDA amendments suggest that the DDA 
must be amended to make the exemption available post enrolment to ‘support’ the operation of the 
Standards. See Explanatory Memorandum, Disability Discrimination Amendment (Education 
Standards) Bill 2004 (Cth), outline. If the Standards, but not he DDA itself, make available the 
exemption post-enrolment there is an argument that the Standards operate in a manner not authorised 
by the parent legislation. 
93 Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) s 10.2. 
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In their minority judgment in Purvis, McHugh and Kirby JJ considered how the 
unjustifiable hardship exemption might assist educational authorities seeking to refuse 
enrolment to students with problem behaviour such as that displayed by Daniel 
Hoggan.  Daniel was excluded from South Grafton State High School after repeated 
incidents of violence against class mates and teachers.  It is a relevant circumstance, 
for the purpose of proof of unjustifiable hardship, that ‘detriment’ is likely to be 
suffered by ‘any persons concerned’ as a result of the accommodation or inclusion of 
a person with a disability.94 McHugh and Kirby JJ expressed the view that such 
detriment ‘would comprehend consideration of threats to the safety and welfare of 
other pupils, teachers and aides’ and, further, that it would allow ‘consideration of the 
duty of care owed by the educational authority to the other pupils’.95 
The inference to be drawn from the minority judgment of McHugh and Kirby JJ, in 
Purvis, is therefore, that the State would likely have succeeded had it sought to justify 
a refusal to enrol Daniel Hoggan on the basis of the hardship it would cause.  A 
further inference seems irresistible that, had the unjustifiable hardship exemption been 
available after enrolment under the DDA, the State may well have proved the 
exemption to justify Daniel’s exclusion.  McHugh and Kirby JJ made the explicit 
finding that ‘the limited operation of s 22(4) is anomalous and requires correction by 
the parliament’.96 Their suggestion was, therefore, that the solution to an educational 
authority’s problem of balancing its competing duties to students with disabilities and 
to ‘normal’ students and staff, did not lie in the DDA as it stood, but in amending the 
DDA to make available the unjustifiable hardship exemption after enrolment.  There 
 
94 See DDA s 11(a); cf QADA s 5(d). 
95 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 123 [94]. 
96 Ibid 124 [96]. 
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is little doubt that recent amendments to the DDA which make the exemption 
available after enrolment were prompted by the analysis of McHugh and Kirby JJ in 
Purvis.
D The Queensland ‘Behaviour’ Cases 
The QADA has always made available the unjustifiable hardship exemption after 
enrolment.  L, P and K all involved the issue of proof of unjustifiable hardship in 
circumstances similar to that of Daniel Hoggan: that is, where enrolled students 
proved difficult to accommodate on account of their behaviour.  The exemption was 
successfully raised in each of the three cases which all involved attempts to exclude 
students with intellectual impairments and related ‘impaired’ behaviour from ‘regular’ 
schools. The facts of L and P are outlined, above.97 In K, a complaint of 
discrimination was made after K was excluded from her small, independent primary 
school when she was eleven years old. She had attended the school for three years, 
from the beginning of 1993.  The evidence was that, while K was not violent nor 
‘difficult to control’, she displayed ‘significant problem behaviours’, the most 
pronounced being ‘fits of screaming’ and hyperventilation.98 As in the case of L, the 
respondent was concerned about the amount of time ‘spent’ on K, and claimed that 
this increased pressure on staff and created anxiety.99 It was interesting in this case 
that three parents gave evidence that they would remove their children from the 
respondent school should K be allowed to return.  
 
97 See Parts I, II and III, above. 
98 K (1997) 1QADR 620, 621. 
99 Ibid  622. 
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E Problems with the Applicability of the Unjustifiable Hardship Exemption to 
‘Behaviour’ Cases 
 
Analysis of the Queensland ‘behaviour’ cases, L, K and P, indicates that, despite the 
suggestion of McHugh and Kirby JJ in Purvis that problem behaviour could amount 
to unjustifiable hardship, there may still be problems with applying the exemption in 
cases such as the Purvis case.  The decisions in L, K and P suggest several 
controversial issues in relation to proof of unjustifiable hardship in behaviour cases. 
Although in each of the Queensland cases unjustifiable hardship was proved on the 
basis of such ‘detriment’, the process of proof was, in principle, flawed.  First, anti-
discrimination legislation requires that the unjustifiable hardship must arise from the 
provision of goods or services to a student with a disability.100 Secondly, hardship 
must be to the educational authority.101 Thirdly, the solution posited by schools in 
each case, and, by implication, regarded as appropriate by the QADT, was to relocate 
‘problem’ students from their mainstream school to a special school, where, 
presumably, the same problem behaviours would arise and impose the same 
‘detriment’ on staff and students.  
 
1 ‘Supply of Special Services or Facilities’ in the Queensland Cases. 
In all three Queensland cases the focus was on two varieties of hardship with each 
alleged by the respondent school to be ‘unjustifiable’.  First, each respondent argued 
hardship in the financial cost of providing specialist teaching to the complainant in a 
mainstream setting.  Secondly, each respondent argued hardship in accommodating 
the difficult behaviour of the complainant.  In both L and P the Tribunal refused to 
find hardship in the financial costs attendant on providing an education for the 
 
100 See, for example, QADA s 44(1)(b); cf DDA s 22(4). 
101 See, for example, QADA s 44(1)(b); cf DDA s 22(4). 
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complainant in a State School – suggesting that it will be difficult for the State, with 
vast resources at its disposal, to prove financial hardship in accommodating a student 
with an impairment at a regular school.  In K, the Tribunal did accept that financial 
hardship was unjustifiable.  The respondent school was a small independent school 
with limited resources and the evidence was that, even with the support of 
government grant monies, the school could not afford to provide the services and 
facilities required by K.  In L, K and P, however, the Tribunal found unjustifiable 
hardship was caused to the staff and students of the school simply by their presence at 
the school. 
 
The wording of the QADA, as noted above, authorises consideration of the ‘nature of 
any benefit or detriment to all people concerned’ in determining whether the supply of 
services and facilities causes unjustifiable hardship.  In L, K and P, significant 
detriment was alleged to the staff and students who were affected by the difficult 
behaviour of the complainant children.  At this point, parallels with the Purvis case 
are clear.  The circumstance, ‘detriment to any person concerned’, suggested by 
McHugh and Kirby JJ as relevant in behaviour cases, was the circumstance deemed of 
special relevance in each of the Queensland cases.  In L it was found that ‘the 
demands that would be imposed on the teacher involved, pending resolution of L’s 
present behavioural problems, are of themselves such as to constitute unjustifiable 
hardship’.102 In K it was found that  
there is another respect [apart from financial hardship] in which hardship would be 
caused, namely the stress caused to teachers who have inadequate experience and 
expertise in teaching special needs children, particularly in a context where the 
school's attempt to educate K so far has been relatively misguided and unsuccessful, 
 
102 L (1996) 1 QADR 207, 216. 
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and where there has been considerable animus built up between the school and the 
child's parents.103 
In P, Commissioner Keim noted that the situation faced by those staff and students 
required to associate with P was ‘intolerable’.104 
The difficulty is that the wording of the QADA is clear that the hardship must be 
caused by the supply of the special services or facilities: it is not unlawful to 
discriminate if ‘the supply of special services or facilities would impose unjustifiable 
hardship’.105 The difficulty is that the detriment to the students and staff found to 
exist in each of these cases was not – at least in any conventional sense – caused by 
the supply of services and facilities to the complainant, but by the simple presence of 
the complainant in the classroom.  A similar disjunction is apparent in the terms of the 
DDA where although ‘detriment likely…to be suffered by any persons concerned’ is 
expressed as a relevant circumstance, the exemption arises when a person ‘if admitted 
as a student by the educational authority, would require services or facilities that are 
not required by students who do not have a disability’ and the ‘provision’ of those 
services or facilities would impose unjustifiable hardship.106 On the facts of the 
Purvis case, for example, the hardship alleged would be detriment to staff and 
students in the risk to them posed by Daniel’s propensity to violence.  This hardship is 
factually unrelated to the provision of any facilities or services to Daniel.  
Unfortunately, the problem of this disjunction was not addressed by McHugh and 
Kirby JJ in their analysis of the exemption. 
 
103 K (1997) 1QADR 620, 624. It is especially interesting in this case that the School’s own failure to 
train staff ultimately allowed them to rely on the unjustifiable hardship exemption. 
104 P (1996) 1 QADR 755, 786. 
105 QADA s 44(1)(b). 
106 DDA s 22(4). 
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The detriment to others envisaged by the description of the relevant circumstances 
provided in both the QADA and the DDA is, perhaps, of the kind canvassed in the 
Finney case.  In that case it was alleged that detriment would flow to other members 
of the school community in that teachers would be forced to work longer hours – 
perhaps necessitating greater remuneration – to implement curriculum changes 
necessary to accommodate Scarlett Finney, and that the parent body would be forced 
to pay higher fees to cover the cost of capital works required to provide access to 
Scarlett.  
 
In Finney there is a clear link between this alleged detriment and the supply of 
services and facilities.107 In L, K and P, and by implication, Purvis, there is arguably 
no link.  In those cases, therefore, there is arguably no discretion to consider the 
detriment alleged as relevant to the determination of whether unjustifiable hardship 
exists.  Commissioner Keim, in P, however, was alert to this conceptual gap in the 
legislation and provided a ‘solution’ – a tenuous solution based on an artificial 
definition of services and facilities designed to allow the section to work.  As noted 
above, Commissioner Keim defined services and facilities widely to include the 
tolerance, camaraderie and friendship shown to P by staff and students at his school. 
In constructing his definition of services and facilities, Commissioner Keim relied on 
the cautionary advice relating to statutory interpretation given by Mason CJ and 
Gaudron J in their judgment in Waters v Public Transport Corporation:
the principle that requires that the particular provisions of the Act must be read in the 
light of the statutory objects is of particular significance in the case of legislation 
which protects or enforces human rights.  In construing such legislation the courts 
 
107 It is arguable, however, that even in Finney, consideration of such detriment should not have been 
relevant to proof of unjustifiable hardship in that the legislation provides that the hardship must be to 
the educational institution.  See below: ‘Is hardship to staff and students hardship to an ‘educational 
authority’? 
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have a special responsibility to take account of and give effect to the statutory 
purpose.108 
In the Waters case, the Court took such an approach to read down the scope of an 
exemption.  Here, Commissioner Keim uses the principle expounded in Waters to 
increase the scope of an exemption:  
…the statutory objects of the Act will not be served by a restrictive reading of an 
exemption provision which results in an unrealistic or illogical application of the Act 
any more than they are served by a narrow and restrictive reading of the primary 
provisions of the Act prohibiting discrimination on certain grounds so as to cause the 
Act to have no more than a residual impact… In the present case, in my view, s. 44 
and s. 5 together need to be given a reasonably broad construction in order to avoid 
defeating the objects of the Act by producing an unreasonable, illogical or 
"intolerable" situation. 109 
It is a bold move, perhaps, to claim advice delivered by the High Court in support of 
statutory interpretation which delivers the statutory object of reducing discrimination, 
as supporting, in P, an interpretation which excuses discrimination.  The inference is 
possible that Commissioner Keim considered the hardship caused by P’s behaviour to 
be so ‘unjustifiable’ that he simply made the words of the QADA fit the circumstances 
of the case.  Moreover, and somewhat ironically in view of the approach of  McHugh 
and Kirby JJ to the unjustifiable hardship exemption expressed in Purvis, it is 
apparent that to make the exemption fit the facts of Purvis would require exactly the 
same variety of ‘artificial construction’ they condemned in that case.110 It is clear that 
some amendment of the section is necessary to allow tribunals to consider any 
detriment which may be caused by the mere inclusion of a student without resort to 
linguistic gymnastics.  Indeed, the QADA already includes an exemption in the 
protected area of employment where the ‘circumstances of impairment’ would create 
unjustifiable hardship: 
 
108 Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349, 359. 
109 P (1996) 1 QADR 755, 785. 
110 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 124 [96]. 
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36 Circumstances of impairment 
(1) It is not unlawful for a person to discriminate on the basis of impairment against 
another person with respect to a matter that is otherwise prohibited … if the 
circumstances of the impairment would impose unjustifiable hardship on the first 
person.  
(2) Whether the circumstances of the impairment would impose unjustifiable 
hardship on a person depends on all the relevant circumstances of the case, including, 
for example--  
(a) the nature of the impairment; and  
(b) the nature of the work or partnership.  
 
The QADT has not taken the opportunity to consider in any detail the ‘circumstances’ 
where this exemption may be applicable.111 An exemption in similar terms in the 
education area would, however, address the concern that ‘hardship’ may flow from 
factors other than the supply of services or facilities.   
 
2 Is Hardship to Staff and Students Hardship to an ‘Educational Authority’? 
There is a further problem with the intersection of the provision creating the 
unjustifiable hardship exemption for educational institutions and the provision 
defining unjustifiable hardship apparent in both the QADA and the DDA. The 
exemption is made available only in respect of unjustifiable hardship proved to an 
educational authority. The QADA and the DDA define ‘educational authority’, in 
identical terms.  It ‘means a person or body administering an educational 
institution’.112 Clearly, hardship to staff and students cannot be characterised as 
hardship to an ‘educational authority’ without taking significant liberty with the 
meaning of the words of the statutory definition.  This problem is not addressed in any 
of the Queensland behaviour cases.  It is, however, briefly touched on – without 
satisfactory resolution – in another Queensland education case, the Corinda case.113 
111 See Gray v Queensland Rail [2000] QADT 3 (Unreported, Commissioner Pope, 30 March 2000); 
The exemption was raised and dismissed as unproved in this case without any close analysis of its 
scope. 
112 QADA s 4; DDA s 4. 
113 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Commissioner Copelin, 31 January 2001). 
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In that case, the relevant issue was whether the imposition of a financial burden on 
students at a State high school could be taken to be unjustifiable hardship to 
Education Queensland, an ‘educational authority’.  The complainant had alleged 
discrimination arising from issues relating to venues selected by Corinda State High 
School for two functions – the school formal and the school graduation dinner.  The 
formal took place at the Greek Club and the graduation dinner on ‘The Island’, a 
restaurant barge on the Brisbane River.  The complaints arose out of access and toilet 
arrangements for the complainant at both venues and out of concerns about 
emergency evacuation procedures on ‘The Island’.  
 
As already noted, QADA provides that the cost of supplying special services or 
facilities is relevant to the consideration of whether hardship is unjustifiable.114 In 
this case, it was accepted that alternative venues with acceptable access would have 
imposed an additional cost.  The problem was that any additional cost would have 
been borne by the other students attending the formal and dinner and not by the 
school.  Hardship arising from this additional cost, therefore, would be borne by 
students and not by an ‘educational authority’.115 However, proof of unjustifiable 
hardship requires proof of imposition of unjustifiable hardship on the educational 
authority or supplier of goods and services.116 There was no evidence presented of 
the financial circumstances of the school and, as such, of whether the school, rather 
than the students, could afford to take on the extra costs of a different venue.  The 
QADT acknowledged that the legislative policy is such that the only ‘person’, for 
 
114 QADA s 5 (b). 
115 Nor, indeed, would the additional cost be borne by a ‘supplier of goods and services’.  The same 
problem arises, therefore, in respect of proof of unjustifiable hardship under other sections, such as 
QADA s 51(1)(b), which is applicable to the goods and services protected area. 
116 QADA s 44 (b) and s 51 (1)(b). 
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whom cost is relevant, in a consideration of unjustifiable hardship, is the school.  The 
Tribunal attempted to avoid the problems raised by this finding by simply stating that 
[w]hile there is no evidence that the respondents could not afford to pay for 
supplying the special services or facilities (by arranging and paying for other 
venues if they were suitable), I believe it would be highly unusual for a school 
(rather than the attending students) to pay for events such as school balls or 
dinners such as the ones the subject of this dispute.117 
In a further attempt to avoid the problem, the Tribunal considered the cost to students 
as part and parcel of ‘detriment’ which would be caused if the venues were changed. 
Section 5(e) includes as relevant circumstances in proof of unjustifiable hardship ‘the 
nature of any benefit or detriment to all people concerned’.  The Tribunal found that 
the school was obliged to consider a multiplicity of issues in selecting suitable venues 
and that detriment to the other students in terms of cost, security, transport, and 
supervision issues outweighed the benefit which would flow to the complainant. 
Again, however, this detriment to other students does not mesh easily with a finding 
of unjustifiable hardship to the school, the ‘educational authority’, as contemplated by 
the legislation.  Direct hardship to the school was at best, tangential and minimal, 
arising out of the ‘disruption’ caused through any relocation of the events.118 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal found that the unjustifiable hardship exemption was made 
out. 
 
This issue was also raised, briefly, in argument before the High Court in the Purvis 
case with Gleeson CJ questioning the applicability of the unjustifiable exemption to 
the case of a school challenged by the problem behaviour of a student.  He asked 
counsel for the appellant how hardship on an educational authority would ‘pick up 
 
117 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Commissioner Copelin, 31 January 2001) 11.2.2.3. 
118 Disruption is a relevant consideration: QADA s 5 (d).  
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danger to students’.119 Counsel for the appellant argued that those affected were 
within the care of the educational authority and that ‘obviously the educational 
authority runs an institution and has certain obligations, some legal, some moral, 
some practical, in the way it deals with students, so it is unjustifiable hardship to the 
educational institution’.120 Gleeson CJ was not convinced, saying, ‘I am not sure that 
that is all there is to it’.121 This exchange of views in Purvis further emphasises the 
need for clarification of the scope of the unjustifiable hardship exemption. Plainly, 
some amendment of both the QADA and the DDA, and similar Australian 
legislation,122 is desirable if hardship to people or bodies other than an educational 
authority123 is unequivocally sufficient to ground a finding of unjustifiable hardship. 
 
3 Why is Behaviour Considered Detrimental to Others in a ‘Mainstream’ School 
Not Considered Detrimental to Others in a ‘Special’ School? 
It is tempting to ask why the argument which proved persuasive against the public 
health exemption, in L, and against the workplace health and safety exemption, in P,
was not raised against the unjustifiable hardship exemption in either of those cases, or 
in K. That is, if the presence of a student with behaviour difficulties is enough to 
create an unjustifiable hardship to the staff and students in a regular school, why does 
it not cause similar hardship to the staff and students at a ‘special’ school?  The 
answer given to this conundrum, would, perhaps, be that the staff in special schools is 
specially trained to cope with problem behaviours and that there is a smaller student 
 
119 Transcript of Proceedings, Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and 
Training) (High Court of Australia, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon 
JJ, 29 April 2003). 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 See above n 67. 
123 Or provider of goods and services, or provider of accommodation, or employer, and so on. This 
problem with the terms of the legislation arises with the operation of the exemption in all protected 
areas. 
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staff ratio in those schools, ‘diluting’ the hardship.  However, it could be argued – 
and, in fact, was argued in expert evidence in each of the Queensland cases – that 
specialist teacher training and extra staff would similarly mitigate the problems at a 
regular school.  So, this answer is, arguably, no good answer at all.  This answer also 
fails to address the situation of fellow students: if ‘normal’ students cannot be asked 
to bear the ‘hardship’ of sharing a classroom with a ‘problem’ student, why should 
‘special’ students be expected to do so?  There is the suggestion here of an 
educational sub-culture where students with impairment are expected to accommodate 
the needs and demands of other students with other impairments while ‘normal’ 
students are not.  It could be argued that this ‘two-tiered’ system implies more 
favourable treatment of ‘normal’ students, and, further, resonates the anachronistic 
and discriminatory view that students with impairments should be grouped together 
and removed from public view.  Further, such a system is inconsistent with the 
fundamental communitarian tenet that democratic society is inclusive.  Tam has 
warned that ‘total segregation could mean that a culture of co-operative citizenship 
could be seriously undermined’.124 Walzer has pointed out that ‘the adult world is not 
segregated by intelligence’.125 The segregation of people with impairments is, as 
such, practically and politically wrong: ‘in a practical sense we are required by our 
work to mix up and down the status hierarchy; further, democratic politics requires 
that we mix with a wide range of people’.126 
In P, Commissioner Keim found that the accommodation of the complainant not only 
caused unjustifiable stress to the staff and students at his school, it also hindered the 
 
124 Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship (1998) 68. 
125 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 221. 
126 Ibid. 
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educational opportunities of his classmates because teacher time was deflected from 
other students by his needs and because his behaviour disrupted learning in the 
classroom.127 To argue that this educational ‘hardship’ to other students would justify 
the complainant’s exclusion is also difficult when the proposal was that he be 
relocated to another school where, presumably, he would continue to disrupt the 
learning of others.  Does it matter less if the learning of a student with an impairment 
is disrupted than if the learning of a ‘normal’ student is disrupted?  Is the education of 
students with impairments less important than the education of ‘normal’ students? 
Again, it could be answered that specialist staff and extra staff mitigate the disruption 
at a special school.  Again this answer is undone by the fact that specialist staff and 
extra staff could be made available in a regular classroom. 
 
The problem raised by this analysis is not easily cured by legislative amendment. 
Ironically, it appears that the ‘hardship’ may be removed by the provision of special 
services or facilities in the form of more staff and more supervision, not simply by 
relocation to another school.  That there is reluctance to place extra staff at regular 
schools to support students with impairments can be explained, at a policy level, by 
funding considerations.  Education Queensland, for example, has a policy of the 
clustering of resources at particular schools to suit particular classes of impairment in 
order to maximise the efficient use of department resources.128 However, there is 
compelling evidence presented in each of the Queensland cases that suggests that, at a 
cost, the accommodation of any student with any impairment is possible in a regular 
classroom.  In P, for example, Commissioner Keim conceded,  
 
127 P (1996) 1 QADR 755, 785. 
128 Education Queensland, ‘Curriculum Studies 05: Education Provision for Students with Disabilities’ 
Department of Education Manual, Procedures 1.4. 
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I am not convinced…that it was impossible or completely impractical to adjust 
arrangements so that a mix of services could be provided at some non-segregated 
campus outside the Aitkenvale Special School.  It seems to me not unreasonable that, 
if a dual enrolment was considered for P by which he would be taxied from one 
campus to another, it might also be possible to consider taxiing services including 
staff resources from one campus to another.129 
In K, Commissioner Holmes made a similar finding:  
At the end of the day, I formed the impression that K could properly be educated in a 
regular classroom setting with opportunities for withdrawal, provided appropriate 
specialist assistance of the kind proposed by Dr Giorcelli and Mr Worthington was 
forthcoming. I accept Dr Sigafoos' evidence that such behavioural problems as K 
evinces can be managed by appropriate intervention.130 
In L, Commissioner Holmes found that with full-time special education assistance L 
could be accommodated in a regular classroom.131 The QADT has not been prepared 
to rely on this evidence, however, to the extent necessary that it may find for the 
complainant.  It has found, at least where the respondent is the State, that financial 
hardship is not unjustifiable, but it has not been prepared to impose the financial cost 
of accommodating students with behavioural difficulties on educational authorities, 
by making a finding of unlawful discrimination and ordering that the complainant be 
returned to a mainstream school.  It can be seen that to find unjustifiable hardship in 
the effect on learning and in the ‘stress’ caused by the behaviour problems of students 
with impairments, effects which could be mitigated – at a cost – is, perhaps, in reality, 
to find unjustifiable hardship in a financial sense after all. This link is made explicit in 
K:
…given the evidence as to the financial basis of the school, I am satisfied that 
provision of the necessary services to K would cause hardship. I am also satisfied that 
there is another respect in which hardship would be caused, namely the stress caused 
to teachers who have inadequate experience and expertise in teaching special needs 
children, particularly in a context where the school's attempt to educate K so far has 
been relatively misguided and unsuccessful, and where there has been considerable 
 
129 P (1996) 1 QADR 755, 787. Commissioner Keim ultimately decided, however, that Education 
Queensland was not obliged to deliver such a ‘mix of services at some non-segregated campus’ on the 
basis that P’s mother did not co-operate with the department to the extent necessary for such a plan to 
be effected: 787. 
130 K (1997) 1QADR 620, 623. 
131 L (1996) 1 QADR 207, 216. 
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animus built up between the school and the child's parents. The latter is a hardship 
which could be overcome with appropriate specialist assistance; the difficulty is that 
one then returns to the problem of how that assistance is to be funded.132 
In K, it was easy to concede that the complainant could be catered for, at a cost, in a 
‘regular’ school, because of the finding that the cost of providing special services and 
facilities would cause unjustifiable hardship to that small, independent, ‘regular’ 
school.  The link has not been so easy to concede, perhaps, in cases where the 
defendant is the State and financial hardship is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. 
 
It is interesting to note that in the Purvis case, too, the HREOC found that more could 
have been done by South Grafton High to accommodate Daniel, in terms of specialist 
support and teacher training. The HREOC went a step further than the QADT, 
however, and found that the failure to accommodate Daniel was unlawful 
discrimination.133 The HREOC also found that the failure to provide this 
accommodation was causally related to Daniel’s expulsion in that proper 
accommodation would have mitigated his behaviour problems.134 These findings 
were not addressed in the Federal Court hearings.  In the High Court, McHugh and 
Kirby JJ affirmed the HREOC findings that proper accommodation had not been 
made and, further, that ‘if the accommodation had been provided, more probably than 
not, the misbehaviour would not have occurred.135 While, Commissioner Innes, of the 
HREOC, and McHugh and Kirby JJ, unlike the QADT, were prepared to make 
findings which would force the State to take the expensive steps necessary to 
accommodate Daniel in his mainstream school, their views yielded to the majority 
finding in the High Court that there had been no discrimination against Daniel 
 
132 K (1997) 1QADR 620, 623. 
133 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75172-5 
[6.4].    
134 Ibid. 
135 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 128 [107], 136-7 [134]-[138]. 
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Hoggan.  Indeed, Callinan J was impressed by the State’s ‘very great investment of 
time, resources, energy, expertise, money and compassion’ in Daniel.136 
VI  CONCLUSION 
It is instructive to note the conceptual gap between the policy reasons frequently 
advanced for not implementing complete inclusion of students with impairments at 
‘regular’ schools and the reasons accepted as just by the QADT.  One reason 
advanced is that many families prefer a segregated setting for their children.137 The 
other, more controversial, reason is that the cost of effecting full inclusion is 
prohibitive:  scarce resources are best distributed by the clustering of those resources 
at regular schools designated for a particular impairment, or at special schools or 
units.138 The difficulty is that, in each individual case, the State can afford the cost of 
the requisite services and facilities but, when the cases are multiplied, the cost 
becomes prohibitive.  In this context, it is interesting to note the response of the 
disability sector to the cases of P and L – they were seen as putting to rest any chance 
of succeeding against the State in a claim for inclusion at a mainstream school.139 
Unjustifiable hardship on the basis of detriment to others, and not of financial 
hardship, was found in those cases, but the denial of a remedy for discrimination in 
those cases, it can be suggested, must ultimately have saved the State a significant 
amount of money.  By glossing over the construction difficulties raised by applying 
 
136 Ibid 164 [239]. 
137 See, for example, Josephine Jenkinson, Special Education: A Matter of Choice (2001), 52;  Senate 
Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of Australia, Education of 
students with disabilities (2002) (‘Senate Report’) 32-3 [3.14]-[3.15], 37 [3.29], 39-40 [3.37], 41-2 
[3.43]. 
138 See, for example, Senate Report, above n 136, 2 [1.6], 43 [3.47]; Education Queensland, 
‘Curriculum Studies 05: Education Provision for Students with Disabilities’ Department of Education 
Manual, Procedures 1.4. 
139 After L, Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, which funded the case, made a policy decision ‘not to 
take on any further inclusive education matters in the near future’.  It was decided there were ‘other 
areas where we should be directing our resources’: Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, Annual Report 
(1995-1996). 
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the unjustifiable hardship exemption to the situation where the behaviour of a student 
with a disability causes ‘detriment’ to staff and other students, and by avoiding the 
policy issue of why problem behaviour is ‘detrimental’ in a mainstream school but not 
in a ‘special’ school, the QADT has not only saved teachers and students in 
mainstream schools ‘hardship’, it has saved the State money.  Another concern is that 
the State appears willing – or, at least, has been compelled – to apply resources to 
facilitate the inclusion of students with physical impairments.  This has, it may be 
argued, promoted a hierarchy of impairments with students with intellectual or 
behavioural impairments afforded fewer opportunities for inclusion.140 Although the 
decision of McHugh and Kirby JJ, in the Purvis case, apparently confirms the 
availability of the unjustifiable hardship exemption in behaviour cases brought under 
the DDA and similar legislation, the problems with the construction of this 
controversial exemption suggest that it will inevitably attract close judicial scrutiny in 
the future. 
 
Communitarians have not explicitly advanced the appropriate solution to either the 
detrimental impact on others of including students with behaviour problems or the 
prohibitive cost to the state of including students with ‘expensive’ disabilities.  As 
already suggested, however, the communitarian solution would probably be to allow 
the exclusion of students with disabilities in either case – the good of the majority 
prevails over the good of the individual.141 It could be argued, however, that the 
legislation, and the courts which apply it, should not dress up unaffordable financial 
 
140 See Julie Smart, Disability, Society, and the Individual (2001). Smart has theorised that there is a 
hierarchy of disability according to type of disability whereby people with physical impairment are 
afforded greater access to and acceptance by society than people with intellectual or psychiatric 
impairments. Education Queensland statistical data also support the conclusion that there is such a 
hierarchy.  See Part III B, Chapter 4: The Impact of the Legislation.  
141 See Part VI, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
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detriment in other guises and should be more frank in acknowledging that there are 
financial limits even to the state’s ability to include all comers.  Further, it is unlikely 
that communitarians who have written so eloquently on the place of people with 
intellectual disabilities in mainstream community would condone the supply of 
expensive support to people with challenging physical disabilities but not to those 
with challenging intellectual and behavioural disabilities, particularly where the 
evidence is that such support would allow their inclusion without detrimental impact 
on others.  To allow the creation of a hierarchy of disability is inconsistent with the 
fundamental right to equality of citizens.  As Tam has succinctly stated, ‘democratic 
society is inclusive’.142To remove such students from the mainstream classroom is to 
deny them – and others – the opportunity to learn the lessons of citizenship, and 
particularly the values which prevail ‘beyond all our differences’.143 Etzioni has 
emphasised, for example, that schools ‘ought to teach’ that ‘the dignity of all persons 
ought to be respected, that tolerance is a virtue and discrimination abhorrent’.144 
Further, to prefer physically impaired students to those with intellectual and 
behavioural impairments undermines ‘mutual obligation’ in that it denies those with 
intellectual or behavioural impairment the opportunity to ‘give back’ to the 
community in response to what they have taken.  As McIntyre has explained each 
citizen is both learner and teacher:  ‘each member of the community is someone from 
whom we may learn and may have to learn about our common good and our own 
good, and who always may have lessons to teach us about those goods that we will 
not be able to learn elsewhere’.145 
142 Tam, above n 123, 8. 
143 William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State (1991) 245. 
144 Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda 
(1993) 258. 
145 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependant Rational Animals (1999) 135. 
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CHAPTER 7 
AN IMPLIED DUTY OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
 
Some Australian cases have suggested that anti-discrimination legislation requires not 
only that educational institutions not treat students less favourably on the ground of 
disability, but also that they take positive steps to accommodate or to adjust to a 
student’s impairment.  At first glance, this willingness to impose positive duties on 
education providers suggests recognition that disability is a social construct and that 
disability can be controlled, limited, reduced or even removed by institutional and 
environmental adaptation.  The Productivity Commission has argued that the 
imposition of a positive duty of accommodation or adjustment is an essential element 
of effective anti-discrimination legislation:  
 The Commission considers that the task of eliminating discrimination cannot be 
 adequately addressed in the absence of a duty to make reasonable adjustments.  If 
 disability discrimination legislation only went as far as formal equality, it would 
 entrench existing disadvantages.1
The Commission argued that adjustment is necessary to deliver substantive equality 
‘because it addresses the environmental barriers that are so disabling to people with 
impairments’.2
The cases reveal, however, that the finding of a duty to accommodate a student may 
work not only as a sword to prosecute claims of unlawful discrimination but also as a 
shield to defend them.  Any duty imposed by courts and tribunals, to date, has been 
moderated by a constraint of reasonableness.  Education providers have been required 
 
1 Productivity Commission, Australian Government, Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992,
Report No 30 (2004) 193. 
2 Ibid. 
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to make only a ‘reasonable adjustment’ or to take a ‘reasonably proportionate 
response’.  The concept of reasonable adjustment, it could be argued, is potentially 
consistent with communitarian theory in that it allows a balancing of competing 
interests, with the right of the person with impairment to inclusion yielding when 
majority rights are infringed by that inclusion.3
This reasoning of those Australian tribunals which have found an implied duty of 
reasonable adjustment was, doubtless, influenced by the fact that a duty to take 
positive steps to mitigate disability is commonly found in anti-discrimination 
legislation in other jurisdictions.  In the United States, for example, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 contains an obligation of ‘reasonable accommodation’.4
The obligation is limited by a defence of ‘undue hardship’.5 Thus, in this legislation 
there is an express link between two concepts similar to that implied in the context of 
Australian legislation.6 Similarly, the European Community has adopted a directive 
that, in the employment context, ‘reasonable accommodation shall be provided’ to 
people with disabilities ‘to guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment 
 
3 See Part IV, Chapter 5: Communitarian Education. 
4 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 USC §§12101-12213. See, for example, in relation to 
employment discrimination § 12111(9) and § 12112 (b)(5)(a). 
5 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 USC §§12101-12213. See, for example, in relation to 
employment discrimination § 12111(10)(B). 
6 It is interesting to note a similar case law controversy in the USA to the ‘reasonable accommodation’ 
controversy here. The US Supreme court has recently implied from the terms of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 a limit upon the duty of reasonable accommodation which arises even when 
undue hardship cannot be proved. The court has re-invigorated the meaning of ‘reasonableness’ finding 
in that word a limit separate from the limit of undue hardship: U.S. Airways, Inc. v Barnett, 535 US 391 
(2002).  The US National Council on Disability has described the decision as ‘troubling because it 
allows employers to evade providing accommodations that do not cause an “undue hardship”, by 
endorsing a separate “reasonableness” standard into the law's requirement for reasonable 
accommodation’. See National Council on Disability, Reasonable Accommodation after Barnett (2003) 
< http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/accommodation.htm> at 27 July 2005. This 
approach of the US Supreme Court, although it post dates the Australian case law discussed below, 
resonates in that Australian case law. 
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in relation to persons with disabilities’.7 The limit to the accommodation which must 
be provided occurs when to provide accommodation would ‘impose a 
disproportionate burden’.8 In 2002, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) was 
amended to extend a duty to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ to schools.  Previously, 
the duty had applied in the employment context.9 Schools must now take ‘such steps 
as it is reasonable for it to have to take’ to ensure that ‘disabled pupils are not placed 
at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with pupils who are not disabled’.10 What 
is and is not ‘reasonable’ is not spelled out in the legislation but provision is made for 
guidance via regulation.11 
Australian courts and tribunals have, no doubt, also been influenced in their reasoning 
on the reasonable adjustment issue by statements in the Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Disability Discrimination Bill 1992 (Cth) and in the second reading speech for 
that bill which imply that such a duty is to be part of the Disability Discrimination Act 
1992 (Cth) (DDA).  The Memorandum stated that ‘[t]he Bill also provides that only 
reasonable accommodation need be made for people with disabilities, and persons 
against whom complaints are made will be able to argue that accommodation 
necessary to be made will involve unjustifiable hardship on that person’.12 In the 
second reading speech, in the context of employment discrimination, the Deputy 
Prime Minister said, ‘there is an exemption which does not prohibit discrimination if 
the person is not able to perform adequately the inherent requirements of the job, even 
 
7 Council Directive (EC) No 78/2000 of 27 November 2000 Establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJL 303/16, Chapter 1, Article 5. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) s 6: ‘duty of employer to make adjustments’. 
10 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) s 28C. 
11 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) s 28C(3). 
12 Explanatory Memorandum, Disability Discrimination Bill 1992 (Cth). 
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where reasonable accommodation has been made’.13 Several subsequent speakers at 
the second reading stage also accepted that such a duty existed.14 In fact the concept 
of reasonable accommodation caused some alarm to one member of the Opposition: 
Not only do we have people assessing the almost unassessable things such as feelings 
and humiliation, but the Bill also provides for things like reasonable accommodation 
needs. Who determines what is reasonable? Is there a community standard as to what 
reasonable accommodation is? Is reasonable accommodation in northern Australia 
the same as in southern Australia? There is a great diversity. If we are going to put 
into place legislation that addresses these things, we will have to have a lot more 
clarity than is provided by generalised terms such as `reasonable accommodation'.15 
In Purvis v New South Wales,16 however, five members of the High Court considered 
the issue of whether the terms of the DDA contained an implied duty of ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ and concluded that they did not.17 While this decision casts doubt on 
the legitimacy of the reasoning of earlier cases which did find such a duty, it is 
nevertheless useful to examine the reasoning in those cases in order both to 
understand the complex insinuations of meaning in the legislation, and to appreciate 
the willingness of courts and tribunals to infer methods of denying liability for 
discrimination from the terms of the legislation.   
 
I THE LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATION OF THE IMPLIED DUTY OF REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION 
The Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) provides that for the purposes of the 
definition of direct discrimination, ‘the fact that the person with the impairment may 
require special services or facilities is irrelevant’ in the determination of whether the 
 
13 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 1992, 2750 (Brian 
Howe, Deputy Prime Minister). 
14 See, for example, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 August 
1992, 144 (Bruce Scott); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 October 1992, 1309 (GEJ 
Tambling). 
15 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 August 1992, 150 (CG 
Miles). 
16 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92 
(‘Purvis’).  
17 The analysis of the reasonable accommodation issue by the High Court is considered at Part II, 
below. 
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circumstances of the person with the impairment are the same or not materially 
different from the circumstances of a person without an impairment.18 Prima facie, 
the effect of this subsection is that a respondent cannot argue that the circumstances of 
X and the circumstances of Y are materially different because, for example, X needs a 
ramp for wheelchair access, an aide, a guide dog or extra time for an exam and Y does 
not.  To allow these environmental ramifications of a disability to make the 
circumstances of X and Y different would in many instances make it impossible to 
prove a discrimination claim.  Further, it is obvious that one, if not the only, reason 
people discriminate against others with disabilities is because they fear or resent the 
need to accommodate that disability. 
 
The reasoning of QADT President Copelin in Brackenreg v Queensland University of 
Technology19 seems to take the effect of this rider to the definition one step further, 
towards imposing a responsibility on respondents to make ‘reasonable adjustment’20 
for people with disabilities.  President Copelin described the scope of the duty of 
Queensland University of Technology (QUT) to students with disabilities thus: 
There is no obligation on the respondent to pass a student just because they have a 
disability.  Their obligation is to reasonably make available such special services or 
facilities which may be necessary to enable a student with disabilities to undertake 
studies. 21 
The reasoning behind this statement of obligation is not clearly stated but may 
nevertheless be inferred:  if an educational institution discriminates because it fails or 
refuses to make a reasonable adjustment, then it necessarily follows that for an 
educational institution not to discriminate it must make reasonable adjustment.  
 
18 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) s 10(5).  
19Brackenreg v Queensland University of Technology [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 
December 1999) (‘Brackenreg’). 
20 Brackenreg [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999) [4.2.2.4(v)]. 
21 Brackenreg [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999) [4.2.2.4(v)]. 
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President Copelin found in Brackenreg that there was no discrimination because QUT 
had made ‘reasonable adjustment to allow the complainant to compete on a level 
playing field’.22 
The decision in Brackenreg echoes a trend evident in several decisions in cases 
brought under the DDA. Mansfield J in A School v Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission and Another23 cautiously canvassed the idea that there may 
be an ‘obligation to take positive action’24 to accommodate a person with a disability.  
Mansfield J recognized that three aspects of the DDA suggest such a positive 
obligation.  First, the DDA stipulates that less favourable treatment of a person 
because they need support from, for example, a therapeutic device,25 an assistant26 or 
a guide dog27 is discriminatory.  It is thereby acknowledged in the DDA that special 
devices or aids may be necessary for a person with a disability.  Secondly, proof of 
the unjustifiable hardship exemption28 is predicated on the fact that ‘services or 
facilities’ must be provided for a person with a disability.  Thirdly, the DDA expressly 
provides that ‘circumstances … are not materially different because of the fact that 
different accommodation or services may be required by the person with a 
disability’.29 Mansfield J tentatively concluded:  
Thus it is not necessarily the case that where the DD Act applies to a particular 
relationship or circumstance, there is no positive obligation to provide for the need of 
a person with a disability for different or additional accommodation or services. 30 
22 Brackenreg [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999) [4.2.2.4(v)]. 
23 A School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 55 ALD 93. 
24 Ibid 103. 
25 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) s 7. 
26 DDA s 8. 
27 DDA s 10. 
28 DDA s 22(4). 
29 DDA s 5(2); cf QADA s 10(5). 
30 A School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 55 ALD 93, 104. 
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Various commissioners of the HREOC have also embraced the view that there is a 
requirement to make ‘reasonable accommodation’.  Commissioner Nettlefold in 
Garity v Commonwealth Bank of Australia31 considered that the principle of 
reasonable accommodation ‘should be regarded as a central principle of disability 
discrimination law.  The proper construction of the [DDA] shows that the principle of 
reasonable accommodation is contained in it’.32 Commissioner Nettlefold considered 
that the word ‘favourably’ as used in s 5 of the DDA ‘adverted to the notion of giving 
aid or help’.33 
Commissioner McEvoy in her decision in Mrs Cowell and Fleur Cowell v A School,34 
delivered after Mansfield J remitted the matter to HREOC following the Federal 
Court hearing outlined above,35 unequivocally accepted that action amounting to 
‘appropriate accommodation’ of a student’s disabilities is required: 
It is my view that the substantial effect of section 5(2) is to impose a duty on a 
respondent to make a reasonably proportionate response to the disability of the person 
with which it is dealing in the provision of appropriate accommodation or other 
support as may be required as a consequence of the disability, so that in truth, the 
person with the disability is not subjected to less favourable treatment than would a 
person without a disability in similar circumstances. 36 
Despite argument from the New South Wales Education Department that there was no 
statutory basis for the existence of a reasonable accommodation test, ‘apart from the 
limited terms of s 5(2)’ and that educational institutions were motivated by ‘other 
statutory and policy reasons’ and not by any requirement of reasonable 
accommodation in their treatment of students with disabilities, Commissioner Innes, 
 
31 Garity v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1999) EOC ¶92-966 (HREOC). 
32 Ibid 6.4. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Mrs Cowell and Fleur Cowell v A School [2000] HREOC No97/168 (Unreported, Commissioner 
McEvoy, 10 October 2000) (‘Cowell’).  
35 A School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998) 55 ALD 93. 
36 Cowell [2000] HREOC No97/168 (Unreported, Commissioner McEvoy, 10 October 2000) [5.2.2]. 
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at first instance in Purvis, concluded that ‘the accepted approach of the courts is that 
the respondent has an obligation to make a reasonably proportionate response to the 
person’s disability’.37 
Both Commissioner McEvoy in Cowell and Commissioner Innes in Purvis were 
influenced by the decision of the United States Court of Appeal in Southeastern 
Community College v Davis38 and the decision of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal in Jamal v Secretary, Department of Health.39 The Courts in both these cases 
grappled with the distinction between adjustments for disability that are ‘reasonable’, 
and therefore required of a respondent, and those which are ‘substantial’ and therefore 
not required.  The Courts in both Davis and Jamal did not acknowledge a ‘positive 
obligation’ or a duty of ‘affirmative action’ on a respondent’s part, preferring the 
more subtle terminology adopted by both Commissioners McEvoy and Innes: the 
requirement of a reasonably proportionate response. 
 
The findings of Commissioner Innes in Purvis suggest that the ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ concept could operate as both a sword and a shield in discrimination 
cases.  Whereas in Brackenreg and Cowell it worked to defend claims of 
discrimination, in Purvis, at least in the HREOC, it worked to prove a failure to 
provide for the complainant’s needs which was sufficient to amount to discrimination. 
While in Brackenreg and Cowell no discrimination was found in that the respondents’ 
actions were found to have been ‘reasonably proportionate’, in Purvis, Commissioner 
Innes identified ‘three actions’ which the respondent should have taken to make its 
 
37 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75170 
[6.3]. 
38 Southern Community College v Davis, 442 US 397 (1979). 
39Jamal v Secretary, Department of Health (1988) 14 NSWLR 452. 
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actions reasonably proportionate.  Commissioner Innes was satisfied that if the 
following three actions had been taken, the respondent’s ‘actions would have been 
reasonably proportionate in the circumstances, and discrimination would not have 
taken place’: 
• [the respondent] should have more broadly consulted in the development of 
Daniel’s discipline and welfare policy 
 
• … once the policy was in place and being followed the respondent should 
have been more prepared to be flexible in allowing changes. 
 
• … the advice of special education experts should have been taken more 
generally. 40 
It could be argued that the actions specified are vague in their formulation: ‘more 
broadly consulted’, ‘more prepared to be flexible’, ‘taken more generally’.  As such, 
the findings of Commissioner Innes in Purvis were clearly likely to cause a measure 
of discomfort for educational institutions used to more specific determinations that, 
for example, not providing wheelchair ramps, or extra time on exams or access to 
excursions, is discriminatory.  Still it must be noted that even in this decision, which 
could be seen as pushing the boundaries of the operation of anti-discrimination law in 
Australia, there is implicit acknowledgement that only a ‘reasonable’ response will be 
demanded of education providers and that, as such, there is no legislative guarantee 
that a student with an impairment will be accommodated in his or her school of 
choice.  
 
Application for review by the Federal Court of the decision in Purvis was made by the 
respondent pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 
(Cth).  Emmett J found for the appellant, reversing the finding of the HREOC that 
 
40 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75172-5 
[6.4].
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Daniel Hoggan had been discriminated against in his treatment at the South Grafton 
High School.  Emmett J found that, ‘s 5(2) does not appear to have any relevant 
application in the present case’ and read down the meaning of ‘accommodation’ in the 
Act to that provided in the definitions section – ‘residential or business 
accommodation’.41 He found that the school’s treatment of Daniel was not 
discriminatory because it was on the ground of his behaviour and not on the ground of 
his disability, and that the hearing commissioner had erred in his interpretation of the 
definition of disability in s 4 DDA.42 Emmett J’s decision was, subsequently, 
affirmed by the Full Federal Court.43 
The Full Federal Court, in its consideration of the circumstances of the Purvis case 
backed away from imposing a requirement that a ‘reasonably proportionate response’ 
be made to an impaired student.  Indeed, it backed away from imposing any positive 
obligation on an alleged discriminator.  It was particularly critical of the findings of 
Commissioner Innes of discrimination by the respondent school in its management of 
Daniel Hoggan:44 
The findings of discrimination which were made by the HREOC  in relation to acts or 
omissions other than expulsion go further and impose positive duties on the school to 
manage the conduct of the student, presumably regardless of cost or impact upon 
other school activities, without explaining why such measures would not involve a 
breach of s 22(2)(a) or (c).The critical points are that there is no criterion of 
reasonableness in s 22(2) and no equivalent of s 22(4) in relation to a student once 
enrolled.45 
41 DDA s 4(2). 
42 See Chapter 8: The Definition of Disability. 
43 Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237. 
44 Commissioner Innes made these findings of discrimination in addition to finding that Daniel’s 
exclusion had breached the DDA. See Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of 
Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75172-5 [6.4].
45 Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 247 [26] 
(‘Purvis’). 
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The reasoning of the Full Court is not transparent here.  It could be argued that the 
Court was suggesting that to take positive measures to accommodate a student with a 
disability amounts to discrimination against students without disability.  The 
implication appears to be that the ‘cost and impact’ of taking positive measures for the 
student with the disability will, to adapt the terminology of s 22(2)(a), ‘limit’ or 
‘deny’ the ‘access’ of other students to ‘benefits’ provided by the school. 
Alternatively, to adapt the terminology of s 22(2)(c), the cost and impact will 
‘subject’ other students to ‘detriment’.  There are problems with this line of reasoning.  
Firstly, it is difficult to reconcile with s 5 of the DDA or with the terms of the 
unjustifiable hardship exemption in s 22(4).  Section 5(1) spells out that 
discrimination occurs when a person with a disability is accorded less favourable 
treatment than a person without a disability in ‘circumstances that are the same or not 
materially different’.  Section 5(2) stipulates that ‘circumstances in which a person 
treats or would treat another person with a disability are not materially different 
because of the fact that different accommodation or services may be required by the 
person with a disability’.  If this interpretation of the reasoning of the Full Court is 
accepted, then it must also be accepted that the provision of ‘different accommodation 
or services’ must be cost and impact neutral or risk ‘discriminating’ against persons 
who do not have a disability.  Such a narrow reading of s 5 is surely against the spirit 
and purpose of the legislation.  Further, while the unjustifiable hardship exemption46 
was not, at the time of the Full Federal Court hearing,47 available to an educational 
institution once a student is enrolled, its terms clearly indicate that parliament 
 
46 DDA s 24(4). 
47 In February 2005 Commonwealth amending legislation was passed which replaced the existing 
unjustifiable hardship exemption created by DDA s 24(4) with a broader unjustifiable hardship 
exemption available to education institutions to resist claims of discrimination made by students after 
their enrolment. See Disability Discrimination Amendment (Education Standards) Act 2005 (Cth) s 3. 
See Part V C, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
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anticipated that the accommodation of a student with a disability would ‘cost’ in 
terms of money and resources because qualification for the exemption follows from 
such a cost being proved ‘unjustifiable’.  Finally, it goes, perhaps, without saying, that 
discrimination, to contravene the DDA, must be on the ground of disability.  
Therefore ‘discrimination’, as contemplated by the Full Federal Court, against what 
the justices call ‘ordinary’ students48 would not offend the DDA. This is surely a very 
clear explanation of ‘why such measures would not involve a breach of s 22(2)(a) or 
(c)’. 
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the Full Court was suggesting that the taking of 
‘special measures’ by the school in the treatment of Daniel himself may have 
offended s 22(2)(a) or (c).  The implication of this reading is that different treatment 
on the ground of disability is, prima facie, discriminatory.  This reading, too, seems 
out of step with the intention and terms of the DDA. Again, the wording of s 5(2) 
DDA explicitly contemplates that special measures may be necessary to accommodate 
disability and, further, that a failure to provide such special measures may amount to 
discrimination.  Queensland case law suggests that different treatment is not 
automatically discriminatory treatment.  In P v Director-General, Department of 
Education,49 for example, Commissioner Keim postulated a two-stage test: first, it 
must be established that the complainant’s treatment was different; secondly, it must 
be determined whether that different treatment is less favourable.50 Further the case 
law suggests that what constitutes less favourable treatment cannot be determined 
solely by objective measures; the subjective view of the complainant of their 
 
48 Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 247 [26]. 
49 P v Director-General, Department of Education [1995] 1 QADR 755 (‘P’).
50 P [1995] 1 QADR 755, 766. 
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treatment is also influential in the decision making process.  For example, in another 
Queensland case, L v Minister for Education,51 in P and in the HREOC finding in 
Purvis, the subjective view of their treatment of the complainants was important in 
proof of discrimination.  Each of those complainants was found to have been 
discriminated against in that they were denied access to the school of their choice, 
even though expert evidence was that the school of choice may not have been the 
‘best’ school for their particular educational needs.52 The Full Federal Court reading 
also suggests a failure to understand the social model of disability and that disability, 
for an impaired person, may flow from institutions, such as schools, which cater for 
and aim to reproduce norms of behaviour.  Finally, this reading suggests a failure to 
understand that equality amounts to ‘treatment as equals’ and not to ‘equal 
treatment’.53 
The Full Court, by its own analysis, was influenced in its reasoning on the ‘positive 
duties’ issue by the fact that ‘there is no criterion of reasonableness in s 22(2) and no 
equivalent of s 22(4) [the unjustifiable hardship exemption] in relation to a student 
once enrolled’.54 That is, the legislation did not explicitly envisage a limit on any 
obligation to accommodate a student with a disability once that student is enrolled, 
nor did it explicitly empower a court to balance competing demands for scarce 
resources according to what is ‘reasonable’ on the facts of any case.   
51 L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 207 
52 See Part I, Chapter 11: Less Favourable Treatment. 
53 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously.  (2nd ed, 1978) 370. 
54 Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 247 [26]. 
But see above n 47 for the current position. 
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II  PURVIS AND THE HIGH COURT ANALYSIS OF ‘REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION’
Since the decision of the High Court in Purvis there seems little doubt that the DDA,
and, perhaps state legislation such as the QADA which utilise similar formulae for 
discrimination, are not to be read as containing an implied duty of reasonable 
accommodation.  Before the High Court, the Attorney General and HREOC both 
argued that a duty was to be implied from the terms of s 5(2) DDA which anticipates 
that affirmative action may be required of a service provider because ‘different 
accommodation or services may be required by the person with a disability’.55 
Counsel for the complainant argued that it was to be inferred from the fact that the 
unjustifiable hardship exemption created by the Act imposed a ‘burden’ on a potential 
discriminator.56 
Five members of the Court considered the issue.  Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ 
contrasted the nature of the DDA with that of similar statutes in the UK, USA and the 
European Community which do oblige reasonable accommodation.  They simply 
concluded that such a duty is not part of the DDA:
The principal focus of the Act, however, is on ensuring equality of treatment. In this 
respect it differs significantly from other, more recent, forms of disability 
discrimination legislation. In particular, for present purposes, it is important to notice 
that, unlike the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) (“the 1995 UK Act”), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“the ADA”) or the European Community 
Directive for "establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation", the Act does not explicitly oblige persons to treat disabled persons 
differently from others in the community. The Act does not, for example, contain 
provisions equivalent to ss 5 and 6 and ss 28B to 28G of the 1995 UK Act which 
expressly oblige employers and educational authorities to make “reasonable 
adjustments” to accommodate disabled persons.57 
55 Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92, 120-1 [85].  The equivalent provision in the Queensland legislation is 
QADA s 10(5): ‘In determining whether a person treats, or proposes to treat a person with an 
impairment less favourably than another person is or would be treated in circumstances that are the 
same or not materially different, the fact that the person with the impairment may require special 
services or facilities is irrelevant’. 
56 Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92, 120-1 [85]. 
57 Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92, 155 [203].  
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McHugh and Kirby JJ acknowledged that ‘[d]isability discrimination is different from 
other types of discrimination, such as sex or race discrimination, in that its elimination 
is more likely to require affirmative action than is the case with sex and race 
discrimination’,58 but they were not prepared to find a positive obligation to take 
affirmative action.59 Unlike Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, however, they reprised 
and rejected the reasoning of the various tribunals which had been prepared to infer 
such a duty, reasoning which had influenced submissions on the point by the Federal 
Attorney General, HREOC and the complainant.60 The essence of the analysis of  
McHugh and Kirby JJ was that while service providers such as educational 
institutions may, ‘as a practical matter’,61 have to accommodate people with 
disabilities to avoid a finding, via DDA s 5, that they have committed unlawful 
discrimination, there is no express or implied obligation to do so.  The Act 
‘recognises’ but does not ‘oblige’ accommodation: ‘[n]o matter how important a 
particular accommodation may be for a disabled person or disabled persons generally, 
failure to provide it is not a breach of the Act per se’.62 The limit upon that 
accommodation which must be delivered lies in the operation of the unjustifiable 
hardship exemption.  The Act provides that in certain areas of activity, a service 
provider must accommodate a person’s disability only to the point that it causes the 
service provider unjustifiable hardship: 
 
58Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92, 121 [86]. 
59 While concurring with the finding of both the Federal Court and the Full Federal Court that there is 
no implied duty of reasonable accommodation McHugh and Kirby JJ are critical of Emmett J’s rather 
obvious method of avoiding so finding of limiting the meaning of ‘accommodation’ to that provided in 
DDA s 4(1): ‘In the Federal Court, however, Emmett J said the case does not appear to have anything 
to do with "accommodation" or "services". He referred to the definition of these terms in s 4(1) of the 
Act. Section 4(1) declares that "accommodation" includes "residential or business accommodation". 
But this is an inclusive definition. The objects of the Act would be seriously undermined if 
"accommodation" was confined to residential or business accommodation. It is hardly to be supposed 
that material circumstances for the purpose of s 5 of the Act do not include the accommodation of the 
disabled by providing ramps in appropriate cases’.  Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92, 121 [87]. 
60Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92, 125-7 [100]-[106]. 
61 Ibid 127 [104].  
62 Ibid. 
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Adding the qualification “reasonable” to the requirement of accommodation imposes 
an unwarranted gloss on the Act - which reconciles the competing interests of the 
disabled and those with whom they interact by the more stringent standard of 
"unjustifiable hardship". Substituting the notion of reasonableness for "unjustifiable 
hardship" is an error.63 
The unjustifiable hardship exemption, they found, is the means by which the DDA 
‘provides for a balance to be struck between the rights of the disabled child and the 
rights of other pupils and, for that matter, teaching staff’.64 McHugh and Kirby JJ 
accepted that the attraction of finding a duty of reasonable accommodation is that it 
fills the gaps in the scope of the unjustifiable hardship exemption.65 They resisted, 
however, misrepresenting the will of the parliament to solve the ‘problem’ that the 
exemption was not available to education institutions once they had enrolled a 
student:  ‘Parliament has chosen to qualify the accommodation requirement by using a 
standard of unjustifiable hardship. It is not for the courts to change this standard by 
treating it as equivalent to reasonableness’.66 
III  DISABILITY STANDARDS FOR EDUCATION AND REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION: THE FUTURE 
At the time of the decision of the High Court in Purvis, the Disability Standards for 
Education 2005 (Cth) were only in draft form.  The draft Standards purported, 
however, to impose an obligation of ‘reasonable adjustment’ on education providers 
in a number of areas: enrolment, participation, curriculum development and delivery 
and student support services.  This initiative was designed to ‘strengthen’ the DDA 
and was intended, generally, as a positive step towards delivery of educational 
 
63 Ibid 122 [89]. 
64 Ibid 123 [94]. 
65 Ibid 122 [90]. 
66 Ibid 125 [98], 122 [90] and 124 [96]. 
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‘justice’ to people with disabilities.67 McHugh and Kirby JJ, in Purvis suggested that 
this obligation to make reasonable adjustment was inconsistent with the terms of the 
Standards’ parent legislation, the DDA, and as such, by implication, unenforceable.68 
The DDA has since been amended to bring the Standards ‘within power’.69 The DDA 
now provides that ‘[f]or the avoidance of doubt, disability standards may require a 
person or body dealing with persons with disabilities to put in place reasonable 
adjustments to eliminate, as far as possible, discrimination against those persons’.70 
The Standards came into force in August 2005 without substantial change to the draft 
form.71 It is likely that they will create a new  battlefield in respect of claims of 
disability discrimination in education72 in that compliance with the Standards excuses 
education providers from the scope of the unlawful discrimination provisions of the 
DDA.73 The principal question for future courts hearing future education complaints 
made under the DDA may well be whether the respondent has acted in compliance 
with the Standards. Only if non-compliance can be demonstrated will the issue of 
unlawful discrimination be revived. Although some guidance is provided as to 
relevant considerations to be taken into account when determining whether 
adjustments are ‘reasonable’74 it will be necessary to make the long wait for case law 
 
67 Philip Ruddock and Brendan Nelson, ‘Improved Opportunities for Students with Disabilities’ (Press 
Release, 15 June 2004). 
68 Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92, 125 [99]. 
69 Disability Discrimination Amendment (Education Standards) Act 2005 (Cth) Schedule 1 s 4.  See 
Brendan Nelson and Philip Ruddock, ‘Government Acts on Discrimination against Students with 
Disabilities’ (Press Release, 12 August 2004). 
70 DDA s 31(1A). 
71 Obligations to make reasonable adjustment in the areas outlined above are found in Disability 
Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) (‘Standards’) in ss 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2. 
72 At least in respect of claims brought under the DDA. How the Standards will affect claims brought 
under state anti-discrimination legislation is unclear. See Australian Government Solicitor, Letter of 
Advice re Productivity Commission’s Inquiry into the Disability Discrimination Act (1992), 10 
February 2004 <.http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/DDA/advice/ags1/ags1.pdf> at 25 June 2005, 4-5. The 
advice suggests that further amendment to the DDA may be necessary if the Commonwealth intends 
that compliance with the Standards should displace obligations arising under State legislation.  See also 
Part V, Chapter 5: The Impact of the Legislation. 
73 DDA s 34. 
74 Standards Part 3. See particularly s 3.4(2). 
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to emerge in this area before confident comment can be made on how the reasonable 
adjustment provisions of the Standards will be interpreted and applied.  It is 
interesting in the early days of this new regime to note, however, that the Standards 
explicitly divorce the concept of unjustifiable hardship from the concept of reasonable 
adjustment.  Both concepts are retained - ‘to provide a balance between the interests 
of providers and others, and the interests of students with disabilities’75 - but they 
have independent operation: 
The Standards generally require providers to make reasonable adjustments where 
necessary. There is no requirement to make unreasonable adjustments. In addition, 
section 10.2 provides that it is not unlawful for an education provider to fail to 
comply with a requirement of these Standards if, and to the extent that, compliance 
would impose unjustifiable hardship on the provider. The concept of unreasonable 
adjustment is different to the concept of unjustifiable hardship on the provider. In 
determining whether an adjustment is reasonable the factors in subsection 3.4 (2) are 
considered, including any effect of the proposed adjustment on anyone else affected, 
including the education provider, staff and other students, and the costs and benefits 
of making the adjustment. The specific concept of unjustifiable hardship is not 
considered. It is only when it has been determined that the adjustment is reasonable 
that it is necessary to go on and consider, if relevant, whether this would none-the-
less impose the specific concept of unjustifiable hardship on the provider.76 
While ‘balance between the interests’ of schools, students and staff is an acceptable 
objective in terms of communitarianism, the Standards deliver a ‘thickening’ of the 
protection available to education providers wishing to resist the inclusion and 
inclusive treatment of students with disabilities in that there will be two tiers of limits 
to the adjustment required.  First, an adjustment will not be required if it is 
‘unreasonable’, and secondly, a reasonable adjustment will not be required if it 
imposes ‘unjustifiable hardship’.  The availability of the unjustifiable hardship 
‘exception’ to the obligations imposed by the Standards is confirmed77 and the DDA 
 
75 Standards s 10.2(3) note. 
76 Standards s 3.4 note. 
77 Standards Part 10. 
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definition is adopted.78 This ‘two tier’ system of defences aligns with the 
controversial approach adopted by the US Supreme Court in Barnett79 but is a novelty 
and an unknown quantity in the Australian context and will, no doubt, increase the 
complexity of cases in this area. Confusion will, no doubt, also arise from the fact that 
many of the factors to be taken into account when determining ‘reasonableness’ 
overlap with those to be taken into account when determining ‘unjustifiable hardship’.  
These include the effect of the disability concerned,80 financial cost to the education 
provider81 and the benefits of making an adjustment.82 It has been seen, in the 
previous chapter,83 that criteria such as these are formulated with sufficient vagueness 
to allow courts extensive discretion in determining the correct ‘balance of interests’ in 
each case. Whether the implementation of the duty of reasonable adjustment in 
addition to the existing unjustifiable hardship exception works to deliver greater 
equality of opportunity to students with disabilities or greater scope to exclude them 
remains to be seen. 
78 Standards s 10(2) note. 
79 U.S. Airways, Inc. v Barnett, 535 US 391 (2002). See above n 6. 
80 DDA s 11(b); Standards s 3.4(2)(c) and (d). 
81 DDA s 11(c); Standards s 3.4(2)(e). 
82 DDA s 11 (a); Standards s 3.4(2)(e). 
83See Part V, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE DEFINITION OF IMPAIRMENT 
Perhaps the most dramatic challenge to liability which has been advanced in the 
context of Australian disability discrimination cases is the argument that the 
complainant is not ‘impaired’ or ‘disabled’ for the purpose of the legislation and thus 
not entitled to its protection.  This was the principal argument before the High Court 
of Australia in the important Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) case, 
Purvis v New South Wales,1 which involved a teenaged student with problem 
behaviour caused by a brain impairment.  The New South Wales Department of 
Education argued in Purvis that the complainant’s child, Daniel Hoggan, had been 
excluded from his mainstream state high school not because of his brain impairment 
but because of his behaviour.  Whilst the Department conceded that his behaviour was 
caused by his impairment, it argued that it was not within the scope of the definition 
of disability provided in the DDA. The complainant’s argument was that Daniel’s 
problem behaviour was a manifestation of his impairment and, thus, within the 
protected attribute of disability as defined.  Ultimately, the High Court refused to limit 
the scope of the definition of disability in the DDA and found that, for the purposes of 
the DDA, a disability did include the behaviours caused by that disability.  The 
grappling of lower courts and tribunals with this issue in Purvis and other similar 
cases, however, gives interesting insights into the efficiencies and deficiencies of 
Australian anti-discrimination legislation, as well as into judicial understandings of 
the nature and scope of disability.  Before analysing more closely the Australian 
 
1 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92 
(‘Purvis’). 
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approach to the meaning of disability it is useful to give brief consideration to 
‘definition’ dilemmas which have arisen in other jurisdictions. 
 
I THE MEANING OF DISABILITY: THE USA AND THE UK 
The experience of other similarly situated jurisdictions certainly suggests that 
resisting liability through challenging the disability of the complainant is a common 
defence strategy.  It could be speculated that the problem of having to identify and 
highlight impairment and, therefore, difference, may be reduced or even removed in 
legislative systems which create a ‘right’ to education.  In the USA, for example, the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)2 creates a right to a ‘free and 
appropriate public education’ in the ‘least restrictive environment’, for Americans 
with disabilities.  Under that regime, the main focus of the legislative enquiry would, 
perhaps, be on the appropriateness of the education provided to an individual and not 
on the proof of impairment of that individual.  Closer examination of the US law 
indicates, however, that this is not the case.  It is particularly interesting, from an 
Australian perspective, that in the US it appears to be students with physical 
disabilities who are entitled to fewer education guarantees than those with intellectual  
and learning disabilities – the opposite to what cases in Australia suggest about the 
Australian system.3 Proof of a particular variety of disability is necessary to attract 
the protection of IDEA. For the purpose of that legislation, ‘child with a disability’ 
means a child with one of a list of impairments ‘who, by reason thereof, needs special 
education and related services’.4 The effect of that limiting phrase is that many 
students – and especially students with physical impairments who do not need ‘special 
 
2 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 2004 20 USC §1400 (‘IDEA’). 
3 See Part II, Chapter 5: The Impact of the Legislation. 
4 IDEA s 1401(3). 
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education’ – are unable to access the protection of the legislation.  They are not left 
without any legislative remedy.  They are able to rely on general anti-discrimination 
provisions in the Rehabilitation Act.5 The Rehabilitation Act, however, does not 
deliver the same suite of educational ‘rights’ to students with disabilities as IDEA.
While the principal purpose of IDEA is to create educational rights, with incidental 
protection against discrimination, the Rehabilitation Act is generically anti-
discrimination legislation.  Unlike IDEA, for example, the Rehabilitation Act does not 
guarantee students with disabilities a ‘free and appropriate public education’, the 
development of an individual education plan, nor does it provide the same level of 
procedural safeguards.6 Further, the definition of disability in the Rehabilitation Act 
is the same as that which has attracted controversy in the context of the companion 
legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act.7 Proof of disability for the purpose of 
that legislation requires proof of an impairment that substantially affects one or more 
major life activities; or a record of having such impairment, or being regarded as 
having such an impairment.8 This definition of disability has been interpreted 
narrowly by the US Supreme Court to deny protection to individuals whose disability 
is mitigated by medication or therapy to the extent that there is no substantial effect 
on life activity.  In  Sutton v United Airlines9 the US Supreme Court held that the 
plaintiffs, short-sighted sisters who had been refused employment by the respondent 
airline on account of that visual impairment, did not have a disability within the 
meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act because their visual impairment was 
 
5 Codified as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 29 U.S.C. § 794d. 
6 For more detailed analysis of the differences between IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act s 504 see Peter 
W D Wright and Pamela Darr Wright, Wrightslaw: IDEA 2004 (2005) appendix 1. 
7 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 USC §§12101-12213.  This Act is the key anti-
discrimination legislation in the US and prohibits discrimination in areas such as government activity, 
employment, accommodation and transportation. 
8 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 USC §12102(2). 
9 Sutton v United Airlines, Inc, 527 US 471 (1999).  
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corrected by the wearing of glasses. As a result, United Airlines could lawfully 
discriminate against the sisters on the basis of their visual impairment.  It is 
interesting to note that this reading of disability as referring to a restriction on ‘life 
activities’ gels with the reading preferred by disability lobby groups.  The reading is, 
nevertheless, problematic in this context because it allows a restriction on the major 
life activity of employment without acknowledging that this amounts to a socially 
constructed disability.10 The Sutton case clearly allows a manipulation of the 
definition of disability to narrow the class of people who are able to invoke the 
protection of anti-discrimination legislation. 
 
In the United Kingdom the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) utilises a similar 
formula to that adopted in the US for the definition of disability: ‘a person has a 
disability for the purposes of this Act if he has a physical or mental impairment which 
has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-
to-day activities’.11 The definition has, however, been construed differently in this 
jurisdiction.  Further, the definition has been litigated in the context of education 
discrimination cases.  The High Court of England and of Wales has recently heard 
appeals from three decisions of the Special Educational Needs and Disabilities 
Tribunal (SENDIST) that students did not have a disability within the meaning of the  
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) because there was no substantial 
interference with their ability to carry out day to day activities.12 In each case the High 
 
10 See Part II, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
11 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) c 50, s 1.  Education became a protected area under that 
legislation in 2002: see Special Education Needs and Disabilities Act 2001 (UK) c 10 pt 2 c 1 and c 2; 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) c 50 pt 4. 
12 H v R School and the SENDIST [2004] EWHC 981; A v Governing Body of Hob Moor School and 
the SENDIST [2004] EWHC 2165; M v SW School and the SENDIST [2004] EWHC 2586. 
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Court applied reasoning adopted in the context of employment cases13 to the 
education context.  The High Court held that SENDIST had erred in law in deciding 
that there was not a ‘substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry 
out normal day-to-day activities’ by focussing on what the child could do and not on 
what he could not do or could do only with difficulty.  Each case was remitted for 
rehearing to the SENDIST.  Here we see, perhaps, a clearer recognition than US cases 
such as Sutton demonstrate, that the issue of disability should be determined in the 
context of the discriminatory treatment of the complainant - and not before.  The 
effect of the decision in Sutton is that a person with an impairment who cannot 
demonstrate a restriction on ‘life activities’ because, for example, that impairment is 
negatived by technology or medication, will not be protected by anti-discrimination 
legislation.  This means that discrimination against a complainant on the basis of 
stereotyped rather than actual ‘limitations’ is allowed to proliferate.  The approach of 
the High Court of England and Wales, by contrast, recognises the fact that disability 
arises from ill-informed assumptions about and reactions to the capabilities of people 
with impairments.  
 
II  AUSTRALIAN CASE LAW ON THE MEANING OF IMPAIRMENT 
Although the definition of impairment or disability is cast very broadly in Australian 
anti-discrimination legislation to include physical, intellectual, psychiatric and 
sensory impairments,14 it has nevertheless caused controversy in the context of 
education discrimination cases.  Unlike the USA and the UK, however, the 
controversy has not centred on excluding certain groups who cannot demonstrate 
 
13 Goodwin v Patent Office [1999] ICR 302; Leonard v Southern Derbyshire Chamber of Commerce 
[2001] IRLR 19. 
14 See Part IV, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
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inability to carry out ‘life activities’ from the definition itself.  It has centred, instead, 
on which aspects of a person’s acknowledged impairment are protected by the 
legislation.  In Australia the key controversy has been whether a complainant’s 
impairment includes its behavioural manifestations.  Does schizophrenia, for example, 
include the behavioural manifestation of rude and abrupt interpersonal skills?15 Does 
intellectual impairment include the behavioural manifestation of a propensity to 
scream out, interrupt and run away?16 Functional limitations such as these have long 
been acknowledged as intimately connected with and caused by underlying 
impairment.17 Indeed, it is frequently only behavioural manifestations which disclose 
‘hidden’ impairment.  To fail to recognise behavioural manifestations as part of the 
impairment which causes them results, in particular, in hardship for people with 
intellectual and psychiatric impairment.  This failure also supports a hierarchy of 
impairment which prefers people with physical impairment whose ‘difference’ is 
obvious and whose impairment, is, arguably, more readily accommodated by the 
community.18 The installation of ramps and lifts, the provision of special equipment 
and technology can mitigate the disability experienced by people with physical 
impairment.  The inclusion of people with intellectual and psychiatric impairments, 
and their ‘challenging’ behaviour, however, can often only be achieved through 
 
15 See, for example, X v McHugh (1994) 56 IR 248. 
16 See, for example, L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 
(‘L’). 
17 See National Council on Intellectual Disability, ‘Human Rights Legislation Fails People with 
Disability and their Families:  We need a better way of supporting a fair society’ (Press Release, 4 
September 2001).  See also the World Health Organisation definition of ‘disability’ as ‘any restriction 
or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to perform an activity in a manner or within the range 
considered normal for a human being: World Health Organisation, International classification of 
impairments, disabilities and handicaps: A manual of classification relating to the consequences of 
disease (1980).  While the WHO definition is now rejected by the disability lobby in favour of a 
reading of disability as the social restriction experienced by a person with impairment it indicates 
recognition that impairment does cause functional limitations.  The disability lobby today regards such 
functional limitations as part of a person’s impairment. See Part I, Chapter 3: The Meaning of 
Disability. 
18 See Parts III B and IV D, Chapter 5: The Impact of the Legislation. 
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attitudinal change and the willingness of others to accept some level of personal 
‘discomfort’. 
 
A Queensland Case Law on the Meaning of Impairment 
The issue of whether impairment includes its behavioural manifestations was raised in 
Australia’s first education discrimination case, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 
(Qld) (QADA) case of L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland.19 In L,
the respondent argued that the appropriate comparison, for deciding the question of 
whether L had been treated ‘less favourably’ than a person without L’s impairment, 
was between L and another student without L’s impairment but who exhibited L’s 
disruptive behaviours.  The respondent contended that it was clear that L had not been 
discriminated against because she had been treated ‘precisely as a student without her 
impairment but displaying similar disruptive behaviour would have been’.20 
Commissioner Holmes of the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (QADT) 
rejected this argument, adopting the earlier decision of  the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (HREOC) in the employment case, X v McHugh,21 that 
aspects of behaviour caused by a person’s impairment are not to be ‘treated as 
divorced from it’.22 In X the complainant was dismissed on account of his difficulties 
relating to colleagues and clients.  President Wilson23 found there was a ‘remarkable 
correspondence between the problems associated with the complainant's work 
 
19 L [1995] 1 QADR. 
20 Ibid 211.  The character of the comparator required by the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) 
(QADA) s 10 and similar provisions in anti-discrimination legislation from other Australian 
jurisdictions is considered in detail in Chapter 9: the Comparator. 
21 X v McHugh (1994) 56 IR 248. 
22 L [1995] 1 QADR 207, 211. 
23 It is worth noting that President Wilson had retired from a distinguished career on the High Court 
before taking up the HREOC appointment. 
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performance and the symptoms of his disability’24 and that his dismissal was unlawful 
on the basis that the complainant’s difficulties were manifestations of his disability, 
schizophrenia: 
In the light of this evidence, I find that the respondent's evaluation of the 
complainant's work performance between May and November 1992 namely, lack of 
interpersonal skills, failure to exercise reasonable judgement and refusal to accept 
counselling reflected a manifestation of the symptoms of the complainant's illness. 
The dismissal therefore discriminated against the complainant on the ground of his 
disability.25 
The issue was raised again in the later Queensland case, P v Director-General, 
Department of Education.26 It was argued for the respondent in that case ‘that a 
person without P’s impairment who exhibited such behaviour would be asked to leave 
Rasmussen School and, perhaps, subjected to more formal disciplinary procedures’.27 
The ‘logic’ of the argument extended to the claim that P had, therefore, been treated 
‘the same, or not materially different from, or even more favourably than a person 
without his impairment’.28 Commissioner Keim, citing with approval the decisions in 
both L and X v McHugh, accepted the complainant’s argument that ‘those aspects of 
P’s behaviour which arise from his impairment must not be relied upon for the 
purposes of comparison’.29 
B The High Court and the Meaning of Impairment: IW v City of Perth30 
The High Court was first invited to consider the meaning and scope of disability in IW 
v The City of Perth a case brought under the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA).31 In 
 
24 X v McHugh (1994) 56 IR 248, 258. 
25 Ibid. 
26 P v Director-General, Department of Education [1995] 1 QADR 755 (‘P’).
27 Ibid 778. 
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. 
30 IW v The city of Perth (1997) 146 ALR 696 (‘IW’). 
31 The relevant protected attribute under the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) is ‘impairment’. 
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that case, the complainant’s contention was that he, and other people with AIDS, had 
been discriminated against by the City of Perth on the basis of characteristics 
generally imputed to people with AIDS.  The respondent contended that while the 
notional person with whom the impaired person is to be compared is not impaired, he 
or she retains the characteristics imputed to the impaired person.  Brennan CJ and 
McHugh, Dawson and Gaudron JJ did not find it necessary to address this issue, 
rejecting the complainant’s appeal on the grounds that he lacked standing and that the 
City had not failed to provide a service on the ground of impairment.  Toohey,32 
Gummow33 and Kirby JJ,34 however, all considered the issue and all concluded that 
characteristics which, in the words of the relevant legislation, ‘appertain generally, or 
are generally imputed to persons having the same impairment as the aggrieved 
person’35 must be ignored for the purpose of the comparison.  To do otherwise, would 
‘fatally frustrate’36 the objects of anti-discrimination legislation.  Thus, Toohey, 
Gummow and Kirby JJ held that the comparison required for the purpose of 
identifying ‘less favourable treatment’, and, thus, discrimination, is between a person 
with the complainant’s impairment but without the characteristics ‘imputed’ to them 
as a result of their impairment. 
 
In IW the characteristics sought to be separated, and not allowed to be separated, from 
the impairment were ‘imputed’, rather than actual.  It could be argued that the case for 
not allowing the separation of actual characteristics from the impairment which 
 
32 IW (1997) 146 ALR 696, 719. 
33 Ibid 725. 
34 Ibid 745-8. 
35 Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA). 
36 Dopking & Thomas v Department  of Defence [1992] HREOCA 5 (Unreported, Wilson P, 13 March 
1992).  Extract available at (1992) EOC ¶92-421, 79005.  Note this case is also known as Sullivan v 
Department of Defence. The phrase used by Sir Ronald Wilson in Dopking was quoted in IW (1997) 
146 ALR 696, 719 per Toohey J, 748 per Kirby J. 
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causes them is surely even stronger and consistent with the approach taken by the 
QADT in L and P.37 The reading of impairment as including its manifestations – 
actual or imputed – is clearly consistent with the social model of disability which 
contends that disability results from the often ill-informed reactions of others to 
impairment.38 Excluding people with impairments based on untested pre-conceptions 
about the nature of their impairments exacerbates disability.  Similarly, responding to 
behaviour caused by impairment rather than to the impairment which causes it 
exacerbates disability.  Allowing discriminators to act because of behaviour, without 
requiring them first to consider its connection with underlying impairment, allows 
discriminators to avoid strategies which could mitigate disability because they can 
lawfully adopt the simpler, and often cheaper, course of exclusion.39 
C The Definition of Disability and the Purvis case 
1 Purvis:  Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
The behaviour issue was raised for the first time in an education context under the 
DDA in Purvis, and was considered by HREOC,40 the Federal Court,41 the Full 
Federal Court42 and the High Court.43 Commissioner Innes, of HREOC, found that 
 
37 The decision in IW was, however, distinguished by the Full Federal Court in Purvis as relevant to ‘a 
different issue in a different statutory setting’: Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education 
and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 246-7 [24]. 
38 See, for example, Roger Slee, ‘Special education and human rights in Australia: How do we know 
about disablement, and what does it mean for educators?’ in Felicity Armstrong and Len Barton (eds), 
Disability, Human rights and Education: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (1999) 125. 
39 In the context of the Purvis legislation, for example, HREOC found that the school system could 
have done more to accommodate Daniel Hoggan’s impairment, to mitigate the effects of the violence 
which flowed from it and, thus, to avoid the ‘need’ for him to be excluded. See Purvis obo Hoggan v 
New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75172-5 [6.4].  In the High Court, 
McHugh and Kirby JJ, in their minority judgment accepted the finding of HREOC on the point. See 
Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 127-8 [106]-[107]. 
40 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117. 
41 New South Wales (Department of education and Training) v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission and Another (2001) 186 ALR 69. 
42 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 
248. 
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the New South Wales Department of Education had discriminated against Daniel 
Hoggan and awarded him damages in the amount of $25 000.  Daniel was a thirteen-
year-old boy affected by multiple medical conditions stemming from a brain infection 
in infancy. Significantly, the evidence was that this infection damaged the frontal 
lobes of Daniel’s brain, the part of the brain responsible for regulating behaviour.  It 
was not in dispute that Daniel’s difficult behaviour was caused by his medical 
conditions. The complainant’s argument, therefore, was that Daniel’s disability, 
within the meaning of the Act, included his behaviour.44 As such, treatment of Daniel 
on the ground of his behaviour was, in effect, less favourable treatment of Daniel on 
the ground of his disability. Commissioner Innes, following the earlier decision of 
HREOC, X v McHugh, accepted this argument: 
To accept the formulation proposed by the respondent (separating Daniel's behaviour 
somehow from his disability) would mean that no student with behaviours caused by 
or integrally linked to their disability could be discriminated against because 
manifestation of the disability is disturbed behaviour which could pose a risk of 
injuring others. Any action then taken by a school to suspend or exclude such a child 
because they posed a safety risk would be permissible. This would circumvent the 
clear legislative intent to make unlawful discrimination against a person because of a 
disorder, illness or disease that results in disturbed behaviour:  X v McHugh 
(supra).45 
Commissioner Innes highlighted what was to prove to be a significant problem for 
later courts involved in the Purvis litigation, the safety risk posed by Daniel Hoggan’s 
exclusion.  He saw the solution to this problem as lying within the terms of the 
legislation and suggested that the appropriate course of action for a respondent 
concerned by a safety risk posed to others by the inclusion of a person with disability 
 
43 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92. 
44 It should be reiterated that the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) uses the term 
disability where the QADA uses the term impairment. As argued in Chapter 3: Meaning of Disability, 
above, in the context of current disability theory the term impairment is a more accurate descriptor of 
the protected attribute.  In this Part, however, the term disability is frequently used when the term 
impairment would be technically more accurate because disability is the term used in the DDA and the 
term used in the analysis of the DDA by the courts involved in the Purvis dispute. 
45 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75172-5 
[6.4].
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related problem behaviour was to apply for a special exemption under the DDA.46 
Later courts, however, did not consider the utility of the tribunal granted exemption or 
dismissed it as inappropriate to the circumstances raised by the Purvis case.47 
2 Purvis:  Federal Court of Australia 
In the Federal Court, Emmett J authorised a strategy for exclusion based on a 
manipulation of the terms of the definition of disability in the DDA.48 He held that 
behaviour could and should be divorced from underlying impairment because analysis 
of the grammatical structure of the definition of discrimination indicated that this was 
the will of Parliament.  Emmett J concluded that Commissioner Innes of HREOC had 
treated Daniel’s disability as falling within the parameters of paragraphs (f) and (g) of 
the definition: 
(f) a disorder or malfunction that results in the person learning differently 
from a person without the disorder or malfunction… 
(g) a disorder, illness or disease that affects a person’s thought processes, 
perception of reality, emotions or judgment or that results 
in disturbed behaviour…49 
Emmett J held that the language of each of those paragraphs distinguished disability 
from its ‘symptoms’ and that it is only the ‘disorder, or malfunction’   (para (f)) or the 
‘disorder, illness or disease’ (para (g)) which causes the symptoms, which 
‘constitutes’ the disability for the purpose of the DDA, and not the symptoms.50 
Emmett J was of the view that it ‘would have been possible for the Parliament to 
define disability by reference to symptoms that have a particular cause.  For example, 
 
46 Ibid. DDA s 55.  See Part IV, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
47 See Part IV, Chapter 6: Exemptions. See the approach of the Full Federal Court to DDA s 55: Purvis 
v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 247-8 [27]. 
But contrast the view of McHugh and Kirby JJ in the High Court: Purvis v State of New South Wales 
(Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92, 129 [111]. 
48 DDA s 4. 
49 DDA s 4. 
50 New South Wales (Department of education and Training) v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission and Another (2001) 186 ALR 69, 77 [37]. 
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it would have been possible to define disability as “disturbed behaviour that results 
from a disorder, illness or disease”’.51 He concluded that it was evidence of the 
Parliament’s intention that disability did not include its symptoms that the Parliament 
had not taken such an approach to the definition.52 
Emmett J also constructed a very technical line of reasoning in criticising HREOC for 
treating the behaviour of Daniel as ‘necessarily being the manifestation of his 
disability’.  He held that, while Daniel’s behaviour ‘was in fact the result of or caused 
by his disability, that behaviour is not necessarily caused by or the result of a 
disability such as the disability of the complainant’.53 Emmet J’s narrow 
interpretation of disability allowed him to conclude that that relevant comparator – for 
the purpose of determining whether Daniel Hoggan had been treated less favourably 
than a person without his disability would have been in the same circumstances – was 
a person who exhibited Daniel’s ‘challenging behaviour’, but who did not have 
Daniel’s ‘disability’:  
 If such a hypothetical student would not have been suspended and would not have 
 been excluded from the School, it would follow that the Complainant was treated less 
 favourably than such a hypothetical student.  However, if such a hypothetical student 
 would have been treated in the same way, there was no discrimination.54 
The respondent was able to demonstrate that the ‘hypothetical student’ would have 
been treated in the same manner as Daniel Hoggan, and, therefore, that there had been 
no discrimination. 
 
51 Ibid 77 [38]. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid 79 [45]. 
54 Ibid 80 [52]. 
230
Emmett J indicated that, ‘The position [with regard to the definition of disability] 
might have been different in a case where the disability necessarily resulted in the 
relevant behaviour’.55 The implication of this difficult line of reasoning appears to be 
that where the symptom of a disability – such as challenging behaviour, for example – 
can be caused by something other than disability – such as wilfulness, or boredom, for 
example – then that symptom can never be regarded as part of the disability for the 
purpose of attracting the protection of the DDA. It has already been noted that, at the 
time of the Purvis litigation, the unjustifiable hardship exemption was not available to 
education authorities once they had enrolled a student with a disability.56 As such, the 
Federal Court had no ‘tailor made’ means of rendering Daniel Hoggan’s exclusion 
lawful.  This problem confronted and confounded Emmett J and subsequent courts 
involved in the matter.  While it is obvious that Emmet J was keen to locate a 
legislative imprimatur for the exclusion of Daniel Hoggan, and his narrow reading of 
the definition of disability delivered such an imprimatur, his reasoning is clearly 
inconsistent with the current understanding of impairment as including functional 
limitations.  Moreover, it is potentially offensive to people with impairments in that it 
implies that there should be no differentiation between their situation and the situation 
of a person who intentionally or negligently behaves badly.  It is also a concern that a 
narrow reading of disability has the clear potential to erode the protective scope of the 
DDA. Could an education provider argue that because learning slowly can be caused 
by factors other than disability – laziness, for example – a person with an intellectual 
impairment affecting their ability to learn does not have a disability within the 
meaning of the Act?57 Could it be argued that because seizures – a form of ‘disturbed 
 
55 Ibid 77 [36]. 
56 See Part V C, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
57 It should be remembered, on this point, that the paragraph of the definition of disability, in DDA s 4, 
which relates to learning difficulties, paragraph (g), was considered By Emmett J and, subsequently, by 
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behaviour’ – can be caused by factors other than impairment – blood sugar 
irregularities, high temperature, drug reactions, shock, physical trauma, for example – 
a person with epilepsy does not have a disability for the purposes of the Act?   
 
3 Purvis:  Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia  
The Full Federal Court essentially adopted the reasoning of Emmett J on the disability 
definition and affirmed his decision that there had been no actionable discrimination 
against Daniel Hoggan: 
In our opinion … Justice Emmet was correct in holding that HREOC had misdirected 
itself as to the proper construction of s 4 of the Act in regarding the conduct of the 
complainant which occasioned the actions of those in charge of the school as part of 
the disability of the complainant.  In our opinion, that conduct was a consequence of 
the disability rather than any part of the disability within the meaning of s 4 of the 
Act.  This is made quite explicit in subs (g), which most appropriately describes the 
disability in question here and which distinguishes between the disability and the 
conduct which it causes.  The same may be said of subs (f).  The other subsections do 
not involve conduct. 58 
The Court also affirmed the decision of Emmett J that the appropriate comparator is a 
hypothetical person exhibiting Daniel’s behaviour but without his ‘disability’: ‘like 
conduct is to be assumed in both cases’.59 The Full Court characterised the approach 
of  HREOC to the comparator question as ‘capricious’ and expressed the view that, 
even if conduct is separated from the disability which causes it, it is still ‘at least 
possible that enquiry may show that the complainant was treated more harshly than 
another exhibiting similar conduct at school, but without disability would have 
been’.60 The Court also held that, by contrast, the consequence of the argument that 
 
the Full Federal Court, to demonstrate a statutory intention to separate disability from its consequences:  
thus ‘learning differently’ is not a protected disability, only the ‘disorder or malfunction’ which causes 
it. 
58 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 
248 [28].  
59 Ibid 248 [29]. 
60 Ibid. See also 249-50 [34]. 
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disability includes conduct would be that a lawful exclusion of a student with a 
disability would not be possible:  
any exclusion from ordinary classes, or special physical or other restraints imposed as 
a price of attendance at ordinary classes, would be a breach of s 22(a) or (c), as the 
anti-social behaviour caused by the brain damage would be the cause of the special 
and detrimental treatment.61 
In reaching its decision, the Full Court was not inclined to follow case law referred to 
on behalf of the appellant, on the basis that there was no decision available which 
would ‘satisfactorily resolve the issue’.62 The Court distinguished the decision in X v
McHugh as ‘it arose in an employment setting under a previous statute and [asserted] 
the result without setting out any satisfactory comparative analysis such as is required 
by s 5 or its equivalent’.63 The Court also declined to follow the view expressed by 
some members of the High Court in IW, that ‘characteristics’ which attach to a 
disability must be ignored for the purpose of determining the relevant comparator:  
‘the dicta of Toohey J and Kirby J’ was ‘directed to a different issue in a different 
statutory context’.64 
The Full Court stated, in reference to the line of cases in which ‘the issue of what 
constitutes the proper construction called for by discrimination legislation has been 
much discussed’, that ‘it is difficult not to conclude that some of the reasoning has 
been affected by a view as to outcome’.65 It could be argued, however, that the 
reasoning of the Full Court itself in Purvis has been similarly affected.66 The Court 
 
61 Ibid 247 [26]. 
62 Ibid 246 [24]. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. See also 248-9 [31]-[33]. 
65 Ibid 250 [35]. 
66 See the comments of McHugh and Kirby JJ in the High Court: Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92 129 [134]. 
See nn 76 and 77, below. 
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was clearly concerned about safety risk problem first identified by Commissioner 
Innes in the HREOC decision: 
It must be steadily borne in mind that the expulsion of the complainant followed 
repetitive anti-social and violent conduct towards other students and staff which was 
plainly unacceptable in a primary [sic] school.  It was disturbing to the function of 
education and threatened the safety of other students and staff.  Those responsible for 
administration of the school owed a duty of care to the other students in the school, 
the teachers and the teacher’s aides, with potential liability for any breach of that duty 
(Commonwealth v Introvigne (1981) 150 CLR 258). 67 
The Court suggested that if the law were applied so as to recognise a right to inclusion 
for Daniel Hoggan, and others like him, then staff and students ‘injured’ by this 
inclusion would be without redress – that is, they could not remove the source of their 
harm, as ‘the school authorities are hamstrung by the law in adopting normal 
measures of control’.68 While the Court implied a very strong policy argument for 
finding that the exclusion of Daniel Hoggan was not unlawful, ultimately it relied on a 
dry and technical statutory interpretation argument to deliver what it clearly regarded 
as the just ‘outcome’.  Somewhat ironically, the Court concluded that, rather than 
deliver a judgment ‘affected by a view as to outcome’, it is preferable to adopt ‘the 
safest course [which] is to be guided by the ordinary meaning of the words of ss 4 and 
5 of the Act as they apply to the facts of this case’.69 
It is, perhaps, a fair assessment of the Full Court decision in Purvis, that a practical 
distinction is implied for the complainant, between disability caused by society and 
disability caused by his particular medical condition.  The outcome for the 
complainant is that he has no recognised right to attend the school of his choice.  The 
finding of the Full Court that symptoms are to be separated from the underlying 
 
67 Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 247 [25]. 
68 Ibid 247-8 [27]. 
69 Ibid 250 [35]. 
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impairment which causes them effectively means that the inability to attend the school 
of choice is not on account of the education authority’s response to the complainant’s 
impairment but on account of the impairment induced behaviour.  While 
Commissioner Innes in the HREOC hearing of Daniel’s case had squarely located the 
cause of Daniel’s inability to attend the South Grafton High School in the failure of 
the school to prepare for and to adapt to Daniel’s educational and behaviour 
management needs, the Full Court located the cause in Daniel’s impairment induced 
behaviour.  While the enquiry in HREOC concentrated not only on the effects of 
Daniel’s inclusion on others, but also on what it considered the demonstrated failure 
of the school to adapt to Daniel’s needs, the enquiry in the Full Court concentrated 
only on what the Court characterised as the ‘draconian consequences’70 of the 
inclusion of Daniel for the school community.  Thus, the Full Federal Court did not 
entertain the possibility that Daniel’s disability, as expressed in his inability to attend 
his chosen school, could be even partly the result of an inflexible society.  
 
4 Purvis: The High Court of Australia 
Six of the seven Justices of the High Court found that the definition of disability did 
include manifestations of disability and, as such, revealed some sensitivity to 
disability theory and the concerns of people with disabilities that the cause and effect 
of disability had not been properly comprehended by lower courts.71 Callinan J did 
not decide the point but appeared out of step with the sentiments of the rest of the 
 
70 Ibid 247-8 [27]. 
71 See National Council on Intellectual Disability, ‘Human Rights Legislation Fails People with 
Disability and their Families: We need a better way of supporting a fair society’ (Press Release, 4
September 2001): allowing the separation of impairment from its manifestations ‘has simply provided 
institutions set on continuing discriminatory practices with a technical loophole that will make 
complaints of disability discrimination increasingly difficult’. 
235
Court in that he was impressed by the arguments which had succeeded in the Federal 
Court and Full Federal Court:  
Paragraph (g) internally does appear to distinguish between the disorder, illness or 
disease and the behavioural results of any of them, perhaps indicating thereby that the 
condition and the behaviour are different and separate, and that the reference to 
behaviour is adjectival only.72 
He was adamant, moreover, that ‘[t]he definition of disability is not to be read as 
covering criminal or quasi-criminal behaviour’.73 
Gleeson CJ found that the definition is wide enough to include manifestations but 
nevertheless seemed reluctant to make the concession:  
It may be accepted, as following from pars (f) and (g) of the definition of disability, 
that the term "disability" includes functional disorders, such as an incapacity, or a 
diminished capacity, to control behaviour. And it may also be accepted, as the 
appellant insists, that the disturbed behaviour of the pupil that resulted from his 
disorder was an aspect of his disability.74 
McHugh and Kirby JJ, however, were unequivocal in their rejection of the Federal 
Court reading of disability and held that to limit the definition of disability in the 
manner adopted by the Federal Court and Full Federal Court would undermine the 
remedial nature of the DDA:
To construe ‘disability’ as including functional difficulties gives effect to the 
purposes of the Act. Such a construction accords with the Act's beneficial and 
remedial nature. In this case, the damage to Mr Hoggan's brain is a ‘hidden’ 
impairment - it is not externally apparent unless and until it results in a disability. It is 
his inability to control his behaviour, rather than the underlying disorder, that inhibits 
his ability to function in the same way as a non-disabled person in areas covered by 
the Act, and gives rise to the potential for adverse treatment. To interpret the 
definition of ‘disability’ as referring only to the underlying disorder undermines the 
utility of the discrimination prohibition in the case of hidden impairment.75 
72 Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92, 173 [272]. 
73 Ibid 173 [271]. 
74 Ibid 100 [11]. 
75 Ibid 119 [80]. 
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Moreover, McHugh and Kirby JJ appeared convinced that the approach taken to the 
meaning of disability in the lower courts had been influenced by preconceptions as to 
the desirable outcome of the case76 and took the opportunity to deliver a terse lecture 
on the principles of statutory interpretation: 
The correct path of judicial interpretation - as always - requires that the Act be 
applied according to its terms and purposes. If its application in a particular case 
operates or may seem to operate harshly, it is a matter for the Parliament to correct. 
And it should not be forgotten that construing the Act narrowly because of the 
consequences in a particular case may lead to injustices in other cases perceived by 
the judicial mind as more deserving. In matters of anti-discrimination law generally, 
and disability law in particular, judicial intuition as to what is "draconian" must be 
kept in firm check, for sometimes it will be based unconsciously on the very attitudes 
that the law is designed to correct and redress.77 
Gummow, Heydon and Hayne JJ also found that a narrow reading of disability was 
not consistent with the nature of disability: 
To identify Daniel's disability by reference only to the physiological changes which 
his illness brought about in his brain would describe his disability incompletely. His 
disability is a particular type of disorder, a particular kind of malfunction of his brain, 
a loss of a particular aspect of his mental functions.78 
III  CONCLUSION: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PURVIS DECISION ON THE MEANING 
OF DISABILITY 
Since the decision of the High Court in Purvis it appears that it is now settled law that 
the definition of disability in the DDA is to be read widely to encompass functional 
limitations and behavioural manifestations caused by underlying impairment. By 
implication, it appears that the similar definitions of disability and impairment in 
other Australian anti-discrimination legislation, including the Anti-Discrimination Act 
1991 (Qld) (QADA), are also to be read widely.  Indeed, the QADT, applying the 
 
76 ‘The learned judges of the Full Court of the Federal Court who heard the case felt driven to adopt the 
construction they placed on the Act because of what they expressed as an intuitive feeling that reading 
the Act in the way contended for by the appellant would impose “draconian consequences” on the first 
respondent’.  Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92 129 [134]. 
77 Purvis (2004) 217 CLR 92, 103 [19]. 
78 Ibid 157 [211]. 
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QADA, has always preferred a wide reading as demonstrated in the early cases of L
and P.
Ultimately, however, the ‘generous’ reading of the meaning of disability adopted by 
six of the seven members of the High Court did not assist Daniel Hoggan and is 
unlikely to assist future litigants who assert claims of unlawful discrimination because 
of behaviour caused by impairment.  What the High Court gave with one hand it took 
away with another.  The majority of the High Court found that Daniel Hoggan had not 
been treated less favourably than another student ‘in circumstances that are the same 
or are not materially different’.79 The majority authorised consideration of Daniel’s 
behaviour, even though it was caused by and, indeed, part of, his disability, as a 
relevant circumstance to be taken into account when determining whether there had 
been less favourable treatment. Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Heydon, Hayne and 
Callinan JJ, did not endorse the approach to the comparator issue taken in lower 
courts and all found that Daniel Hoggan’s comparator for the purpose of determining 
whether there had been unlawful discrimination was a person with his ‘bad behaviour’ 
but without his disability.80 The understanding of the nature of disability displayed by 
Gleeson CJ and by Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in their construction of the 
meaning of disability, therefore, did not apply across their handling of all issues in the 
case and another means of denying a remedy to Daniel Hoggan was engineered from 
the terms of the legislation.  Like the Federal Court, the majority of the High Court 
was concerned that an education authority could not meet its obligations to ensure the 
safety of the wider school community if forced to accommodate ‘problem’ students 
 
79 See DDA s 5. 
80 See DDA s 5. 
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with disabilities.81 Whilst this concern is a legitimate one, and, indeed, demonstrates a 
preference for majority rights over individual rights which would be respected by 
communitarian thinkers,82 it will be seen that the ‘comparator’ solution posited by the 
High Court is at odds with both disability theory and the objects of anti-discrimination 
legislation.  The foundations and ramifications, both theoretical and practical, of the 
High Court analysis of the characteristics of the comparator will be considered in 
detail in the next chapter. 
 
81 See Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 99 [7] (Gleeson CJ), 161 [227] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) 
174 [271] (Callinan J).  
82 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (1991).  See also 
Part III, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE COMPARATOR 
 
Several strategies for exclusion have been derived from the terms of the definition of 
direct discrimination provided in the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA).  
Direct discrimination arises ‘if a person treats, or proposes to treat, a person with an 
attribute less favourably than another person without the attribute is or would be 
treated in circumstances that are the same or not materially different’.1 This definition, 
suggests a series of intersecting questions: Who is the appropriate ‘comparator’, the 
appropriate ‘other person without the attribute’, when determining whether treatment 
is ‘less favourable’?  When will the circumstances of the person without the 
impairment be ‘materially different’?  What is ‘less favourable treatment’? How these 
questions have been answered by a variety of courts and tribunals has had significant 
ramifications for the scope of protection available to people with disabilities seeking 
an inclusion in mainstream schools.  The QADA also requires that discrimination must 
be ‘on the basis of’ a protected attribute.2 Strategies for exclusion have been generated 
from argument that any ‘less favourable treatment’ of the complainant was not ‘on the 
basis of’ and thus not caused by the impairment of the complainant.  Related 
arguments about the relevance of motive and intention to a finding of discrimination 
have also been raised.  The cases demonstrate that highly technical arguments about 
the terms of the legislation have not only defeated individual claims of discrimination, 
they have also diminished the effectiveness of the legislation as a tool for its intended 
 
1 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) s 10; c/f DDA s 5(1): For the purposes of this Act, a 
person ( discriminator ) discriminates against another person (aggrieved person) on the ground of a 
disability of the aggrieved person if, because of the aggrieved person's disability, the discriminator 
treats or proposes to treat the aggrieved person less favourably than, in circumstances that are the same 
or are not materially different, the discriminator treats or would treat a person without the disability. 
2 QADA s 7; cf Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) s 5(1): ‘on the ground of’.  
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purpose of social reform.  This chapter will consider how courts have constructed the 
appropriate comparator for the purpose of determining whether a complainant has 
been treated ‘less favourably’ than that comparator.  Chapter 10 will examine 
causation as an issue relevant to proof of discrimination and Chapter 11 will consider 
the nature of ‘less favourable treatment’ in the education context. 
 
I WHO IS THE APPROPRIATE COMPARATOR IN AUSTRALIA?
Complainants and respondents have argued diametrically opposed interpretations of 
the ‘identity’ of the notional comparator required for the purpose of determining 
whether the complainant has been treated ‘less favourably’ and, thus, has been a 
victim of discrimination.  The question is particularly poignant in the context of 
impairments which cause problem behaviours which impact on others.  In education 
cases this problem behaviour might be the impulsiveness of a person with Down’s 
syndrome,3 the problems with bowel control and regurgitation of a person with a 
developmental disorder,4 or most problematically, the unwilled violence of a person 
with brain damage.5 The question is not only poignant but crucial to outcome in these 
cases.  Complainants have argued that the appropriate comparator is a person without 
the impairment and without the impairment induced behaviour.  If the comparison is 
between the treatment of the person with the problem behaviour and the treatment of a 
person without it then it is obviously easier to prove ‘less favourable treatment’ 
because it could only rarely be proved that a person without the behaviour would have 
been disciplined or excluded in the same manner as the complainant.  Respondents 
have argued that the appropriate comparator is a person without the impairment but 
 
3 P v Director-General, Department of Education [1995] 1 QADR 755 (‘P’).  
4 L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 207 (‘L’). 
5 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92 
(‘Purvis’). 
241
with the behaviour.  When the behaviour is common to complainant and comparator it 
is obviously easier to rebut any allegation of discrimination as it could only rarely be 
proved that the comparator would not have been disciplined or excluded in the same 
manner as the complainant.  The decision of the High Court in Purvis v State of New 
South Wales (Department of Education and Training)6 appears to have settled the 
answer to the comparator question: the appropriate comparator is a person without the 
complainant’s impairment but with the complainant’s behaviour. The stunning 
ramification of this answer is that it will be difficult for a person with impairment 
related problem behaviour which affects others in the school environment ever to 
assert a right to inclusion in a mainstream school.7 The answer provided by the 
majority of the Court in Purvis, however, was directly at odds with the view taken by 
the minority, by earlier benches of the High Court, and by assorted anti-discrimination 
tribunals.8 Further, the answer suggests a fundamental misconception of the nature of 
disability which is best understood as encompassing not only any underlying physical 
impairment but the functional limitations which attach to that impairment.9 Despite 
the fact that six of the seven members of the High Court accepted that the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) definition of disability included behavioural 
manifestations, the majority judges, Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, 
with whom Callinan J agreed on the point, manipulated a solution for the respondent 
school by allowing the teasing out of the behaviour from the disability in a manner at 
odds with their professed understanding of disability.  To allow the unwilled acts of 
the complainant to be compared with the willed violence of a person without 
 
6 Ibid. 
7 Further, the reasoning adopted by the majority in Purvis on the comparator question has already been 
applied in several employment cases: See below at Part II B. 
8 See Part II, Chapter 8: The Definition of Impairment. 
9 See Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
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disability must understandably be offensive to those with disabilities and their 
supporters. 
 
A The High Court Majority Approach to the Comparator in Purvis 
1 Gleeson CJ 
In Purvis, Gleeson CJ was, perhaps, most blunt in his analysis of the comparator 
issue.  His approach was clearly informed by his view that if it were required to 
include the complainant, Daniel Hoggan, the respondent school would be placed in an 
untenable position whereby it could not reconcile the ‘conflict between its 
responsibilities towards a child who manifests disturbed behaviour and its 
responsibilities towards the other children who are in its care, and who may become 
victims of that behaviour’.10 As explained in earlier chapters, Daniel Hoggan was 
excluded from his mainstream state high school after repeated incidents of violence 
against the property and person of others in the school community.11 According to 
Gleeson CJ, a comparison between the treatment of Daniel and the treatment of a 
notional person without Daniel’s disability, but with his behaviour, would permit ‘due 
account to be taken of the first respondent's legal responsibilities towards the general 
body of pupils’.12 Gleeson CJ also asserted that ‘[i]f the person without the disability 
is simply a pupil who is never violent, then it is difficult to know what context is 
given to the requirement that the circumstances be the same’.13 
10 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 101 [12]. 
11 Callinan J provides a useful chronology of events relevant to the Purvis litigation.  See Purvis (2003) 
217 CLR 92, 175-9. 
12 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 101 [12]. 
13 Ibid. 
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2 Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ 
This last comment foreshadowed the more complex approach to the comparator issue 
taken by Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ and accepted by Callinan J.14 Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ, unlike Gleeson CJ, appeared not to reject outright the 
proposition that the comparator is a person without the disability but with the 
behaviour.  Their solution was to allow the behaviour which is caused by and is part 
of the disability to be considered as a relevant ‘circumstance’ when comparing the 
treatment of Daniel Hoggan and the treatment of another without his disability: 
It may readily be accepted that the necessary comparison to make is with the 
treatment of a person without the relevant disability. Section 5(1) makes that plain. It 
does not follow, however, that the "circumstances" to be considered are to be 
identified in the way the appellant contended. Indeed, to strip out of those 
circumstances any and every feature which presents difficulty to a disabled person 
would truly frustrate the purposes of the Act. Section 5(2) provides that the relevant 
circumstances are not shown to be materially different by showing that the disabled 
person has special needs. The appellant's contention, however, went further than that. 
It sought to refer to a set of circumstances that were wholly hypothetical - 
circumstances in which no aspect of the disability intrudes. That is not what the Act 
requires.15 
This is a new configuration of a ‘circumstances’ argument advanced and dismissed in 
earlier cases.16 The argument in those earlier cases was that the fact of the 
complainant’s impairment, when manifest in challenging behaviour, was enough to 
render his or her circumstances ‘materially different’ from the circumstances of a 
person without impairment.  The implicit, if not express, corollary of this argument is 
that the circumstances of the complainant are individualised to the extent that there 
cannot be a proper comparison made between his or her treatment and the treatment 
 
14 Ibid 175 [273]. 
15 Ibid 160 [222]. 
16 L [1995] 1 QADR 207, 210;  P [1995] 1 QADR 755, 779; Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales 
(Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75173 [6.4]; IW v City of Perth (1996) 191 CLR 1, 
33 (Toohey J) and 66 (Kirby J). 
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of another.  As such there cannot be proof of ‘less favourable treatment’.  This 
argument was rejected by some members of the High Court for the same reason that 
they rejected the more basic argument that the notional comparator should exhibit the 
same behaviour as the complainant: it would undermine the purpose of anti-
discrimination law in that the circumstances of the person with the impairment and 
the person without the impairment would always be materially different and thus 
outside the remedial scope of the legislation.  In IW v City of Perth, both Justice 
Kirby17 and Justice Toohey, 18 with whom, ironically in view of his position in Purvis, 
Gummow J agreed on the point,19 cited with approval the oft quoted words of Sir 
Ronald Wilson, President of the HREOC: 
It would fatally frustrate the purposes of the Act if the matters which it 
expressly identifies as constituting unacceptable bases for differential 
treatment … could be seized upon as rendering the overall 
circumstances materially different, with the result that the treatment 
could never be discriminatory within the meaning of the Act.20 
The approach of Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in Purvis still highlights the 
‘circumstances’ of the complainant and comparator as crucial to proof of 
discrimination. It is different from the circumstances argument in earlier cases, 
however, in that instead of confining the bad behaviour to the circumstances of the 
complainant they give it also to the circumstances of the comparator – complainant 
and comparator have circumstances which are ‘materially the same’ in that both 
behave badly.  The approach of Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, is, in fact, only 
 
17 IW v City of Perth (1996) 191 CLR 1, 67. 
18 Ibid 33. 
19 Ibid 40-1. 
20 Dopking & Thomas v Department  of Defence [1992] HREOCA 5 (Unreported, Wilson P, 13 March 
1992).  Extract available at (1992) EOC ¶92-421, 79005.  Note this case is also known as Sullivan v 
Department of Defence; Sir Ronald Wilson’s words were also quoted in Commonwealth v Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1993) 46 FCR 191, 209 and in Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission v Mt Isa Mines Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 301, 327. 
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linguistically, not essentially, different from the argument adopted by Gleeson CJ that 
the required comparison should be between the complainant and a person without the 
complainant’s impairment but with his or her behaviour. 
 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ stressed that it is the ‘actual’ circumstances of the 
complainant rather than the ‘hypothetical’ circumstances – ‘defined by excluding all 
features of the disability’21 – of a notional comparator which must be the focus. 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ stated that the circumstances ‘include all of the 
objective features which surround the actual or intended treatment of the disabled 
person’22 and include relevant aspects of the person’s disability: ‘[i]t would be 
artificial to exclude (and there is no basis in the text of the provision for excluding) 
from consideration some of these circumstances because they are identified as being 
connected with that person's disability’.23 In Purvis, Daniel Hoggan’s ‘violent actions 
towards teachers and others’24formed part of the circumstances to be taken into 
account when comparing his treatment with how others without his disability would 
have been treated.  
 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ argued that their approach did not distinguish 
‘between the cause of a person's disability and the effects or consequences of it’.25 It 
is, they claimed, ‘a construction which embraces the importance of identifying (as 
part of the relevant circumstances) all the effects and consequences of disability that 
 
21 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 161 [223]. 
22 Ibid 161 [224]. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 161 [225]. 
25 Ibid 162 [230]. 
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are manifested to the alleged discriminator’.26 This language, however, is deceptive – 
the ‘effects or consequences’ of a disability, the ‘circumstances’, are not identified in 
order that they may be accommodated, they are identified in order to distinguish 
people with disabilities from ‘normal’ people and ‘normal’ behaviour and to 
legitimise their treatment.  
There is a different reading of the required comparison here, from that intended by the 
DDA. The DDA defines discrimination as occurring when ‘the discriminator treats or 
proposes to treat the aggrieved person less favourably than, in circumstances that are 
the same or are not materially different, the discriminator treats or would treat a 
person without the disability’.27 According to the formula of Gummow, Hayne and 
Heydon JJ, the relevant enquiry is not that stipulated in the Act – whether the 
complainant is treated ‘less favourably’ – but, rather, ‘how would that person [the 
‘discriminator’] treat another in those same circumstances?’28or ‘what would have 
been done in those circumstances if the person concerned was not disabled’.29 Their 
formula implies that there will be no discrimination if the ‘disabled’ complainant who 
‘misbehaves’ is treated in the same manner as a ‘person without disability’ who 
‘misbehaves’.  The ‘effects or consequences’ of the disability – but not the underlying 
cause – are transferred to a ‘normal’ comparator.  The problem with this is that, for 
the ‘normal’ comparator, these ‘circumstances’ are not inevitable or unwilled or 
unintended.  Further, the ‘misbehaviour’ of the ‘normal person’ is not the result of any 
failure of a hostile or unaccommodating community to adapt to impairment. 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 DDA s 5. 
28 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 162 [230]. 
29 Ibid 160 [223]. 
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The effect of the approach postulated by the majority in Purvis is not that the 
disability is taken out of the comparison, rather it is the focus of the comparison.  
While they may claim that ‘[i]t may readily be accepted that the necessary 
comparison to make is with the treatment of a person without the relevant disability’30 
the effect of their formula is that the ‘disability’ of the complainant – but not its 
explanation – is applied to the ‘normal’ comparator as well as to complainant. 
Because the ‘normal’ person who ‘misbehaves’ would be sanctioned, it is appropriate 
that the complainant be sanctioned.  In that this approach seizes on the protected 
attribute – which the majority accepts includes its ‘manifestations’ – to justify 
exclusion of the complainant, it is an approach which promotes rather than precludes 
the marginalisation of people with disabilities and, as such, an inversion, perhaps, 
even, a perversion of the scheme of anti-discrimination legislation.  Further, it is a 
denial of the truth that equal treatment may deliver inequality.31 As acknowledged by 
McHugh J in the key High Court discrimination case, Waters v Public Transport 
Corporation, ‘discrimination can arise just as readily from an act which treats as 
equals those who are different as it can from an act which treats differently persons 
whose circumstances are not materially different’. 32 
30 Ibid 160 [222]. 
31 See Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424 (1971).  In Griggs, the US Supreme Court first 
highlighted how apparently ‘equal’ treatment could have a discriminatory effect.  In that case a literacy 
test was applied to all potential employees of the respondent.  It was held that the test was unnecessary 
when applied to unskilled workers and discriminated against African American workers who had not 
had the same access to educational opportunities as white applicants.  The notion that equal treatment 
may deliver inequality of outcome is enshrined in the indirect discrimination provisions of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and of other 
Australian anti-discrimination legislation.  Indirect discrimination is discussed in Chapter 12:  Indirect 
Discrimination. For a theoretical discussion of the difference between ‘equal treatment’ and ‘treatment 
as equals’ see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) 370. 
32 Waters v. Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349, 402. 
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Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ were adamant that their approach ‘does not frustrate 
the proper operation of the Act’.33 Earlier judges, when addressing the comparator 
issue, however, were concerned about ‘fatally frustrating’ the ‘purpose’ of the Act.34 
It could be argued that the majority in Purvis have delivered an interpretation of DDA 
s 5 which will not frustrate what they see as the Act’s ‘proper operation’ of 
‘protecting’ the public rather than one which will not frustrate the ‘purpose’ of the 
DDA: ‘to eliminate, as far as possible, discrimination against persons on the ground of 
disability’, ‘to ensure, as far as practicable, that persons with disabilities have the 
same rights to equality before the law as the rest of the community’ and ‘to promote 
recognition and acceptance within the community of the principle that persons with 
disabilities have the same fundamental rights as the rest of the community’.35 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ have also, clearly, been influenced by a perceived 
need to deliver an interpretation of the DDA which allows for ‘a proper intersection 
between the operation of the Act [DDA] and the operation of State and Federal 
criminal law’: 
Daniel's actions constituted assaults. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to decide 
whether he could or would have been held criminally responsible for them. It is 
enough to recognise that there will be cases where criminal conduct for which the 
perpetrator would be held criminally responsible could be seen to have occurred as a 
result of some disorder, illness or disease. It follows that there can be cases in which 
the perpetrator could be said to suffer a disability within the meaning of the Act.36 
It would be a startling result if the Act, on its proper construction, did not permit an 
employer, educational authority, or other person subject to the Act to require, as a 
universal rule, that employees and pupils comply with the criminal law.37 
33 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 161 [226]. 
34 See above n 20. 
35 DDA s 3. 
36 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 161 [227]. 
37 Ibid 162 [228]. 
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II  PURVIS APPLIED 
A Education Cases 
The majority approach in Purvis has been followed in a later disability discrimination 
in education case brought under the DDA. In Tyler v Kesser Torah College38 Driver 
FM, of the Federal Magistrates Court, found that the temporary exclusion of a student 
with Down’s syndrome, who had, allegedly, thrown an object from a balcony which 
hit a teacher, was not discriminatory.  There were problems with proof of a link 
between the disability of the complainant and his behaviour with Driver FM noting 
that ‘while there is clearly evidence that Joseph presented with behavioural 
difficulties, I have no medical evidence at all that these were a consequence of his 
Down’s syndrome’.39 Nevertheless, the decision arguably extends the scope of Purvis 
beyond the context of students proved to be violent to apply to students who simply 
stand accused of being violent.  Although Driver FM refused to find that the 
complainant had thrown the object or even that he was ‘involved’ in the throwing 
incident,40 he found that a comparator without the complainant’s disability but 
similarly standing accused of throwing would also have been temporarily excluded.41 
Driver FM, like the majority of the High Court, was impressed by duty of care issues 
and found that ‘[i]t would have been irresponsible for Rabbi Spielman [the principal] 
to have taken no action as that would have exposed the College to substantial risk’.42 
The majority approach in Purvis has also been applied in an education case beyond 
the context of the DDA. The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal relied on it 
 
38 Tyler v Kesser Torah College [2006] FMCA 1 (Unreported, Driver FM, 20 January 2006). 
39 Ibid [105]. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid [107]. 
42 Ibid. 
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to defeat a claim of discrimination made under the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) 
by a student with problem behaviour linked to his disabilities.  In Zygorodimos v State 
of Victoria, Department of Education and Training43 the plaintiff student had been 
shifted to a different class in response to his behaviour problems and the stress they 
caused his teacher.  He had not exhibited ‘violence’ of the kind complained of in 
Purvis but had nevertheless been ‘difficult’.44 He had, among other misdemeanours, 
thrown tantrums, been inattentive, put ‘inappropriate objects’ in his mouth, and run 
from the classroom.  This case demonstrates not only a willingness to apply the 
majority approach in a less ‘dangerous’ context than that postulated in Purvis, but also 
in the context of state legislation where the availability of other exemptions45 would 
have already, perhaps, allowed an ‘out’ to a court keen to authorize the apparently 
‘less favourable’ treatment of a ‘problem’ complainant.  It is of further interest that 
the Court refused to consider evidence of other ‘circumstances’ asserted by the 
complainant to be relevant to his treatment.  This evidence may have brought into 
issue the appropriateness of the school’s response to the complainant’s behaviour:  
Before leaving this claim I should add that Mr Gray, counsel for Ben, relied on 
various matters which he said I should take into account to formulate the proper 
comparator. These included provisions concerning disciplinary policies of state 
schools in the Education Regulations 2000, the absence of a provision for the transfer 
of a child from one class to another in VCD's code of student conduct, and views 
expressed by some of the witnesses, such as the education expert Professor Branson, 
about when it would be appropriate to transfer a child for behavioural reasons from 
one class to another. While this evidence may be appropriate in general terms in 
dealing with the challenging behaviour of children, the only evidence which, in my 
view, is relevant to the proper comparator here, is how Dr Pearce would have treated 
a child other than Ben without epilepsy, but with similar behaviour.46 
43 Zygorodimos v State of Victoria, Department of Education and Training [2004] VCAT 128 
(Unreported, McKenzie DP, 3 February 2004) [98]-[100] (‘Zygorodimos’). 
44 Ibid [49].  
45 See Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 39.  See Part V, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
46 Zygorodimos [2004] VCAT 128 (Unreported, McKenzie DP, 3 February 2004) [100]. 
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In a controversial Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) case, Chinchen,47 the New 
South Wales Administrative Appeals Tribunal (NSWADT), at first instance, found 
that several allegations of discrimination on the basis of an undiagnosed and 
undisclosed learning disability had been proved.  Rhys Chinchen was a student who 
had been assessed as ‘gifted’ but who, nevertheless, was experiencing difficulty 
completing set tasks at school.  The complainant’s case was that Rhys had been 
treated less favourably in that he had been removed from an ‘extension’ class to a 
mainstream class as a result of his failure to maintain the standards required for 
inclusion in the extension class, which in turn, was a result of his learning disorder.  It 
was also alleged that the failure to have Rhys tested in order to determine the reason 
for his difficulties at school was discriminatory.  While raising Purvis as a relevant 
authority and purporting to apply the majority approach in Purvis to the comparator, 
the NSWADT excluded any characteristics related to the disorder – the difficulty with 
completing school work, for example – from  the relevant circumstances to be taken 
into account.48 The State appealed but, before hearing, the matter was settled.  The 
parties agreed that the original decision would be set aside, that there had been no 
unlawful discrimination and that each party would carry its own costs. Upon 
consenting to the settlement,49 the Appeal Tribunal noted that the parties had agreed 
that the Hearing Tribunal had erred in the comparison made for the purpose of 
determining whether there had been less favourable treatment.  It had  
failed to determine the proper circumstances in which to compare the treatment 
accorded to Rhys and the treatment accorded to a hypothetical student without motor 
dyspraxia and thereby failed to determine that Rhys Chinchen was treated less 
 
47 Chinchen v NSW Department of Education and Training [2006] NSWADT 180 (Unreported, Goode 
P, Nemeth de Bikal JM and Weule M, 15 June 2006). 
48Ibid [244]-[253]. 
49 In accordance with the terms of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 86. 
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favourably than another student without motor dyspraxia in the same or similar 
circumstances…50 
Although the reasoning is not fully developed in the appeal decision, a proper 
application of the Purvis approach would suggest that the treatment of Rhys should be 
compared with the treatment of another student without his learning disorder but with 
his difficulty in keeping up with the tasks in the extension class.  If the State can then 
show that such a comparator would also have been excluded from the extension class 
and would not have been tested, then there will be no less favourable treatment.  Upon 
this analysis, the Purvis approach can again be seen to have significantly eroded the 
opportunities available to students with impairments.  It could be argued, and the 
hearing Tribunal accepted such an argument, that educators are in a position to 
recognize the symptoms of a learning disorder such as that displayed by Rhys 
Chinchen, and, further, may reasonably be expected in such a case to seek expert 
guidance and intervention so as to minimize any detriment to the learning 
opportunities of the affected student.51 Indeed, evidence was presented to the hearing 
Tribunal that it was acknowledged in NSW Education Department policy documents 
that ‘government schools have a responsibility to identify their gifted students’ and to 
be alert to and prepared to intervene in respect of learning disorders which ‘may 
inhibit the expression of giftedness’.52 
50 State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) v Chinchen [2006] NSWADTAP 
63 (Unreported, Hennessy DP, Britton DP and Bolt M, 20 November 2006) [5]. 
51 Chinchen v NSW Department of Education and Training [2006] NSWADT 180 (Unreported,  Goode 
P, Nemeth de Bikal JM and Weule M, 15 June 2006) [193].  
52 Ibid [36]. 
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B Employment Cases 
While the focus of the present study is on discrimination in education, it is interesting 
to note the potential for the decision in Purvis to erode the protective scope of anti-
discrimination law in other contexts, and particularly in the protected area of 
employment.  In Purvis, McHugh and Kirby JJ warned of the potential of the majority 
approach to undermine the efficacy of disability discrimination legislation by 
analysing an example of a disability which ‘manifests itself in ways that society 
perhaps finds more acceptable than in cases where the disability manifests itself in 
dangerous conduct’.53 They cited the example of Randell v Consolidated Bearing,54 
which was decided on the basis that manifestations were part of the disability and 
excluded from the comparator.  In that case the plaintiff’s dyslexia manifested as an 
inability to manage the stock numbering system used by his employer.  It was held 
that to dismiss the plaintiff because of this difficulty was unlawful discrimination on 
the ground of disability.  While it was found in Randell that a relatively simple 
adjustment to the stock management system would have allowed the complainant to 
continue effectively in his job, since Purvis it is arguable that a similar case would be 
differently decided on the basis that the defendant could, perhaps, demonstrate that an 
employee without dyslexia but with a difficulty with numbers would have been 
dismissed.  Therefore, the unintended upshot of the majority approach in Purvis, it 
could be argued, is that the pressure to accommodate difference is removed from 
respondents. It is significant, in this context, that McHugh and Kirby JJ found in 
Purvis that more could have been done to accommodate Daniel and that if he had 
been properly accommodated his problem behaviour would likely have been 
mitigated and his expulsion avoided:  
 
53 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 144 [168]. 
54 Randell v Consolidated Bearing Co (SA) Pty Ltd [2002] EOC ¶93-216. 
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To obtain access to the benefits of an education at the High School and to overcome 
his behavioural problems, Mr Hoggan required accommodation. His disabilities 
required the educational authority to adjust the DWD Policy to suit his needs, to 
provide teachers with the skills to deal with his special problems and to obtain the 
assistance of experts to formulate proposals for overcoming those problems. On the 
findings of the Commissioner, if that accommodation had been made, it is likely that 
the educational authority would not have denied the benefits to Mr Hoggan or 
subjected him to the detriments that it did because it is likely that he would have 
behaved.55 
The warning given by McHugh and Kirby JJ was prescient in that the comparator 
approach taken by the majority in Purvis has already been applied in a growing 
number of employment cases.56 In Power v Aboriginal Hostels Limited,57 for 
example, Selway J of the Federal Court postulated the following blunt approach to the 
situation of employees with disabilities who are dismissed for absenteeism:  
If the employer would treat any employee the same who was absent from work for 
some weeks (whether or not the employee had a disability or not) then this would not 
constitute discrimination under the DDA. On the other hand, if the employer 
terminates the employment of an employee who has a disability (including an 
imputed disability) in circumstances where the employer would not have done so to 
an employee who was not suffering a disability then this constitutes discrimination 
for the purpose of the DDA.58 
55 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 136 [136]. 
56 See also the following cases where disability discrimination was found after the majority approach to 
the comparator issue in Purvis was applied: Nesci v TAFE Commission of NSW (No 2) [2005] 
NSWADT 183 (Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members Weule and Lowe, 8 August 2005); 
Trindall v NSW Commissioner for Police [2005] FMCA 2 (Unreported, Driver FM, 7 February 2005); 
Ware v OAMPS Insurance Brokers Ltd [2005] FMCA 664 (Unreported, Driver FM, 29 July 2005).  
57 Power v Aboriginal Hostels Limited (2003) 133 FCR 254.  
58 Ibid 259 [8]. In this case, however, it was conceded that the complainant had been dismissed 
because of his employer’s concerns that his depression would recur rendering him unfit for his duties. 
See [2] and [4].  The complainant had, in fact, been wrongly diagnosed with depression and this 
misdiagnosis had been communicated to the respondent by the complainant’s doctor. Selway J 
accepted that there had been unlawful discrimination against the complainant on the ground of his 
‘presumed’ disability in that the respondent did not argue that it would have dismissed an employee 
without disability who had been absent for a similar period. Selway J seemed bemused by this 
‘concession’ of the respondent which, he found ‘seemed to…go considerably further than the evidence 
required’ [9].  It is likely that the respondent made the concession, however, in order to facilitate its 
argument that the dismissal on the ground of disability was authorised under the ‘inherent 
requirements’ exemption.  Selway J set aside the earlier decision of the Brown FM that the inherent 
requirements exemption had been proved [Power v Aboriginal Hostels Limited [2003] FMCA 42 
(Unreported, Brown FM, 3 March 2003)] and remitted the matter back to the Federal Magistrates Court 
for further hearings.  Selway J found that a decision of discrimination on the ground of presumed 
disability was not compatible with a finding that the disability prevented the complainant’s ability to 
perform the inherent requirements of his job.  
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The words of Selway J illustrate quite clearly the potential of the comparator 
approach authorised by the High Court majority to undermine the protective scope of 
anti-discrimination legislation.  It appears from the explanation in Power that if an 
employer would treat everybody ‘badly’, by sacking them for absenteeism, then there 
can be no discrimination against a person with disability in that they are not treated 
‘less favourably’ than those without disability.  Further, there is no allowance made in 
this explanation for the fact that the person with disability may be absent for some 
legitimate reason associated with his or her disability, while the person without 
disability may be illegitimately taking a ‘sickie’.   
 
Forbes v Australian Federal Police59 illustrates very clearly the erosion of the 
protective scope of anti-discrimination legislation foreshadowed in the earlier case of 
Power. In Forbes the Full Federal Court followed the majority approach in Purvis to 
inform their decision that there was no unlawful discrimination in the decision of the 
AFP not to re-employ an employee who had been absent from work for an extended 
period on account of her depressive illness because a person without disability who 
had been similarly absent, and with a similarly ‘broken’ relationship with her 
employer, would not have been reemployed:   
The difficulty is that the appellant must establish that the AFP treated her less 
favourably, in circumstances that are the same or are not materially different, 
than it treated or would have treated a non-disabled person. The approach of the 
majority in Purvis makes it clear that the circumstances attending the treatment of the 
disabled person must be identified. The question is then what the alleged 
discriminator would have done in those circumstances if the person concerned was 
not disabled. Here, the appellant was not reappointed because the history of her 
dealings with the AFP, including her absence from work for nearly three years, 
showed that the employment relationship had irretrievably broken down. There is 
nothing to indicate that in the same circumstances, the AFP would have treated a non-
disabled employee more favourably (emphasis in original).60 
59 Forbes v Australian Federal Police (Commonwealth of Australia) [2004] FCAFC (Unreported, 
Black CJ, Tamberlin and Sackville JJ, 5 May 2004). 
60 Ibid [80]-[81]. 
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In Fetherston v Peninsula Health,61 Heery J of the Federal Court followed the 
majority approach in Purvis and authorised the dismissal of a doctor with 
deteriorating eyesight.  Although much of the analysis in that case rested on the 
‘relevant circumstance’ that the complainant, fearing dismissal, had refused to allow 
an assessment of his eyesight, the Court made the explicit finding that there was no 
discrimination in the failure of the respondent to supply aids to the complainant 
which, he had argued, would have allowed him to continue effectively in his role as a 
doctor: 
Any failure by the respondents to provide aids for Dr Fetherston did not contravene 
the Act. The Act does not impose a legal obligation on employers, or anyone else, to 
provide aids for disabled persons: Purvis at [203] and [218]. The Act does deal with 
various aids: palliative and therapeutic devices and auxiliary aids (s 7), interpreters, 
readers and assistants (s 8), and guide dogs, hearing assistance dogs and trained 
animals (s 9). However, none of those sections mandate the provision of such aids. 
Rather they provide that there will be discrimination for the purposes of the Act if a 
person is treated less favourably because of the fact that he or she is accompanied by 
or possesses such aids. Nor can any of the aids that Dr Fetherston requested be 
considered as “opportunities for promotion, transfer or training, or … other benefits 
associated with employment” within the meaning of s 15(2)(b).62 
This is another alarming elaboration on the majority approach in Purvis. It must be 
questioned, however, whether the Court’s assertion that the DDA does not ‘mandate’ 
the provision of aids to people with disabilities accounts for the fact that the failure to 
provide such aids can expose a respondent to a finding of unlawful indirect 
discrimination.63 The Full Court of the Federal Court in Catholic Education v Clarke 
61 Fetherston v Peninsula Health [2004] FCA 485 (Unreported, Heerey J, 23 April 2004). 
62 Ibid [77]-[79]. 
63 See Chapter 12: Indirect Discrimination. In the recent cases Hurst and Devlin v Education 
Queensland [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005) [380]-[381] and Hurst v State of 
Queensland [2006] FCAFC 100 (Unreported, Ryan, Finn and Weinberg JJ, 28 July 2006), for example, 
Education Queensland was held to have indirectly discriminated against two students with hearing 
impairments because it failed to provide them with Auslan interpreters to assist in their classroom 
instruction.  A similar finding was made in Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor [2003] 202 
ALR 340 [49]. 
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cautioned against a reading of Purvis and a construction of the DDA as ‘precluding’ 
any requirement of ‘positive discrimination’.64 
It is of further concern that the comparator approach of the majority in Purvis has 
been imported to another variety of discrimination where ‘manifestations’ of a 
protected attribute may challenge employers – pregnancy .  In Dare v Hurley,65 a Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) case, the complainant had been dismissed after making 
a request for leave as a result of her pregnancy.  Driver FM, of the Federal 
Magistrates Court, did find that the complainant had been treated less favourably than 
a hypothetical comparator who was not pregnant but who had made a similar request 
for leave.  His reasoning, applying the majority approach in Purvis, however, suggests 
a potential for the lawful dismissal of pregnant women where employees who are not 
pregnant, but who ‘manifest’ the same demands upon an employer, would be treated 
in the same ‘unfavourable’ way.  The respondent’s case in Dare v Hurley was harmed 
by evidence that he had produced an employee manual ‘as a guide to the way 
employees were expected to work and would be treated’66and which outlined 
circumstances where leave would be available.  Driver FM found that the respondent 
was a person who ‘placed great store on following procedures’ and that ‘[i]n the 
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that the hypothetical comparator would have 
been treated in accordance with those procedures’.67 It is tempting to speculate, 
however, on whether a logical extension of the application of the majority approach to 
the comparator in Purvis to a case such as this, is that an employer, who has no
‘procedures manual’ and who treats everyone unfairly – that is, the kind of employer 
 
64 Catholic Education Office v Clarke [2004] 138 FCR 121, 140-1 [91]-[93]. See below nn 119-21. 
65 Dare v Hurley [2005] FMCA 844 (Unreported, Driver FM, 12 August 2005). 
66 Ibid [112]. 
67 Ibid. 
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anti-discrimination legislation would seek to reform – would escape liability under 
that legislation in that they could, presumably, prove they would unfairly sack not 
only a ‘pregnant’ employee but also a ‘comparator’ who was not pregnant.  As 
Selway J said in Power when explaining the majority approach to the comparator in 
Purvis, ‘If the employer would treat any employee the same who was absent from 
work for some weeks (whether or not the employee had a disability or not) then this 
would not constitute discrimination under the DDA’.68 
The recent decision of the QADT in Edwards v Hillier and Educang69 shows both 
that the comparator analysis has been applied outside the context of disability 
discrimination and also that it has been adopted for the purpose of applying the 
QADA. In Edwards, the complainant was seeking to return to her job as registrar at 
Forest Lake College on a part time basis following a period of maternity leave.  The 
College would make the job available to her only on a fulltime basis.  The QADT 
found that there had been no direct discrimination in that the College would have 
refused to employ any person who was not available to work full time: 
Even if a preference for part-time work and a practical inability to work full-time 
could be regarded as so bound up in the attributes of parental status and family 
responsibilities as to be part of them, the complainant’s direct discrimination claim 
would still not succeed because the appropriate comparison is with another person 
who prefers not to, and practically cannot, meet the respondents’ requirement to work 
full time, but who is not a parent with family responsibilities. This was the reasoning 
of the majority in Purvis v New South Wales.70 
The complainant was not left without a remedy, however, as Dalton P found that the 
facts established a case of indirect discrimination: the term imposed on Edwards that 
she work fulltime, and with which she could not comply because of her family 
 
68 See above n 58. 
69 Edwards v Hillier and Educang [2006] QADT 34 (Unreported, Dalton P, 11 August 2006).
70 Ibid [87]. 
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responsibilities, was not reasonable.  The application of the law in this case, suggests, 
perhaps, that allegations of discrimination may, after Purvis, be more effectively 
mounted as indirect discrimination cases.71 
III  THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATOR 
The problem posed by students who display disability related difficult behaviour is 
not exclusive to Australia.  It is instructive to compare how the United States and the 
United Kingdom have dealt with the ‘comparator’ issue.  
A The US Position on Students with Disabilities who ‘Misbehave’ 
While the position in the United States remains in stark contrast to the position in 
Australia, recent legislative amendments have eroded the procedural protections 
available to US students with disabilities who ‘misbehave’.  In the United States, the 
issue of students with disability induced problem behaviour is addressed in the 
context of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) which creates a 
positive right to inclusion for students with disabilities in ‘the least restrictive 
environment’.72 The ‘normal’ disciplinary procedures available in respect of ‘normal’ 
students are not considered appropriate for IDEA protected students.  Thus, the 
legislation does not require a comparison to be made between how a student with 
disability who misbehaves is treated and how a student without disability who 
misbehaves would be treated.  The general rule is that a student with a disability can 
 
71 It is possible to plead direct and indirect discrimination as alternative cases:  see, for example, Minns 
v State of New South Wales [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002). 
72 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 20 USC § 1412(a)(5)(A) (‘IDEA’).  Federal financial 
assistance is available to the states if they comply with IDEA. It was held in by the US Supreme Court 
that a court called on to assess compliance with the Act must ask two questions: first, whether the state 
has complied with the procedures set forth in the Act; secondly, whether the individualised education 
plan (IEP) implemented through he Act’s procedures is reasonably calculated to allow the child to 
receive educational benefits: Board of Education v Rowley, 458 US 176, 206-7 (1982).  IDEA states a 
preference for mainstreaming ‘special needs’ students whenever possible: IDEA § 1412(5)(A). 
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be suspended for a maximum of 10 days for discipline code violations.73 While a 
school can seek, via court intervention, to have a student’s placement changed where 
there is a risk of injury to self or others, a change in placement can only be authorised 
after an exhaustive process of notices and independent ‘due process’ hearings.74 ‘Stay 
put’ provisions allow many children with disabilities threatened with a change of 
placement to stay in their current placement until review procedures available under 
the legislation are exhausted.75 A ‘manifestation determination’ hearing, conducted 
by the school authority, the student’s parent and members of the Individualised 
Education Plan [IEP] team for the student,76 must be scheduled within 10 days of any 
decision to seek to change the placement of a child because of a discipline code 
violation.77 The hearing will determine whether the behaviour was ‘caused by, or had 
a direct and substantial relationship to the child’s disability’ or if the conduct was a 
‘direct result of the local educational agency’s failure to implement the [child’s] 
IEP’.78 If the behaviour is determined to be a result of either it will be held to be a 
manifestation of the child’s disability.79 The legislative presumption appears to be 
that behavioural manifestations of disability evidence a deficiency of the student’s 
placement in not addressing the behaviour, as where the behaviour is determined to be 
a ‘manifestation’ the general rule is that the student must be allowed to return to 
school and the onus is on the school to adjust the student’s individual education 
program to address what can be done to mitigate the causes and effects of the 
behaviour.80 Only if the hearing determines that the behaviour is not a manifestation 
 
73 IDEA § 1415(k)(1)(B). 
74 IDEA § 1415(i). 
75 IDEA § 1415(j).    
76 IDEA § 1415(k)(1)(E) 
77 IDEA § 1415(k)(E). 
78 IDEA § 1415(k)(1)(E). 
79 IDEA § 1415(k)(1)(F).   
80 IDEA § 1415(k)(1)(F).  
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of the student’s disability will regular disciplinary procedures be applicable.81 A right 
is retained by the student, however, to ‘receive educational services…so as to enable 
the child to continue to participate in the general educational curriculum’,82 albeit in a 
different, and, perhaps, ‘more restrictive’ environment.  Moreover, and again 
reflecting an emphasis on institutional accommodation of problem behaviour, IDEA 
mandates an institutional response which may ultimately resolve behaviour problems 
by providing that students who are removed from their current placement 
‘shall…receive, as appropriate, a functional behavioral assessment, behavioral 
intervention services and modifications, that are designed to address the behavior 
violation so that it does not recur’.83 
Honig v Doe and Smith84 is the only US Supreme Court case directly on point.  The 
case demonstrates an insistence on both due process and parental involvement in the 
treatment of students with disabilities which is not standard in the Australian context. 
In Honig it was held that the indefinite suspension of two teenaged students whose 
violence was a manifestation of their impairments, pending the outcome of exclusion 
proceedings, offended the stay put provisions contained in IDEA. Doe was a ‘socially 
and physically awkward 17 year old who experienced considerable difficulty 
controlling his impulses and anger’.85 He was suspended after he had ‘choked [a] 
student with sufficient force to leave abrasions on the child’s neck, and kicked out a 
window while being escorted to the principal’s office afterwards’.86 Smith was 
suspended after a pattern of inappropriate behaviour including ‘stealing, extorting 
 
81 IDEA § 1415(k)(1)(C).  
82 IDEA § 1415(k)(1)(D)(i). 
83 IDEA § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii). 
84 Honig v Doe and Smith 484 US 305 (1988). 
85 Ibid 312. 
86 Ibid 313. 
262
money from fellow students, and making sexual comments to female class mates’.87 
The Court refused to entertain a defence argument that it should recognise a 
‘dangerousness’ exception to the stay-put rule and found that Congress had 
deliberately removed from schools the opportunity to make unilateral decisions to 
exclude students with disabilities.88 The Court explained that Congress had enacted 
the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) (now known as IDEA) in order to 
correct a culture of excluding students with disabilities on account of ‘behavioural 
problems’: 
…Congress passed the EHA after finding that school systems across the country had 
excluded one out of every eight disabled children from classes. In drafting the law, 
Congress was largely guided by the recent decisions in Mills v. Board of Education of 
District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (1972), and PARC, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972), 
both of which involved the exclusion of hard-to-handle disabled students. Mills in 
particular demonstrated the extent to which schools used disciplinary measures to bar 
children from the classroom. There, school officials had labelled four of the seven 
minor plaintiffs “behavioural problems”, and had excluded them from classes without 
providing any alternative education to them or any notice to their parents. 348 F. 
Supp., at 869-870. After finding that this practice was not limited to the named 
plaintiffs but affected in one way or another an estimated class of 12,000 to 18,000 
disabled students, id., at 868-869, 875, the District Court enjoined future exclusions, 
suspensions, or expulsions “on grounds of discipline”. Id, at 880.89 
The majority judgment,90 delivered by Brennan J, emphasised that ‘the Act [EHA]
establishes various procedural safeguards that guarantee parents both an opportunity 
for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's education and the right to 
seek review of any decisions they think inappropriate’.91 The majority held, further, 
that schools are not without remedy in the case of ‘violent’ students in that that they 
can utilise disciplinary proceedings mandated by the legislation, including suspension 
 
87 Ibid 315. 
88 Ibid 323. 
89 Ibid 324. 
90 The minority dissent delivered by Scalia J, with whom O’Connor J agreed, did not address the 
substantive issues of the case but would have dismissed it on the basis that, as the plaintiffs were no 
longer in school, they were no longer entitled to relief. 
91 Ibid 311-12.  
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for up to 10 days.92 It stressed, however, that in the case of ‘a truly dangerous child’93 
if parents refuse to agree to an alternative placement judicial relief may be sought in 
the form of an injunction ordering the relocation of the child.94 
The case of Consolidated School District No 93 v John F95is a ‘garden variety’ 
example of many more recent cases which illustrate the United States position.96 John, 
a student with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), was suspended for 
the last 22 days of the 1992 school year for threatening another student through 
references to the Columbine School massacre which had occurred three days earlier.  
The Illinois District Court found that John’s suspension was in violation of IDEA, the 
school having failed to follow the procedural safeguards mandated by that legislation. 
Holderman J found that the school was in breach of the legislation in that it ‘did not 
modify [John’s] IEP, discuss ways to address his behavioural problems, or consider 
ways in which in-school devices and services could address his behaviour 
problems’.97 John was awarded US $22,300 damages in respect of his unlawful 
suspension.  
 
A suite of amendments to IDEA in 2004, in force from July 2005, however, has 
diminished procedural safeguards for students who display problem behaviour as a 
result of disability, suggesting, perhaps, that problem behaviour is an ongoing 
 
92 Ibid 326. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid 328. 
95 Community Consolidated School District No 9 v John F, 33 IDELR ¶ 40 (ND Ill 2000). IDEA has 
been the subject of extensive litigation and has given rise to its own series of case reports: Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Law Report (IDELR). 
96 See also, for example, Colvin v Lowndes County, Mississippi School District, 147 Educ L Rep 601 
(ND Miss 1999); JC v Regional School District No 10, 147 Educ L Rep 935 (D Conn 2000); Farrin v 
Maine School Administrative District No 59, 170 Educ L Rep 565 ( D Me 2001). 
97 Community Consolidated School District No 9 v John F, 33 IDELR ¶ 40 (ND Ill 2000) 12. 
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challenge for school systems around the world.  A particularly sharp erosion of rights 
has arisen from the fact that the circumstances in which a child can be removed from 
school, pending the implementation of IDEA hearing procedures, have been enlarged. 
Before 2004, IDEA had expressly authorized schools unilaterally to remove children 
to an interim alternative educational setting for up to 45 days for drug and weapon 
offences, even when the offence was caused by the student’s disability.  This was the 
only circumstance when behaviour caused by disability could result in removal from 
school without a hearing.  Now schools may unilaterally remove children in the 
additional circumstance that they have ‘inflicted serious bodily injury’, and for a 
longer period of 45 school, rather than calendar, days.98 Further, when the matter 
does go to hearing, the hearing officer is no longer required to consider whether the 
school made a reasonable effort to minimize the risk of harm through the use, for 
example, of supplementary aids and services.  
 
B The US Position Compared with the Australian Position 
It is tempting to compare the IDEA focus on the school’s responsibility to 
accommodate, adjust to and mitigate the student’s problem behaviour with the 
minority approach taken by McHugh and Kirby JJ, in Purvis, to the events 
culminating in Daniel Hoggan’s expulsion.  As noted earlier in the chapter,99 
McHugh and Kirby JJ were of the opinion that more could have been done to 
accommodate Daniel and that ‘if that accommodation had been made, it is likely that 
the educational authority would not have denied the benefits to Mr Hoggan or 
 
98 IDEA § 1415 (k)(1)(G).  Note, however, that during these periods of suspension, and after a change 
of placement, IDEA requires that the affected student continue to ‘receive educational services…so as 
to enable the child to continue to participate in the general educational curriculum’ See above nn 82and 
83. 
99 See above n 55. 
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subjected him to the detriments that it did because it is likely that he would have 
behaved’. 100 
The 2004 amendments undoubtedly bring the US position closer to the Australian 
position by allowing a wider scope for schools to remove students from their 
preferred school and by diluting the expectation that schools will proactively reduce 
the potential for student violence by reacting to and accommodating the disability 
causes of that violence.  Despite the amendments, however, the emphasis on 
behavioural modification interventions, the opportunity for co-operative decision 
making between parents and school101and the scope for independent and expedited 
enquiry into threatened sanctions of students with disabilities, aligned with the 
presumption that an accommodating mainstream placement is the norm, mean greater 
protection for ‘problem’ students exists in the United States.  Further, the US position 
is clearly more in concert with the communitarian value placed on citizenship and 
with prevailing disability theory.  It is the communitarian view that a person, disabled 
or otherwise, has a prima facie right to inclusion as a corollary of citizenship.  Tam, 
for example, counsels that citizens vulnerable to discrimination because of disability 
‘should have confidence that society as a whole is on their side, and should not be 
made to feel isolated as troublemakers who refuse to accept their lot’.102 According to 
Tam, it is the role of the community to empower people with disabilities to play an 
 
100 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 136 [136]. 
101 See, for example, the manifestation hearing process outlined above.  It should also be noted that his 
or her parents are automatic members of each student’s IEP team [20 USCA § 1414 (d)(1)(B)]. In a 
recent decision (14 November 2005) of the US Supreme Court, ‘the co-operative process it establishes 
between parents and schools’ was described as the ‘core’ of IDEA: Schaffer v Weast, 546 US 49 
(2005). There is concern, however, that this decision will reduce the remedial effectiveness of IDEA.
IDEA is silent on the point of who bears the burden of proof in due process hearings where the 
appropriateness of the terms of the IEP of a student with a disability is challenged [see 1415 (f)].  In 
Schaffer it was held by a majority of the US Supreme Court that the burden lies on the party making 
the challenge – that is, invariably, the student with disability.  
102 Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship (1998) 137. 
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active part in the determination of their futures.103 Education institutions are the 
places where the knowledge which underpins this empowerment is imparted.  Further, 
education institutions, as microcosms of wider society, are expected to model 
democratic inclusion to the student body. Although communitarians acknowledge that 
there will be circumstances where the right to inclusion must yield, there is a heavy 
onus on the community to be tolerant, inclusive and accommodating of difference.  
Walzer has emphasized that it is ‘crucial’ that schools ‘aim at a pattern of association 
anticipating that of adult men and women in a democracy’.104 Moreover, the social 
theory of disability postulates disability as caused by the failures of mainstream 
society to accommodate impairment, and like IDEA, starts from the premise that 
society must adjust to mitigate the ramifications of impairment.105 
C The Comparator in the United Kingdom 
The comparator issue has been the subject of significant litigation in the United 
Kingdom.  The courts there, though, admittedly in the context of a differently worded 
statute,106 have reached the opposite conclusion from that of the High Court of 
Australia:  the appropriate comparator is a person without the disability, and without 
the behaviour, of the person alleging discrimination.  This conclusion was reached by 
the English Court of Appeal in the seminal employment discrimination case, Clark v 
Novacold,107 discussed below.  Disability discrimination in education cases have 
followed Clark v Novacold, finding that in the case of the treatment of students like 
 
103 Ibid 134. 
104 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 217. 
105 See Part II B, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
106 The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK).  The terms of the legislation as relevant to the 
comparator issue are discussed, below. 
107 Clark v TDG Ltd (t/a Novacold) [1999] 2 All ER 977 (‘Clark v Novacold’).  Clark v Novacold is 
further discussed at Part III D, below. 
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Daniel Hoggan, who misbehave as a result of their disabilities, the required 
comparison is with the treatment of students who do not misbehave. 
 
McAuley Catholic High School v C,108 the first reported case concerning the 
application of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) (DDA (UK)) in an 
education context, concerned the exclusion of a student with autistic spectrum 
disorder who, after a long history of being bullied, reacted with verbal and physical 
aggression towards students and staff.  The English High Court affirmed the finding 
of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal (SENDIST) that the boy’s 
exclusion amounted to unlawful discrimination and, importing Clark v Novacold 
principles into the education context, held that the required comparison was between 
his treatment and the treatment of another without his ‘disorderly behaviour’.  Unlike 
the DDA, the DDA (UK) does expressly impose a positive duty on education 
providers to accommodate students with disabilities.109 In McAuley Catholic High 
School v C, SENDIST identified a failure of the school to provide the necessary 
personal guidance and support to the plaintiff and ordered the school to produce an 
action plan to deal with the specific needs of pupils with autistic spectrum disorder 
and to establish a mentoring system. 
 
In a similar case, T v Governing Body of OL,110 the exclusion of an 8 year old student 
for behaviour related to her disability, including the biting, hitting and kicking of 
other students and teachers, was found to be less favourable treatment.  In this case 
however, the High Court affirmed the SENDIST finding that the treatment was 
 
108 McAuley Catholic High School v C [2004] 2 All ER 436. 
109 See Part II A, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy, n 8. 
110 T v Governing Body of OL [2005] All ER 213. 
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‘justified’.  The student’s exclusion, Goudie J said, ‘on any view, at least provided 
some respite to the school, its pupils and its staff’.111 This case illustrates, of course, a 
significant point of difference between the DDA, as it was enacted at the time of the 
Purvis hearing, and the DDA (UK) – the availability of the ‘justification’ defence.112 
Like the QADA, and several other Australian state acts,113 the DDA (UK) allows, via 
the justification defence, for a finding of less favourable treatment while 
acknowledging that, in some situations, that treatment is ‘justified’.114 It can be 
speculated that the existence of this defence allowed the English courts – like the 
Queensland courts before them – to take a more ‘disability friendly’ approach to the 
comparator issue, as they could deliver an interpretation of the discrimination 
provisions consistent with prevailing disability theory and the remedial purpose of 
anti-discrimination legislation, secure in the knowledge that a defence was available 
to protect those discriminators who could not avoid harming the complainant without 
risking harm to others.  
 
D Purvis: Distinguishing the UK Approach to the Comparator 
The majority of the High Court in Purvis, perhaps for obvious reasons, was reluctant 
to follow the UK approach to the comparator, highlighting what they claimed to be 
significant differences in the UK definition of direct discrimination in the DDA (UK). 
First, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ claimed that the focus of the DDA is on 
‘equality of treatment’ and that in this respect it differs from legislation in similarly 
situated jurisdictions, like the DDA (UK), which specifically obliges reasonable 
 
111 Ibid 214. 
112 DDA UK s 28B(1)(b): discrimination will only be established if a ‘responsible body’ ‘cannot show 
that the treatment is justified’. Compare with the ‘unjustifiable hardship’ defence in Australia. 
113 See Part V, Chapter 6: Exemptions n 67. 
114 See Part IV, below. 
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accommodation.115 While even the minority in Purvis agreed that there is no duty of 
reasonable accommodation to be implied from the terms of the DDA116 it is, perhaps, 
understating the effect of the Act to assert that its principal focus is on ensuring 
equality of treatment.  As noted earlier, the High Court has acknowledged as a 
fundamental tenet of discrimination that it can arise from the equal treatment of those 
who are not ‘equal’ as well as from the unequal treatment of equals.117 Sackville and 
Stone JJ, of the Full Federal Court, in their joint judgment in Clarke,118 distanced 
themselves from the Purvis majority’s understanding of the focus of the legislation, 
warning that the approach in Purvis should not be parlayed into an approach which 
denies any place for ‘positive discrimination’ within the scope of the Act.119 
Sackville and Stone JJ pointed out that Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, themselves 
conceded ‘there is considerable room for debate about when apparently “equal” 
treatment is to be understood as being discriminatory and apparently unequal 
treatment is not’.120 Sackville and Stone JJ implied that, at least in the context of 
indirect discrimination, the kind of discrimination found to have occurred in Clarke,
positive discrimination may be required in order to avoid liability:  
The reasoning in the joint judgment in Purvis does not support the proposition that 
the appellants appeared to be urging, namely that the DD Act should be construed so 
as to preclude any requirement that an educational authority ‘discriminate positively’ 
in favour of a disabled person.121 
The finding in Clarke was that discrimination had arisen through the refusal of the 
respondent to provide an Auslan interpreter to assist the complainant child in his 
 
115 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) ss 5 and 6 and ss 28B–28G.  
116 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 127 [104]. 
117 See above n 32. 
118 Catholic Education Office v Clarke [2004] 138 FCR 121. 
119 Ibid 140-1 [91]-[93]. 
120 Ibid.  See Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 156 [207]. 
121 Ibid 141 [93]. 
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secondary school studies.  A condition was imposed on the complainant that he 
receive instruction in English.  While he could not comply with this condition, others 
in his peer group could.  The provision of an Auslan interpreter, it can be inferred 
from the words of Sackville and Stone JJ, would be a variety of ‘positive 
discrimination’ – Jacob Clarke would be treated differently from his peers, but this 
different treatment was necessary to avoid a discriminatory outcome.  
 
While Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ did not directly address the point, McHugh 
and Kirby JJ, in Purvis, also pointed out that the failure to take positive steps to 
accommodate a student with disability can expose an education institution to a finding 
that they have discriminated against that student.  Like the majority in Purvis, they 
found no obligation to take positive steps, but unlike the majority they acknowledged 
that the failure to do so may amount to discrimination.  McHugh and Kirby JJ 
provided a more sophisticated analysis of the terms of DDA s 5 in order to inform 
their conclusion.  They focused on the intersection between the contentious phrase in 
s 5(1), ‘in circumstances which are the same or are not materially different’, and the 
rider in s 5(2), ‘[f]or the purposes of subsection (1), circumstances in which a person 
treats or would treat another person with a disability are not materially different 
because of the fact that different accommodation or services may be required by the 
person with a disability’. This rider amounted to acknowledgement that 
accommodation may need to be delivered to a person with a disability: 
No matter how important a particular accommodation may be for a disabled person or 
disabled persons generally, failure to provide it is not a breach of the Act per se. 
Rather, s 5(2) has the effect that a discriminator does not necessarily escape a finding 
of discrimination by asserting that the actual circumstances involved applied equally 
to those with and without disabilities. No doubt as a practical matter the discriminator 
may have to take steps to provide the accommodation to escape a finding of 
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discrimination. But that is different from asserting that the Act imposes an obligation 
to provide accommodation for the disabled.122 
In the context of direct discrimination too, therefore, it is arguably a misconstruction 
of the DDA to claim its ‘principal focus’ as delivery of ‘equal treatment’.  Close 
analysis of the terms of the DDA (UK) suggests that it requires a comparison which is 
not substantially different from that required by the DDA. As Gummow, Hayne and 
Heydon JJ explained, the DDA (UK) requires an enquiry into the reason for the 
treatment of the complainant and a comparison with the treatment of a person to 
whom that reason does not apply: 
In the 1995 UK Act, for example, the focus is not upon the cases of different persons 
(one disabled, one not) in the same or not materially different circumstances. As was 
pointed out in Clark v TDG Ltd, the focus of the 1995 UK Act is much narrower. It 
looks only to the reason for the treatment of the disabled person and then requires 
comparison with the treatment of "others to whom that reason does not or would not
apply" (emphasis added). That is, it requires identification of why the disabled person 
was treated as he or she was, and then asks would another, to whom that reason did 
not apply, have been treated in the same way?123 
What Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ did not make explicit in their judgment, 
however, is that the reason for the treatment must be a ‘reason which relates to the 
disabled person’s disability’.  The DDA (UK) defines discrimination as follows: 
(1) For the purposes of this Part, an employer discriminates against a disabled person 
if 
(a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he treats him less 
favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom that reason does not or would 
not apply; and 
(b) he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified.124 
It could be argued that the DDA (UK) simply teases out what the High Court of 
Australia has acknowledged in its reading of the definition of disability – that 
 
122 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 127 [104]. 
123 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 158 [215]. 
124 DDA (UK) s 5. 
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disability includes its manifestations.  In the UK case Clark v Novacold, for example, 
the plaintiff, Clark, had suffered a back injury at work and medical evidence was that 
no firm date for his return to work could be provided.  Clark was sacked.  The reason 
for his ‘less favourable treatment’ – his sacking – was his continued absence from 
work.  This reason related to his disability – indeed, it was, to adopt a term familiar in 
the Australian case law context, a ‘manifestation’ of his disability.  The comparison 
was made with the treatment of someone to whom that reason did not apply – a 
person who was not absent from work.  In Australia, Purvis has settled that 
‘disability’ includes its manifestations.  On this construction, disability would include 
the inability to attend work from time to time.  Therefore to sack someone because 
they were absent from work because of their disability, would be to sack them 
because of their disability.125 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ also did not elaborate on the deliberations of the UK 
Court of Appeal on the issue of whether the comparator had the reason for the 
discrimination – the absence – but not the disability, or whether they did not exhibit 
the reason at all – they were not absent from work.  This is the same question that 
perplexed the High Court in Purvis. Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ did quote the 
following passage from Mummery LJ:  
The definition of discrimination in the [1995 UK Act] does not contain an express 
provision requiring a comparison of the cases of different persons in the same, or not 
materially different, circumstances. The statutory focus is narrower: it is on the 
`reason' for the treatment of the disabled employee and the comparison to be made is 
with the treatment of `others to whom that reason does not or would not apply'. The 
`others' with whom comparison is to be made are not specifically required to be in the 
same, or not materially different, circumstances: they only have to be persons `to 
whom that reason does not or would not apply'.126 
125 It is interesting to compare the approach of the UK Court of Appeal in Clark v Novacold with the 
approach taken in the Australian employment case Power, discussed above.  See, particularly, the 
quotation from Power, above n 57. 
126 Clark v Novacold [1999] 2 All ER 977, 987. 
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Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ seize on this paragraph to support their contention 
that the DDA (UK) authorizes a different kind of enquiry from that authorized by the 
DDA (Cth).  The meaning of the quoted paragraph, however, takes on a slightly 
different gloss when read in context.  The preceding paragraph is as follows: 
In the historical context of discrimination legislation, it is natural to do what the 
industrial and the appeal tribunal [the hearing tribunal] (though 'without great 
confidence') did, namely to interpret the expression 'that reason' so as to achieve a 
situation in which a comparison is made of the case of the disabled person with that 
of an able-bodied person and the comparison is such that the relevant circumstances 
in the one case are the same, or not materially different, in the other case. This might 
be reasonably considered to be the obvious way of determining whether a disabled 
person has been treated less favourably than a person who is not disabled.127 
This paragraph suggests that the ‘natural’ conclusion, that the required comparison in 
Clark v Novacold is with a person with the absence from work but without the 
disability, is wrong.  In the paragraph following that quoted by Gummow, Hayne and 
Heydon JJ, Mummery LJ distinguishes disability discrimination legislation from other 
legislation which requires comparison of ‘like with like’, specifically sex 
discrimination legislation and victimization legislation: 
This is to be contrasted not only with the different approach in the 1975 and the 1976 
Acts, but also with the express requirement of comparison with the treatment of other 
persons 'whose circumstances are the same' stipulated in victimisation cases by s 
55(1)(a) of the 1995 Act.128 
Mummery LJ also gave examples from the second reading speech in support of the 
DDA (UK) and from the explanatory notes to the DDA (UK) to illustrate the 
detrimental effects should the legislation be read narrowly to allow the reason for the 
less favourable treatment to be attributed also to the ‘comparator’.129 In one example, 
a man with vision impairment is asked to leave a restaurant because he is 
accompanied by a dog.  If the restaurant management could show that it would have 
 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid 988-9.  
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asked another patron without impairment, but accompanied by a dog, to leave the 
restaurant, then it would avoid a finding of discrimination.  Mummery LJ pointed out 
that such a finding would be in direct conflict with the statement of the Minister for 
Social Security and Disabled People, in his second reading speech, that the removal of 
a person on account of their guide dog would be a prima facie case of 
discrimination.130 This informed his conclusion, therefore, that the required 
comparison is with a patron without a dog, who, of course, would not be asked to 
leave the restaurant.  
It is instructive to examine how this scenario could be dealt with according to the 
comparison formula developed by the majority in Purvis. Their approach, to recap, is 
as follows: first, ‘the circumstances attending the treatment given (or to be given) to 
the disabled person must be identified’;131 secondly, an examination must be made of 
‘what would have been done in those circumstances if the person concerned was not 
disabled’.132 Arguably, the dog, though a corollary of the disability, would be a 
‘circumstance’ which could be attributed also to the comparator and taken into 
account in determination of whether the treatment is less favourable.  Such an 
analysis, however, would be baldly inconsistent with provisions in the DDA which 
explicitly protect those who use guide dogs from discrimination regardless of, or 
perhaps because of, the discriminator’s ‘practice to treat less favourably any person 
who possesses, or is accompanied by, a dog or any other animal’.133 
Mummery LJ, in Clark v Novacold, alluded, however, to the problems with the 
‘comparator approach’ to determining less favourable treatment when he implied that 
 
130 Ibid.  
131 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 160 [223]. 
132 Ibid. 
133 DDA s 9. 
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the definition of discrimination in the DDA (UK), focusing on the ‘reason’ for 
treatment, was purpose built to avoid difficult issues of construction surrounding the 
issue of the characteristics of the comparator which had tormented the UK courts in 
relation, particularly, to allegations of pregnancy discrimination:  
It would avoid the kind of problems which the English (and Scottish) courts and the 
tribunals encountered in their futile attempts to find and identify the characteristics of 
a hypothetical non-pregnant male comparator for a pregnant woman in sex 
discrimination cases.134 
The fact that the Court of Appeal grappled with the meaning of ‘the reason’ in Clark v 
Novacold suggests that the purpose built DDA (UK) definition is also flawed, but it is, 
perhaps, misleading of the majority in Purvis to seize on that definition, and its 
application in Clark v Novacold, to justify its interpretation of the comparison 
required by the DDA (Cth). 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
While the approach of the majority in Purvis to the comparator question is 
problematic, it must be acknowledged that the opposing view is not unproblematic in 
the context of the DDA as a whole.  There is little doubt that the majority judges were 
influenced in their reading of the provisions relating to the comparator by a desire to 
construct the Act in a way which would legitimise the expulsion of Daniel Hoggan 
whom they considered a dangerous presence at the South Grafton High School.135 
With the unjustifiable hardship exemption not available to schools after the point of 
enrolment, there was no sign-posted legislative method of authorising Daniel’s 
exclusion.136 When the comparator question had arisen in the context of other 
 
134 Clark v Novacold [1999] 2 All ER 977, 987-8.  
135 See, for example, above nn 12, 36 and 37. 
136 For the current position on the unjustifiable hardship exemption in the DDA see Chapter 6:  
Exemptions, n 90. 
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legislation, most notably in the QADA cases, L,137P138 and K,139 tribunals could allow 
a reading which accorded respect to prevailing disability theory, and, arguably, to the 
object of the anti-discrimination legislation of protecting against ‘unfair’ 
discrimination,140 because they could rely on the unjustifiable hardship exemption to 
legitimise the removal of the problem student.141 In the QADA cases there was no 
pressure on the QADT to separate behaviour from impairment for the purpose of 
making a comparison, as a more direct route to finding no compensable 
discrimination was available.  The QADT could accommodate the arguments of both 
complainant and respondent in that they could find both that discrimination had 
occurred and that it was not unlawful.  The Queensland legislation, as interpreted by 
the QADT, allowed the Tribunal to make at least a ‘show’ of understanding the 
discrimination suffered by the complainant.  This understanding is apparent in the 
implicit recognition of the difference between unwilled and willed violence, in the 
decision that the required comparison was between the treatment of the complainant 
and of a person without the complainant’s impairment or impairment related 
behaviour, and in the finding that a prima facie case of discrimination had been 
proved.  While it must be conceded that it is doubtful that this ‘show’ delivered any 
more comfort to the complainants in L, K and P, than the outright denial of 
discrimination delivered by the High Court to Daniel Hoggan, it can be concluded that 
the QADA, as interpreted by the QADT, allows a more honest weighing of competing 
considerations than the DDA as manipulated by the majority in Purvis. While the 
 
137 L [1995] 1 QADR 207.  
138 P [1995] 1 QADR 755. 
139 K v N School (No 3) [1996] 1QADR 620. 
140 See QADA long title. 
141 Similarly, when the question arose under the DDA but in the context of the protected area of 
employment, the HREOC in X v McHugh (1994) 56 IR 248 could find that the comparison was to be 
made with the treatment of a person without the problem behaviour knowing that, in many other 
similar instances, if not on the present facts, both the unjustifiable hardship exemption (DDA s 
15(4)(b)) and the inherent requirements exemption (DDA s 15(4)(a)) may deliver an opportunity to 
allow the removal of an employee whose behaviour could not be accommodated. 
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balancing of competing interests is expressly provided for in the QADA, there is little 
doubt that the majority reading of the required comparison in Purvis is simply a less 
direct method of delivering what the court regarded as a ‘fair’ decision.  
 
Many Australians, alongside the majority of the High Court, may well think that the 
result in Purvis is ‘fair’.  Arguably, it is ‘fair’ in terms of communitarian theory that 
the safety and educational opportunity of the community at South Grafton High 
School should prevail over any right of Daniel Hoggan to a mainstream education.  It 
is a basic tenet of communitarian philosophy that in a competition between what is 
good for the community and what is good for the individual citizen, the community 
prevails.  It is a corollary of the principles of mutual obligation and of community 
interdependence expounded in the Responsive Community Platform, that when the 
‘hard cases’ arise, when problems of competing rights and obligations arise, these 
problems are resolved in the manner which will benefit the wider community rather 
than the individual because ‘neither human existence nor individual liberty can be 
sustained for long outside the interdependent and overlapping communities to which 
we all belong’. 142 While communitarians have not expressly considered a ‘rights 
clash’ such as that posed by the facts of Purvis, it is a logical extension of core 
communitarian philosophy that where the inclusion of a student with a disability in a 
mainstream education setting compromises the ability to learn of the majority of 
students, or compromises the safety of the school community, it may be necessary for 
the exclusion of that student from the mainstream setting.  What may challenge 
communitarian support for the decision in Purvis, however, is the acknowledgement 
 
142Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda 
(1993) 258. 
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by McHugh and Kirby JJ that more could have been done to support Daniel Hoggan’s 
inclusion at South Grafton State High School.  It has been argued in an earlier chapter 
that findings of students with impairment creating ‘risk’ in a mainstream education 
environment are rendered suspect by evidence that, although admittedly expensive, 
individualised support of the student would mitigate any risk.143 
The method used by the majority of the High Court in Purvis to deliver its ‘fair’ 
result, however, has already proved to be a threat to the effectiveness of anti-
discrimination legislation Australia-wide and a threat to the achievement of the 
desirable aim of social inclusion of people with impairment.  Although the DDA has 
been amended to make available the unjustifiable hardship exemption after enrolment 
in the education context,144 although the unjustifiable exemption was, from the 
introduction of the DDA, available in the employment context,145 the growing list of 
cases which have applied the comparator approach of the majority in Purvis suggests 
that significant damage has already been done to the remedial scope of the legislation 
and to the rights of people with disabilities. 
 
143See Part V E 3, Chapter 6: Exemptions.  
144 See above n 136. 
145 DDA s 15(4)(b). 
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CHAPTER 10 
CAUSATION 
 
The requirement that there be causal link between the impairment of a complainant 
and his or her less favourable treatment has proved fruitful ground for those seeking 
to resist claims of unlawful discrimination.  For the purpose of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) direct discrimination must be ‘on the basis of’ 
a protected attribute, such as impairment, to be prohibited.1 The Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) uses slightly different language to describe the 
requisite causal link.  Discrimination ‘on the ground of’ disability must be 
established.2 It is explained further in the DDA that discrimination ‘on the ground’ of 
disability will occur if a person is treated less favourably ‘because of’ of their 
disability.3
Both the QADA and the DDA contemplate the situation where less favourable 
treatment arises from multiple causes.  Under the QADA, where there are ‘2 or more 
reasons’ for discrimination, it will be ‘on the basis’ of impairment if the 
complainant’s impairment is a ‘substantial reason for the treatment’.4 Under the 
DDA, when ‘an  act is done for 2 or more reasons’ and disability is ‘one of the 
reasons’ it will be taken to be done for ‘that reason’ and any discrimination proved 
will be considered to be ‘because of’ disability.5 The DDA states explicitly that there 
is no requirement that the discriminatory reason be a ‘substantial’ or ‘dominant’ 
 
1 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA), s 7, s 8 and s 10. 
2 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) s 5(1). 
3 DDA s 5(1). 
4 QADA s 10(4). 
5 DDA s 10. 
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reason.6 In summary, therefore, the QADA uses the language ‘on the basis of’ and 
‘reason’ to address causation.  The DDA uses the terms ‘on the ground of’, ‘because 
of’ and ‘reason’.  It will be seen from the cases on point, however, that little has 
turned on the different language used to describe the requisite causal link – the focus 
of the courts, instead, has been on determining the nature of the link itself.7
Several strategies for exclusion have been constructed from the requirement that there 
be a causal link between impairment and treatment.  It has been argued, for example, 
and with some success, that whilst the complainant has clearly suffered a detriment, 
the plaintiff’s impairment, and not any treatment by the alleged discriminator, 
‘caused’ the complainant’s detriment.8 The cases demonstrate that this argument is 
usually run in conjunction with the argument that there has been no less favourable 
treatment by the alleged discriminator.9
A more controversial strategy for exclusion, which has recently succeeded before the 
High Court of Australia in Purvis v New South Wales,10 is to concede that there has 
been less favourable treatment of the complainant but to argue that the treatment was 
not on the basis/ground of impairment or disability but on the basis/ground of 
something else – notably, the ‘behaviour’ of the complainant and its ramifications for 
 
6 DDA s 10. 
7 See the discussion in Part II, below. 
8 See the discussion in Part I, below. 
9 See, for example, Brackenreg v Queensland University of Technology [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, 
Copelin P, 20 December 1999) (‘Brackenreg’), W v Flinders University of South Australia [1998] 
HREOCA 19 (Unreported, Commissioner McEvoy, 24 June 1998) (‘W’), Chung v University of Sydney 
[2001] FMCA 94 (Unreported, Driver FM, 20 September 2001) (‘Chung’) and other cases discussed in 
Part I, below. 
10 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92 
(‘Purvis’). 
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others in the community.  This argument, it will be seen, is a different construction of 
the comparator issue discussed in the previous chapter.11 
The decision of the majority of the High Court in Purvis was that the exclusion of 
Daniel Hoggan was not ‘on the ground’ of his disability but ‘on the ground’ of the 
threat his inclusion posed to other members of the school community.  This is of 
added significance because the reasoning which informed it is likely to revitalise 
other, previously less successful, strategies for exclusion which focused on the 
motivation behind the treatment.  It has been argued, without success, for example, 
that there must be a discriminatory ‘intention’ for unlawful discrimination to arise.12 
It has also been argued, with only mixed success, that there was no less favourable 
treatment caused by impairment because the alleged discriminator was not aware of 
the complainant’s impairment.13 
Another causation-related strategy which may be affected by the decision in Purvis is 
the strategy of arguing that there were multiple reasons for the treatment of the 
complainant but that impairment was not, or, was not a ‘substantial’ reason for the 
treatment.14 McHugh and Kirby JJ found in Purvis that there were multiple reasons 
for the exclusion of Daniel Hoggan including the unlawful reason that he could not 
cope with the mainstream school because of his disability.15 After the decision in 
Purvis it could be expected, perhaps, that complainants may attempt to identify 
 
11 See the discussion in Part II, below. 
12 See case analysis in Part III, below. 
13 See case analysis in Part IV, below. 
14 See Part V, below. 
15 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 144 [169]. 
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reasons for their treatment which cannot be so easily separated from their disability in 
order to found successful claims of discrimination.  
 
I DETRIMENT CAUSED BY IMPAIRMENT ITSELF AND NOT DISCRIMINATION 
Australian cases reveal some acceptance of the argument, promoted by both 
proponents of the medical model of disability and by critics of the social model, that 
the nature of an impairment itself may cause restriction, that not all social restriction 
on a person with an impairment can be attributed to the acts and attitudes of others, to 
‘discrimination’.16 Further, the cases suggest that there are some forms of disability 
which cannot be alleviated by social adjustment.  In the following cases, the student 
complainants have clearly suffered a ‘detriment’ but have been denied a remedy 
because they have been unable to satisfy the court that the detriment flowed from ‘less 
favourable treatment’ and not from the exigencies of their impairment. 
 
A Cases Involving a Failure to Meet Course Requirements 
The Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (QADT) case of Brackenreg v 
Queensland University of Technology concerned a student excluded from the 
Bachelor of Laws degree course at Queensland University of Technology.  The 
complainant enrolled as an external student in 1993 and was excluded in December 
1997, as she was ‘in breach of both the double fail rule and the progression rule’.17 
She reapplied for admission in second semester 1999 but the University declined to 
readmit her to the course. 
 
16 See Part II B, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
17 Brackenreg [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999) [4.2.1.3(vii)]. 
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Brackenreg had syringomyelia and cervical cancer, and, most significantly for her 
studies, Attention Deficient Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).  Brackenreg’s case was 
that her academic difficulties had flowed from her then undiagnosed ADHD, that the 
ADHD had since been controlled by medication and that, as such, she should be 
allowed another opportunity to complete her course.  She applied to the QADT for an 
interim order that the University readmit her pending the outcome of her complaint of 
discrimination. 
 
President Copelin of the QADT ultimately determined that she did not have the power 
to make the order sought by Brackenreg, which, in effect, was the equivalent of a 
mandatory injunction.18 Nevertheless, in light of the possibility that she might be 
‘wrong on the question of jurisdiction’,19 President Copelin considered the issue of 
whether there was a serious question to be tried and concluded, ‘I do not find that 
there is a serious issue to be tried’.20 
President Copelin conducted what amounted to a hearing of the issue of whether or 
not Brackenreg had been discriminated against by QUT.  She found that Brackenreg’s 
‘difficulties with her studies’ were not due to less favourable treatment and that 
Brackenreg was treated more favourably than other students: ‘the complainant’s 
disability was taken into account and certain adjustments were made’.21 President 
Copelin found that Brackenreg’s difficulties ‘were attributable … to her disabilities, 
 
18 QADA s 144 empowers the QADT to grant interim orders to protect complainants’ interests before 
the referral of a complaint to the QADT.  It was held by the Federal Court in Carson v Minister for 
Education for Queensland and others (1989) EOC ¶ 92-269, a race discrimination case, that the 
equivalent provision in the Race Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) empowered a tribunal to make orders 
equivalent in effect only to a prohibitory injunction, not to a mandatory injunction.  
19 Brackenreg [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999) [4.2]. 
20 Ibid [4.2.2]. 
21 Ibid [4.2.2.4]. 
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to circumstances in her personal life, and studying as an external student’.22 There 
were, perhaps, ‘multiple causes’ for the complainant’s difficulties but none of them 
was any ‘less favourable treatment’ of her by QUT: 
In this case the evaluation by the respondent of the complainant’s academic 
performance before and at the time of her exclusion from QUT may have reflected a 
manifestation of the symptoms of the complainant’s disabilities.  However, even 
when consideration was given to the complainant by the respondent for her 
disabilities, such as giving her extra time to complete exams, extensions of times in 
handing in assignments, and by giving her conceded passes on numerous occasions 
after considering her circumstances, she still demonstrated an inability to 
satisfactorily complete a law degree to the standard required by the respondent. 23 
The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) case W v Flinders 
University of South Australia24 also concerned a complaint of discrimination by a 
student excluded from her university course after failing to meet course requirements.  
W was studying a teaching degree course and had been diagnosed with a psychiatric 
disorder, the symptoms of which included ‘depression, short term memory loss, poor 
concentration, withdrawn and racing thoughts, hypermania, confusion, forgetfulness, 
thought disorder, and anxiety’.25 The symptoms were ‘erratic and episodic’ and 
affected her ability to study.26 Commissioner McEvoy, like President Copelin in 
Brackenreg, attributed W’s difficulties not to her treatment by the university but to 
her disability: 
… I am satisfied that the complainant’s complaints cannot be sustained under the Act.  
Her circumstances clearly demonstrate many of the difficulties which persons with 
disabilities may face but I am satisfied that she was not discriminated against either 
directly or indirectly by the respondent on the basis of her disability … None of those 
difficulties resulted from discrimination on the basis of her disability, although they 
may well have resulted from her disability itself. 27 
22 Ibid [4.2.1.3]. 
23 Ibid [2.2.4(iv)]. 
24 W [1998] HREOCA 19 (Unreported, Commissioner McEvoy, 24 June 1998). 
25 Ibid [4.1]. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid [7]. 
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The case of Chung v University of Sydney28 again concerned a student with a 
disability excluded for failure to meet course requirements.  Chung, who had been 
diagnosed with depression, enrolled in a physiotherapy degree course and had 
completed sixty percent of course requirements at the time of his exclusion.  Chung 
made a complaint of disability discrimination and race discrimination to the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC).  HREOC dismissed his 
complaint as lacking in substance and Chung appealed the decision to the Federal 
Magistrates Court.  Driver FM found that there was no evidence to support a claim of 
either disability or race discrimination.  Like President Copelin in Brackenreg and 
Commissioner McEvoy in W, he found that the respondent in this case also took steps 
to accommodate Chung: 
It is apparent that Mr Chung suffered difficulties in coping with his university studies 
almost from the outset. It is also apparent that the university made a substantial effort, 
in fact a very substantial effort, to attempt to assist him with his studies to enable him 
to complete his course successfully. Ultimately, after seven years the university felt 
that it was unable to continue with those efforts and took the decision to exclude Mr 
Chung.29 
Driver FM went so far as to imply, perhaps, that the complainant’s illness not only 
caused his failure at university, but also explained his difficulty in accepting the fact 
that no discrimination could be proved.  He implied, too, that an order for summary 
dismissal was appropriate in the case as a ‘means of protecting’ Chung from the 
distress of further pursuing the claim of discrimination: 
Mr Chung clearly suffers from a disability, be it an anxiety disability or a depression 
disability, that continues to this time. He has been unable to accept the 
appropriateness of the way that he has been dealt with by the university and that has 
led him to this point…In addition to the general principles that I have referred to in 
relation to the exercise of the discretion of summary dismissal it seems to me that 
there are cases where it is in the interests of justice that litigants be given some 
protection from themselves.  
It seems to me that this is such a case.30 
28 Chung [2001] FMCA 94 (Unreported, Driver FM, 20 September 2001). 
29 Ibid [22]. 
30 Ibid [27]. 
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The summary dismissal, however, did not ‘protect’ Chung from appealing, 
unsuccessfully, from Driver FM’s decision to the Federal Court or, subsequently, 
from seeking leave to appeal, unsuccessfully, to the High Court.  Spender J of the 
Federal Court also implied a link between Chung’s depressive anxiety and his 
inability to accept that ‘justice’ had been done31 and cautioned that ‘[b]road and bald 
accusations which fly in the face of the material are insufficient to establish 
discrimination on the ground of disability or on the ground of race’.32 After urging an 
unrepresented Chung to address the issue of whether the lower courts had erred in law 
in their decisions, Gaudron and McHugh JJ ultimately refused leave to appeal to the 
High Court of Australia.33 
In the case of Reyes-Gonzalez v NSW TAFE Commission34 fourteen separate 
allegations of discriminatory treatment by the TAFE College attended by the 
complainant were dismissed by the NSW Administrative Decisions Tribunal on 
grounds ranging from a deficiency of evidence, to a failure to prove that he had been 
treated less favourably than others without his impairment would have been treated in 
the same circumstances, to a failure to prove that his treatment and not his impairment 
had caused him detriment.  Reyes-Gonzalez had been diagnosed with schizophrenia 
which resulted in problems with meeting schedules and deadlines, problems 
 
31 Chung v University of Sydney [2002] FCA 186 (Unreported, Spender J, 21 November 2002) [28]-
[29]. 
32 Ibid [46]. 
33 Chung v University of Sydney [2002] HCA S87/2002 (Unreported, Gaudron, McHugh JJ, 5 
November 2002). It is clear from the text of each of the decisions in this case that Chung was 
disadvantaged by the fact that he did not have legal representation.  See Chung [2001] FMCA 94 
(Unreported, Driver FM, 20 September 2001) [46]; Chung v University of Sydney [2002] FCA 186 
(Unreported, Spender J, 21 November 2002) [1]-[5]. Mr Chung had indicated to the Federal Court that 
he did not want legal representation: Chung v University of Sydney [2002] FCA 186 (Unreported, 
Spender J, 21 November 2002) [4].  
34 Reyes-Gonzalez v NSW TAFE Commission [2003] NSWADT 22 (Unreported, Ireland J, Members 
Silva and Strickland, 3 February 2003) (‘Reyes-Gonzalez’). Reyes-Gonzalez also alleged, but failed to 
prove, instances of race discrimination.  
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interacting in groups, and, as a result, problems with completing his courses.  The 
clear implication of the decision is that the complainant’s disability was fundamental 
to his failure at TAFE.  Medical evidence which detailed the significant impact of his 
impairment on the complainant’s ability to complete tertiary studies was persuasive: 
His illness, as noted by me and others, would affect his capacity to study at TAFE, 
this would include working in groups. He may be sensitive or over sensitive to peer 
assessment, particularly if others are not aware of his disabilities and do not take 
those disabilities into account. It is likely he will have difficulties from time to time 
attending classes at 9am and equally he is likely to have problems remaining at 
school for a full day. Noises such as voices, televisions and radios may cause him to 
become anxious or paranoid and there are times when his anxiety symptoms may 
cause him to become anxious or paranoid and there are times when his anxiety 
symptoms may cause him distress if he feels trapped or confined in a building. I 
would equally expect him to have problems writing examinations, presenting in front 
of a class, doing group projects and being peer assessed.35 
As in the case of Chung, there was also some suggestion that his disability impacted 
not only the complainant’s difficulties with completing course requirements but also 
on his dealings with TAFE in relation to his discrimination claims.  One doctor, while 
accepting the respondent may have breached its duty to the complainant, implied 
paranoia in the complainant’s dealings with TAFE about the discrimination 
allegations: 
…my overall impression is that Mr Reyes-Gonzalez's history of poor educational 
attainment and conflict with educational institutions may well be largely as a result of 
his schizophrenic illness. His capacity to effectively study for and pass courses may 
well be severely affected by his illness. There is a paranoid tinge to his 
correspondence and interaction with educational institutions which may also be a 
reflection of his illness, however such situation does not exclude the scenario that 
there may have been a lack of appropriate accommodation made for him and his 
disability. 36 
The influence of this evidence can be detected in the Tribunal’s finding in relation to 
several allegations of discrimination that they illustrate ‘the degree of sensitivity of 
the Applicant in his perception of circumstances which otherwise are neutral but 
 
35 Ibid [16]. 
36 Ibid. 
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which, as a consequence of his disability, he either misunderstands or unduly gives 
greater emphasis than would a person who did not have his disability’.37 
B Cases Involving Mobility Impairment and Access to Education 
The HREOC decision in Cowell v A School38 also concerns a finding that disability 
itself, not discrimination, causes detriment.  Fleur Cowell, a secondary school student 
rather than a tertiary student, unlike complainants in the majority of similar cases, 
alleged both direct and indirect discrimination during the term of her enrolment at ‘A 
School’.  She had been diagnosed with Perthe’s Disease which affected her right hip 
and, consequently, her mobility.  She claimed she was unable to attend some classes 
because of their location, she was ‘prevented from attending school functions and 
academically and socially disadvantaged by the actions of the school’.39 
Commissioner McEvoy accepted the respondent’s case attributing Fleur’s 
disadvantage to her disability and not to the actions of her school: 
While the matters of which Fleur complains clearly are consequential upon her 
disability, it does not necessarily follow that the respondent has treated her less 
favourably on the ground of her disability.  It was because of her disability she was 
not able to be placed in an upstairs classroom.  But it was her disability which created 
these problems, not the school’s response to her disability.40 
Commissioner McEvoy found, further, that the Cowell family’s own actions had 
exacerbated Fleur’s problems.  The school had offered to change Fleur’s ‘house’ 
which would have had the consequence of her being able to attend classes at a more 
accessible location.  Mrs Cowell and Fleur rejected this option: ‘Many of the matters 
complained of follow this decision’, said Commissioner McEvoy.41 
37 Ibid [46].  See also [43] and [56]. 
38 Cowell v A School [2000] HREOC No97/168 (Unreported, Commissioner McEvoy, 10 October 
2000) (‘Cowell’). 
39 Ibid [1]. 
40 Ibid [5.2.3]. 
41 Ibid [5.2.3]. 
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The case of Sluggett v Flinders University of South Australia,42 like Cowell,
concerned a student with mobility impairment, and also like Cowell, demonstrates 
that the complainant’s own behaviour may be interpreted by a court or tribunal as 
contributing to, if not causing, relevant detriment.  Sluggett, a social work student at 
Flinders University, had mobility difficulties due to a childhood infection with polio.  
Her difficulties increased during the course of her studies because she developed post-
polio syndrome.  The evidence was that she did not consider herself to be ‘disabled’.  
Further she did not keep the university administration fully informed of her disability, 
only complaining after she had been excluded from the degree course as a result of 
failure to meet course requirements.  She made complaints of both discrimination in 
education and discrimination in access to premises to HREOC.  HREOC declined to 
inquire further into the complaints.  Upon review by the President of HREOC this 
decision was confirmed in relation to the education claims but the access claims were 
referred for hearing.  The access complaint, formulated as a complaint of indirect 
discrimination, was heard by Commissioner McEvoy in 1996.43 The complaint 
related to an alleged requirement that Sluggett ‘attend classes’ in the hilly campus and 
that she attend work placement premises to which she had been allocated and where 
she needed to negotiate a spiral staircase.  The claim in relation to the university 
campus failed because it was held that she could comply with the requirement as lifts 
were available as an alternative means of access.  That Sluggett did not know of the 
existence of the lifts could be traced to her own lack of enquiry and to her failure to 
put the university on notice about her access difficulties.  The claim in relation to the 
work placement failed because there was found to be no requirement ‘imposed’ on 
Sluggett that she use the stairs at these premises because she had agreed to the work 
 
42Sluggett v Flinders University of South Australia [2000] HREOC No H96/2 (Unreported, 
Commissioner McEvoy, 14 July 2000) (‘Sluggett’). 
43 Indirect discrimination is considered in detail in Chapter 12: Indirect Discrimination. 
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placement.  The University argued that had Sluggett refused the placement on the 
basis of her mobility problems an alternative accessible placement could have been 
arranged.  Upon review by the Federal Court, Drummond J declined to interfere with 
the decision of HREOC on the basis that he could find no reviewable error.44 Upon 
appeal to the Full Federal Court, Drummond J’s decision was affirmed.45 
This case is interesting for the legal modeling of impairment because, in a sense, 
Sluggett’s claim ‘fell between two stools’.  The detriment she had suffered, the core 
of her complaint, related to her exclusion from the university because of failure to 
meet course requirements.  Yet the discrimination in education claim was not pursued 
by HREOC on the basis that ‘it had been adequately dealt with’, presumably by 
review processes initiated by the university in response to complaint from Sluggett.46 
She failed in her access claim because she had not complained about access during 
her time at university.  She had sought ‘adjustment’ to her disability in the sense of 
extensions and remarking of papers because of difficulties in attending university.  
These adjustments had been afforded her, though ultimately they were not enough to 
allow her to pass her course.  In the words of the Full Federal Court: ‘The appellant 
complained to her lecturers that she was having difficulties.  They made some 
accommodations for her in terms of receipt of late papers and such like, but these 
were insufficient to resolve her problems’.47 She did not seek any adjustments to 
 
44 Sluggett v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2002] FCA 987 (Unreported, 
Drummond J, 9 August 2002). 
45 Sluggett v Flinders University of South Australia [2003] FCAFC 27 (Unreported, Spender, Dowsett, 
Selway JJ, 5 March 2003). 
46 The HREOC can decline to inquire into an alleged discriminatory act or practice if ‘where some 
other remedy has been sought in relation to the subject matter of the complaint – the Commission is of 
the opinion that the subject matter of the complaint has been adequately dealt with’:  See Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Act 1986 (Cth) s 32(3)(c)(iii). 
47 Sluggett v Flinders University of South Australia [2003] FCAFC 27 (Unreported, Spender, Dowsett, 
Selway JJ, 5 March 2003) [5]. 
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accommodate her disability in the form of improved physical access to the campus or 
work placement premises.  The evidence suggested that, in fact, her academic 
problems were caused by her worsening health, rather than by her access problems.  
The Full Federal Court conceded a potential link between tiredness induced by access 
difficulties and declining academic performance but found that there was not 
sufficient evidence to establish the link.48 Further, even had the link been established 
it would not have upset the finding that there had been no discrimination.49 
C Detriment resulting from ‘impairment’ not ‘treatment’: ramifications for the 
meaning of disability and the protective scope of anti-discrimination legislation 
 
The decisions in cases like Brackenreg, W, Sluggett and Cowell have the effect of 
casting access to education squarely as the ‘problem’ of the excluded student, rather 
than as the responsibility of the education system.  At first glance, the approach 
adopted by the tribunals in these cases suggests a ‘medical model’ understanding of 
disability: disability is the problem of the ‘disabled’ person, and to be solved by 
medical treatment and management; further, if medicine and technology cannot 
provide a solution the consequent ‘limitations’ must be stoically borne.  It can be 
argued, however, that Brackenreg and W, and the other ‘university’ cases, suggest a 
problem with the ‘social model’ of disability which is yet to be satisfactorily 
addressed by the theorists:  it is difficult to explain how the social model accounts for 
all of the ‘disability’ faced by people with impairments.50 It was found in 
Brackenreg, W, Chung and Reyes-Gonzalez that, even with appropriate 
accommodation by the respondent universities, the complainants were unable to pass 
 
48 Ibid [15] and [16]. 
49 Ibid [16]. 
50 See Part II B, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
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their respective courses.51 It is, perhaps, a valid challenge to the social model that, in 
the case of some types and some degrees of impairment, no amount of social 
adjustment or attitudinal change will deliver equality of opportunity.52 
It seems this is a particular problem in cases where the relevant impairment is 
intellectual or otherwise relates to the ability to learn.  At the tertiary level of 
education the situation is further complicated by the fact that, to a large extent, the 
tertiary sector functions to prepare students for the workforce and there is a legitimate 
expectation that if a student is accredited with having passed a course, that student has 
met all the requirements of the course.  Communitarians have acknowledged that 
there is a place for selective courses which may involve the exclusion of those who 
cannot meet entrance requirements, as a result, perhaps, of impairment.  MacIntyre 
concedes that it is appropriate, for example, that one of the major aims of modern 
education systems is ‘to fit the young person for some particular role and occupation 
in the social system’.53 Walzer is pragmatically prepared to admit not only that some 
students are better suited to a more ‘specialised education’,54 such as that on offer at 
tertiary institutions, but also that the community needs ‘leaders’ and that these leaders 
are entitled to a ‘specialised education’ to fit them for their role. 55 Walzer sees such 
‘specialised education’ as a legitimate ‘monopoly of the talented’.56 It is easily 
inferred from the comments such as these that tertiary institutions which are charged 
with the responsibility of fitting citizens as what Walzer describes as ‘future experts’, 
 
51 See also Part I, Chapter 7: An Implied Duty of Reasonable Accommodation. 
52 Oliver, one of the first to articulate the social model, acknowledges the validity of this criticism and 
concedes that ‘most disabled people’ can cite examples of how their impairment has created 
restrictions: Mike Oliver, Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice (1996) Chapter 3.  
53 Alasdair MacIntyre et al, Education and Values: the Richard Peters Lectures (1987) 17. 
54 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 208-20. 
55 Ibid 208. 
56 Ibid 211. 
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have a concurrent responsibility to ensure that students are not graduated as ‘future 
experts’ without meeting the requisite standard.  
 
Perhaps, therefore, at least in the tertiary context, there may be a place in the 
legislation for a ‘legitimate education requirements’ exemption cast in similar terms 
to the ‘genuine occupational requirements’ exemption.57 The exemption could 
operate to authorize the exclusion of those students who cannot meet valid entrance 
requirements for ‘specialised education’ courses or who, once admitted, cannot meet 
valid benchmarks of achievement within a course.  Since 2001, the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) (DDA UK) has provided for such an exemption.58 
Under the DDA (UK) it is unlawful to discriminate against a higher education student 
with a disability by refusing admission59or by exclusion once admitted.60 ‘Less 
favourable treatment’ of this nature is ‘justified’ however, when it is for the purpose 
of the maintenance of academic standards.61 Provided academic standards are 
genuine indicators of the level of achievement required for the award of a 
qualification, therefore, people with disabilities who cannot meet the standards may 
be required to accept that there are aspects of their disability which cannot be 
eliminated or even mitigated by social adjustment and, as such, that there are 
educational opportunities and outcomes which are closed to them.  It should be 
stressed, however, that this kind of exemption to the protective scope of anti-
discrimination legislation should not be allowed to erode any obligation upon 
education institutions to make purely administrative accommodations, such as 
 
57 See ‘genuine occupational requirements’ QADA s 25, ‘inherent requirements of the particular 
employment’ DDA s 15(4)(a). 
58 The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) (DDA (UK))  was amended in this respect by the 
Special Needs and Disability Act 2001 (UK) ss 26 and 27. 
59 DDA (UK) s 28R(1). 
60 DDA (UK) s 28R(3). 
61 DDA (UK) s 28S(6)(a). 
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extensions of time for assessment, which may allow students flexibility to meet 
academic standards.  
 
The problem of how to mesh the expectation of equality of opportunity at the tertiary 
level and the expectation that tertiary institutions will certify only students who have 
met course requirements has been addressed, at least at the Federal level, in the 
Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth)62which adopt a similar approach to the 
DDA (UK) to the issue of academic standards.  As noted in earlier chapters,63 the 
DDA provides for the drafting of standards to clarify the obligations of service 
providers, such as education institutions, in relation to people with disabilities.64 The 
effect of standards is that if they are complied with by an institution, that institution 
will be exempted from the relevant unlawful discrimination provisions of the DDA.65 
The intended effect of the Standards has been explained as follows:  
to give students and prospective students with disabilities the right to education and 
training opportunities on the same basis as students without disabilities.  This 
includes the right to comparable access, services and facilities, and the right to 
participate in education and training unimpeded by discrimination, including on the 
basis of stereotyped beliefs about the abilities and choices of students with 
disabilities.66 
Most significantly, perhaps, the Standards purport to extend the scope of the DDA by 
introducing an obligation upon education authorities to make ‘reasonable adjustment’ 
to student disabilities.67 There is recognition in the terms of the Standards, however, 
that there are circumstances where an education provider is ‘entitled to maintain the 
 
62 Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) (‘Standards’).  The Standards came into force on 17 
August 2005. 
63 See Part V, Chapter 5: The Impact of the Legislation; Part III, Chapter 7: An Implied Duty of 
Reasonable Accommodation. 
64 DDA s 31. 
65 DDA s 33. 
66 Standards Guidance Notes [3]. 
67 Obligations to make reasonable adjustment are found in Standards ss 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2.  See also 
Part III, Chapter 7: An Implied Duty of Reasonable Accommodation. 
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academic requirements’ of a course and ‘other requirements or components that are 
essential to its nature’ even though this may mean that it will not be available to a 
student with a disability.68 The obligation to make reasonable adjustment, therefore, 
will not require an education institution to pass a student who cannot meet course 
requirements because of his or her disability.  The rationale for this ‘exemption’ in the 
Standards is that also suggested in Brackenreg and W: ‘a provider may continue to 
ensure the integrity of its courses or programs and assessment requirements and 
processes, so that those on whom it confers an award can present themselves as 
having the appropriate knowledge, experience and expertise implicit in the holding of 
that particular award’.69 
The Standards attempt to cover the field in terms of the experience of education and 
set out the rights of students with disabilities and the concomitant legal obligations, 
including the obligation of reasonable adjustment, of education providers in the areas 
of enrolment, participation, curriculum development, accreditation and delivery, 
student support services and harassment and victimisation.70 As such, it is anticipated 
that education institutions will not be able to rely on any entitlement to maintain 
academic standards in order to avoid making mechanical rather than intellectual 
adjustments to the delivery and assessment of course materials.  Flexible assessment 
arrangements, the provision of course materials in accessible formats, and, indeed, the 
provision of physical access to education facilities, it appears, will all still be 
‘reasonably’ expected under the Standards regime.  This accords with the scope of the 
 
68 Standards s 3.4 (3). 
69 Standards s 3.4 (3) note. 
70 See Standards ss 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2. 
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tertiary institution’s obligation to its students as expressed by President Copelin of 
QADT in Brackenreg:  
There is no obligation on the respondent to pass a student just because they have a 
disability.  Their obligation is to reasonably make available such special services or 
facilities which may be necessary to enable a student with disabilities to undertake 
studies. 71 
There is some concern, however, that the academic standards limit on the duty to 
make reasonable adjustment provided for in the Standards under the DDA goes 
beyond the context which was relevant in Brackenreg, and, indeed, beyond the 
context in the DDA (UK), in that it is not limited to the tertiary education sphere.  It 
will be interesting to see whether this ‘entitlement’ to ‘maintain the academic 
requirements of the course or program’  is raised by education providers in order to 
justify the exclusion of students with disabilities from, say, some secondary school 
subjects which are relied on as pre-requisites to entry to tertiary courses or 
employment.  This kind of imposition of ‘academic standards’ would be less likely to 
meet with the approval of communitarian theorists who, while they see the need for 
‘specialisation’ and the special advantage which attaches to it, counsel that it should 
be delayed until as late as possible in the education process.  Walzer, for example, 
explicitly advises that the early identification of future ‘specialists’ and the ‘tracking’ 
of them through the education system should be avoided.72 The reasoning behind this 
is twofold.  First, the entitlement of all to citizenship education prevails over the need 
to develop ‘specialists’ in that ‘if the community that one wants to defend is a 
democracy … no form of recruitment can precede the “recruitment” of citizens’.73 
Secondly, to ‘pick out the future specialists early on’ denies others the ‘chance at 
 
71 Brackenreg [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999) [4.2.2.4(v)]. 
72 Walzer, above n 54, 211. 
73 Ibid. 
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inspiration’.74 The communitarian position, then, is that the exclusive process of the 
education of ‘experts’ is to be delayed until the tertiary level of education by which 
time there has been maximum exposure for all to ‘common work for a common 
end’.75 
II  DISCRIMINATION NOT ‘ON THE BASIS’ OF IMPAIRMENT 
One causation related strategy that has demonstrated potential to narrow the scope of 
any right to an inclusive education for people with disabilities is to argue that 
admitted less favourable treatment of the complainant was not ‘on the basis’76 or ‘on 
the ground’77 of his or her impairment but on the basis or ground of some other, 
unprotected, attribute.  Typically, the argument advanced has been that a complainant 
was not excluded on the basis of their impairment but on the basis of the difficult 
behaviour caused by their impairment.78 This argument is, of course, intimately 
linked with the argument that the appropriate comparator for the purpose of 
determining whether the complainant has been treated ‘less favourably’ is a person 
without the complainant’s impairment but with the complainant’s behaviour.79 If the 
manifestations of a disability can be separated from the disability itself for the 
purpose of constructing the appropriate comparator, then they can also be separated 
from the disability for the purpose of identifying the ‘ground of’ an alleged 
discriminator’s treatment of a complainant.  If the comparator can be vested with the 
behaviour of the person with a disability then, presumably, the behaviour of the 
person with a disability can also amount to the ‘ground of’ his or her treatment.  Once 
 
74 Ibid 220. 
75 Ibid 206. 
76 QADA s 7. 
77 DDA s  5(1). 
78 See, for example, Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92. The approach of the High Court to the causation issue 
is discussed later in this part. 
79 See Chapter 9: The Comparator. 
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the separation of the manifestations of a disability from the disability itself is 
authorised, either or both of the following arguments may well succeed for a 
respondent:  the comparator would have been treated in exactly the same way as the 
complainant, thus there is no ‘less favourable treatment’ of the complainant and no 
unlawful discrimination; or, the treatment of the complainant was on the ground of his 
or her behaviour and not on the ground of the protected attribute of disability and is 
therefore not unlawful discrimination. 
 
A The High Court Approach to Causation before Purvis 
Before Purvis, where the issue of the causal link required between disability and 
treatment was most recently canvassed by the High Court, the High Court had been 
invited to consider the issue in IW v The City of Perth.80 That case involved an 
impairment discrimination claim arising out of the refusal of the City of Perth to grant 
a planning approval application for a drop-in centre for people affected by the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS).  
Some councillors who voted against the application claimed to be concerned about the 
potential health and safety risks posed for the wider community should the centre be 
established.  The substantive discrimination issues were considered by only two of the 
justices comprising the Court, Toohey and Kirby JJ.  The majority, Brennan CJ and 
McHugh JJ, Dawson and Gaudron JJ, and Gummow J, found that the case failed for 
the ‘technical’ reason that there had been no refusal to supply a ‘service’, in the form 
of consideration of the planning application, to the complainant.  Therefore, there had 
been no discrimination in the ‘protected area’ of goods and services.81 Dawson and 
Gaudron JJ, and Gummow J, also held that the complainant did not have standing in 
 
80 IW v City of Perth (1996) 191 CLR 1 (‘IW’). 
81 Ibid 12-17 (Brennan CJ and McHugh J), 22-4 (Dawson and Gaudron JJ) and 41-5 (Gummow J). 
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that he was not an ‘aggrieved person’ within the meaning of the relevant act, the 
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA).82 
Toohey J found for the complainant and did address the causation issue.  He cited 
with approval83 the approach to causation taken by the House of Lords in R v
Birmingham City Council; Ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission84 and in James 
v Eastleigh Borough Council.85 On the assessment of Toohey J, ‘the test to be applied 
was objective in the sense that it was necessary to show no more than that “but for” 
the prohibited ground, the complainant would have been treated differently’.86 Toohey 
J also adopted an analysis of the comparator which would not allow the separation of 
the ‘characteristics’ of an impairment from the impairment itself.87 There was 
argument in IW that discrimination on the basis of  ‘characteristics’ imputed to the 
HIV status, such as infectiousness, illegal drug use and homosexuality, was not 
discrimination on the ground of HIV status.  Toohey J found that ‘there may be 
wrongful discrimination against the aggrieved person “on the ground of impairment” 
where the ground is not the impairment itself but one or other of these characteristics 
[imputed to impairment]’.88 
82 Ibid 24-5 (Dawson and Gaudron JJ) and 45-6 (Gummow J). 
83 Ibid 32. 
84 R v Birmingham City Council; Ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1989] AC 1155. 
85 James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751. 
86 IW (1996) 191 CLR 1, 32.  Note that in IW and the English cases the statutory phrase interpreted was 
‘on the ground of’.  Toohey J, however, at 31, was of the opinion that ‘[a]s this matter has progressed 
through the courts, it has been accepted that “by reason of” is not materially different from “on the 
ground of”’. 
87 IW (1996) 191 CLR 1, 33. 
88 Ibid.  Compare QADA s 8 which clarifies that for the purposes of that Act,  a protected attribute will 
include ‘characteristics’ related to or imputed to it.  Discrimination on the basis of  related or imputed 
‘characteristics’ will, therefore, be prima facie unlawful. 
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Kirby reached similar conclusions to Toohey J on both the causation and comparator 
points.  Like Toohey J, he approved the approach to causation taken by the House of 
Lords.89 Kirby J elaborated on the point that the relevant enquiry was objective rather 
than subjective, quoting from R v Birmingham City Council:90‘Whatever may have 
been the intention or motive of the alleged discriminator…such subjective 
considerations were “not a necessary condition of liability” because it was “perfectly 
possible to envisage cases where the defendant had no such motive, and yet did in fact 
discriminate on the ground [complained of]”’.91 According to Kirby J, it is sufficient 
proof that an ‘unlawful reason (or ground)’ is the ground of discrimination if ‘it had a 
real causative effect in the sense that but for its presence the act complained of would 
not have occurred’.92 On the comparator point Kirby J, too, did not allow the 
separation of the imputed ‘characteristics’ of an impairment from the impairment 
itself, and  emphasized that ‘like must be compared with like’.93 
B The Approach to Causation since Purvis 
The High Court has recently reviewed causation in the context of the Purvis case.  At 
first instance, HREOC resolved the causation issue in a similar fashion to the 
comparator issue, and consistently with the analyses of Toohey J and Kirby J in IW 
and found that discrimination on the ground of manifestations of a disability amounts 
to discrimination on the ground of the disability itself.  Thus, discrimination against 
Daniel Hoggan ‘on the ground’ of problem behaviour caused by his disability, 
amounted to unlawful discrimination against Daniel Hoggan ‘on the ground’ of his 
 
89 IW (1996) 191 CLR 1, 63-4.  
90 R v Birmingham City Council; Ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1989] AC 1155, 1194. 
91 IW (1996) 191 CLR 1, 64. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid 67. 
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disability.94 In the Federal Court, Emmett J suggested that discrimination on the 
ground of behaviour is not necessarily discrimination on the ground of the disability 
which, in fact, caused it.95 He said that, while the position might be different where 
the disability ‘necessarily resulted in the relevant behaviour’, that was not the present 
case.96 
The Full Federal Court also refused to find that ‘to discriminate against a person 
suffering a mental disorder because of that behaviour which directly results from that 
disorder is to discriminate against that person because of the mental disorder’.97 
Spender, Gyles and Conti JJ explicitly dismissed the reasoning of Toohey J and Kirby 
J on point as ‘directed to a different issue in a different statutory setting’.98 The Full 
Court was clearly influenced by policy in its treatment of the issue, highlighting the 
difficulty faced by school administrators if compelled both to tolerate ‘antisocial 
behaviour’ and to protect other staff and students from that ‘antisocial behaviour’: 
The consequence of the argument for the appellant ... is that, once enrolled, any 
treatment of the student by the school authorities as a result of conduct caused by his 
disorder which restricted or disadvantaged him compared with the ordinary student 
would be discrimination in breach of the Act, no matter how necessary to preserve the 
discipline of the school and safety of staff and students. On this argument, any 
exclusion from ordinary classes, or special physical or other restraints imposed as the 
price of attendance at ordinary classes, would be a breach of s 22(2)(a) or (c), as the 
antisocial behaviour caused by the brain damage would be the cause of the special 
and detrimental treatment.99 
94 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75167 
[6.2]. 
95 New South Wales (Department of Education) v Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 
(2001) 186 ALR 69, 77 [36]. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 248 [30]. 
98 Ibid 246 [24]. 
99 Ibid 247 [26]. 
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1 The High Court Approach to Causation in Purvis 
In Purvis, each of the judgments identified causation as an issue relevant to liability. 
Callinan J accepted that Daniel’s behaviour was the ‘reason’ for his exclusion but did 
not advance a view as to the appropriate test for causation.100 Gleeson, Hayne and 
Heydon JJ, similarly, addressed the causation issue only briefly, concentrating their 
analysis and founding their decision, instead, on the comparator issue.  They simply 
stated, in relation to causation, that the question to be asked is ‘why was the aggrieved 
person treated as he or she was?’101 The point must be made, however, that because 
of their authorisation of the separation of behaviour from disability, in the Purvis 
case, in their view the legitimate answer to the question ‘why was Daniel Hoggan 
expelled?’ would have been a ‘lawful’ reason: ‘because of his behaviour’.  Thus the 
approach of Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ to causation can be impugned on the 
same basis as their approach to the comparator – it seizes on the protected attribute 
(which, they had accepted, included its ‘manifestations’) to  justify exclusion of the 
complainant in a manner offensive to the current understanding of the nature of 
disability as including ‘functional’ disorders.  Further, their approach undermines the 
stated object of the DDA ‘to eliminate, as far as possible, discrimination against 
persons on the ground of disability’.102 
McHugh and Kirby JJ reached a similar conclusion to Gummow, Hayne and Heydon 
JJ on the nature of the test for causation.  They stated that the correct focus is on ‘the 
“real reason” for the alleged discriminator’s act’.103 That McHugh and Kirby JJ 
equated the ‘reason for’ an act with ‘why’ an act was done is clear from their citing 
 
100 Ibid 173-4 [267]-[270]. 
101 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 163 [236]. 
102 DDA s 3. 
103 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 144 [166]. 
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with approval the following words of Lockhart J in Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunities Commission v Mount Isa Mines: ‘The plain words of the legislation ... 
necessarily render relevant the defendant's reason for doing an act, that is the reason 
why the defendant treated the complainant less favourably’.104 McHugh and Kirby JJ 
retreated from earlier authorities, including the judgment of Kirby J himself in IW,
which supported the view that the appropriate test is the ‘but for’ test: that is, ‘but for’ 
the disability the complainant would not have been subjected to less favourable 
treatment.  McHugh and Kirby JJ assigned rather more importance, however, than 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, to the reasoning – expressed and unexpressed, 
conscious and unconscious105 – of the alleged discriminator.  In fact, they dismissed 
the ‘but for’ test because it focuses on the ‘consequences for the complainant’ rather 
than on the ‘mental state of the alleged discriminator’.106 They were, nevertheless, 
quick to distinguish between what can be described as ‘motivation’ – ‘the reason for 
the alleged discriminator’s act’ – and ‘motive’.107 They stressed that a discriminatory 
motive is not necessary and emphasised that, upon their view, HREOC correctly 
found that, on the facts of the Purvis case, the express, benign motive behind the 
expulsion of Daniel Hoggan from South Grafton high – to ‘protect’ students and staff 
from Daniel’s ‘violent’ outbursts – did not prevent Daniel’s expulsion from being 
motivated by and, therefore, because of a protected attribute – Daniel’s disability.108 
104 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission v Mount Isa Mines (1993) 46 FCR 301, 322.  
See Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 143 [161]. 
105 See Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 143.  McHugh and Kirby JJ cite with approval the following words 
of Ormiston J in University of Ballarat v Bridges [1995] 2 VR 418, 428: ‘[N]otwithstanding that it has 
been said on many occasions that the Act should be given a broad interpretation, the object of the 
legislature was to look at the reasoning process behind the decision, conscious and unconscious, at least 
so far as direct discrimination is concerned’.  
106 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 144 [166]. 
107 Ibid 142-3 [160]. 
108 Ibid 143-4 [166]. 
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Although McHugh and Kirby JJ essentially agreed with Gummow, Hayne and 
Heydon JJ that ‘why’ the alleged discriminator acted as he or she did is the relevant 
causal enquiry, they could reach a different conclusion as to the outcome of the Purvis 
case because of their different reading of the relationship between a disability and its 
manifestations, a reading consistent with an understanding of disability as including 
any functional limitations attached to it.  According to Kirby and McHugh JJ, the 
manifestations of a disability are part of a disability for the purpose of the definition 
of disability,109 for the purpose of the construction of the comparator,110 and for the 
purpose of determining the ‘reason’ for discrimination.111 If the reason for the 
discrimination, as in the Purvis case, is behaviour caused by the disability, the reason 
is the disability itself.  
 
2 Gleeson CJ in Purvis: a More Radical Reading of Causation 
Like Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, Gleeson CJ authorised the separation of 
behaviour from disability for both the purpose of constructing the appropriate 
comparator and the purpose of determining the ground of discrimination.112 Like 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, he held that Daniel Hoggan had been excluded on 
the ground of his behaviour: ‘The expressed and genuine basis of the principal's 
decision was the danger to other pupils and staff constituted by the pupil's violent 
conduct, and the principal's responsibilities towards those people’.113 
109 Ibid 118 [73]. 
110 Ibid 134 [129]. 
111 Ibid 144 [167]. 
112 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 102-3, [12]-[13]. 
113 Ibid 102 [13]. 
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Gleeson CJ paid lip service to the ‘objects of the Act’114 but his judgment goes further 
than any of the other judgments in Purvis in its potential to undermine the operative 
provisions of the DDA and thus their effectiveness in achieving the objects of the 
DDA. Gleeson CJ rejected the ‘but for test’115 and referred, instead, to the need to 
establish the ‘true basis’ of a potentially discriminatory decision, such as the decision 
to exclude Daniel Hoggan from his mainstream school.116 While his ‘true basis’ test 
for causation is superficially similar to that expounded by other members of the Court, 
upon closer reading Gleeson CJ placed much more emphasis on a subjective enquiry 
into the thought processes of the alleged discriminator and, particularly, into the 
express reasons for the treatment offered by the alleged discriminator.  It is true that 
the analyses offered by Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, McHugh and Kirby JJ suggest 
that there is an element of subjectivity involved in the causation enquiry, to the extent, 
at least, that the reason for the treatment is a question of fact, and that an ‘objective’ 
‘but for’ link between the outcome for the complainant and the actions of the 
discriminator is not enough to demonstrate discrimination.  Gleeson CJ, however, 
went further in his analysis implying that there is no room, on the particular facts of 
Purvis at least, for any objective analysis of the motivation of the alleged 
discriminator: ‘There is no reason for rejecting the principal's statement of the basis of 
his decision as being the violent conduct of the pupil, and his concern for the safety of 
other pupils and staff members’.117 
The judgment of Gleeson CJ suggested that the explanation offered by the alleged 
discriminator is simply to be accepted as the reason for his actions.  Indeed, Gleeson 
 
114 Ibid 102 [14]. 
115 Ibid 102 [13]. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid 102 [14]. 
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CJ stated that it would be ‘unfair’ to the principal of South Grafton State High School 
to find a discriminatory ‘basis’ for his decision: ‘It is not incompatible with the 
legislative scheme to identify the basis of the principal's decision as that which he 
expressed. On the contrary, to identify the pupil's disability as the basis of the 
decision would be unfair to the principal and to the first respondent [the State of New 
South Wales]’.118 While Gleeson CJ conceded that from the point of view of Daniel 
Hoggan it may be reasonable to believe that he was expelled ‘because of’ his 
disability, Gleeson CJ stressed that, as it was the lawfulness of the principal’s actions 
that was in question, it was his point of view which was relevant to the enquiry.119 
3 Ramifications of the Approach of Gleeson CJ to Causation 
It is interesting to note that the approach of Gleeson CJ to causation has already been 
followed in another DDA education case.  In Tyler v Kesser College120 a student with 
Down’s syndrome was suspended after he was accused of throwing, from a balcony, 
an object which hit a teacher.  As noted in the previous chapter, there was no clear 
evidence of a causal link between the complainant’s disability and the throwing.121 
The lack of this evidence was ultimately of little significance, however, in that Driver 
FM, on the causation point, simply accepted the reason advanced by the principal of 
the school as the operative reason for the suspension: 
Even if I had such evidence [of a casual link between disability and behaviour], it is 
clear from the evidence of Rabbi Spielman [the principal], which I accept, that he 
took his action not because of any concern about a behavioural consequence of 
Joseph’s disability, but rather because of his concern about the College’s duty of care 
to its teachers and its students (including Joseph). Rabbi Spielman was seriously 
 
118 Ibid 102-3 [14]. 
119 Ibid 102 [13]. 
120 Tyler v Kesser Torah College [2006] FMCA 1 (Unreported, Driver FM, 20 January 2006). 
121 See Chapter 9, The Comparator, Part II A. See Tyler v Kesser Torah College [2006] FMCA 1 
(Unreported, Driver FM, 20 January 2006) [105]. 
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concerned, after the alleged throwing incident, that the College might breach its duty 
of care if it did not take immediate action.122 
Allowing an exclusively subjective enquiry into the reasons advanced by the alleged 
discriminator, however, is potentially dangerous in that it encourages the 
unscrupulous invention of ‘authorised’ reasons for acting.  As such, should the 
Gleeson CJ reading of causation be allowed to prevail as precedent it would  
inevitably mean less pressure on institutions and individuals to accommodate people 
with disabilities.  The unscrupulous school administration, for example, could escape 
liability simply by asserting that it was a student’s ‘truancy’, not his or her 
impairment, that was the ‘basis’ of a decision to exclude.  Upon the analysis of 
Gleeson CJ there is no need to evaluate, objectively, the reasons advanced for the 
‘truancy’, no need, even, to enquire whether the ‘truancy’ was an incidence of the 
student’s impairment.  Further, the unscrupulous school could be encouraged to 
manufacture a misleading document trail which supported the stated reason for 
exclusion.   
 
In this context, it is interesting to consider the recent QADT case of I on behalf of BI v 
State of Queensland.123 In BI, President Dalton applied an approach similar to that 
advanced by Gleeson CJ but without acknowledging his decision in Purvis.124 In BI,
122 See Tyler v Kesser Torah College [2006] FMCA 1 (Unreported, Driver FM, 20 January 2006) 
[105]. 
123 I on behalf of BI v State of Queensland [2005] QADT 37 (Unreported, Dalton P, 14 December 
2005) (‘BI’). 
124 In an interesting and, arguably, unorthodox, judgment, President Dalton relied, instead, on two other 
controversial and difficult decisions: the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in JM v QFG & 
GK [2001] 1 Qd R 373 that a lesbian had been denied fertility treatment not on the basis of the 
protected attribute of ‘lawful sexual activity’ but on the basis that she ‘did not comply with the clinic’s 
definition of infertility’; and  the decision of the High Court of Australia in Australian Iron and Steel 
Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165 that the complainants had  been dismissed not the basis of their 
‘gender’ but on the basis of their ‘time of employment’. See Ibid [19]-[22]. 
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the stated reason for a student’s exclusion was ‘poor attendance’.  The student had 
been unable to attend school because of his illness, schizophrenia, and because of the 
side effects associated with the medication used to treat his illness.  The principal of 
the school, however, said in evidence, ‘I did not take his disability into account in any 
way in deciding to cancel his enrolment.  I was not made aware that his disability had 
caused non-attendance.  I considered the fact that he was not attending’.125 Further, 
the principal made no enquiries as to the causes for the absences.  He presented 
apparently damning records of ‘unexplained’ failures to attend not only classes but 
also meetings to discuss his education.  The picture created by these records was only 
corrected by the subpoenaing by the complainant of phone records to demonstrate that 
the school had been notified when BI was too sick to attend school.  President Dalton 
accepted the stated reason for exclusion and held that there was no unlawful direct 
discrimination against BI because his treatment was not on the basis of a protected 
attribute: 
It is clear on the evidence of both the Principal of the school and the Guidance 
Officer that the reason for the cancellation of BI’s enrolment was his non-attendance. 
It is not therefore necessary to address other arguments as to the applicability of s 10 
of the Act because even if the cancellation of enrolment otherwise amounted to direct 
discrimination, it was not “on the basis of an attribute” within the meaning of ss 8 
and 10 of the Act.126 
125 BI [2005] QADT 37 (Unreported, Dalton P, 14 December 2005) [14]. 
126 Ibid [19].  President Dalton was, nevertheless, critical of the school’s handling of BI’s illness, 
attendance and exclusion.  She ultimately found, at [42], that, although there had been no direct 
discrimination, BI had been subjected to indirect discrimination.  She held, at [28], that an 
unreasonable term was imposed that ‘students’ enrolments would be cancelled if they did not attend 
school on a regular basis’.  She held, at [37]-[42], that the term was unreasonable not only because of 
its ‘drastic consequences’ for BI but also because the school knew in advance of BI’s enrolment that he 
would be absent for periods of time as a result of his serious illness and had been kept informed by BI’s 
mother of his absences.  See [37]-[42].  The approach in this case can be compared with the approach 
taken on the comparator point by Dalton P in the employment discrimination case Edwards v Hillier 
and Educang [2006] QADT 34 (Unreported, Dalton P, 11 August 2006).  See Part II B, Chapter 9: The 
Comparator. 
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In a further effort to support his position on the causation issue, in Purvis, Gleeson CJ 
drew an interesting analogy with the facts and his findings in Modbury Triangle 
Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil127 arguing that ‘questions of causation may be 
affected by normative considerations arising out of the legal context in which they are 
to be answered’.128 In Modbury Triangle, the relevant argument dismissed by 
Gleeson CJ was that the Shopping Centre proprietors had ‘caused’ the injuries 
suffered by the plaintiff in that their failure to keep the shopping centre car park well 
lit at night allowed the plaintiff’s attack by three unidentified persons.  In that case, 
Gleeson CJ held that  
[t]he finding on causation adverse to the appellant [Modbury Triangle] can only be 
justified on the basis of an erroneous view of the nature of the appellant's duties as 
occupier. On an accurate legal appreciation of those duties, the appellant's omission 
to leave the lights on might have facilitated the crime, as did its decision to provide a 
car park, and the first respondent's decision to park there. But it was not a cause of the 
first respondent's injuries.129 
In Purvis, Gleeson CJ seems to be using the term ‘normative’ in the sense of what is 
legally acknowledged as the socially acceptable ‘view’ of the scope of a ‘duty’.  The 
implication is that the correct ‘view’ of the scope of the principal’s duty to ‘protect’ 
the school community excuses his potentially discriminatory expulsion of Daniel 
Hoggan.  The use of ‘normative’ considerations to interpret anti-discrimination 
legislation is troubling in that anti-discrimination legislation is designed to change 
‘norms’ of human behaviour rather than to reflect them.130 The ‘norm’, arguably, in 
respect of treatment of people with disabilities has been to discriminate against them.  
Anti-discrimination legislation is designed in the short term, to ‘prohibit’ 
discrimination and, in the long term, to change the attitudes and behaviours which 
 
127 Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254. 
128 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 102 [14]. 
129 Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254, 269 [37]-[40]. 
130 See Chapter 3, The Meaning of Disability, Part III. 
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cause it.131 It is true that the terms of the anti-discrimination legislation concede that 
some discrimination is inevitable.  The DDA, for example, seeks to prevent 
discrimination only as far as is ‘practicable’ or ‘possible’.132 But the limit on 
practicability or possibility is surely not set at the level of the current ‘norm’ for 
treatment of people with disabilities.  ‘Norms’ are, arguably, not even acknowledged 
at the level of exemptions and defences.  Case law demonstrates that respondents 
must prove unreasonableness or hardship beyond the level of mere discomfort or 
inconvenience, rather than a forced departure from ‘norms’ of behaviour to escape 
liability.  
 
The problem that so troubled Gleeson CJ – the uncomfortable intersection of duties in 
tort and of obligations arising out of anti-discrimination legislation – is one which is 
not addressed with sufficient clarity in the DDA. Communitarians would concede that 
there must be a legislative regime which allows due attention to be paid to the burden 
placed on the majority by the inclusion of a ‘problem’ minority.  The Responsive 
Community Platform, for example, rationalizes the preference for majority ‘rights’ 
over minority ‘rights’ on the basis that individual rights and freedoms are best 
protected in a strong community: ‘neither human existence nor individual liberty can 
be sustained for long outside the interdependent and overlapping communities to 
which we all belong…The exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the network of 
social environments on which we all depend and is destructive to our shared 
experiment in democratic self-government’.133 Despite the ‘problem’ created by the 
 
131 See Barnes, Colin, Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination:  a case for anti-discrimination 
legislation (1991) 232; Len Barton, ‘Introduction’ in Len Barton (ed) Disability and Society: Emerging 
Issues and Insights (1996) 13.  See Part III, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
132 DDA s 3. 
133 Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda 
(1993) 258. 
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inclusion of Daniel Hoggan, and despite any ‘benefit’ which may be proved to flow to 
the wider school community from his exclusion, it is dangerous to allow such obvious 
policy considerations, which would be better addressed in the context of exemption or 
defence provisions, to erode the effectiveness of the operative provisions of the 
legislation.  
 
III THE RELEVANCE OF A ‘DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVE’ OR ‘INTENTION TO 
DISCRIMINATE’
In some cases, where there is an admitted ‘discriminatory motive’ or ‘intention to 
discriminate’ against a person on the ground of their impairment, discrimination is 
admitted and liability is resisted on some other basis.  In K v N School,134 for 
example, it was conceded not only that discrimination occurred but that it was 
deliberately engineered.135 K, an 11 year old at the time of hearing, had attended N 
School from the age of eight, from the beginning of 1993.  N School decided to 
exclude K and three other ‘special needs’ students from the start of 1996 because of 
the cost of providing for their ‘special needs’.  N school was clearly motivated in its 
treatment of K by financial considerations.  Funding provided to the school to 
accommodate K was not considered sufficient.  Further, the school ‘feared’ they 
would lose other students because of K’s enrolment.136 Three parents gave evidence 
via affidavit that they ‘may’ have removed their children if K were allowed to remain 
at the school.  The school, therefore, anticipated a compounded financial imposition – 
 
134 K v N School (No 3) [1996] 1 QADR 620 (‘K’). 
135 The issue in this case was whether an exemption on the basis of section 44 QADA ‘unjustifiable 
hardship’ was available 
136 K [1996] 1 QADR 620, 624. 
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if K returned not only would it have to provide for her but it would risk losing 
enrolments and, thus, income from fees.137 
While an intention to discriminate may be identified in cases like K, a significant 
causation issue is whether it is, indeed, necessary to prove such an intention in order 
to prove discrimination.  In some education discrimination cases, it has been argued 
that the motive informing the actions of the respondent was not to discriminate 
against the complainant but to ‘do them a favour’ and that, in the absence of an 
intention to discriminate, there could be no discrimination.  In L, for example, it was 
argued that the motive behind the planned relocation of the complainant to a special 
school was to benefit her by providing her with an environment better suited to her 
educational needs.  The fact that there was no intention to discriminate, however, did 
not prevent a finding of a prima facie case of discrimination. 
 
A The Relevance of Intention before Purvis 
Until Purvis, the generally accepted position was that it was not necessary to prove a 
motive to discriminate in order to prove unlawful impairment discrimination.  Indeed 
the QADA states explicitly, in relation to direct discrimination, that the ‘person’s 
motive for discriminating is irrelevant’.138 To require an intention to discriminate for 
proof of direct discrimination would also be inconsistent with the scheme of anti-
discrimination legislation in that indirect discrimination is, invariably, also prohibited.  
Indirect discrimination provisions address the usually unintended and unanticipated 
 
137 It is interesting that in K the complainant was able to lead evidence that the impact of K’s enrolment 
‘cut both ways’.  One parent, a volunteer worker with K, gave evidence that she had decided to 
terminate her child’s enrolment at ‘N’ School ‘because of what she perceive[d] as its negative 
attitude towards K and the case before the Tribunal’: K [1996] 1 QADR 620, 624. 
138 QADA s 10(3). The DDA is silent on the point. 
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discriminatory effects which are ‘hidden’ in the conditions imposed upon 
participation in mainstream society.  The QADA provides in respect of proof of 
indirect discrimination that ‘[i]t is not necessary that the person imposing, or 
proposing to impose, the term is aware of the indirect discrimination’.139 
In Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic,140Deane and Gaudron JJ accepted that 
the reasons identified by the alleged discriminator as motivating his or her acts may 
mask the true basis for them and cited with approval the words of Lord Goff in R v
Birmingham City Council that:  
The intention or motive of the defendant to discriminate…is not a necessary 
condition to liability as it is perfectly possible to envisage cases where the defendant 
had no such motive, and yet did in fact discriminate on the grounds of sex.141 
In Waters v Public Transport Corporation, an impairment discrimination case arising 
out of access restrictions on public transport in Melbourne, Mason CJ and Gaudron J 
held as follows:  
It would, in our view, significantly impede or hinder the attainment of the objects of 
the Act if s 17(1) were to be interpreted as requiring an intention or motive on the part 
of the alleged discriminator that is related to the status or private life of the person 
less favourably treated. It is enough that the material difference in treatment is based 
on the status or private life of that person, notwithstanding an absence of intention or 
motive on the part of the alleged discriminator relating to either of those 
considerations. 142 
Banovic was, admittedly, an indirect sex discrimination  case arising out of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) and Waters was, admittedly, an indirect 
discrimination case arising out of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic).  But in X v
139 QADA s 11(3). 
140 Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165, 176. 
141R v Birmingham City Council; Ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1989] AC 1155, 1193-4 
(Lord Goff). 
142 Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349, 359. 
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McHugh,143 an early disability discrimination in employment case, the view of Mason 
CJ and Gaudron J in Waters as to the irrelevance of motive and intention was 
‘respectfully adopted’ by President Wilson of HREOC as ‘wholly applicable’ to the 
context of a direct discrimination case arising under the DDA.144 
B The Relevance of Intention since Purvis 
The debate as to the relevance of ‘motive’ and ‘intention’ was revived in Purvis as an 
aspect of the larger issue of the appropriate test for causation.  The argument for the 
State was that the motive behind the exclusion of Daniel Hoggan was not to 
discriminate against him but to protect ‘the safety and welfare of other students and 
staff at the school and Mr Hoggan himself’145 and that, as such, there had been no 
discrimination ‘on the ground of’ disability.  The counter argument was that even 
where the motive or intention of the alleged discriminator was ‘benign’ the ‘criteria 
employed for a decision may be inherently discriminatory’.146 Callinan J did not 
address the issue.  Although Gleeson CJ did not address the relevance of intention and 
motive explicitly, it can be inferred from his emphasis on the ‘expressed and genuine’ 
basis of the principal’s action as amounting to the ‘true basis’ of his action that he 
does regard intention and motive as relevant to causation.147 Gummow, Hayne and 
Heydon JJ dealt only briefly with the issue, conceding that motive and intention may 
be relevant to the determination of the ‘central question’ of ‘why’ a potentially 
discriminatory act was taken but doubting ‘that distinctions between motive, purpose 
 
143 Xv McHugh, Auditor General for Tasmania (1994) 56 IR 248 (‘X’).  This case is further considered 
in Part IV, below.  It is worth noting that Wilson P accepted his position on HREOC after retiring from 
the bench of the High Court of Australia. 
144 Ibid 256. 
145 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 139 [147] (McHugh and Kirby JJ). 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid 102 [13]. 
315
or effect will greatly assist the resolution of any problem about whether treatment 
occurred or was proposed ‘because of’ disability’.148 
McHugh and Kirby JJ were critical of the failure to distinguish between the meaning 
and effect of the words ‘intention’ and ‘motive’.  Their judgment suggests that 
intention is relevant to the question ‘why’ an act was taken and thus relevant to 
causation.  This is a separate issue, however, from the issue of whether the actor 
intended to discriminate or had a discriminatory motive.  McHugh and Kirby JJ found 
that while it was causally necessary to determine ‘why’ the principal had excluded 
Daniel Hoggan, motive was not relevant to proof of discrimination against him.  They 
did not see motive as inextricably linked to the enquiry into ‘why’ the alleged 
discriminator had acted: ‘…while it is necessary to consider the reason why the 
discriminator acted as he or she did, it is not necessary for the discriminator to have 
acted with a discriminatory motive’.149 This position on motive was, they claimed, 
consistent with the current position in the United Kingdom150 and the position taken 
by other courts in Australia.151 
The view that it is not necessary to prove a discriminatory motive or an intention to 
discriminate is clearly the better view in terms of consistency with the general scheme 
of anti-discrimination legislation which recognises both directly discriminatory acts 
and social conditions which conceal discriminatory consequences.  This view is 
 
148 Ibid 163 [236]. 
149 Ibid 142 [160]. 
150 Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [2000] 1 AC 501; Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary [2003] 2 All ER 26. 
151Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165, 176 (Deane and Gaudron JJ); 
Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349, 359 (Mason CJ and Gaudron J); Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 301, 322; University 
of Ballarat v Bridges [1995] 2 VR 418, 438. 
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preferable too in terms of consistency with the nature of disability as a social 
construct which grows as much from thoughtless acts as from intentional acts of 
discrimination.  To insist that a discriminatory motive must be identified as a 
prerequisite to liability would simply drive discriminators further ‘underground’, 
protected from the consequences of their actions by layers of sanitised, neutral 
reasons for acting.  As Goff LJ argued so convincingly in R v Birmingham, if motive 
were relevant to liability then an unscrupulous employer could discriminate against 
female employers with impunity, rationalising that ‘he discriminated against women 
not because he intended to do so but (for example) because of customer preference, or 
to save money, or even to avoid controversy’.152 
IV IS KNOWLEDGE OF AN IMPAIRMENT A PREREQUISITE TO DISCRIMINATION ON 
THE BASIS OF THAT IMPAIRMENT?
The case of Sluggett, discussed above, illustrates that dire consequences may follow 
for a student who chooses not to reveal an impairment to the administration of the 
education institution attended.  In that case, the HREOC found that it was Sluggett’s 
own failure to enquire about alternative access and not the university respondent’s 
failure to identify alternative access which caused her detriment.  While many 
students are understandably reluctant to identify themselves as ‘impaired’, fearing not 
only the stigma which, historically, has attached to that status, but also, ironically, a 
discriminatory response, if they do not reveal the impairment in sufficient detail to 
allow an education institution to respond to it then it becomes difficult for them to 
allege discrimination in any failure to accommodate.  It is interesting to note that, 
perhaps as a result of cases such as Sluggett, it is current practice for many education 
 
152 R v Birmingham City Council; Ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1989] AC 1155, 1193-4 
(Goff LJ). 
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institutions, at least at the tertiary level, to encourage disclosure of impairment upon 
enrolment and to provide the opportunity to do so on enrolment forms, so that equity 
officers can be notified of that impairment and plan, with the student, appropriate 
accommodation strategies.153 Such a ‘risk management’ strategy, discreetly managed, 
it is to be hoped, may improve levels of inclusion for students with impairment.  It is 
also interesting to note that the UK legislature has protected its tertiary institutions 
from claims by students who have not disclosed their disability by providing that 
there can be no discrimination on the basis of disability, in the higher education 
context, when the higher education institution ‘did not know, and could not 
reasonably have been expected to know, that [a student] was disabled’.154 
In the QADA, it is explicitly provided in relation to indirect discrimination that ‘it is 
not necessary that the person imposing, or proposing to impose, the term is aware of 
the indirect discrimination’.155 While there is no express equivalent provision in 
relation to direct discrimination, early discrimination cases suggested that there was 
little doubt that in that situation, too, there need not be awareness that the 
discriminator’s actions are discriminatory.  In X v McHugh it was held, for example, 
that a person’s actions can be directly discriminatory and on the basis of impairment 
even if that person is not aware of the impairment. 
 
153 See, for example, the University of Queensland, Do I have to disclose my disability at enrolment? 
< http://www.sss.uq.edu.au/index.html?page=22729&pid=1208> at 27 November 2006. Queensland 
University of Technology encourages ‘[s]tudents with disabilities who may require support 
services…to disclose their needs at the earliest opportunity’: Queensland University of Technology, 
Guide for students with a disability 2005 <http://www.equity.qut.edu.au/programs/forstudents/ 
disability_services/disabgd_2005/part_1.jsp#applying> at 20 November 2006. 
154 DDA (UK) s 28(4). 
155 QADA s 11(3).  There is no equivalent provision in the DDA.
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In X the complainant, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, was dismissed 
from his employment because of his ‘lack of interpersonal skills’ and ‘failure to 
exercise “reasonable judgment” in the conduct of [his] work’.156 The employer did 
not know, at the time of X’s dismissal, that he was impaired.  The behaviours of X 
relied upon by the employer as justifying the dismissal were, however, direct 
manifestations of his illness.  The hearing commissioner, Sir Ronald Wilson, 
president of HREOC, noted the poignancy of the situation, highlighting both the 
unfortunate consequences for the complainant of the stigma associated with mental 
illness and the unfortunate consequences for the respondent ignorant of the 
complainant’s condition: 
On the one hand, there is the complainant: caught in the grip of a cruel illness, the 
effect of which was to interfere with his appreciation of the reality of its impact upon 
him and whose attitude to it was coloured by the arcane, prejudiced attitude of a 
society that will not face the reality of mental illness, an attitude which rendered him 
incapable of acknowledging or divulging its existence. On the other hand, there is the 
respondent and his officers, denied the knowledge that they might reasonably have 
been expected to be given, knowledge which could have led them to treat the 
complainant with greater understanding and without discrimination.157 
President Wilson was clear in his conclusion, however, that ‘[i]t is not necessary that 
an employer know of the existence of the disability. It is enough if an employer is 
shown to have discriminated because of a manifestation of a disability’.158 This 
finding on the knowledge point is, of course, simply a corollary of his finding that it is 
not allowable to separate the manifestations of an impairment from the impairment 
 
156 X v McHugh (1994) 56 IR 248, 257.  It should be noted in this context that the respondent also 
sought to rely on the exemption to discrimination found in DDA s 15(4), the ‘inherent requirements’ 
exemption.  The respondent argued that the matters identified as the basis for the complainant’s 
sacking were ‘inherent requirements’ of his job as an auditor and that, as such, he could be dismissed 
for failing to meet these inherent requirements.  President Wilson dismissed this argument, at 258-9, 
finding that the complainant had not been given a ‘fair chance’ to demonstrate his capacity to carry out 
the inherent requirements of his job. 
157 Ibid 256. 
158 Ibid 257. 
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itself, and of the related finding that discrimination on the ground of ‘manifestations’ 
of disability is discrimination on the ground of the disability itself: 
There is a remarkable correspondence between the problems associated with the 
complainant’s work performance and the symptoms of the disability… I find that the 
respondents’ evaluation of the complainant’s work performance between May – 
November 1992, namely lack of interpersonal skills, failure to exercise reasonable 
judgment and refusal to accept counselling reflected a manifestation of the symptoms 
of the complainant’s illness.  Dismissal, therefore, discriminated against the 
complainant on the ground of his disability. 159 
It is interesting, however, that the reasoning in X was not followed by the Victorian 
Equal Opportunity Tribunal (Victorian EOT) in the disability discrimination in 
education case, Lynch v Sacred Heart College and Others.160 In that case, the 
complainant, a student at the respondent college, asserted that she suffered from a 
temporary psychological impairment resulting from a sexual assault.  The 
psychological impairment was allegedly manifest in behaviours at school which 
caused the respondent to exclude the complainant.  The Victorian EOT granted an 
application under s 44C of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic) to strike out the 
claim of discrimination on the ground of impairment.161 The Victorian EOT granted 
the application on the basis that ‘there was nothing from which it could conclude that 
the respondents’ actions were substantially based on the complainant’s 
impairment’.162 Note that under the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic) there was a 
requirement that a protected attribute be a ‘substantial’ reason for discrimination 
before it will be held that discrimination occurred ‘on the basis’ of that protected 
attribute.163 
159 Ibid 258. 
160 Lynch v Sacred Heart College and Others (1995) EOC ¶92-724 (‘Lynch’). 
161 There is not directly equivalent section of the QADA which allows the respondent to apply for a 
complaint to be struck out.  
162 Lynch (1995) EOC ¶92-724, 78416.   
163 Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic) ss 7 and 8.  See now Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 8(2)(b). 
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The Victorian EOT decided that ‘at the time of the alleged acts of discrimination, 
there was nothing to indicate that the respondents were aware that the complainant 
may have been suffering from an impairment [and] … there was nothing to indicate 
that a reasonable person in the respondent’s position ought to have been aware of that 
impairment’.164 For the reason of this lack of ‘awareness’ the Victorian EOT held 
‘there was nothing from which the conclusion could be drawn that the respondent’s 
actions were substantially based on the complainant’s impairment’.165 The Victorian 
EOT expressed the view that ‘it was the complainant’s behavioural problems that 
prompted the school to refuse to re-enrol the complainant’.166 That is, the 
complainant’s exclusion was ‘on the basis’ of her behaviour and not of her 
impairment. 
 
The Victorian EOT applied in this case a requirement of actual or constructive 
knowledge of the impairment by the respondent before discrimination could be 
considered caused by the impairment.  It is submitted, however, that such a 
requirement was not supported by the wording of the Equal Opportunity Act 1982 
(Vic).  Nor was it supported by precedent – the decision in Lynch is clearly 
inconsistent with the decision in X. While X was not a ‘binding precedent’ on the 
EOT it was, nevertheless, a clearly reasoned and persuasive decision delivered by a 
retired member of the High Court of Australia.  It perhaps explains the decision in 
Lynch that the complainant was represented by her mother while the school was 
represented by counsel.  Indeed there is no indication from the report that the decision 
in X was even considered by the Tribunal. 
 
164Lynch (1995) EOC ¶92-724, 78417.    
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
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In the QADT case Brackenreg, discussed above, the QADT appeared tempted to find 
that a lack of knowledge of impairment excused potentially discriminatory behaviour. 
The complainant in that case suffered from multiple disabilities including Attention 
Deficient Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) of which the respondent university was 
unaware at the time of an alleged discriminatory act.  President Copelin of the QADT 
acknowledged X as persuasive precedent but nevertheless seemed close to declining 
to follow it in making the following statement: ‘at the time of her exclusion in 
December 1997, the respondent was not aware of the complainant having ADHD.  
Her exclusion was based on her academic record which was not unreasonable’.167 
The Tribunal avoided a conclusion on the point, however, by finding that no ‘less 
favourable treatment’ had occurred ‘on the basis’ of the complainant’s ADHD and 
that she had been treated fairly by the university: 
A detailed explanation of the ADHD diagnosis appears only to have been made 
known to QUT during the course of this hearing … In spite of QUT not being fully 
appraised of her medical condition, I find it did conduct a fair reassessment of her 
capacity during the readmission and appeal process. 168 
The issue of whether it is possible to discriminate on the basis of an undisclosed 
disability was raised again more recently in the context of a DDA case, Tate v 
Rafin.169 Tate was expelled from the Wollongong Cricket Club after an altercation 
with two other members.  Wilcox J, of the Federal Court, was roundly critical of the 
behaviour of the club executive and accepted that they had inflamed the situation and 
triggered the discrimination claim through their ‘handling’ of the dispute.170 He 
found, however, that while Tate had been treated badly, there had been no actionable 
 
167Brackenreg [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999) [4.2.1.3(b)]. 
168 Ibid 4.2.2.4(a)(vi). 
169 Tate v Rafin [2000] FCA 1582. 
170 Ibid [43]-[50]. 
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discrimination against him.171 Tate had argued that he was expelled from the club 
because of his severe physical impairments.  Wilcox J, however, found that his 
expulsion was because of his behaviour towards the other club members.  Tate 
argued, further, that expulsion on the basis of his behaviour was discriminatory 
because his behaviour was an aspect of the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder which he 
developed as a result of his service during the Vietnam War.  Wilcox J determined 
that, as the club was unaware of Tate’s psychiatric condition, they could not have 
treated him less favourably because of it: 
…there is no evidence that any member of the committee realised that Mr Tate had a 
psychological disability…Mr Tate does not claim to have disclosed to the club that he 
suffered any psychological disability. That being so, it seems impossible to say the 
club discriminated against Mr Tate on the ground of his psychological disability 
(emphasis in original).172
Like Lynch, however, this is another case involving a self represented complainant. 
Like Lynch, there is no indication that Wilcox J was asked to consider the reasoning 
in X. Indeed, Wilcox J made a number of controversial assertions about the 
application of discrimination law without backing those assertions with precedent.  It 
is particularly significant that he adopted a comparator without Tate’s behaviour 
without acknowledging that this was, at that time, a departure from the accepted 
precedent: 
The psychological disability may have caused Mr Tate to behave differently than if 
he had not had a psychological disability, or differently to the way another person 
would have behaved. But the disability did not cause the club to treat him differently 
than it would otherwise have done; that is, than it would have treated another person 
who did not have a psychological disability but who had behaved in the same way. It 
could not have done, if the club was unaware of the disability (emphasis in 
original).173 
171 Ibid [70]. 
172 Ibid [65]. 
173 Ibid [67]. This construction of the comparator by Wilcox J is particularly interesting in that in The 
Commonwealth v Human Rights Commission (1993) 46 FCR 191, 209 he reiterated the now well 
known words of the then President of the HREOC, Sir Ronald Wilson, delivered in his decision at first 
instance in the same case: ‘It would fatally frustrate the purposes of the Act if the matters which it 
expressly identifies as constituting unacceptable bases for differential treatment ... could be seized upon 
as rendering the overall circumstances materially different, with the result that the treatment could 
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Further, Wilcox J raised and dismissed, without identifying it as such, the ‘but for’ 
test for discrimination: 
It may be said…"yes, but a person without a psychological disability would not have 
behaved in this way, so effectively Mr Tate was excluded from the club and its 
facilities because of his psychological disability". I accept that may be true, but I do 
not think that circumstance would bring the case within the purview of the Disability 
Discrimination Act. The focus of that legislation is on the conduct of the alleged 
discriminator; not the effect on the alleged discriminate (emphasis in original).174 
Again, at the time that Tate v Rafin was decided, case law suggested the prevalence of 
the ‘but for’ test as the test for causation in the context of Australian discrimination 
law but Wilcox J did not consider the treatment of the test by Toohey J and Kirby J in 
IW.175 
Despite his somewhat cavalier disregard for the reasoning in earlier, persuasive, if not 
binding decisions, the analysis by Wilcox J of the comparator point and of the 
causation point, and perhaps, too, of the knowledge point have proved to be 
remarkably prescient in view of the majority decision in Purvis. In view of the 
abandonment, in Purvis, of the reasoning in X on the comparator point, and the 
understanding of causation promulgated by the majority justices, it is likely that in a 
post Purvis environment, a court or tribunal adjudicating a case involving a person 
with an undisclosed impairment would be likely to find along the lines of Lynch or 
Tate rather than along the lines of X. Although the issue was not raised in the High 
Court, Emmett J had commented, obiter, citing Tate v Rafin, that there could be no 
discrimination on the ground of disability where there was no knowledge of the 
disability by the alleged discriminator: 
 
never be discriminatory within the meaning of the Act’. The case concerned marital status 
discrimination.  See Dopking & Thomas v Department  of Defence [1992] HREOCA 5 (Unreported, 
Wilson P, 13 March 1992).  Extract available at (1992) EOC ¶92-421, 79005.  Note this case is also 
known as Sullivan v Department of Defence.
174 Tate v Rafin [2000] FCA 1582 [68]. 
175 See discussion at Part II A, above. 
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Psychological disabilities may constitute a “disability” within the meaning of the Act. 
Such psychological disabilities may cause a person to behave differently from the 
way in which a person who does not have that disability would behave. However, 
where an educational authority is unaware of the disability, but treats a person 
differently, namely, less favourably, because of that behaviour, it could not be said 
that the educational authority has treated the person less favourably because of the 
disability - see Tate v Rafin [2000] FCA 1582 (emphasis in original).176 
The decision in X from a post Purvis perspective can be seen, perhaps, as a high water 
mark in terms of willingness to find discrimination against, and compel acceptance 
and accommodation of, people with disabilities.  The reasoning in X revealed a 
willingness to accept the nature of disability as a social construct and a willingness to 
compel social change to mitigate disability – beyond the context, even, of a workplace 
which included people with acknowledged disabilities.  The decision placed a heavy 
onus on employers not only to second guess an impairment as underpinning every 
controversial behaviour by an employee, but also to implement workplace procedures 
which would diminish the effects of unadmitted, or even, perhaps, undiagnosed 
impairments.  President Wilson gave the blunt warning in X that ‘[e]mployers are 
required to be vigilant in their regard for circumstances affecting the interest of their 
employees’.177 By analogy, the decision in X placed a heavy onus on other 
institutional environments, including schools, proactively to implement procedures 
which would address and alleviate disability before being compelled to do so by the 
inclusion of a person with impairment.  In this sense, X, while no longer ‘good law’, 
could, perhaps, be said to have stimulated an institutional response to disability which 
has culminated in the implementation of disability standards, such as the Disability 
 
176 New South Wales (Department of Education) v Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 
(2001) 186 ALR 69, 77 [35]. 
177 Xv McHugh (1994) 56 IR 248, 257. 
325
Standards for Accessible Public Transport 2002 (Cth), Disability Standards for 
Education 2005 (Cth) and forthcoming disability standards for access to premises.178 
V MULTIPLE REASONS FOR TREATMENT OF THE COMPLAINANT 
Respondents to claims of discrimination have attempted to avoid liability by arguing 
that there were multiple reasons for their treatment of the complainant but that 
impairment was not a significant cause.  This argument has usually been run in 
conjunction with an argument that behaviour should be separated from disability.  It 
was an argument of particular relevance in the Queensland discrimination in 
education cases because of the requirement under the QADA that a protected attribute 
must be a ‘substantial’ reason for less favourable treatment before the less favourable 
treatment will be ‘on the basis’ of the protected attribute.  For example, in the QADA 
case L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland,179 a case involving a 
lower primary school student with global development delay, the respondent argued 
that it was not L’s impairment but her behaviour which was the ‘substantial’ reason it 
proposed her exclusion from her mainstream primary school.  L’s teachers had 
complained about her ‘frequent crying…her lack of ability to concentrate on tasks, 
her failure to return after class breaks, her limited vocabulary, and hygiene problems 
revolving around her propensity to regurgitate and toileting accidents’.180 
Commissioner Holmes rejected this argument: 
I cannot accept that submission.  It seems to me that the behaviours…for 
which L was suspended – regurgitation and toileting problems, lack of 
concentration, inappropriate noise - making and so on – were characteristic of 
a child with her impairment, ie global development delay, and cannot be 
treated as divorced from it… her disruptive behaviours are elemental to her 
 
178 See Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Access to Premises  < http://www.hreoc.  
gov.au/disability_rights/buildings/access_to_premises.html#standards> at 27 November 2006. 
179 L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 207. 
180 Ibid 209. 
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impairment and without them she would not have been suspended from 
school. 181 
Commissioner Holmes applied the reasoning of President Wilson in X and would not 
allow the separation of L’s behaviour from her impairment for the purpose of 
identifying it – and not her impairment – as the reason for her proposed exclusion.  
 
A similar argument was run in the HREOC in the Purvis case.  Under the DDA it is 
necessary only to prove that disability is a cause, not a substantial cause, to establish 
unlawful discrimination.182 The respondent argued, therefore, that Daniel’s behaviour 
and not his disability was the sole reason for his exclusion.  Commissioner Innes, 
again relying on X, refused to separate Daniel’s behaviour from the disability which 
caused it and the defence argument failed.  Significantly, however, he also found that 
Daniel had been excluded for a separate reason, unrelated to his behaviour: his 
inability to cope with the stresses of high school life because of his disability.  In the 
High Court, McHugh and Kirby JJ also legitimized the finding of discrimination 
against Daniel Hoggan on this basis which was clearly, in their view, related to his 
protected attribute of disability.183 McHugh and Kirby JJ held, therefore, that the 
HREOC finding of discrimination could be supported ‘without having to consider 
issues relating to behaviour’.184 Callinan J was the only other member of the Court to 
address this ground for Daniel’s treatment.  He simply dismissed it, however, as 
another manifestation of the principal’s ‘stated reason’ for acting – the threat posed to 
others by Daniel’s inclusion at the school: ‘This…finding is consistent with the 
principal's stated reason for Daniel's exclusion. To say, as the Commissioner did, that 
 
181 Ibid 211. 
182 DDA s 10. 
183 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 144 [169]. 
184 Ibid. 
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the principal's decision “related to [his] perceptions of Daniel's success socially and 
educationally” really adds nothing to, or, is to say nothing different from, what the 
principal said was the reason for his decision’.185 
Whereas pre-Purvis the ‘multiple causes’ strategy was one exploited by respondents, 
post-Purvis it may be of potential interest to complainants.  In view of the willingness 
of McHugh and Kirby JJ to tease out a separate basis for a finding of unlawful 
discrimination it is possible that complainants may be encouraged to seek to identify 
causes for their discriminatory treatment which are not so easily divorced, as 
‘behaviour’, from their underlying disability.  
 
VI CONCLUSION 
That courts have been willing to entertain causation related strategies for exclusion is 
clear evidence that they tacitly accept, without necessarily acknowledging or 
understanding that they are doing so, that not all detriment suffered by people with 
impairments is a social construct flowing from the failure of society to accommodate 
difference.  Early cases such as X did reveal a commitment to compelling a proactive 
response to disability consistent with the objectives of anti-discrimination legislation 
and consistent with what Tam has emphasised as a fundamental tenet of 
communitarianism, that ‘democratic society is inclusive’.186 The decision in X
suggested that institutions are required to anticipate and react to the possibility of 
inclusion of a person with impairment before the situation actually arises and are 
required to have policies and procedures in place which will facilitate the 
accommodation of a person with impairment.  President Wilson was unequivocal in 
 
185 Ibid 174 [270]. 
186 Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship (1998) 8. 
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his warning that employers must be ‘vigilant’ in their assessment of circumstances 
affecting each employee’s performance187 and lamented the ‘arcane, prejudiced 
attitude of a society that will not face the reality of mental illness’.188 
Cases since X, however, have demonstrated a retreat from this position of regarding 
inclusion as a right rather than as a concession and from the associated emphasis on 
attitudinal and institutional adjustment.  The effect of the decisions in cases like 
Cowell and Brackenreg is to highlight the point that there are, perhaps, aspects of 
disability which are not created and cannot be mitigated by social adjustment and to 
suggest that, as such, the social model of disability is flawed.  However, the effect of 
the decision of the High Court in Purvis goes further to excuse the failure to make 
adjustments which could, perhaps, be reasonably expected by people with 
impairments.  Indeed, at first instance, Commissioner Innes of HREOC found that 
Daniel Hoggan’s exclusion was traceable to the failures and inflexibilities of the 
school system.189 The effect of the decision of the High Court in Purvis will be, 
arguably, to allow institutions such as schools to avoid taking steps – even reasonable 
steps – to accommodate difference because the case strengthens the causal link 
between impairment and discrimination which must be proved before there will be a 
remedy.  Since the case allows the separation of manifestations of impairment from 
the impairment itself, it seems the causal link must be between the treatment by the 
alleged discriminator and the underlying impairment before the treatment will be 
prohibited.  Thus, future direct discrimination cases may demonstrate that it will be 
only the most stark examples of discrimination that will be remedied – those cases 
 
187 Xv McHugh (1994) 56 IR 248, 257. 
188 Ibid 256. 
189 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75172-5 
[6.4].  
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where the actions of the alleged discriminator are clearly informed by prejudice 
against or primal fear of the impairment of the complainant.  This is because where 
the alleged discriminator acts ‘because of’ the complainant’s ‘abnormal’ behaviour, or 
tardiness, or clumsiness or absenteeism, his or her actions will be held to be on that 
‘basis’ or ‘ground’ and not on the ‘basis’ or ‘ground’ of the impairment which, in fact, 
triggers the behaviour, tardiness, clumsiness, absenteeism.  It will, as such, be difficult 
to prove discrimination ‘on the basis’ of what Gleeson CJ calls ‘functional 
disability’,190 but which is really disability in the ‘purest’ sense of the word – that is, 
the social restriction flowing from the impairment and society’s failure to 
accommodate it.191 
190 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 100 [11]. 
191 See Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
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CHAPTER 11 
LESS FAVOURABLE TREATMENT 
 
Proof of direct discrimination requires proof that the complainant has been treated 
‘less favourably’ than others without his or her protected attribute of impairment.1 In 
many education discrimination cases, the existence of less favourable treatment is 
obvious from the facts – exclusion from an excursion,2 for example, or the deliberate 
obstruction of wheelchair access.3 In cases involving a complaint of discrimination 
arising from an education provider’s decision to refuse or to terminate a mainstream 
enrolment to a student with intellectual or behavioural impairment, however, the issue 
of what amounts to ‘less favourable treatment’ has been contentious.  This chapter 
will consider a variety of approaches taken by respondents in education 
discrimination cases to the characterisation of treatment of such students as something 
other than ‘less favourable’ and, therefore, as lawful.  
 
Respondent schools have attempted to resist allegations of discrimination by arguing 
that their treatment of student complainants is not ‘less favourable’ but, rather, ‘more 
favourable’ treatment than that given ‘regular’ students.4 They have argued that the 
treatment is ‘individualised’ treatment mandated by legislation,5 or the ‘best 
treatment’ suited to a student’s needs.6 It will be seen, however, that tribunals have 
 
1 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) s 10(1).  Compare Disability Discrimination Act 1992 
(Cth) (DDA) s 5(1). 
2 I v O’Rourke and Corinda State High School and Minister for Education for Queensland [2001] 
QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001). 
3 Murphy and Grahl v The State of New South Wales (NSW Department of Education) and Wayne 
Houston [2000] HREOC NoH98/73 (Unreported, Commissioner Carter, 27 March 2000). 
4 See Part I B, below. 
5 See Part I C, below. 
6 See Part I D, below. 
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decided that what is ‘less favourable’ is determined largely subjectively, and from the 
point of view of the complainant.7 The fact that respondents adopt a strategy of 
colouring less favourable treatment as something else in order to avoid any duty of 
inclusion suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of disability as a 
social construct which can be alleviated by social adjustment.  An understanding of 
disability as a social construct, it has been argued, underpins the terms of disability 
discrimination legislation.8
I THE MEANING OF ‘LESS FAVOURABLE TREATMENT’ IN THE CONTEXT OF 
STUDENTS WITH INTELLECTUAL OR BEHAVIOURAL IMPAIRMENTS 
The Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) case P v Director-General, 
Department of Education9 represents, perhaps, the most closely reasoned analysis of 
what amounts to ‘less favourable’ treatment in education discrimination cases 
involving students with intellectual and behavioural impairment.  It also demonstrates 
a particularly agile approach to construction of the term by the respondent as part of 
its campaign to justify its treatment of P, a student with Down’s syndrome 
manifesting not only as intellectual impairment but also as inappropriate behaviour.  
A ‘proposed’ exclusion from a ‘mainstream’ school and transfer to a ‘special’ school 
was the source of the complaint in P. 
A No Treatment 
The first relevant argument mounted by the respondent in P was that, as legal action 
was commenced by the complainant before his suspension or exclusion could be 
effected, there had, in fact, been no ‘less favourable treatment’ in that there had been, 
 
7 See Part II, below. 
8 See Part III, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
9 P v Director-General, Department of Education [1995] 1 QADR 755 (‘P’).
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in fact, no relevant ‘treatment’ of P. 10 Commissioner Keim was not ‘convinced’ by 
this argument and dispatched it with some alacrity.11 QADA s 10(1) clearly states that 
direct discrimination occurs when a person ‘treats or proposes to treat’ a person with 
an attribute less favourably.  It is apparent from the terms of that section that 
‘proposed’ treatment, such as that planned by the respondent in P and anticipated by 
the complainant, is potentially discriminatory and within the reach of the legislation. 
 
B ‘More Favourable’ Treatment 
A more forcefully presented argument advanced by the respondent, was that P had 
been treated ‘more favourably’ than a person without his impairment, on the basis that 
a person without his impairment but who ‘exhibited his behaviour’ would have been 
‘asked to leave the Rasmussen School and, perhaps, subjected to more formal 
disciplinary procedures’.12 This argument carries an implication offensive to the 
principles of communitarianism, that inclusion is not a right of citizenship shared by 
people with disabilities but, a concession granted out of generosity rather than 
acknowledged obligation.  Commissioner Keim expressly rejected the more 
favourable argument, not on any ‘rights’ basis, however, but on the ground that it 
relied on an unacceptable separation of impairment and behaviour: ‘P’s behavioural 
and communication problems are inherently part of his particular impairment’.13 
Commissioner Keim, in P, had adopted the comparator analysis promulgated in X v
McHugh14 and applied in the earlier Queensland education discrimination case of L v
Minister for Education for the State of Queensland15 – the  appropriate comparator for 
 
10 Ibid 777-8. 
11 Ibid 778. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid 782. 
14 X v McHugh (1994) 56 IR 248. 
15 L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 207 (‘L’). 
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the determination of less favourable treatment is a person, real or hypothetical, 
without the impairment and without the behaviour of the complainant. Regardless of 
the seismic shift in the comparator approach now endorsed by the High Court in 
Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training),16 a 
‘more favourable’ argument such as that mounted by the respondent would still be 
unlikely to succeed in that the relevant enquiry is, surely, into the lawfulness of the 
proposed suspension and exclusion, not into the ‘generosity’ of the school’s 
‘tolerance’ of P’s behaviour before the decision to suspend had been reached.  
 
It is interesting to note that a different ‘more favourable’ argument was raised in 
Purvis. In that case, the respondent sought to prove that the student complainant, a 
child with a complex array of impairments manifesting as problem behaviour, had 
been treated more favourably in terms of the resources expended on his welfare.  In 
teacher aide hours, special curriculum development and support, Daniel Hoggan 
received more time, effort and money and thus, the argument went, ‘more favourable’ 
treatment than most students in New South Wales.  Commissioner Innes, at the 
original Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) hearing, 
accepted that Daniel was ‘receiving one of the highest amounts of Departmental 
funding for a child with a disability in the State’.17 He was not satisfied, however, 
that such ‘generosity’ in the resourcing of Daniel equated with more favourable 
treatment.  Indeed, he had little difficulty in finding that Daniel had been subjected to 
less favourable treatment: ‘Exclusion is clearly less favourable treatment, as Daniel is 
prevented from attending the School, and denied access to the benefits provided by 
 
16 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92 
(‘Purvis’).  See Chapter 9: The Comparator. 
17 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75154 
[5.14]. 
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the School’.18 In the High Court, McHugh and Kirby JJ, in a minority judgment, 
agreed with the HREOC finding of less favourable treatment:  
That less favourable treatment consisted of the school denying him benefits available 
to other students and subjecting him to detriments not suffered by other students. That 
the High School denied Mr Hoggan those benefits and subjected him to those 
detriments is not open to doubt. The educational authority denied, and continues to 
deny, him access to the benefits of an education at the High School, suspended him 
from the school on several occasions and ultimately expelled him (or excluded him, if 
you like) from the school and its facilities.19
While the focus of the majority judges in the High Court in Purvis was firmly on the 
comparator aspect of direct discrimination, it is interesting to note some sympathy, 
perhaps, for the respondent’s ‘more favourable’ argument in the separate judgment of 
Callinan J, who was clearly impressed by the respondent’s treatment of Daniel 
Hoggan:  
After a very great investment of time, resources, energy, expertise, money and 
compassion, on 3 December 1997, the first respondent determined that it could no 
longer provide a place for Daniel Hoggan within its mainstream classes at the South 
Grafton High School which it funded and conducted.20 
It could be argued, however, that to postulate the provision of resources to 
accommodate a student with disability as ‘more favourable treatment’ is inconsistent 
with an understanding of disability as a social construct which can be mitigated by 
social adjustment.  Indeed, the ‘more favourable’ treatment assertion in Purvis, like 
that made in P, resonates an outmoded ‘charity’ model of disability which positions 
people with disabilities as the ‘fortunate recipients’ of the largesse of others rather 
than as citizens entitled to inclusion.  Further, to argue that the allocation of special 
resources is more favourable treatment is not consistent with the clear policy of anti-
discrimination legislation which anticipates that such resources may be required to 
 
18 Ibid 75172 [6.4] .   
19 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 136 [134]. 
20 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 164 [239]. 
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remove a discriminatory disadvantage.  QADA for example explicitly provides that 
‘[i]n determining whether a person treats, or proposes to treat a person with an 
impairment less favourably than another person is or would be treated in 
circumstances that are the same or not materially different, the fact that the person 
with the impairment may require special services or facilities is irrelevant’.21 
Communitarian theory, by contrast, acknowledges that people with disabilities are 
entitled to a ‘distribution of goods’ as a corollary of their position as citizens in an 
inclusive society.22 Tam issues the blunt reminder that people with disabilities 
‘should have confidence that society as a whole is on their side, and should not be 
made to feel isolated as troublemakers who refuse to accept their lot’.23 
C ‘Individualized’ Treatment 
In P it was further argued that P’s treatment was not less favourable because ‘it was 
the form of education which was most suited to P’s needs’.24 The respondent’s case, 
on this point, focused on s 12 of the Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld): 
(1) For every student attending a State educational institution established 
pursuant to ss. 13, 14 or 15(1)(c), there shall be provided a program of 
instruction in such subjects of such duration as the Minister approves that: 
 
a) has regard to the age, ability, aptitude and development of the student 
concerned; 
b) is an integral element within the total range of educational services 
offered with the approval of the Minister first had and obtained; 
c) takes account and promotes continuity of the student’s learning 
experiences; 
d) recognizes and takes account of the nature of knowledge; 
e) has regard to whether enrolment is compulsory or non-compulsory. 
 
21 QADA s 10 (5). 
22 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 198. 
23 Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship (1998) 137. 
24 P [1995] 1 QADR 755, 777.  
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Relying on s 12, the position of the respondent was that ‘P was not treated differently, 
but was simply provided a program of instruction in subjects and of a duration that 
had regard to his age, ability, aptitude and development and the other matters dealt 
with in s 12 of the Education Act’.25 At the time P was enrolled at Rasmussen State 
School, as a matter of policy, each Queensland school student with a disability was 
provided with an individualized education program or plan (IEP):         
An IEP is simply a written statement of the target curriculum areas and intended 
learning outcomes for an individual, and usually involves input from the student, 
teacher, parents and other personnel such as counsellors and speech pathologists 
…The curriculum priorities and long term goals for a student with special needs may 
be very similar to those planned for the majority of students in the class … or they 
may involve modified or alternative curricula. 26 
According to the respondent, P’s treatment was not different because certainly each 
student with a disability and, at least notionally, on the basis of the Education 
(General Provisions) Act s 12, each student without a disability is required to be 
treated ‘individually’.  Further, it was argued P’s treatment was not ‘less favourable’ 
but particularly suited to his needs.  Commissioner Keim acknowledged that the 
proposed transfer of P ‘did involve the exercise of powers and duties of providing a 
program of instruction comprehended by Section 12 of the Act’.27 Nevertheless, he 
found that P had been subjected to less favourable treatment.  The less favourable 
treatment lay, according to Commissioner Keim, in the fact that P’s choice of school 
had been curtailed. 
 
25 Ibid 774.   
26 P Foreman (ed), Integration and Inclusion in Australia (1996) 136.  In 2005, Education Queensland 
began phasing in a new scheme whereby an IEP is to be replaced with Education Adjustment Programs 
(EAP).  See Part III B, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy, n 79.  
27 P [1995] 1 QADR 755, 776. 
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Commissioner Keim identified three aspects of the proposed transfer of P as less 
favourable: 
• ‘… it was less favourable because … his mother desired that the education he 
receive be provided at his local school’. 
 
• ‘ … there was necessarily a disadvantage in being forced to change from a school  
where one had a certain familiarity and various levels of attachment to existing 
teachers and students and other staff to one where one was a new enrolee’. 
 
• ‘ … whereas other students without the impairment were able to receive an 
education suitable to their needs at their local school and at a local school of their 
choice, P was placed in a position where he could only received education adjudged 
suitable to him which neither he nor his parents chose and which was not his local 
school’.28 
•
These three aspects all derive, it could be argued, from the denial by the respondent of 
a ‘right’ of P’s family to send P to a school of their choice.  Essentially, P’s treatment 
was less favourable because while the notional child without P’s impairment could 
choose freely, P was to be ‘placed’ at a school ‘adjudged suitable to him’.  
Commissioner Keim provided, perhaps, a more elaborate version of the finding by 
Commissioner Holmes of less favourable treatment in L which also concerned a child 
who had been excluded from her mainstream school pending relocation to a special 
education facility: 
That [L’s] treatment, and proposed treatment, by way of suspension and exclusion, 
was ‘less favourable’ I have no doubt; it had the effect of closing an educational 
option to her which would not have been closed in the absence of her impairment. 29 
While Commissioner Keim considered a reference by P’s counsel to the closing of an 
educational option as of ‘only limited assistance’,30 the findings in L and P both focus 
on the curtailment of choice.  In L, less favourable treatment was found in the closing 
of an option, in P, in the imposition of a placement. 
 
28 Ibid 783. 
29 L [1995] 1 QADR 207, 211.  
30 P [1995] 1 QADR 755, 777. 
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It is interesting to note, in this context, that since P, two members of the High Court 
of Australia appear to have accepted curtailment of choice as amounting to ‘less 
favourable treatment’.  The minority judges in Purvis, McHugh and Kirby JJ, 
acknowledged that Daniel Hoggan had experienced ‘less favourable treatment’ in that 
he had ‘been denied a valuable choice, that is, to be enrolled in a mainstream 
school’.31 
D ‘Best’ Treatment 
In the HREOC hearing of the Purvis case it was also argued by the respondent that it 
was in the ‘best interests’ of Daniel Hoggan that he be transferred to a special school. 
Daniel’s parents, however, were of the view that ‘a fully integrated education would 
be the best course for Daniel’.32 Commissioner Innes, like Commissioner Keim in P,
suggested less favourable treatment in the curtailment of choice, referring to Article 
26 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘Parents have a prior right to 
choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children’. Commissioner 
Keim,33 and Commissioner Innes, both implied a presumption that a mainstream 
education is, in fact, in the ‘best interests’ of the child, citing with approval the 
finding of Professor Alston, ACT Discrimination Commissioner, in Dalla Costa v the 
ACT Department of Health.34 In Dalla Costa the complainant child had been 
transferred to a special school which had the effect that he could no longer access 
speech pathology services provided by the ‘mainstream’ ACT Child Health 
Department, but was permitted access only to the services provided by the 
 
31 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 137 [141]. 
32 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75163 
[5.21]. 
33 P [1995] 1 QADR 755, 780. 
34 Dalla Costa v the ACT Department of Health (1994) EOC ¶92-633 (‘Dalla Costa’). 
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Community Disability Service of the Housing and Community Services Bureau.  The 
complainant argued that discrimination had occurred in that the ‘mainstream’ option 
was no longer available.  The respondent argued that the treatment provided by the 
Community Disability Service was more suited to the complainant’s needs and 
therefore not less favourable – the same argument used in relation to both P and 
Daniel Hoggan.  Professor Alston criticized the ACT policy as ‘exclusionary’: 
[The decision] was justified on the grounds that the Department could not afford to 
permit parents to choose an option which it believed to be clearly inferior for that 
child under the circumstances. 
 
But this goes to the heart of the philosophy of mainstreaming and, of more direct 
relevance, for the determination of this complaint, the requirements of the 
Discrimination Act and the concepts of equal opportunity and equal citizenship which 
underlie this act and other Australian discrimination legislation…The question is 
whether the mainstreaming option is so unthinkable as to justify an exclusionary 
policy which simply does not countenance the option.  Unless absolute discretion is 
to be vested in the relevant Department officials it would seem essential that some 
room be left for parents, and, where appropriate, the child, to choose an option that 
the experts consider to be inferior. 35 
Inclusion is regarded by communitarians as a fundamental right of people with 
disability.  Further, it is an important tenet of communitarian education that it is 
delivered to each child in his or her own community.  In Queensland, when students 
are denied access to their local mainstream school they may face further curtailment 
of choice in respect of which schools are available to them.  They may be referred to 
special education units or schools which ‘cluster’ resources appropriate to a class of 
impairment.36 The unit or school considered appropriate for a particular child’s 
needs, unfortunately, may not be located in the student’s own community.  If the 
student chooses a special school within their community but not set up for their 
 
35 Ibid 77370. 
36 See Education Queensland, ‘Curriculum Studies 05: Education Provision for Students with 
Disabilities’ Department of Education Manual (‘CS-05’). See Part III B, Chapter 4: Queensland 
Education Policy. 
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particular impairment there is no guarantee that they will receive the special services 
and facilities required to address their impairment.37 
II  LESS FAVOURABLE TREATMENT: A SUBJECTIVE ENQUIRY 
It is clear from P and from the HREOC hearing in Purvis that whether treatment in 
education is less favourable is to be determined subjectively with preference given to 
the view of the complainant.38 In both cases an almost overwhelming amount of 
expert evidence was tendered as to what was ‘best’ for each complainant in terms of 
their schooling.  In neither case was this evidence considered relevant to the 
determination of whether treatment was less favourable.  In Daniel Hoggan’s case, 
there was even evidence that suggested that if the complainant had remained at his 
preferred school his health could have suffered.  Yet this evidence was not held 
relevant to the determination that his treatment was less favourable:  
Where the respondent…may see attendance by Daniel at the Support Unit as more 
beneficial for him this is not a relevant consideration when assessing his exclusion 
from SGHS as this view was not held by Mr Purvis. Irrespective of whether the 
respondent is of the view that it would be more beneficial for Daniel, it could still 
constitute less favourable treatment for the purposes of the Act. 39 
While anti-discrimination legislation prohibits discrimination in the ‘education area’, 
the bitter disputes in cases like L, P and Purvis prompt the question ‘what is 
 
37Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Education of Students with Disabilities (2002) (‘Senate Report’) 37-8, [3.17]-[3.18].  
38 The approach in these cases accords with the approach taken in employment cases.  See, for example 
Commonwealth v Human Rights And Equal Opportunity Commission (1993) 119 ALR 133, 152 
(Wilcox J): ‘I do not think it is legitimate to deny that a person is treated less favourably simply 
because someone else might prefer the treatment offered by the alleged discriminator than that 
provided to persons of a different marital status.  Where there are both advantages and disadvantages of 
each course of treatment, whether one alternative is more or less favourable than the other will usually 
be a matter of personal preference.  Where there is a mixture of advantages and disadvantages it is not 
for the employer or the Commission to impose a preference’.  This passage was cited with approval by 
Commissioner Innes in his decision in the Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of 
Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75171-2 [6.3]. 
39 Ibid 75172 [6.3]. 
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education?’  In cases such as L, P and Purvis, the complainants and the respondents 
are clearly arguing from fundamentally different understandings of the nature and 
purpose of education.  For the complainants, school is as much, if not more, about 
social interaction and acceptance as about academic achievement.  This view is 
clearly in close accord with the understanding of education postulated by 
communitarians.  Communitarians emphasise both the explicit and the implicit 
curriculum and argue that valuable lessons are learned through both.40 The parent 
advocates in P and Purvis, like communitarians, see a mainstream education as both 
an indicator of and preparation for citizenship.  For the respondents, however, the 
focus is clearly on educational ‘attainment’.  Their assessment of what is ‘best’ for the 
complainant child is based squarely on the explicit curriculum despite policy 
protestations about the importance of inclusion as a benchmark of civil society.41 For 
the complainants the ‘best education’ is the one they choose – and that, the cases 
suggest, is inclusive.  For the respondents the ‘best’ education is the one most suited 
to the complainants’ objectively assessed needs.   
 
While a detailed enquiry is beyond the scope of the present research, it is interesting 
to speculate also about the educational philosophies held by the various members of 
courts and tribunals called upon to adjudicate these mainstreaming disputes, and the 
influence such philosophies may – subconsciously – exert on their deliberations.  
Only Commissioner Innes in Purvis has explicitly supported a ‘broader’ definition of 
education, consistent with a communitarian position, stating ‘I am satisfied that 
learning is a primary function of schools, but that social activity and interaction also 
 
40 See Part I, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
41 See Part III, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
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play an important part in the overall learning process’.42 Commissioner Innes is 
bluntly a strong supporter of ‘inclusion’: ‘I am not prepared to consider what amounts 
to “separate but equal” or segregated education.  I am satisfied that such education is, 
by its nature, discriminatory’.43 Further, Commissioner Innes has criticised the 
‘negative views about teaching children with disabilities held by some teachers’44 and 
found a compensable detriment to Daniel Hoggan in the fact that there was a failure 
on the part of the respondent to ‘provide teachers with training or awareness 
programs’ which impacted on the discriminatory treatment which Daniel received.45 
Some Justices of the Federal Court and High Court hearing the Purvis case, however, 
were clearly alarmed by the formal educational detriment which Daniel Hoggan’s 
inclusion may have continued to cause to other students, implying, perhaps, an 
understanding of education as involving predominantly scholastic attainment rather 
than social involvement.  Spender, Gyles and Conti JJ, for example, were alarmed not 
only by the potential impact of Daniel Hoggan’s behaviour on the safety of others but 
also on the ‘function of education’ and ‘educational endeavours’ of others: 
It must steadily be borne in mind that the expulsion ... followed repetitive anti-social 
and violent conduct towards other students and staff which was plainly unacceptable 
in a primary school.  It was disturbing to the function of education and threatened the 
safety of other students and staff.46 
Most importantly, what is the position of the school and those at the school while the 
availability of an exemption is being decided? The staff and other students will live 
with the threat of injury or abuse, may suffer actual injury or abuse, and classes and 
other educational endeavours will be disrupted.47 
42 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75150 
[5.8]. 
43 Ibid 75178 [7.2]. 
44 Ibid 75175 [6.6.6]. 
45 Ibid 75170 [7.4]. 
46 Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2002) 117 FCR 237, 247 [25]. 
47 Ibid 247-8 [27].  
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Callinan J, in the High Court, expressed concern that to construct the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) as meaning that an education institution was 
compelled to include a potentially violent student, such as Daniel Hoggan, may offend 
the Constitution by taking the legislation beyond the scope of the heads of legislative 
power allocated to the Commonwealth in the Constitution to interfere with the States’ 
performance of their legitimate functions of provision of education and the criminal 
law.48 The argument of Callinan J implies, however, not only concern about a breach 
of the Constitution but a view of education as a formal process constructed around the 
‘delivery of services’ and the ‘maintenance of standards’: 
Disruption of a class, violence towards other students and teachers, and departures 
from the standards which the staff of a school seek to maintain clearly have a capacity 
to interfere with the provision of education by the State. It is arguable that federal 
legislation imposing upon a State educational authority the adoption of measures 
which would appear to require it to tolerate behaviour which is otherwise proscribed 
as criminal, or is detrimental to the education of the general body of students, or 
which requires the State to alter the manner in which it ordinarily provides 
educational services , may have a capacity to burden or affect a State government in 
the performance of its functions , or unduly interfere with them.49 
III LESS FAVOURABLE TREATMENT: FUTURE TRENDS 
To date, the most contentious, perhaps, of the decided Australian education 
discrimination cases have been stimulated by the exclusion of students for whom 
inclusion in a mainstream environment has been demanded.  These cases have 
suggested that the complainants’ right to choose – even if their choice is arguably, 
objectively, ‘inferior’ to other options – is of paramount importance.  However, 
whether limits to freedom of choice of an objectively ‘inferior’ education will be set, 
or should be set, by courts and tribunals remains unclear.  The implications of one 
issue raised in Professor Alston’s decision in Dalla Costa have, perhaps, not been 
 
48 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 172-5 [266]-[271]. 
49 Ibid 172. 
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explored in subsequent cases: ‘The question is whether the mainstreaming option is so 
unthinkable as to justify an exclusionary policy which simply does not countenance 
the option’. 50 The answer in Dalla Costa, of course, was that inclusion was not 
‘unthinkable’ even though it may, ‘objectively’, have been considered an ‘inferior’ 
option.  Will a future tribunal, however, find on the facts of a particular case that 
inclusion is ‘so unthinkable’ that to deny it is not discriminatory?  Certainly 
communitarians have postulated a justifiable limit on inclusion where ‘there is a total 
incapacity to learn’51 – whatever that may mean.  It is true that, to date, tribunals have 
often relied on the unjustifiable hardship exemption to render exclusion lawful on the 
basis that inclusion is ‘unthinkable’ for others affected by it.52 As yet, however, no 
tribunal has been prepared to decide that inclusion is ‘unthinkable’ for the 
complainant. 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court, however, has acknowledged in Eaton v Bryant County 
Board of Education,53 that ‘while integration should be recognised as the norm of 
general application because of the benefits it generally provides, a presumption in 
favour of integrated schooling could work to the disadvantage of pupils who require 
special education to achieve equality’.54 This suggests contemplation of a situation 
where the accommodation of a student’s impairments can only be achieved in a 
special education setting.  In the abstract, it is difficult to contemplate a situation 
where accommodation in the form of special services and facilities cannot, at a cost, 
be delivered in mainstream setting.  Perhaps the judgment in Eaton contemplates a 
 
50 Dalla Costa (1994) EOC ¶92-633, 77370. 
51 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 221. 
52 See, for example, L [1995] 1 QADR 207, P [1995] 1 QADR 755, and K v N School (No 3) [1996] 1 
QADR 620. 
53 Eaton v Bryant County Board of Education (1997) 1 SCR 241. 
54 Ibid [66]. 
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different set of parental and student expectations of education.  For some parents and 
students, like those in P and Purvis, the indicator of equality is experience-based and 
represented by student inclusion.  For, others, perhaps, the indicator of equality is 
outcome-based and represented by student achievement.  While the former view of 
education is consistent with the communitarian position that education is not so much 
an instrument of opportunity as of inclusion, there is certainly evidence that some 
parents and students prefer a special education to the mainstream experience.55 The 
fact that special education units still exist in Australia and are populated by students 
who do not complain that they have been refused inclusion in a mainstream school 
must suggest that there are many who prefer measurable ‘achievement’ to inclusion.  
 
There has been no Australian case where discrimination has been found in the denial 
of a segregated education, but the reasoning in Eaton suggests that such a case could 
succeed.  The closest Australian case examples are, perhaps, Hashish v Minister for 
Education for Queensland56 and State of Victoria v Bacon.57 In Hashish, the 
complainant sought to continue his enrolment at the Narbethong School for the 
Visually Handicapped beyond his eighteenth birthday.  Ultimately the complainant 
failed, the Queensland Court of Appeal holding, in a majority decision, that the 
Queensland Education Minister did not have the statutory power to make a place 
available to Dean Hashish once he turned eighteen.  In the Court of Appeal the 
complaint proceeded on the basis of age rather than impairment discrimination, 
because Dean, upon turning eighteen, had ceased to be ‘disabled’ for the purposes of 
the Education Act which sets the parameters of the powers of the Minister to provide 
 
55 Senate Report, above n 37, 37-8, [3.28]-[3.30]. 
56 Hashish v Minister for Education for Queensland [1998] 2 Qd R 18 (‘Hashish’). 
57 State of Victoria v Bacon & Ors [1998] 4 VR 269. 
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education services to students.58 In Bacon, a similar case, several students with mild 
intellectual impairment complained of discrimination when a policy was implemented 
restricting the availability of a state-funded education beyond the age of 18 to only 
those students enrolled for the Victorian Certificate of Education (VCE).  The 
complainants were not enrolled for the VCE and, as a result, lost their places in a 
State funded special education facility.  The Victorian Court of Appeal found that the 
complainants had proved indirect discrimination in that an unreasonable term had 
been imposed that they must be enrolled in the VCE to receive state funding and they 
could not, on account of their intellectual impairment, comply with the term.59 
New Zealand, however, has had a case turning on parental demand for a special 
education rather than a mainstream education for their children: Daniels v Attorney-
General.60 In 1998, a policy decision, informed by a review of special education 
services and a strong policy preference for inclusion, was made that all special 
education facilities in New Zealand would be disestablished and resources and 
students would be reallocated to mainstream schools.  A group of concerned parents 
of students with disabilities, including Shirleen Daniels, was alarmed by the decision 
that their children would be denied the opportunity to be educated in a facility 
designed to meet their special educational needs.  They sought judicial review of the 
decision and also claimed that it was discriminatory and, thus, in breach of the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (NZ)61 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ).62 They succeeded in 
 
58 See Part II, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
59 Proof of indirect discrimination does not require proof of less favourable treatment.  The mechanics 
of indirect discrimination are analysed in Chapter 12: Indirect Discrimination. 
60 Daniels v Attorney-General [2002] HC AK M1516/SW99 (Unreported, Baragwanath J, 3 April 
2002); Attorney-General v Daniels [2003] 2 NZLR 742. 
61 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 19(1): Everyone has the right to freedom from 
discrimination on the grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993.
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the New Zealand High Court and, following an appeal by the respondent, in the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal.  Ultimately the decision to disestablish the schools was 
impugned on the basis of illegality – the Secretary for Education had failed to observe 
statutory notification procedures required by the Education Act before shutting the 
schools.  Although the content and nature of the ‘right’ to education in New Zealand 
was discussed at length in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal the question 
posed by the complainants of whether the closures amounted to discrimination was 
ultimately not addressed.  The Daniels case, therefore, serves as a warning that 
discrimination could be alleged in the failure to provide education in a special 
education facility to a student with a disability but it gives little insight into how such 
a claim of discrimination would be dealt with by an Australian court. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
The argument that a student with impairment who has been excluded from a 
mainstream school has not been subjected to less favourable treatment is perhaps the 
respondent’s argument most overtly influenced by a ‘medical’ rather than a ‘social’ 
model of disability.  To construe the provision of extra services or facilities as 
‘benefits’ rather than as measures designed to mitigate the effect of impairment and to 
optimise opportunities for inclusion is clearly reflective of an understanding of 
disability as an individual rather than a social ‘problem’, and of people with 
disabilities as recipients of charitable support rather than as citizens with a right to 
inclusion.  This approach to disability is not consistent with the policy of anti-
discrimination legislation which recognises the paradox that ‘different’ treatment may 
 
62 Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ) s 21(1)(h): For the purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination are…disability.  Discrimination in access to educational establishments is prohibited in 
Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ) s 57.  Such discrimination includes, at s 57(1)(c), ‘to deny or restrict 
access to any benefits or services provided by the [educational] establishment’. 
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be required to deliver equality by providing that ‘[i]n determining whether a person 
treats, or proposes to treat a person with an impairment less favourably than another 
person is or would be treated in circumstances that are the same or not materially 
different, the fact that the person with the impairment may require special services or 
facilities is irrelevant’.63 Nor is this approach consistent with the communitarian view 
that the right to an inclusive education is a corollary of citizenship.64 Inclusion of 
people with impairment in mainstream schools not only acknowledges their 
entitlement to education on the same basis as other citizens, it provides access to the 
essential lessons which allow them to operate as citizens within society.  Further, by 
replicating the broader structural objective of an inclusive society beyond the school 
room, the inclusive school prepares citizens without impairment to be accepting of 
citizens who are ‘different’.  Communitarians do acknowledge that the right to an 
inclusive education may be denied when it interferes with majority rights.65 It is 
clearly a rejection of communitarian principles, however, to construct exclusion as 
preferential rather than discriminatory treatment by arguing that a ‘special’ education 
is a superior education for a person with impairment.  
 
It must be conceded that there are people with impairments who do not wish to access 
an inclusive education.  There are people with impairments, as well as education 
authorities, who believe that a ‘special’ education outside a mainstream setting is their 
best education option.  The answer to accommodating  the preferences of both those 
who do and those who do not seek a mainstream placement lies, perhaps, in the 
approach taken by Commissioner Keim in P and by the minority in Purvis – an aspect 
 
63 QADA s 10 (5). 
64 See Part III, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education for a detailed discussion of the rationale of 
inclusive education. 
65 See Part III A, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education for a detailed discussion of the limits to the 
right to an inclusive education. 
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of the right to education is the right to enrol in one’s school of choice.66 To refuse to 
enrol a student with an impairment in a mainstream school is to deny that student an 
alternative available to those without the impairment.  This closing of an option is of 
itself ‘less favourable treatment’. 
 
66 See Part I C above and, particularly, nn 28-31.  It is, to my knowledge, an untested paradox that 
students without impairments are unlikely to be accepted as students as special schools.  The effect of 
the new Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) ss 165-7 is, however, that only people with a 
disability, as defined in s 165, can be enrolled in a school which provides special education as defined 
in Schedule 4.  It should also be acknowledged that there are limits which curtail the choice of school 
of all students.   Certain schools, for example, have enrolment management plans which limit access to 
students living within a specified geographical area. These plans are legitimatised by legislation. For 
the current Queensland regime see Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) Part 3.  Certain 
independent schools are accessible only to students who have the means to pay the tuition fees.  A 
close examination of these and other limits on the right to school of choice is beyond the scope of the 
present project. 
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CHAPTER 12 
INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION 
 
Indirect discrimination provisions in anti-discrimination legislation1 address 
discriminatory terms and conditions embedded in the policies and practices of 
institutions.  Such policies and practices may be ‘facially neutral’ but they operate to 
exclude people with disabilities who cannot conform to them.  Dawson and Toohey JJ 
compared the operation of direct discrimination and indirect discrimination in the 
important High Court indirect disability discrimination case, Waters v Public 
Transport Corporation:
Both direct and indirect discrimination ... entail one person being treated less 
favourably than another person. The major difference is that in the case of direct 
discrimination the treatment is on its face less favourable, whereas in the case of 
indirect discrimination the treatment is on its face neutral but the impact of the 
treatment on one person when compared with another is less favourable. 2 
It appears that in many situations the complainant can choose to formulate his or her 
case as either one of direct or indirect discrimination.3 In respect of claims brought 
under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA), there has, until recently, 
been an advantage in formulating claims in the student area as direct discrimination 
claims because the unjustifiable hardship exemption was not available to respondents 
once a student is enrolled.4 There was suggestion, for example, that the high profile 
 
1 See, for example, Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) ss 9(b) and 11, Disability 
Discrimination Act 1991 (Cth) (DDA) s 6. 
2 Waters v. Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR. 349, 392. 
3 See, for example, Minns v State of New South Wales [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 
June 2002) (‘Minns’)[245]. 
4 After the decision of the High Court in Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education 
and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92 (‘Purvis’) the DDA was amended to make the exemption available 
after enrolment.  See Disability Discrimination Amendment (Education Standards) Act 2005 s 3 and 
DDA s 22(4).  See also Part V, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
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Purvis case,5 an exclusion case, would have been more appropriately pressed as an 
indirect discrimination case.6
It appears, also, that complainants can argue ‘alternative’ cases.  That is, they can 
present the same fact scenario as supporting a claim of direct discrimination, or in the 
alternative, of indirect discrimination.  Raphael FM, in the disability discrimination in 
education case, Minns v State of New South Wales7 rejected the argument that a 
complainant must make an election whether to proceed on the basis of direct or 
indirect discrimination.  Raphael FM cited, in support of this conclusion, the 
reasoning of Emmett J in the Federal Court hearing of Purvis8 and of Wilcox J in Tate 
v Rafin.9 Some cases involve a combination of allegations of direct and indirect 
discrimination.  In  I v O’Rourke and Corinda State High School and Minister for 
Education for Queensland,10 for example, the complainant succeeded in an action 
based on direct discrimination but failed to prove that the respondent had indirectly 
discriminated against her.  The complainants in Cowell,11 S on behalf of M&C v 
Director General, Department of Education and Training 12 and Minns all brought 
unsuccessful combination claims. 
 
5 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92. 
6See, for example, ibid [3] (Gleeson CJ); Transcript of Proceedings, Alexander Purvis on behalf of 
Daniel Hoggan v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) and Another 
(High Court of Australia, Gleeson CJ,11 November 2003) [3]; New South Wales (Department of 
education) v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2001) 186 ALR 69, 78 [40].    
7 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) [245]. 
8 New South Wales (Department of Education) v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
(2001) 186 ALR 69, 78 [40], 81[59] and [60].   
9 Tate v Rafin [2000] FCA 1582 (Unreported, Wilcox J, 8 November 2000) [60].  
10 I v O’Rourke and Corinda State High School and Minister for Education for Queensland [2001] 
QADT 1 (31 January 2001) (‘Corinda’). 
11 Mrs J, on behalf of herself and AJ v A School [1998] HREOC No. H97/168 (Unreported, Wilson P, 
23 March 1998) (‘Cowell’). The identity of the complainant, Fleur Cowell, was initially suppressed.  
12 S on behalf of M & C v Director General, Department of Education & Training [2001] NSWADT 43 
(Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members McDonald and Mooney, 21 March 2001) (‘M&C’). 
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The classic example of indirect discrimination is the building accessible only by 
steps.13 This limited form of entering or exiting the building places a condition upon 
entry which cannot be met by many people with physical impairments – a condition 
that one must be able to negotiate steps in order to access to the building. The link 
between indirect discrimination and the nature of disability as a social construct is 
clear – the way society is ‘built’ causes, or, at least, exacerbates the disability endured 
by people who are impaired.14 Under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) 
(QADA) indirect discrimination ‘happens’ if a ‘term’ is imposed, with which a person 
with a protected attribute, such as impairment, does not or is not able to comply, but 
with which a higher proportion of people without the attribute comply or are able to 
comply. Further, the term must be ‘not reasonable’.15 ‘Term’ is defined to include 
‘condition, requirement or practice, whether or not written’.16 Typically, 
discriminatory terms are not ‘written’ but inferred from the circumstances of the 
treatment of a complainant.  It is not necessary that the person imposing the term is 
aware of the indirect discrimination.17 This reflects the fact that discriminatory terms 
are frequently embedded in the culture of an institution rather than consciously 
constructed to discriminate.  
 
There are fewer strategies for exclusion extrapolated from indirect discrimination 
provisions of Australian anti-discrimination legislation than from direct 
discrimination provisions and associated exemptions.  This is to be explained, 
perhaps, by the requirement that a discriminatory term be ‘not reasonable’ before it 
will be unlawful.  This requirement is an express limit on the remedial scope of the 
 
13 See Cocks v State of Queensland (1994) 1 QADR 43. 
14 See Part II B, Chapter 3: the Meaning of Disability. 
15 QADA s 11(1). 
16 QADA s 11(4). 
17 QADA s 11(3). 
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indirect discrimination provisions and operates to protect discriminatory terms which 
it is not ‘reasonable’ to impugn.  There have, however, been some attempts to avoid 
liability constructed from each of the elements of indirect discrimination.  First it has 
been argued that no ‘term’ has been imposed on a complainant.18 Secondly it has been 
argued that the complainant, or, in a refinement, a ‘base group’ to which he or she 
belongs, can comply with a prima facie discriminatory term.19 Each of these 
strategies will be examined in addition to the factors deemed relevant to the 
reasonableness enquiry.20 
I IMPOSITION OF A TERM 
A Formulating the Discriminatory ‘Term or Requirement’ 
Indirect discrimination in the education context arises when a ‘term’ or ‘requirement’, 
a ‘rule’, perhaps, is imposed on a student with an impairment.  Education institutions 
are, of course, institutions which are renowned for running according to ‘rules’.  
Compliance with ‘rules’ is expected and accepted as a ‘term’ of a student’s enrolment.  
As the New South Wales Equal Opportunity Board has brusquely stated, ‘[n]o 
sensible student would dispute that it is reasonable for a community, an organisation 
or a school to set rules and standards of conduct for its members/students.  The point 
is so trite it needs no further discussion’.21 The basic rule is, of course, that if the 
institution’s rules are not obeyed there will be sanctions.  It is also fundamental that 
the rules are to be applied ‘equally’ to all.  Education institutions have traditionally 
been places where all are treated the ‘same’ in order to achieve ‘fairness’.  In the 
 
18 See Part I, below. 
19 See Part II, below. 
20 See Part III, below. 
21M&C [2001] NSWADT 43 (Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members McDonald and Mooney, 
21 March 2001) [123]. M&C is a case brought under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) 
(NSWADA). 
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education setting, however, there has been some delay in recognition of the truth that 
‘fairness’, and ‘equality of opportunity’, may require different treatment.  As McHugh 
J explained in  Waters v. Public Transport Corporation, ‘discrimination can arise just 
as readily from an act which treats as equals those who are different as it can from an 
act which treats differently persons whose circumstances are not materially 
different’.22 Therefore, there is inevitable potential for a clash of imperatives when a 
student with a disability is enrolled in an education institution – the fundamental rule 
that rules apply ‘equally’ to all clashes with the tenet of discrimination law that rules 
must be varied to accommodate individual difference.  Minns and M&C, for example, 
are cases where the inflexible application of school rules has given rise to allegations 
of indirect discrimination.  
 
Potentially offensive ‘terms’ are not, however, limited to the ‘school rules’ overtly 
stated to students and their families.  The cases demonstrate that there are myriad 
terms implicit in the structure and organisation of an educational institution.  In 
Travers v State of New South Wales,23for example, a student with incontinence caused 
by spina bifida was denied access to the nearest toilet to her classroom.  The evidence 
was that, to avoid toileting accidents, the student needed to access a toilet within 12 
seconds.  The relevant requirement inferred from the facts was that the student ‘use 
the toilets which were more than 12 seconds away’.24 In Kinsela v Queensland 
University of Technology,25 the complainant used a wheelchair.  The plans for his 
graduation ceremony, at the Concert Hall in the Queensland Performing Arts 
complex, were that instead of entering the stage from the auditorium with all other 
 
22 Waters v. Public Transport Corporation (1992) 173 CLR 349, 402. 
23 Travers v New South Wales (2001) 163 FLR 99 (Federal Magistrates Court).  
24 Ibid [60]. 
25Kinsela v Queensland University of Technology [1997] HREOC No H97/4 (Unreported, 
Commissioner Atkinson, 27 February 1997) (‘Kinsela’). 
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graduands, he would enter from the side of the stage to receive his degree.  The term 
imposed in that case was that ‘to take part in the degree ceremony fully with the other 
students, Mr Kinsela would have to be able to use steps’.26 In Clarke,27 the 
complainant, Jacob Clarke, was profoundly deaf and reliant on the assistance of an 
Auslan interpreter in class, yet Auslan assistance was not made available.  Here, the 
relevant requirement or condition was accepted by the Court as one that required 
Jacob ‘to participate in and receive classroom instruction without the assistance of an 
interpreter’.28 In Bishop v Sports Massage Training School Pty Ltd29 the complainant, 
who had dyslexia, narrowly failed a written examination causing him ‘a delay in his 
career and a significant loss of self-esteem’.30 The Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (HREOC) found that the respondent ‘required [Bishop] to 
complete the examination in the same two-hour period as the other, able-bodied 
students’.31 
B Strategy for Exclusion – No Term Imposed 
It can be seen that a ‘term’ may be applicable only to the complainant in a particular 
case and be derived from the specific circumstances of their particular disability.  It 
can also be seen that a degree of creativity and flexibility is tolerated in the drafting of 
terms.  Respondents have, nevertheless, argued that there has been no indirect 
discrimination in that no ‘term’ has been imposed on the complainant.  
 
26Ibid [14]. 
27Clarke v Catholic Education Office& Anor [2003] [2003]202 ALR 340.   
28 Ibid [45]. 
29 Bishop v Sports Massage Training School [2000] HREOC No H99/55 (Unreported, Commissioner 
Cavanough , 15 December 2000). 
30 Ibid [1]. 
31 Ibid. 
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In the DDA case, Ferguson v Department of Further Education,32 for example, the 
‘no term’ strategy was successfully employed.  The complainant, a Technical and 
Further Education (TAFE), student was profoundly deaf and relied on the assistance 
of Auslan interpreters to access course materials.  The substance of his complaint was 
that TAFE had limited his access to educational benefits in that he took seven years to 
complete a course which most students completed in two and a half years.  The 
evidence was that during his studies the amount of Auslan assistance he received 
varied from semester to semester.  He received a minimum of six hours a week, 
increasing at times to fifteen hours per week.  The complainant alleged indirect 
discrimination arising from a requirement that he ‘undertake his learning’ with only 
‘limited assistance from an Auslan interpreter’.33 Raphael FM found, however, that no 
such condition was imposed in that the complainant had ‘received all the interpreting 
assistance which he could usefully handle’.34 The Ferguson decision resonates cases 
like Brackenreg,35 W36 and Chung37where it was found, when applying a direct 
discrimination matrix, that any detriment to the complainant was caused by the 
complainant’s disability and not by any ‘less favourable treatment’.38 In Ferguson,
Raphael FM found that ‘[t]he reason that Mr Ferguson did not complete the course 
within three and a half years was not because he did not have sufficient Auslan 
interpreting time but because the course was simply too demanding for him’.39 
32 Ferguson v Department of Further Education [2005] FMCA 954 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 21 July 
2005) (‘Ferguson’). 
33 Ibid [1]. 
34 Ibid [34]. 
35 Brackenreg v Queensland University of Technology [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 
December 1999). 
36 W v Flinders University of South Australia [1998] HREOCA 19 (Unreported, Commissioner 
McEvoy, 24 June 1998). 
37 Chung v University of Sydney [2001] FMCA 94 (Unreported, Driver FM, 20 September 2001). 
38 See Part I A, Chapter 10: Causation. 
39Ferguson [2005] FMCA 954 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 21 July 2005) [32]. 
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The no term argument was also mounted, and, perhaps, more controversially, in the 
QADA case, Corinda. In Corinda, the complainant alleged indirect discrimination 
arising from the access restrictions she would face at venues chosen for a school 
formal and dinner.  Arguing that other, similar cases were wrongly decided,40 counsel 
for the respondent went so far as to allege that ‘[y]ou cannot get past the fact that 
people with disabilities are going to have to do some things differently.  What is 
wrong if you have a disability with using a stair-climber on the steps of the Greek 
Club?’41 The Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (QADT) rejected the 
respondent’s arguments and held that the word ‘term’ should be construed liberally 
‘in an effort to ensure that the objects of the legislation are achieved’.42 The QADT 
accepted that the following terms, idiosyncratic to the circumstances of the 
complainant, were imposed: 
The respondents in selecting the Greek Club proposed terms that:-  
- Persons wishing to access the Greek Club by its front entrance must be able to use 
steps without assistance;  
- Persons wishing to access the ballroom on the first floor must be able to use steps 
without assistance; and  
- Persons wishing to use the toilets in comfort, and with safety must not be in a 
wheelchair.  
And in selecting “the Island” [a floating restaurant barge] imposed terms that:-  
- Persons wishing to access the vessel with minimum risk must be able to be accessed 
without assistance; and  
- Persons wishing to use toilet facilities that were part of the vessel must not be using 
a wheel-chair; and  
- Persons wishing to use the vessel in the knowledge that arrangements were made for 
safe evacuation in the event of a fire or other emergency such as the vessel sinking 
must not be in a wheelchair.43 
40 Kinsela [1997] HREOC No H97/4 (Unreported, Commissioner Atkinson, 27 February 1997), Cocks 
v. State of Queensland (1994) 1 QADR 43. 
41 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [8.2.2.1]. 
42 Ibid [8.2.2.2.a]. 
43 Ibid [8.2.2.2]. 
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In the case of Demmery v Department of School Education,44 however, the New 
South Wales Equal Opportunity Commission found that the terms postulated from the 
context of that case were ‘curious’45 and was sympathetic to the argument that no 
terms had been imposed on the complainant.  Luke Demmery was born profoundly 
deaf.  He was enrolled in a mainstream class at the Kendall Central School in NSW. 
He received a cochlear implant during his first year at school.  The discrimination 
complaints related to his disrupted fourth year at the school when, owing to staffing 
problems, a succession of some six teachers had charge of his class from the 
beginning of the school year until he left the school in May.  The allegation was that a 
series of requirements was embedded in the school environment during the course of 
Luke’s placement in the disrupted class:  that Luke be capable of hearing unaided, 
that Luke not be delayed in his development of speech, language and communication 
skills; that Luke not have a cochlear implant; that Luke be able to cope well with 
unexpected changes in routine; that Luke be able to learn when other children in the 
class behave disruptively; that Luke be able to learn in spite of experiencing 10 
changes in class teacher involving six different teachers over a period of two months; 
and that Luke be confident and self-reliant.46 
The Tribunal criticised the ‘subjective’ approach taken by the complainant which 
involved having regard to ‘the potential for indirect discrimination in a situation’ and 
then looking at the situation ‘in reverse’ in order to ‘determine what requirements or 
conditions would give effect to that potential’.47 The Tribunal found that a more 
‘objective’ approach is required ‘to support the reality of the imposition of a 
 
44 Demmery v Department of School Education [1997] NSWEOT (Unreported, Judicial Member 
Ireland, Members Mooney and MacDonald, 26 November, 1997) (‘Demmery’). 
45 Ibid 22. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid 23. 
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requirement or condition’.48 Despite this criticism, the Tribunal examined the 
evidence relevant to each of the alleged requirements.  Ultimately, however, it was 
persuaded that only one ‘term’ had been imposed – that Luke be able to cope well 
with unexpected change.49 
In the Cowell case, too, an argument that no term had been imposed on the 
complainant was successful.  In that case, the complainant, Fleur Cowell, could not 
access the upstairs classroom where many of her classes were scheduled because of 
her mobility impairment.  The condition allegedly imposed was that Fleur ‘regularly 
attend classes which were located upstairs’.50 The President of the HREOC, Sir 
Ronald Wilson, found that no such condition had been imposed in that the school had 
offered to change Fleur’s ‘house’ to one which had its classes scheduled downstairs.51 
The Cowell family rejected this option and contended that Fleur’s existing house 
should, instead, be relocated downstairs.  
 
On account of the finding that no condition was imposed, Wilson P was not required 
to decide the ‘reasonableness’ of the alleged term.  The case suggests, however, that 
the ‘reasonableness’ of the complainant’s attitude to his or her ‘treatment’ may 
influence a tribunal’s decision on the point of whether a term has been imposed.  The 
strong implication was that the Cowell family had been ‘unreasonable’ to reject the 
change of house and that, as such, the Cowell family, and not the school, had 
subjected Fleur to any discriminatory term attaching to her ability to access upstairs 
classes.  Wilson P repeated the evidence of the Head of Fleur’s house that it would 
 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid 25. 
50 Cowell [1998] HREOC No. H97/168 (Unreported, Wilson P, 23 March 1998) [4.2]. 
51 Ibid. 
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have been very difficult to relocate the house ‘because it would have meant disrupting 
the existing arrangements applicable to 200 students’ and ‘the teachers go to 
considerable pains to create an appropriate learning environment in their allocated 
classrooms and are reluctant to move to different classrooms’.52 
It is interesting to reconsider, at this point, the comment of counsel for the respondent 
in the Corinda case that ‘[y]ou cannot get past the fact that people with disabilities are 
going to have to do some things differently. What is wrong if you have a disability 
with using a stair-climber on the steps of the Greek Club?’53 While his argument that 
no term was imposed on the complainant in that case was rejected, cases such as 
Cowell suggest that there is perhaps some persuasive power in the implication that 
there is ‘nothing wrong’ with expecting people with disabilities to make concessions 
to facilitate their own inclusion.  The ambit claim of the proponents of the social 
model of disability is that disability is a social construct which can be removed by the 
remodelling of society to remove obstacles to inclusion.  Even the proponents of this 
model accept, however, that there are some obstacles to inclusion which cannot be 
mitigated by social adjustment.  As noted in other chapters, this is a particular issue 
for people with intellectual impairments.54 Social adjustment cannot completely 
correct, for example, an impaired ability to process information and pass exams.55 
Counsel’s argument in Corinda and the approach of Wilson P in Cowell however, 
suggests a further limit on the social model of disability may be operative.  Did the 
complainants in those cases impose their own exclusionary ‘term’ by insisting on a 
‘major’ social change when they could have achieved the same degree of inclusion by 
 
52 Ibid.  Note that the influence on the reasonableness enquiry of the ability of a complainant to take 
steps mitigate their own disability is discussed in some detail, below.  See Part III D 1. 
53 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [8.2.2.1]. 
54 See Part II B, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
55 See Part I, Chapter 10: Causation. 
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making a ‘minor’ individual concession?  There are, of course, ideological 
imperatives at work in terms of constructing what actions are ‘major’ and what are 
‘minor’,56 but it appears that even tribunals and courts prepared to acknowledge that 
social change is necessary to allow the inclusion of people with disabilities, may 
require individuals to accept at least some individual responsibility for the mitigation 
of their own ‘limitations’.  Indeed, it is arguable that a disability model of this nature 
could be reconciled with the communitarian emphasis on mutual responsibility – on 
give and take.  Citizens must expect that in order to maintain a strong community it 
will, from time to time, be necessary for their individual objectives to be sublimated 
to what is best for the community.  The Responsive Community Platform, Etzioni’s 
statement of the core principles of communitarianism, warns that ‘[t]he exclusive 
pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on which we all 
depend and is destructive to our shared experiment in democratic self-government’.57 
II  COMPLIANCE WITH A TERM 
A Strategy for Exclusion: Compliance of the Complainant’s ‘Base Group’ 
Under the QADA, proof of indirect discrimination requires proof that ‘a person with 
an attribute’ cannot comply with the term imposed while ‘a higher proportion of 
people without the attribute’ can comply.58 The test is more generous than that 
stipulated in the DDA which requires that a ‘substantially higher proportion of persons 
without the disability’ must be able to comply before there is a remedy.59 
56 See the discussion of the impact of ideology on decision making at Part III D 1, below. 
57 Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda 
(1993) 258. 
58 QADA s 11(1). 
59 DDA s 6(a). 
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Although the only QADA cases on point did not address the controversy,60 two recent 
cases from other Australian jurisdictions, M&C and Minns, suggest that the required 
comparison may not be as straightforward as comparing the ability to comply of the 
complainant with the ability to comply of the majority of people.  The High Court 
case Banovic61 comprehensively, but somewhat confusingly, surveyed this 
comparison issue.  Different judges applied different formulae, but all agreed that it 
was necessary to identify a ‘base group’ for both the complainants in that case and a 
‘base group’ for the ‘substantially higher proportion of people’ with whom the ability 
to comply was to be compared.  Banovic was a case brought under the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) involving the discriminatory dismissal of women 
workers from a Newcastle steel mill on the basis of a ‘last on first off policy’.  It was 
ultimately held that this policy indirectly discriminated against women workers in that 
the respondents had only recently commenced hiring women in any significant 
numbers to redress the fact that, historically, the hiring practice had been skewed in 
favour of men.  Base groups were determined according to the timing of the change of 
hiring practice.  The complainants’ base group comprised those hired after the change 
in practice.  Their compliance ability was compared with that of a base group 
comprised of those hired before the change.  As such, the ‘last on first off’ policy 
affected women more than men in that a higher percentage of the female workforce 
than the male workforce had been hired in the period after the change in hiring 
practice. 
 
60 See I on behalf of BI v State of Queensland [2005] QADT 37 (Unreported, Dalton P, 14 December 
2005) [28] and Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001).  In Corinda,
President Copelin simply considered that the evidence supported the conclusion that ‘these issues of 
access…constituted a term with which the complainant was not able to comply and with which persons 
without a mobility impairment would be able to comply’: 8.2.2.2.c. It did count against the 
complainant, however, in the reasonableness enquiry, that there was no evidence called from other 
students with disabilities at Corinda High who may have been affected by the access arrangements: at 
10.1.1.D.a.  See n 167 below. 
61 Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165. 
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The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (‘NSWADA’) case M&C involved multiple 
claims of discrimination by two sisters.  It was alleged that one of the sisters, M, had 
been subject to indirect discrimination in that she was not able to comply with the 
discipline code imposed by her school.  She had been diagnosed with Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) which affected her behaviour.  The New 
South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSWADT) accepted, without 
question or discussion, that it was necessary for the complainant, M, to establish the 
base group to which she belonged as a necessary element of her case: 
To establish whether or not a group (or individuals within the group) is/are subject to 
indirect discrimination, it is first necessary to identify the pool of persons or group 
concerned.  In this case it appears to us that the relevant group is made up of those 
students suffering from ADD or ADHD who attend School 1. Obviously the wider 
group against whom the treatment of the subject group must be compared is the body 
of school students at this particular school. 62 
The Tribunal assumed that it is necessary for the complainant to be part of a ‘group’ 
for the requisite comparison to take place, and, further, that it is the compliance ability 
of the group, rather than the complainant individually, which is to be examined.  The 
NSWADA, like the DDA, and the QADA, however, simply states that it must be shown 
that the ‘aggrieved person does not or cannot comply’ with the requirement or 
condition imposed upon them.63 
M’s case of indirect discrimination failed because she failed to adduce evidence, 
which would have allowed the Tribunal to ‘define and quantify the status group with 
which M can be said to belong’64and which would have enabled it ‘to estimate the 
 
62 M&C [2001] NSWADT 43 (Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members McDonald and 
Mooney, 21 March 2001) [119]. 
63 NSWADA s 49B(1)(b). 
64 M&C [2001] NSWADT 43 (Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members McDonald and 
Mooney, 21 March 2001) [128]. 
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degree of compliance with the code practices by members of that group’.65 The 
Tribunal considered that it was ‘false logic’ to say ‘M suffers from ADD.  She has 
difficulty complying with the Code.  Therefore all ADD sufferers are unable 
substantially to comply with the code’:66 
We cannot extrapolate from the particular to the general in this sense. While there is 
some general evidence before us that some ADD students demonstrate behavioural 
problems in the school environment this does necessarily mean that they cannot or do 
not substantially comply with the Code. It may be that all ADD sufferers at the school 
do in fact have difficulty complying with the Code. On the other hand, M may be the 
only one of her sub-group who cannot substantially comply with it. We do not know, 
and any conclusions on this score we purported to make would be merely 
speculative.67 
The NSWADA plainly requires, however, only that the ‘aggrieved person’ be unable to 
comply with a discriminatory term.  The reasoning of the Tribunal was, therefore, 
plainly wrong.  It was, nevertheless, fatal to M’s case.68 
The comparison issue is more thoroughly discussed in the DDA case, Minns. Like 
M&C, Minns concerned the ability of a teenager with ADHD to comply with a school 
discipline code.  The applicant submitted that his ability to comply should be 
compared with the ability of other students in his cohort to comply.  The respondent 
argued that such an approach was simplistic and that the approach preferred by the 
High Court in Banovic was for the ‘base groups’ of both applicant and comparator 
group to be identified.  The respondent submitted, in an argument similar to that 
which succeeded in M&C, that as no attempt was made to identify a ‘base group’ to 
which Ryan Minns belonged the claim must fail.69 Raphael FM was impressed by 
 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid [129]: ‘[I]t seems to us that, as a matter of law, the Department is entitled to succeed on this 
basis’.  
69 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) [250]-[254]. 
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these submissions,70 but ultimately found for the respondent on another basis – that is, 
that the allegedly discriminatory term was ‘reasonable’.71 
As Raphael FM noted, there were no disability discrimination cases available to assist 
on this complex issue.  Notably, the issue was not raised in the important High Court 
case of Waters, an indirect disability discrimination case.  There are strong arguments, 
however, to suggest that the identification of Ryan Minns’ ‘base group’ was not 
prerequisite to proof of his case.  Banovic, the case relied on by the respondent in 
Minns, involved different legislation, a different ground of discrimination and a 
completely different set of facts.  In Banovic it was necessary to identify the base 
group of the applicants for reasons of fact peculiar to that case.  The respondent’s 
hiring policies had changed incrementally over time to allow more women job 
applicants to be employed.  Before the required comparison could be undertaken, it 
was necessary for the court to determine the date of commencement of employment 
which would determine the composition of the group of women allegedly affected by 
the discriminatory term.  This group of women constituted the ‘base group’ whose 
ability to comply with the term was tested.  The applicants belonged to this group but 
were not the whole group.  There were no such complexities involved in determining 
who was potentially entitled to claim in Minns, and none should have been 
manufactured.  Raphael FM noted that there was no evidence in this case that anyone 
else at his school suffered Ryan’s disabilities.72 Further, there was no evidence that 
any members of Ryan’s school class could not comply, apart from Ryan.73 
70 Ibid [253]: ‘The respondent’s submissions are well taken’. 
71 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) [263]. 
72 Ibid [254]. 
73 Ibid. 
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It should be noted that this ‘base group’ point was not raised in the more recent DDA 
case, Clarke. The Clarke family enrolled their son Jacob, who is profoundly deaf, at 
The MacKillop Catholic College in Canberra.  Jacob had completed his primary 
education with the assistance of an ‘Auslan’ interpreter.  Auslan is a discrete language 
whereby perceptions, ideas and facts are communicated through signs.  It is in no 
sense a ‘translation’ of the English language.  Although its usage is controversial, its 
advocates claim that it is a superior method of communication for deaf people.74 
MacKillop College accepted Jacob’s application for enrolment but refused to provide 
an Auslan interpreter for Jacob.  The relevant requirement or condition imposed on 
Jacob was accepted by the Court as one that required Jacob ‘to participate in and 
receive classroom instruction without the assistance of an interpreter’.75 Madgwick J 
referred to Banovic, but only as authority for the proposition that a base group 
comparator must be established.  The comparator adopted in Clarke was either ‘those 
students attending year seven at the college in 2000’ or ‘all students enrolling in 
classes at the college in 2000’.76 No mention was made of any legal requirement that 
Jacob be placed in a base group of people similarly impaired. Madgwick J was, 
however, clearly of the view that the case was about the ability to comply of Jacob 
Clarke and ‘no other’: 
 
74 Note that several cases concerning the availability of instruction in Auslan have been heard in 
Australia.  Ferguson was discussed at Part I B, above. Hurst and Devlin v Education Queensland 
[2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005) (‘Hurst and Devlin’) is discussed in detail at 
Part II B, below. Beasley v Department of Education and Training [2006] VCAT 187 (Unreported, 
McKenzie DP, 17 February 2006) is a case with clear similarities of fact to both Clarke and Hurst and 
Devlin. In Beasley, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) dismissed several claims 
of direct discrimination but found that a student whose first language was Auslan had been indirectly 
discriminated against in that he was required to receive instruction in the spoken word, not only 
without an Auslan interpreter, but without any sign interpreter.  By contrast, in Zygorodimos v State of 
Victoria, Department of Education and Training [2004] VCAT 128 (Unreported, McKenzie DP, 3 
February 2004) it was held by VCAT that there had been no discrimination against a student who could 
hear with the assistance of a hearing aide but who was required to receive his instruction in Auslan as 
well as spoken English. 
75 Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor [2003]202 ALR 340, 350 [42]. 
76 Ibid 352 [46]-[48]. 
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It is important to bear in mind that the issue is the reasonableness of the requirement 
or condition attached in the case of Jacob Clarke and of no other person, by the 
respondents.  This is not a test case about the merits of Auslan compared with other 
means of communication between deaf and hearing people.  Neither is it a case about 
the respondent’s or any other authority’s practices generally in relation to all deaf or 
even profoundly deaf and Auslan dependant pupils. 77 
The comparison effected in this case was between the compliance ability of Jacob 
Clarke, and the compliance ability of MacKillop College students who were not deaf. 
Unquestioning acceptance of the appropriateness of this simple comparison was, 
doubtless, facilitated by the fact that Jacob was the only student at the College at that 
time who was profoundly deaf.  On the facts of this case, however, there may have 
been a real difficulty for Jacob if Madgwick J had widened the scope of enquiry and 
held that the required comparison was, as suggested in M&C and Minns, between the 
compliance ability of some wider group to which Jacob belonged – say, secondary 
school students who are profoundly deaf – and the compliance ability of secondary 
school students who are not profoundly deaf.  Proof that a base group of secondary 
school students who are profoundly deaf could not comply may well have been 
problematic because of the wide variety of alternative methods of support made 
available to and relied on by people who are profoundly deaf.  Indeed, the suggestion 
in the evidence was that Auslan is a controversial method of communication.78 
Consequently, the request for Auslan assistance from the school was unusual and not 
easily met.79 Most significant for this compliance point, however, was the evidence 
produced by the respondent that twenty-four of the twenty-five hearing impaired 
 
77 Ibid 355 [56]. 
78 Ibid 355-6 [59]-[63]. 
79 Ibid 357 [66]. 
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students enrolled in Catholic Education Office schools in the ACT in 1999 used 
methods other than signing or Auslan.80 
In disability discrimination cases it is appropriate that each complainant forms his or 
her own ‘base group’.  It is the nature of impairment that its effects vary from person 
to person and from time to time and from situation to situation.  As the Canadian 
Supreme Court has commented, ‘this ground means vastly different things depending 
on the individual and the context’.81 Each person’s experience of impairment is 
unique.  While there are many people who are profoundly deaf, for example, Jacob 
Clarke’s experience of deafness is unique.  As Madgwick J acknowledged, in Clarke,
the focal point for the Court was Jacob and his particular disability and the 
reasonableness of the social response to that disability.82 This ‘uniqueness’ of 
experience distinguishes impairment from other protected attributes such as sex, race 
and religion.  The ‘uniqueness’ of each individual’s impairment and disability does 
not mean that group claims, such as those advanced in Waters are not possible.  It 
simply means that one does not have to be part of an identifiable group to bring an 
action.  That disability discrimination cases are to be treated differently from other 
discrimination cases is also clear from the terms of the legislation.  The QADA and the 
DDA, and all other Australian anti-discrimination statutes define disability widely,83 
reflecting the diverse incidence and experience of disability in the community.  A 
claimant must simply bring him or herself within the scope of this broad definition to 
have standing to sue. 
 
80 Ibid. 
81 Eaton v Brant County Board of Education (1997) 1 SCR 241 [69]. 
82 See above n 77. 
83 Se Part IV, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability; Part II, Chapter 8: the Definition of Impairment. 
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B Strategy for Exclusion:  the Complainant Complies with a Discriminatory Term 
 
In the more recent Auslan case, Hurst and Devlin v Education Queensland,84 a 
different ‘compliance’ strategy for exclusion defeated, at trial, the claim of the 
complainant, Tiahna Hurst.  The successful argument was that Tiahna could comply 
with the discriminatory term. Tiahna Hurst was 7 years old at the time of hearing.  
She was born profoundly deaf into an extended family whose first language was 
Auslan.  The respondent had failed to provide an education to Tiahna in Auslan.  
Although not spelled out clearly in the judgment, the claim appeared to be made that, 
because the State did not provide an appropriate education for Tiahna, her family was 
forced to provide for her needs, through private schooling and therapy, at their own 
expense.85 The respondent’s case was that Tiahna, a bright student with good oral 
communication ability, was not at any disadvantage compared with her hearing peers.  
Tiahna’s academic progress was good and there was evidence that she could 
communicate effectively with others. Lander J found that a term had been imposed on 
Tiahna that she ‘undergo…education in English and without the assistance of an 
Auslan teacher or an Auslan interpreter’.  He also found that the term was ‘not 
reasonable’.86 
Tiahna’s case, however, stumbled on proof that she could not comply with the 
requirement or condition.  Ironically, her family’s efforts to redress, through private 
tuition and their own assistance, what they perceived as deficiencies in what was 
 
84 Hurst and Devlin [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005). The complainant, Devlin, 
succeeded at trial in proving indirect discrimination in the failure of Education Queensland to provide 
him with instruction in Auslan. 
85 Ibid [380]-[381]. 
86 Ibid [797]. 
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offered to Tiahna by the State system, may ultimately have cost them their case.87 
Lander J accepted expert evidence that Tiahna could receive her tuition in English and 
signed English,88 the alternatives offered by Education Queensland. 
 
Upon appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that the decision of Lander J on 
the point was affected by his belief that Tiahna could ‘cope’.  The Court highlighted 
the reliance on expert evidence that Tiahna was sufficiently academically advanced 
that she could manage in a regular class room without Auslan assistance.  The Full 
Court held, however, that the relevant test in respect of the ability to comply was not 
whether the complainant could ‘cope’ but whether the complainant would suffer 
‘serious disadvantage’ if required to comply.89 The Court held, further, that it was 
clear from a ‘substantial body of evidence’ that Tiahna had suffered and would 
continue to suffer ‘serious disadvantage’90 in that, if denied Auslan assistance, ‘she 
could not reach her full educational potential’.91 
While acknowledging that Lander J had been ‘distracted by the somewhat 
unsatisfactory manner in which Tiahna’s case was presented below’, the Full Court 
pointed out that he had not considered the relevance of the earlier Auslan case, 
Clarke, on the compliance point.  The Full Court considered that the ‘issues raised in 
Clarke were essentially the same as those raised by Tiahna’92 yet the complainant in 
Clarke had won at trial and Tiahna had lost.  Madgwick J in Clarke, at first instance, 
 
87 See Ibid [819]: ‘It might be that she [Tiahna] has not fallen behind her hearing peers because of the 
attention which she receives from her mother and the instruction which she no doubt receives from her 
mother in Auslan’. 
88 Ibid [817]. 
89 Hurst [2006] FCAFC 100 (Unreported, Ryan, Finn and Weinberg JJ, 28 July 2006) [134]. 
90 Ibid [108]. 
91 Ibid [113]. 
92 Ibid [117]. 
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found that Jacob Clarke could not ‘meaningfully participate’ in class without Auslan 
assistance despite evidence suggesting that he, like Tiahna, could, theoretically, 
‘cope’: 
… compliance must not be at the cost of being thereby put in any substantial 
disadvantage in relation to the comparable base group. In my opinion, it is not 
realistic to say that Jacob could have complied with the model. In purportedly doing 
so, he would have faced serious disadvantages that his hearing classmates would not. 
These include: contemporaneous incomprehension of the teacher’s words; 
substantially impaired ability to grasp the context of, or to appreciate the ambience 
within which, the teacher’s remarks are made; learning in a written language without 
the additional richness which, for hearers, spoken and "body" language provides and 
which, for the deaf, Auslan (and for all I know, other sign languages) can provide, 
and the likely frustration of knowing, from his past experience in primary school, that 
there is a better and easier way of understanding the lesson, which is not being used. 
In substance, Jacob could not meaningfully "participate" in classroom instruction 
without Auslan interpreting support. He would have "received" confusion and 
frustration along with some handwritten notes. That is not meaningfully to receive 
classroom education.93 
While the decision in Clarke was appealed, the Full Federal Court did not interfere 
with the reasoning of Madgwick J on this point or, indeed, on any other.  In Hurst, the 
Full Court considered that the reasoning of Lander J at first instance could not be 
reconciled with the reasoning in Clarke.94 
It is interesting to note that in Clarke the approach of Madgwick J to the compliance 
point was clearly influenced by what he described as the ‘impressive’ evidence of Dr 
Komesaroff, ‘a highly qualified educationalist and qualified Auslan interpreter’.95 By 
contrast, Lander J, in Hurst and Devlin, was not ‘assisted’ by the evidence of Dr 
 
93Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor [2003] 202 ALR 340 [49]. 
94 Hurst [2006] FCAFC 100 (Unreported, Ryan, Finn and Weinberg JJ, 28 July 2006) [125]. Although 
the Full Court conceded that the denial of Auslan assistance in her early years of formal education 
would ‘implicitly’ have long-term ramifications in terms of her educational achievement there was no 
award of damages to Tiahna: see [130].  Her remedy was a declaration that Education Queensland had 
contravened the indirect discrimination provisions of the DDA by failing to provide Tiahna with 
Auslan assistance: see [136].  Upon appeal, Tiahna did not challenge the decision of Lander J that, 
even had she been able to prove discrimination, she had suffered no compensable loss (Hurst and 
Devlin [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005) [825]-[827]). This seems unfortunate in 
view of the suggestion of the Full Court of the Federal Court that she ‘would be further disadvantaged 
in years to come, as a result of having been denied that assistance during the claim period’: see [130]. 
95 Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor [2003] 202 ALR 340 [62]; Catholic Education Office v 
Clarke (2004) 81 ALD 66 [120]. 
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Komesaroff, or that of another witness for the applicants, Ms Pardo: ‘They acted as 
advocates for Auslan and, in doing so, surrendered their academic detachment and 
objectivity’.96 
The criticism by Lander J of Dr Komesaroff as ‘partisan’ stems, perhaps, from a deep-
seated discomfort with the political agenda evident in the expert evidence in this case. 
The applicants’ actions were supported by the lobby group, Deaf Children Australia, 
which has an unashamed objective of compelling the introduction of Auslan in the 
education of children with hearing impairments.97 Lander J was stern in his criticism 
of the use of legal proceedings such as the present to promote a ‘cause’: 
In my opinion, it is a misconception to think that legal proceedings of this kind are 
the appropriate vehicle to introduce changes into the education system and, in 
particular, into that part of the education system which impacts upon persons with 
disabilities.98 
In my opinion, proceedings under the HREOC Act are not the appropriate medium 
for advancing educational theory in the hope and expectation that educational 
institutions will have to respond to a decision of this Court.99 
Decisions about the education of children with disabilities, according to Lander J, are 
best made ‘by educators in the best interests of the children’100 and not by courts in 
the context of ‘adversarial’ proceedings.101 This view, it could be argued, puts rather 
too much faith in the expertise and impartiality of educators, at the expense of the 
wishes and knowledge of parents and students themselves, and discounts the very real 
function of anti-discrimination legislation of providing a remedy when those 
 
96 Hurst and Devlin [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005) [148]. 
97 Ibid [421]. 
98 Ibid [424]. 
99 Ibid [431]. 
100 Ibid [429]. 
101 Ibid [425]. Note that in the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) case Beasley v Department of 
Education and Training [2006] VCAT 187 (Unreported, McKenzie DP, 17 February 2006), which also 
concerned allegations of discrimination by a student whose first language was Auslan, McKenzie DP 
explicitly endorsed the views of Lander J on this point. See Beasley v Department of Education and 
Training [2006] VCAT 187 (Unreported, McKenzie DP, 17 February 2006) [181]. 
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providing services, intentionally or otherwise, impose a discriminatory regime.  
Indeed, it was only in the context of the present ‘adversarial’ proceedings that it was 
determined that Education Queensland ‘educators’ had not acted ‘reasonably’ in their 
treatment of Ben Devlin and Tiahna Hurst.102 
The respondent had also invited Lander J to hold that Ms Gail Smith, mother of 
Tiahna, and main proponent of Tiahna’s case, had ‘behaved grossly improperly 
leading up to and since the complaint to HREOC’.103 The allegation was that Ms 
Smith had ‘used these proceedings and the media as a two-pronged assault on 
Education Queensland to obtain what she believes Tiahna is entitled to, namely, an 
Auslan education’.104 Lander J, while critical of Ms Smith’s conduct during the 
proceedings,105 ‘declined’ to make any adverse finding of abuse of process.106 
Allegations of this kind, again, reflect ideological differences between the parties, 
different understandings of the nature of disability and of who bears the responsibility 
for its mitigation.  The fact that similar allegations of ‘pushy parents’, and cross- 
allegations of ‘intransigent educators’, have been made in many other Australian 
disability discrimination in education cases,107 however, also suggests not only an 
unacceptable level of frustration generated by the parental ‘interface’ with education 
bureaucracy, but also a reluctance on the part of education administrators to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the complaints of discrimination leveled against them. 
 
102 See above n 86. 
103 Hurst and Devlin [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005)  [389]. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid [388] and [390]. 
106 Ibid [391]-[392]. 
107 See, for example, Travers v State of New South Wales [2001] FMCA 18; Demmery [1997] 
NSWEOT(Unreported, Judicial Member Ireland, Members Mooney and  MacDonald, 26 November 
1997); P v Director General, Department of  Education [1997] QADT 11; Murphy and Grahl v The 
State of New South Wales (NSW Department of Education) and Wayne Houston [2000] HREOC 
NoH98/73 (Unreported, Commissioner Carter, 27 March 2000); Sutherland v State of Victoria 
Department of Education and Training [2007] VCAT 63 (Unreported, Coghlan DP, 19 January 2007). 
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Further, their rejection of such claims as nothing more than aggressive parenting, 
suggests a failure to accept what communitarians would postulate as a prima facie 
right to an inclusive education.  Tam, for example, says that citizens vulnerable to 
discrimination because of impairment ‘should have confidence that society as a whole 
is on their side, and should not be made to feel isolated as troublemakers who refuse 
to accept their lot’.108 Tam’s words are particularly poignant in terms of the 
experience of Tiahna Hurst and her family who ultimately left their home state of 
Queensland to move to Western Australia to secure Auslan support for Tiahna.109 It 
could be argued that they were excluded not only from their community school, but 
from their community as a result of the inflexibility of Education Queensland. 
 
III  REASONABLENESS 
Reasonableness is an explicit limit on the scope of indirect discrimination and it is not 
surprising, therefore, that it is routinely raised as a strategy to avoid liability for 
indirect discrimination.  This limit is, arguably, consistent with a communitarian 
approach to the balancing of competing rights in the community.  It will be seen, 
below, that a ‘reasonableness’ enquiry allows a balancing consistent with a 
communitarian emphasis on the weighing of the impact of the assertion of individual 
rights against resulting detriment to the majority rights of the community at large. 
Provided the majority rights are genuinely compromised by the assertion of an 
individual right it is just that the individual right must yield.110 
108 Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship (1998) 137. 
109See Australian Association of the Deaf Inc, ‘Auslan in the Queensland Education System’ (2005) 
14(4) Outlook 2.  
110 See Part III A, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education.  
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Tam, however, issues a warning that, sometimes, what is asserted by the majority as 
in their best interests is not, in fact, in the best interests of the community as a whole. 
Majority preference, therefore, should not be allowed to dictate what is good for the 
community.  Tam is wary of parents, for example, who, wanting the ‘best’ for their 
own children, selfishly insist on segregating from the mainstream those students 
whose needs are perceived as ‘interfering’ with the schooling of their peers.  The 
‘best’ course for some individuals may have as its corollary the ‘worst’ course for 
other individuals, and for the community as a whole: ‘the admission policy of schools 
must ultimately help to meet the needs of the community as a whole and not just some 
parents who do not care about the needs of others’.111 Communitarians are of the 
view that it is in the best interests of society if inclusivity is promoted in schools, in 
order both to educate all citizens for their role as citizens and to model the tolerance 
which is a feature of a civilised society.112 Analysis of influences on the 
reasonableness enquiry will demonstrate that it is a subtle process which is influenced 
by a variety of factors appertaining to what courts and tribunals consider is ‘best’ for 
the community.113 
There is a significant difference between the QADA and the DDA in respect of the 
burden of proof of reasonableness. Under the QADA the onus of proof of 
reasonableness falls to the respondent.114 Thus the reasonableness inquiry is treated 
similarly to the ‘unjustifiable hardship’ enquiry raised in respect of claims of direct 
discrimination.115 The DDA is silent on the question of which party bears the burden 
of proof of unreasonableness/reasonableness but the issue was settled in 
 
111 Tam, above n 108, 74. 
112 See Part III, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
113 See Part III D below. 
114 QADA s 205. 
115 QADA s 206 provides that the burden of proof of unjustifiable hardship falls to the respondent. 
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Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity 
Commission.116 The applicant bears the burden of proving that a potentially 
discriminatory condition is not reasonable.  There is, therefore, some benefit to the 
complainant under the QADA where, it can be argued, a ‘prima facie’ case of 
discrimination arises once the complainant proves the imposition of a discriminatory 
term and reasonableness must be proved in the nature of a defence.  It is also more 
consistent with the communitarian view that the citizen’s expectation of inclusion in 
mainstream society should only be displaced when that inclusion is proved to impinge 
on majority rights.117 The Productivity Commission has found that it is ‘neither 
appropriate nor efficient’ for the burden of proof to fall on the complainant118 and has 
recommended amending the DDA to place the burden of proof of reasonableness upon 
the respondent.119 It must be conceded, however, that even though the complainant 
bears the burden of proof under the DDA, respondents have a clear interest in seeking 
to convince a court that the impugned condition is reasonable and the cases indicate 
that they are eager to so. 
 
A The Nature of the Reasonableness Enquiry 
While the DDA is silent as to the nature of the reasonableness enquiry, the QADA 
provides that whether or not a term is reasonable depends on ‘all the relevant 
circumstances of the case’.120 The following examples of relevant circumstances are 
set out:  consequences of the failure to comply with the term; the cost of alternative 
terms; and the financial circumstances of the person who imposes or proposes to 
 
116 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 80 
FCR 78. 
117 See Part III A, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
118 Productivity Commission, Australian Government, Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 
1992, Report No 30 (2004) finding 11.7, LXV (‘PC Review’). 
119 Ibid recommendation 11.3, LI. 
120 QADA s 11(2). 
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impose the term.121 Case law, however, has shed further light on the nature of the 
balancing act required in determining whether or not a term is reasonable, which was 
characterised by Madgwick J of the Federal Court, in Clarke v Catholic Education 
Office,122 as ‘the most difficult question’.123 He applied the test articulated in the 
Styles124 case and approved by Dawson and Toohey JJ of the High Court in Waters 
and Others v Public Transport Corporation, a case brought under the Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic): reasonableness as a test is ‘less demanding than one of 
necessity, but more demanding than a test of convenience’.125 In Waters, a case 
concerning access to public transport by people with disabilities, Dawson and Toohey 
JJ suggested that relevant factors in the reasonableness inquiry will vary from case to 
case and considered as relevant in that particular case, ‘the ability of the respondent to 
meet the cost, both in financial terms and in terms of efficiency, of accommodating 
the needs of the impaired persons’, ‘the availability of alternative methods’, ‘the 
maintenance of good industrial relations’ and ‘the observance of health and safety 
requirements’.126 
In Clarke,127 Madgwick J considered the following generic list of relevant 
considerations as spelled out in Styles:
• the nature and extent of the effect of the discriminatory requirement or  
condition; 
• the reasons advanced in favour of it; 
• the possibility of alternative action: and 
• matters of ‘effectiveness, efficiency and convenience’. 128 
121 QADA s 11(2). 
122 Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor [2003]202 ALR 340. 
123 Ibid 353 [50]. 
124 Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade v Styles and Anor (1989) 23 FCR 251, 263 
(Bowen CJ and Gummow J) (‘Styles’). 
125 Waters and Others v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349, 395 (Dawson and Toohey 
JJ). 
126 Waters and Others v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349, 395. 
127 Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor [2003]202 ALR 340, 353-4 [51]. 
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In the most recent indirect disability discrimination in education case decided under 
the DDA, Hurst and Devlin, Lander J adopted Madgwick J’s summary of the relevant 
law on reasonableness but added that it will also be necessary to take into account the 
objects of the Act: 
The question of reasonableness will always be considered in the light of the objects of 
the Act which are to eliminate, as far as possible, discrimination against persons on 
the ground of disability, to ensure as far as practicable that persons with disabilities 
have the same rights to equality before the law, and to promote recognition and 
acceptance within the community of the principle that persons with disabilities have 
the same fundamental rights as the rest of the community.129 
The cases analysed in this chapter, however, illustrate the considerable latitude 
available to courts and tribunals to consider, within a generic framework such as this, 
factors peculiar to the facts of the particular case. 
 
Madgwick J also acknowledged in Clarke,130 that the delicate nature of the 
reasonableness inquiry is further complicated, first, by the fact that judges and 
tribunal members generally have limited expertise in the area in which they are 
required to impose a decision, and secondly by the fact that there will frequently be 
considerable divergence in expert opinion.  He cited the words of  Harper J in State of 
Victoria v Schou:
…when considering in any particular case whether the burden has been discharged courts 
and tribunals must act with an appropriate degree of diffidence.  The expertise of judges 
and tribunal members does not generally extend to the management of a business 
enterprise…and just as the courts, in proper recognition of the lack of relevant expertise, 
will not in general issue to company directors instructions about how they should manage 
the business under their control, so courts and tribunals concerned with equal opportunity 
legislation should resist the temptation unnecessarily to dictate to persons who manage and 
work on the shop floor.  At the same time, any discrimination legislation should be 
liberally construed.  Getting the balance right will often be difficult.131  
128 Styles (1989) 23 FCR 251, 263 (Bowen CJ and Gummow J). 
129 Hurst and Devlin [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005) [75]. 
130 Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor [2003]202 ALR 340, 354 [53]-[54]. 
131 State of Victoria v Schou (2001) 3 VR 655, 663 [30]-[31]. 
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B Indirect Discrimination and Behaviour Impairment and Reasonableness 
As noted above, it was suggested by Gleeson CJ in Purvis that Daniel Hoggan’s case 
was not framed as one of indirect discrimination in order to avoid the requirement of 
proving that a discriminatory term was ‘not reasonable’.132 It is instructive to 
compare how the reasonableness issue has been dealt with in cases similar to that of 
Daniel Hoggan, but formulated as indirect discrimination claims.  The NSWADT case 
of M&C and the DDA case Minns both involved allegations of indirect discrimination 
against students with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).  In M&C the 
following definition of ADHD, contained in a publication produced by the New South 
Wales Education Department, was cited: 
…a mixed group of disruptive behaviours.  These behaviours can have many causes 
and effects and their characteristics merge with normal behaviour.  ADHD is a 
medically diagnostic label given when these behaviours cause difficulty with the 
child’s development; behaviour and performance; family relations and social 
interactions.  Individuals with the disorder may be distractible, inattentive, impulsive 
and sometimes hyperactive. 133 
Both M, of M&C, and Ryan Minns were frequently disciplined for breaches of the 
school rules. In Minns, Raphael FM explicitly drew attention to the similarities 
between that case and the Purvis case commenting that the consequence of Daniel 
Hoggan’s disability was ‘violent and anti-social behaviour very similar to that 
exhibited by Ryan Minns’.134 
In both Minns and M&C the condition imposed was framed as compliance with the 
conduct required by the school discipline policy.135 As discussed, above, in both 
 
132 See above n 6. 
133 M&C [2001] NSWADT 43 (Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members McDonald and 
Mooney, 21 March 2001) [20]. 
134 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) [191]. 
135 See M&C [2001] NSWADT 43 (Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members McDonald and 
Mooney, 21 March 2001) [117] and Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) 
[247]. 
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these cases it was argued by the respondent that the complainant’s case should fail 
because the complainant had not proved that a ‘base group’ to which they belonged 
could not comply with the condition which had allegedly been imposed. This 
argument was successful in M&C. Nevertheless, the NSWADT went on to comment 
on the reasonableness of the respondent’s expectation that M comply with the 
discipline code.  The complainant’s case failed in Minns because the condition 
imposed was held to be ‘reasonable’.136 
Both the NSWADT and Raphael FM emphasised that it was reasonable that schools 
have and enforce codes of conduct.  As noted above, the NSWADT found the point so 
‘trite’ that it required ‘no further discussion’.137 Raphael FM determined that such 
codes were necessary to enable ‘all students to benefit from the educational 
opportunities offered and the requirement to allow this to happen in a safe 
environment’.138 The issue in both cases, however, was not the reasonableness of the 
code, per se, but the reasonableness of the required compliance with the code imposed 
on the complainants who alleged that their impairment prevented such compliance.  
The evidence of M’s mother, in M&C, was that M ‘simply was not capable of 
controlling her behaviour’.139 The complainant’s case in Minns, disputed by the 
respondent, was that Ryan’s impairment made it ‘impossible for him to behave in a 
manner compliant with the discipline policy’.140 The respondent argued that Ryan 
did, in fact, comply with the policy because the policy stipulated ‘if you do x this will 
 
136 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002 [256]-[257]. 
137 See above n 21. 
138 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) [247]. 
139 M&C [2001] NSWADT 43 (Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members McDonald and 
Mooney, 21 March 2001) [117]. 
140 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) [250]. 
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happen to you’ and Ryan ‘did x and that happened to him, so he could comply and did 
comply’.141 Raphael FM was unimpressed with this ‘ingenious’ argument.142 
The NSWADT was critical of the inflexible administration of discipline policy at both 
schools which M attended. Whilst there was considerable discretion as to which 
penalty was meted out, there was no discretion to give no penalty at all.  The Tribunal 
characterised the slavish adherence to the discipline policy as ‘unreasonable’: 
While such behaviour [physical aggression] is clearly unacceptable, and it is 
reasonable to require that such children [children with ADHD] respect others and 
their property, it seems to us that it is unreasonable to apply a disciplinary regime in 
blanket fashion to all children regardless of their subjective features. 143 
The Tribunal compared the inflexible application of the discipline code with a 
mandatory sentencing regime, ‘a form of punishment and social control, which has 
been shown to be largely ineffective in modifying the conduct of people with 
significant psychiatric or psychological difficulties’.144 
The Tribunal also emphasised that it was not reasonable to expect a child such as M to 
comply with the policy unless she had ‘special support to enable…her to do so’.145 
The facts, here, were that M did not have this ‘special support’.  Thus, the Tribunal 
found a clear causal link between the lack of support and M’s failure to comply with 
the discipline code: 
Not only was M an ADD sufferer, she was well behind her colleagues 
academically…In those circumstances, it was unreasonable to expect that she could 
significantly modify her behaviour as a result of being frequently disciplined in the 
absence of that attention, support and special care.  It was in our view therefore 
 
141 Ibid [248]. 
142 Ibid [249]. 
143 Ibid [131]. 
144 Ibid [135]. 
145 Ibid [131]. 
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unreasonable to punish her in the same fashion as any other member of the student 
body if she failed to comply with the requirements of the Code. 146 
The Tribunal’s reasoning here is similar to the reasoning of Commissioner Innes in 
the HREOC hearing of the Purvis case. Commissioner Innes found that the South 
Grafton High School had not taken reasonable steps to accommodate Daniel 
Hoggan’s impairment and that this failure had contributed to his behaviour problems. 
Ultimately the Purvis case failed, as did M’s case.  It is interesting to speculate, 
however, on what the outcome of M’s case would have been if she alleged direct 
discrimination on the basis of the school’s failure to provide the ‘special support’ that 
the NSWADT held that she needed.  The cynical view is, perhaps, that M still would 
have failed.  The cynical view is that the Tribunal only made its pointed criticism of 
the respondent because M failed.  Having found against M, on the compliance point, 
the Tribunal could safely admonish the respondent without actually having to enforce, 
controversially, any improvement in the respondent’s treatment of its students. 
 
The facts of the Minns case differed from the facts of M&C in that there was not the 
same weight of evidence of lack of specialist support for Ryan.  In addition, there was 
evidence that the school had administered the discipline policy flexibly to 
accommodate Ryan’s impairment.  It should also be noted that Ryan and his mother 
objected to Ryan’s taking prescribed medication which may have modified his 
behaviour.  Nevertheless, the complainant argued, along the lines of M&C that the 
respondent had failed to take reasonable steps to deal with Ryan.  The complainant 
suggested alternative methods of management of Ryan’s behaviour.  The court was 
 
146 Ibid [133]. 
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not convinced, however, that this line of argument was relevant147 and found that the 
complainant had not proved that the requirement that Ryan comply with the code was 
‘not reasonable’: 
I am of the view that the requirement that was placed upon Ryan to comply with each 
of the school's disciplinary policies as modified was reasonable in all the 
circumstances. The classes in which Ryan was placed would be unable to function if 
he could not be removed for disruptive behaviour.  The students could not achieve 
their potential if most of the teachers’ time was taken up with handling Ryan.  The 
playgrounds would not be safe if Ryan was allowed free rein for his aggressive 
actions.  Therefore the claim for indirect discrimination must fail in the manner in 
which it is put’. 148 
Thus, in determining the reasonableness issue against Ryan Minns, Raphael FM 
balanced the benefit to Ryan in allowing him ‘free rein’149 against the potential 
detriment to others in the school community and Ryan’s interests yielded to the 
interests of the majority.  His language is clearly reminiscent of the language of 
Gleeson CJ150 and Callinan J151 in the High Court in Purvis who were so concerned 
about the detriment to others in the South Grafton State High School community 
should Daniel Hoggan’s enrolment be maintained.  There seems little doubt that, had 
the Purvis claim been framed as one of indirect discrimination, alleging that Daniel 
could not comply with a condition that he comply with the school’s discipline code, it 
would have stumbled upon proof that the condition was not reasonable.  
 
C The Corinda Case:  Reasonableness and Unjustifiable Hardship 
Although the better view is that whether there is unjustifiable hardship is the relevant 
question in respect of direct discrimination claims, and that whether the term is 
reasonable is the comparable relevant question in respect of claims of indirect 
 
147 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) [256]. 
148 Ibid [263]. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 101-3 [11]-[14]. 
151 Ibid [266]. 
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discrimination,152 there are some Queensland cases where respondents have 
convinced the tribunal to consider whether it would impose unjustifiable hardship on 
an educational institution to change a discriminatory term.153 The Corinda case is a 
case in point.  The case informs a useful comparison of the operation of unjustifiable 
hardship and ‘reasonableness’. 
 
In the Corinda case, the complainant, ‘I’, used a wheelchair and had some intellectual 
impairment.  She completed her secondary education at Corinda State High School, in 
Brisbane.  ‘I’ succeeded in proving one complaint of direct discrimination by the 
respondents arising out of her exclusion from a school excursion to the Tangalooma 
resort on Moreton Island.154 
In respect of her two claims of indirect discrimination, the Tribunal considered both 
unjustifiable hardship and reasonableness as excusing the respondent’s 
discrimination.  These two claims were linked to the venues selected for the school 
formal and the school graduation dinner.  As noted above, the formal took place at the 
Greek Club and the graduation dinner on ‘The Island’, a restaurant barge on the 
Brisbane River.  The complaints arose out of access and toilet arrangements for ‘I’ at 
both venues and out of concerns in relation to emergency evacuation procedures on 
‘The Island’.  The complainant argued that appropriate access was available at other 
venues rejected by the school.155 
152 See Re Opinion on Public Transport Union (QADT, Unreported, Member Keim, 12 October 1998) 
and Re Opinion J & L Hutton (QADT, Unreported, Member Keim, 9 February 1999).  See also 
Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [11]. 
153 See, for example, Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001); Cocks v State 
of Queensland (1994) 1 QADR 43. 
154 See the discussion of the direct discrimination case in Corinda in Part V A, Chapter 6: Exemptions, 
n 76. 
155 See additional discussion of the unjustifiable hardship claim at Part V E 2, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
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Although QADT President Copelin preferred the view, expressed by counsel for the 
complainant, that unjustifiable hardship was not available as an exemption in cases of 
alleged indirect discrimination and that, in such cases, consideration of the 
reasonableness of a discriminatory term covers the same ground as the unjustifiable 
hardship exemption, she nevertheless considered both ‘in the event that I am found to 
be wrong on this point’.156 As noted earlier,157 it is a prerequisite to consideration of 
unjustifiable hardship that there be proof that special services or facilities are required 
by the student with a disability. This process is not required by the legislation for 
proof of indirect discrimination.  For such an allegation, instead, as explained 
above,158 proof is required of the existence of a discriminatory term.  Thus, 
unjustifiable hardship is paired in the legislation with the provision of services and 
facilities and reasonableness is paired with the existence of a discriminatory term.  In 
respect of the indirect discrimination claims, however, the Tribunal rejected the 
argument of the complainant that, had appropriate venues been selected for both 
functions, no special services or facilities would have been required because they 
would have already been in place at both venues.159 As such, the argument went, 
there be no consideration of the unjustifiable hardship exemption.  The Tribunal 
nevertheless accepted the argument of the respondent that the special access and toilet 
requirements of the complainant did amount to ‘special services and facilities’.160 
It was also accepted that there would be additional costs should alternative venues be 
imposed on the school community and that these costs would be borne by the other 
 
156 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [11]. 
157 See Part V A, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
158 See Part I, above. 
159 A similar argument succeeded in respect of the direct discrimination claim: see Part V A, Chapter 6: 
Exemptions 
160 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [11.2]. 
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students attending the formal and dinner and not by the school authority.  The 
Tribunal found that ‘[w]hile there is no evidence that the respondents [the school 
authority] could not afford to pay for supplying the special services or facilities (by 
arranging and paying for other venues if they were suitable), I believe it would be 
highly unusual for a school (rather than the attending students) to pay for events such 
as school balls or dinners such as the ones the subject of this dispute’.161 In addressing 
the issue of whether unjustifiable hardship would arise should the functions be 
relocated, the Tribunal took into account the ‘relevant circumstances’ of ‘cost’162 and 
‘the nature of any benefit or detriment to all people concerned’163 and concluded that 
‘the additional costs for the formal functions would be most disadvantageous to a 
large proportion of the students, whilst the evidence before me is that only the 
complainant may have benefited from a change in venue for the formal function’.164 
The Tribunal found, further, that the school was obliged to consider a multiplicity of 
issues in selecting suitable venues and that detriment to the other students in terms of 
security, transport, and supervision issues outweighed the benefit which would flow 
to ‘I’.165 
In the Tribunal’s consideration of the ‘reasonableness’ of the terms imposed on ‘I’, it 
appears to have been influenced by the fact that ‘I’ was presented, and accepted,166 as 
the only student who could not comply with the terms when other students with 
 
161 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [11.2.2.3]. The argument is 
advanced in Chapter 6 that proof of unjustifiable hardship requires proof of unjustifiable hardship to 
the respondent not to others, such as students, as is the case here. See Part V E 2, Chapter 6: 
Exemptions. 
162 See QADA s 5(b) and (c). 
163 See QADA s 5(e). 
164 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [11.2.2.2]. 
165 ‘Disruption’ is a relevant consideration: QADA s 5 (d).  See also the analysis of the Corinda case at 
Part V A, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
166 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [8.2.2.2.a]. 
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similar impairments were to attend both celebrations.167 However, the cost to other 
students of alternative arrangements was again the principal relevant consideration. 
The Tribunal was ultimately persuaded that the cost of an alternative venue for the 
formal was too high and that ‘The Island’ was the ‘best value’ for the graduation: ‘I 
consider it would be unreasonable for the students, many of whom on the evidence 
are not from wealthy backgrounds, to have to pay any increase in costs …’.168 
Ultimately President Copelin concluded that the alternative access arrangements were 
‘reasonable’169 and, as such, the discriminatory terms extrapolated from the 
circumstances were ‘reasonable’.170 
1 Unjustifiable Hardship Compared with Reasonableness 
As explained above,171 for the purposes of QADA, whether a term is reasonable 
depends upon ‘all the relevant circumstances’ including the consequences of failure to 
comply with the term, the cost of alternative terms and the financial circumstances of 
the person who imposes the term.172 Whether unjustifiable hardship exists is 
determined by reference to ‘all the relevant circumstances’ including the nature of the 
special services or facilities, the cost of suppling the special services or facilities and 
the number of people who would benefit or be disadvantaged, the financial 
circumstances of the person supplying the services or facilities, the disruption that 
 
167 While other students with similar impairments attended Corinda State High School and were to have 
attended the functions none was called to give evidence: see Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, 
Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [7.4], [10.1.D.a].  See above n 60. 
168 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [10.1.3.c]. 
169 Ibid [10.1.2.C]. 
170 Ibid [10.1.4]. 
171 See Part V, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
172 See QADA s 11(2)(a)-(c). 
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supplying the services or facilities might cause, and the nature of any benefit or 
detriment to all people concerned.173 
While both terms are inclusively defined, the definition of unjustifiable hardship gives 
more specific guidance as to what will be relevant.  Reasonableness is left as a more 
general enquiry and, because there is no stipulation that the enquiry is limited to the 
circumstances of the parties to the case, it is, potentially, a more generous enquiry.  It 
is immediately obvious, for example, that in the Corinda case, cost to other students  
is of relevance to the reasonableness of the term, imposed on ‘I’, whereas it could 
only be made relevant to unjustifiable hardship by doubtful manipulation of the 
legislation.174 It is notable that the legislative provisions in relation to unjustifiable 
hardship directly contemplate a balancing of the interests of ‘all concerned’.175 This is 
somewhat ironic in that hardship to the educational institution must be proved to 
prove the exemption.176 Hardship to any other group, person or institution is not, at 
least on the face of the legislation, enough.  In relation to reasonableness, attention is 
directed towards ‘the consequences of failure to comply with the term’.177 The 
unjustifiable hardship provision is more specific in directing a balancing of competing 
interests by making relevant ‘the nature of any benefit or detriment to all people 
concerned’178 and  ‘the number of people who would benefit or be disadvantaged’.179 
173 See QADA s 5(a)-(e). 
174 See Part V E 2, Chapter 6: Strategies for Exclusion: Exemptions.  
175 QADA s 5(e). 
176 QADA s 44(1)(b). 
177 QADA s 11(a). 
178 QADA s 5(e). 
179 QADA s 5(b). 
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Further, although ‘the financial circumstances’ of the respondent are relevant for both 
unjustifiable hardship and reasonableness,180 on the issue of cost there is a more 
specific linking of cost to a cost benefit analysis in the unjustifiable hardship 
provisions.  In relation to reasonableness, it is simply the cost of alternative terms 
which is to be considered.  In relation to unjustifiable hardship, however, 
consideration of the cost of suppling the special services or facilities is linked to 
consideration of the number of people who would benefit or be disadvantaged. 181 
President Copelin, in Corinda, clearly acknowledges that a ‘balancing act’ is required 
by the legislation: ‘I am at all times conscious of the purposes of the Act as set out in 
Section 6 and the provision of equal protection and equal benefit for everyone’.182 In 
Corinda the enquiry extended to ramifications for the state-wide community if the 
term imposed on ‘I’ were struck down.  President Copelin did not accept that it was 
‘reasonable’ for the school, having behind it the resources of the State of Queensland, 
to pay the extra cost imposed, a few hundred dollars, by relocating to a more suitable 
venue.  She held that this would not be appropriate in that it was common practice 
across Queensland schools for the students to ‘pay their own way’ and for the State to 
pay here would unfairly advantage Corinda students:  
The fact that the respondents would be able to meet the additional costs of any 
alternative venues is not the end of the matter in that in practical terms it would be 
unrealistic to consider that the students of CHS Grade 12 would or in fact should 
(above all other students in Queensland) have their end of year functions paid for 
when the normal practice is (as indicated in the evidence of Ms O'Rourke) that these 
extra-curricular activities are on the whole paid for by the students.183 
180 QADA ss 5(c) and 11(2)(c). 
181 See QADA s 5(b). 
182 Corinda [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) [10.1.3.d]. 
183 Ibid [10.1.3.c]. 
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The dubious reasoning that it is not ‘fair’ to other Queensland students if the State 
pays for Corinda students may be made relevant to the reasonableness enquiry in a 
claim of indirect discrimination.  It would, however, be difficult to sustain in relation 
to a claim of direct discrimination as the legislation expressly contemplates that extra 
facilities may have to be provided to accommodate the student with an impairment.184 
It is the clear policy of the legislation that it is ‘fair’ for the State to spend money, 
which might otherwise be used to the benefit of the majority, to deliver substantial 
equality to students with disabilities.   
 
Although analysis of the wording of the provisions suggests that a wider enquiry is 
contemplated for unjustifiable hardship, the inevitable conclusion is that the 
assessment of reasonableness allows a more far-ranging consideration of costs and 
benefits than the assessment of unjustifiable hardship.  Although courts and tribunals 
have manipulated the unjustifiable hardship provision to allow consideration of the 
effects on others, that provision is restricted in its application by the fact that the only 
hardship which will justify an exemption is hardship to the provider of the service or 
facility required by the person with impairment.185 Reasonableness, by contrast, 
allows consideration of the reasonableness of the term for the complainant, the 
respondent and any other group or person affected. It allows a balancing consistent 
with a communitarian emphasis on the weighing of the impact of the assertion of 
individual rights against resulting detriment to the majority rights of the community at 
large.  So long as the majority rights are genuinely compromised by the assertion of 
an individual right, that right must yield.186 
184 See QADA s 10(5) and Part II B, Chapter 9: The Comparator n 63. 
185 See Part V E 2, Chapter 6: Strategies for Exclusion: Exemptions. 
186 See Part III A, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education.  
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D Influences on the Reasonableness Enquiry 
Indirect discrimination cases involve different disabilities, different circumstances and 
different educational institutions.  It can seem difficult to pinpoint why some cases 
succeed while others fail. It must be acknowledged that what is ‘reasonable’ will 
depend on the peculiar facts of each case.  However, case analysis does suggest some 
indicia of a successful claim. 
 
1 The Attitude towards Disability of the Tribunal 
As discussed earlier,187 how the tribunal hearing a case conceives of the concepts of 
inclusion and disability may influence the outcome of the case.  The indirect 
discrimination cases suggest that the intrinsic beliefs and attitudes held by a tribunal 
may influence its conclusions about what is and is not ‘reasonable’.  
 
While it is a basic tenet of communitarianism that democratic society is inclusive,188 
this attitude is not always evident in the reasoning of courts and tribunals called upon 
to decide education discrimination cases.  Similarly, not all courts and tribunals have 
revealed a strong commitment to implementation of the policy of anti-discrimination 
legislation or an appreciation of disability as a social construct. The stand against 
‘political posturing’ taken by Lander J in Hurst and Devlin, for example, has already 
been discussed in this chapter.189 In his criticism of the ferocity of Tiahna Hurst’s 
mother in defending what she saw as her daughter’s ‘right’ to be educated in 
Auslan,190 Lander J was out of step with Tam’s communitarian remonstration, for 
example, that citizens vulnerable to discrimination because of disability ‘should have 
 
187 See Part II B, above.  See also Part II B 1, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
188 See, for example, Tam, above n 108, 8. 
189 See Part II B, above. 
190 Hurst and Devlin [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005) [387]-[392]. 
392
confidence that society as a whole is on their side, and should not be made to feel 
isolated as troublemakers who refuse to accept their lot’.191 It is the role of the 
community not merely to care for people with disabilities, but to empower them to 
play an active part in the determination of their futures and to preserve their dignity 
and responsibility.192 Using language suggestive of a ‘medical model’ of disability,193 
Lander J was seemingly of the view that ‘experts’ and not courts, and certainly not the 
complainants, are best placed to make decisions about the ‘appropriate’ education for 
individual children.  It is ironic, therefore, that his decision was that the ‘experts’ were 
wrong in the case of Tiahna Hurst whom, he held, would have been ‘better taught’194 
in her chosen language of Auslan and not in the manner proposed by Education 
Queensland experts. Lander J may have found in Hurst and Devlin that the 
discriminatory term imposed on the complainants was ‘not reasonable’ but he was 
nevertheless clearly uncomfortable with the use of anti-discrimination legislation as a 
tool towards enforcing social change in order to mitigate entrenched disability.  
 
In Demmery the words of the New South Wales Equal Opportunity Tribunal treated 
inclusion as a privilege rather than a right and revealed a misapprehension of the 
fundamental tenet of anti-discrimination law and policy that equal opportunity for a 
student with an impairment may require different treatment of that student.  In that 
case, a term that the complainant child, who was deaf and who had been allocated six 
different teachers in a two month period, ‘be able to cope well with unexpected 
change’ was found to be ‘reasonable’.195 The attitude of the Tribunal seemed to be 
 
191 Tam, above n 108, 137. 
192 Ibid 134. 
193 See Part II A, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability. 
194 Hurst and Devlin [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005) [798]. 
195Demmery [1997] NSWEOT (Unreported, Judicial Member Ireland, Members Mooney and 
MacDonald, 26 November, 1997) 25. 
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that ‘adjustment’ is required by the student rather than by the school. The onus is 
placed on the included student to adapt to the environment, rather than the reverse. 
The included student must take the bad along with the good: ‘The integration of a 
disabled child including a profoundly deaf child into a normal class setting of a 
school, must require a degree of acceptance that the child will be subjected to the 
usual exigencies that flow from the school setting’.196 The Tribunal inferred from the 
evidence that the goal of inclusion is ‘normalisation’ of the student with the 
impairment: ‘a disabled child, such as Luke, as a part of the normalisation process of 
integration, may reasonably have to expect to be involved in a situation where a 
temporary teacher has to take over his class pending the appointment of a permanent 
teacher’.197 The tribunal referred to ‘the normal school setting’198 and ‘a normalised 
integration program’.199 The Tribunal did acknowledge that, if Luke’s parents 
‘required’ that he be educated in a mainstream setting, the choice was ‘open to them’, 
and they could expect that ‘established policies of integrating a child would be 
implemented’.200 The clear implication was, however, that by choosing a school in a 
more remote part of New South Wales, they could expect only what ‘was reasonable 
and appropriate’201 having regard to that location.  
 
In the Minns case, another ‘lost’ case, there was clear evidence that the system had 
tried to help the complainant to ‘assimilate’ to his school environment.  There was 
also apparent in the Tribunal’s decision, however, a strong assumption that ‘normal’ 
is desirable, that the aim of ‘inclusion’ is for the ‘disabled’ student to be ‘normalised’ 
 
196 Ibid 24. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid 2. 
199 Ibid 25. 
200 Ibid 24. 
201 Ibid 25. 
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and assimilated.  There are repeated references to Ryan’s ‘non-compliant behaviour’ 
and consideration of appropriate methods of ‘normalising’ Ryan’s behaviour.202 The 
underlying assumption seems to be, therefore, that the child must fit the system and 
not that the system must fit the child.  As in Demmery, the implication is that the onus 
is on the student to adapt to the environment.  Such an attitude is simply not in 
keeping with an understanding of disability as a social construct.  
 
Commissioner Atkinson, in Kinsela, and Madgwick J, in Clarke, do demonstrate a 
commitment to the reform policy of anti-discrimination legislation and an 
understanding that disability is a social construct which can be mitigated by an 
appropriate social response.  In both Kinsela and Clarke the complainant won – but 
not without controversy.  Kinsela had completed the degree Bachelor of Science 
(Human Services) at Queensland University of Technology (QUT).  One focus of the 
degree was disability services and the course materials indicated a strong commitment 
to ‘civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights’ for all people.203 In Kinsela,
Commissioner Atkinson noted the policy inconsistency between these course 
materials issued by QUT and Mr Kinsela’s exclusion by QUT from the graduation 
ceremony.204 Further, Commissioner Atkinson emphasised ‘the undoubted goals of 
the Act of inclusiveness, accessibility and availability’205 and cautioned that as anti-
discrimination legislation has introduced change, so the university must change.206 
202 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) [206]. 
203 Kinsela v Queensland University of Technology [1997] HREOC No H97/4 (Unreported, 
Commissioner Atkinson, 27 February 1997) [5]. 
204 Ibid [30]. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid [26]. 
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Unlike Commissioner Atkinson, Madgwick J showed considerable respect for the 
commitment to inclusivity of the respondents in Clarke, commenting that ‘there is no 
doubt that the CEO and the College, due to the religious and ethical convictions of 
those who manage and control them, welcome all pupils, including profoundly deaf 
pupils’.207 He also found that ‘the respondent’s witnesses and others concerned in the 
running of the CEO hold as moral convictions what the relevant legislation seeks to 
accomplish as a matter of legal requirement’.208 He conceded that the case was 
‘unusual’ and that, given the commitment to inclusivity of the respondents, his 
decision in Clarke would be ‘surprising’.209 He noted that, in relation to other cases, 
accusations have been made that legislation has been interpreted strictly to deny a 
remedy for conduct ‘that would be regarded as discriminatory in its ordinary 
meaning’.210 Nevertheless, he saw his role as to apply the legislation to the facts and 
cited the caution of Brennan and McHugh JJ in IW v City of Perth211 that ‘courts and 
tribunals must faithfully give effect to the text and structure of these statutes without 
any preconceptions as to their scope’.212 While many cases may have been lost 
because of such a ‘strict’ approach, he contended, this case showed the ‘the other side 
of the coin’:  ‘conduct which is not discriminatory in its ordinary meaning may be 
caught by the statutory prohibition’.213 Madgwick J found that the good intentions 
and the good record of the respondent could not save a finding that they had 
discriminated against Jacob Clarke and wryly commented that ‘[t]he road to infraction 
 
207 Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor [2003]202 ALR 340, 355 [57]. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid 360 [82]. 
210 Ibid. 
211 IW v City of Perth (1996) 191 CLR 1, 15. 
212 Clarke v Catholic Education Office & Anor [2003]202 ALR 340, 355. 
213 Ibid. 
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of discrimination law, as to other places to be avoided, may be paved with good 
intentions’.214 
2 Failure of the Complainant to ‘Mitigate’ Disability 
The cases demonstrate that a tribunal will not be inclined to find a complainant 
‘reasonable’ and a school’s action or inaction ‘not reasonable’ when a complainant 
has the opportunity to mitigate his or her own disability and fails to do so.  This 
attitude suggests some recognition that there is a limit on the notion of disability as a 
social construct. 
 
In Cowell, for example, although the reasonableness issue was not expressly 
considered, the attitude of Commissioner Wilson was clearly that the Cowell family 
could have avoided much of the disadvantage which flowed to Fleur if they had acted 
on the School’s offer to change Fleur’s house. Wilson P accepted the evidence of 
school staff that this offer was first made only weeks after Fleur had been allocated to 
her house.215 The implication was that an early change could have been made at that 
time without unreasonable disruption to Fleur.  Instead, Fleur persisted with the house 
and its inaccessible classrooms for over two years.  Wilson P was also critical of the 
Cowell family’s failure to communicate with the school.  Here the implication was 
that a lack of feedback from the family affected the school’s ability to accommodate 
Fleur’s needs.  Wilson P even suggested that ‘[i]t may sound a strange thing to say, 
but I believe it would have been easier for the school if both Mrs J and AJ (Mrs 
Cowell and Fleur) had complained more’.216 
214 Ibid 355 [57]. 
215 Cowell [1998] HREOC No. H97/168 (Unreported, Wilson P, 23 March 1998) [4.2]. 
216 Ibid [6]. 
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In Minns there was some implication that the Minns family had unreasonably failed to 
mitigate Ryan’s disability by not following medical advice that Ryan’s ADHD should 
be treated with the drug, Ritalin.  The Minns family objected to the fact that the 
school insisted that Ryan take the drug as a condition of his enrolment.  Raphael FM 
said, ‘[r]equiring Ryan to take medication so that he could obtain the optimum benefit 
from the education that was being offered to him cannot be held up as a failure to 
provide him with educational services’.217 The ‘unreasonableness’ of the Minns 
family, therefore, infected their case.  
 
In Clarke, by contrast, the Clarke family, while insisting that Jacob needed Auslan 
support, demonstrated their reasonableness by going to great lengths to facilitate the 
provision of that support.  It could be argued that they took positive steps to mitigate 
both Jacob’s disability and any potential inconvenience to MacKillop College in 
accommodating him.  The Clarkes had offered the College a cash grant of $15,000 to 
pay for a teacher aide, assistance with applications for government grants, to arrange 
volunteer Auslan support, to attend excursions and camps as Jacob’s interpreter and to 
teach Auslan to the teachers at the school.  The Clarkes’ commitment to easing the 
impact of Jacob’s inclusion on the College undoubtedly helped them to prove that the 
College’s failure to provide Auslan support was not reasonable. 
 
3 The Availability of a Financial Solution 
A complainant is more likely to succeed in proof of indirect discrimination if a 
reasonable alternative to the discriminatory term can be paid for.218 In Clarke there 
 
217 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) [236]. 
218 An exception is the Corinda case where QADT held that it was not reasonable to impose the cost of 
relocating the functions in question upon other students at the school. 
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were government and private funds available to pay for Auslan support for Jacob.  In 
Travers, the building of a small cupboard, at little expense, to house the catheter 
equipment of the other student who would use the ‘disabled’ toilet would mean that 
the toilet could be shared with minimum risk to that other student.  In Kinsela, the 
cost of relocating the graduation ceremony, it was argued, could be recouped in 
increased ticket sales.219 
In most of the failed cases however, changing the discriminatory requirement or 
condition would involve attitudinal and not just financial adjustment by the 
educational institution respondents and their students.  In Demmery, the implication 
was that Luke’s general unhappiness would not be solved by providing him with 
teacher consistency in the classroom, that the true cause of his unhappiness was the 
perception that others excluded him.  In Cowell the solution preferred by the Cowell 
family may have benefited Fleur but would have involved disruption to over 200 
people, including teachers who had taken pains ‘to create an appropriate learning 
environment in their classrooms’ and would be ‘reluctant to move’.220 The behaviour 
cases, Minns and M&C in particular, demonstrate the point that interference with the 
comfort and convenience of other students will be significant in the reasonableness 
enquiry.  While extra funds, in terms of extra support, may have assisted the 
complainants in those two cases, there would still be unreasonable disruption if their 
breaches of discipline were tolerated.  Further, while it is, perhaps, easy for a school 
community to accept that it is fair to provide extra facilities to a student with a 
 
219 Ultimately, however, QUT graduation ceremonies were not relocated.  Instead the format of the 
ceremonies was altered so that no graduand was required to climb stairs onto the stage to receive his or 
her award.  Instead, graduands are seated on stage for the duration of the graduation ceremony. 
220 Cowell [1998] HREOC No. H97/168 (Unreported, Wilson P, 23 March 1998) [4.2]. 
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disability, it is more difficult to accept that it is fair that such students should be 
allowed to ‘flout’ school rules.  
 
IV CONCLUSION 
The case law suggests, therefore, that a discriminatory term, which can be removed 
through mere application of money, may well be struck down.  Most cases, however, 
require more than a money solution.  They require the increased cooperation, 
understanding and tolerance of other students and school staff if the discriminatory 
term is to be removed.  The cases demonstrate that courts and tribunals will rarely 
find it a ‘reasonable’ alternative to attempt to enforce attitudinal change – to attempt 
to override majority perceptions of what is good for the community.  This reluctance 
to ‘interfere’ is driven by a related reluctance, perhaps, to allow the law to intrude 
upon the hearts and minds of the community, by a perception, perhaps, that attitudinal 
change can not be compelled.  The undoubted irony, however, is that anti-
discrimination legislation has been introduced as an instrument of such attitudinal 
change.221 
221 See Part III, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability.  See also the Parliamentary debate of the Anti-
Discrimination Bill 1991 (Qld): Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 3 
December 1991, 3575, (Judy Spence), 3584 (Molly Robson). 
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CHAPTER 13 
CONCLUSION 
 
The question which stimulated this thesis was whether the Anti-Discrimination Act 
1991 (Qld) (QADA) has been an effective tool for the delivery of equality of 
opportunity in education to people with impairments.  The case law which has 
developed since the implementation of anti-discrimination legislation in Queensland 
and other Australian jurisdictions suggests that many educational opportunities are 
contentious, from the opportunity to attend excursions1 to the opportunity to receive 
education in a student’s first language.2 The most problematic opportunity, however, 
is clearly the opportunity to attend a mainstream school.  The inclusion of students 
with impairments in mainstream schools continues to be a problem which vexes 
educators, lawyers and the community at large.  The thesis has demonstrated that the 
mainstream inclusion of people with disabilities is the policy of anti-discrimination 
legislation3 and the policy of Queensland education providers.4 The thesis has also 
demonstrated, however, that many and varied strategies, developed from the terms of 
the legislation, have been employed by education institutions intent on excluding 
students with impairments from mainstream schools and from certain activities 
 
1 See, for example, I v O’Rourke and Corinda State High School and Minister for Education for 
Queensland [2001] QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001)  The complainant succeeded in 
a claim of direct discrimination arising out of her exclusion from a school excursion because of 
concerns that her wheelchair could not be accommodated on transport arranged for the excursion.  For 
further detail see Part II, Chapter 5: The Impact of the Legislation. 
2 See, for example, Hurst and Devlin v Education Queensland [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 
15 April 2005) and Hurst v State of Queensland [2006] FCAFC 100 (Unreported, Ryan, Finn and 
Weinberg JJ, 28 July 2006).  Hurst and Devlin succeeded in claims of indirect discrimination arising 
out of the refusal of Education Queensland to provide them with instruction in Auslan, the indigenous 
Australian language of people with profound hearing impairments.  For further detail see Part II B, 
Chapter 12: Indirect Discrimination.  
3 See Parts III, IV and V, Chapter 3: The Meaning of Disability and Part II B, Chapter 4: Queensland 
Education Policy. 
4 See Part III, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy. 
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available at mainstream schools.  While there is some judicial comment to suggest 
that there is a prima facie ‘right’ to be educated at one’s school of choice, including 
the local mainstream school,5 QADA, it appears from the case law, does not guarantee 
such a right.6 Indeed, even though the Act acknowledges a ‘right to equal protection 
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination’7 and intends to promote ‘equality 
of opportunity for everyone by protecting them from unfair discrimination’8 it also 
anticipates that there will be limits to the situations where equality of opportunity will 
be available.  The Act promises only to protect against ‘unfair’ discrimination.9 The 
inference, therefore, is that some discrimination will be ‘fair’. 
 
I LIMITS ON EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN EDUCATION 
A Overt limits 
The thesis has demonstrated that several overt limits on any ‘right’ to inclusion have 
been recognised in the case law.  The first limit arises when the inclusion of a student 
puts the health and safety of others at risk.  A health and safety limit was clearly the 
most significant issue influencing the majority of the High Court in the Purvis case.10 
In that case the complainant child had exhibited a pattern of violence against staff, 
students and property at his mainstream high school.  The majority was obviously 
concerned about the ramifications of the violence for others’ safety.11 
5 See Part I C, Chapter 11: Less Favourable Treatment. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (QADA) Parliament's reasons for enacting this Act clause 6. 
8 QADA Long Title, Parliament's reasons for enacting this Act clause 7. 
9 QADA Long Title. 
10 Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92 
(‘Purvis’). 
11 Ibid 102 [13]-[14] per Gleeson CJ; 161-2 [227]-[228] per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ; 174 
[271] per Callinan J. 
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While, in Purvis, the issue was how best to protect the physical safety of the school 
community, in other cases the ‘emotional safety’ of the community was of relevance. 
In the Queensland cases L,12 K13 and P,14 for example, stress caused to teachers 
responsible for student complainants with behavioural difficulties was enough to 
persuade the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (QADT) that the complainants should be 
removed from their mainstream schools.  It is significant that safety arguments have 
only succeeded to exclude students with behavioural and intellectual impairments. 
 
A second limit arises when the inclusion has a detrimental effect on the learning 
environment of others.  A detriment to the learning environment limit may operate in 
conjunction with the health and safety limit, outlined above.  The disruption caused to 
the teaching and learning environment by the inclusion of students who may call out, 
run off or ‘play up’ has sufficiently concerned courts and tribunals that they have 
acknowledged that students who interfere with the core business of teaching and 
learning may be excluded from mainstream schools.  Again, the Purvis case15 and the 
Queensland cases L,16 K17 and P18 are relevant.  The cases of Minns and M&C,
however, perhaps best make the point that the conduct of a student must be 
compatible with the school’s mandated code of conduct if that student is to keep his 
or her place at a mainstream school.19 
12 L v Minister for Education for the State of Queensland (No. 2) [1995] 1 QADR 207, 216 (‘L’). 
13 K v N School (No 3) [1996] 1 QADR 620, 622 (‘K’). 
14 P v Director-General, Department of Education [1995] 1 QADR 755, 786 (‘P’). 
15 See particularly Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 172 [266] (Callinan J). 
16 L [1995] 1 QADR 207, 216. 
17 K [1996] 1 QADR 620, 622. 
18 P [1995] 1 QADR 755, 786. 
19 See Minns v State of New South Wales [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002) 
[247] (‘Minns’); S on behalf of M & C v Director General, Department of Education & Training 
[2001] NSWADT 43 (Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members McDonald and Mooney, 21 
March 2001) [123]. 
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A third limit arises when a student cannot meet legitimate requirements of the course 
in which they are enrolled.  To date, this limit has only operated at the tertiary level of 
education.  Courts and tribunals have recognised the special responsibility of tertiary 
education institutions of warranting to the world at large that their graduates have met 
the requirements of the course from which they have graduated.  A growing list of 
cases, including Brackenreg,20 W,21 Reyes-Gonzalez22 and Chung23 demonstrates that 
tertiary institutions will not be required to continue to accommodate those students 
whose impairments mean that they do not have the capacity to ‘pass’ their course.24 
While there is no case, as yet, which suggests that students in the compulsory stages 
of education face a similar limit on their inclusion, it should be noted that the recent 
Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) recognise a limit to the notion of 
‘reasonable adjustment’ in respect of students who cannot meet legitimate course 
requirements and that this limit potentially applies across the spectrum of educational 
enrolment.25 
A fourth limit arises when the cost of inclusion is prohibitive for the education 
provider.  This limit appears to apply, however, only in the narrow circumstance of 
the small independent school.  In K, for example, the respondent school, a small 
independent school, adduced evidence that the financial viability of the school was 
put at risk by the cost of continuing to include a group of students with intellectual 
 
20 Brackenreg v Queensland University of Technology [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 
December 1999). 
21 W v Flinders University of South Australia [1998] HREOCA 19 (Unreported, Commissioner 
McEvoy, 24 June 1998). 
22 Reyes-Gonzalez v NSW TAFE Commission [2003] NSWADT 22 (Unreported, Ireland J, Members 
Silva and Strickland, 3 February 2003). 
23 Chung v University of Sydney [2001] FMCA 94 (Unreported, Driver FM, 20 September 2001). 
24 See Brackenreg [1999] QADT 11 (Unreported, Copelin P, 20 December 1999) [4.2.2.4(v)].  See also 
Part I A, Chapter 10: Causation. 
25 Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) s 3.4(3).  See also Part I C, Chapter 10: Causation. 
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and behavioural impairments.  Although some government funding is available to 
support inclusion, it was not sufficient, in that case, to provide for all the special needs 
of the complainant or of other students like her.26 Financial hardship was not 
sufficient, however, to prove hardship to the State in either L or P or to an 
independent school in the controversial Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
(DDA) case, Finney,27 suggesting that courts and tribunals will expect state schools 
and wealthy independent schools to have the resources to accommodate the individual 
needs of a student with impairments.  
 
A fifth limit arises when the cost of inclusion causes financial detriment to other 
members of the school community.  Again, this limit appears to apply only in limited 
circumstances.  In the Corinda case,28 the QADT was concerned that the cost of 
relocating the school formal to a venue more accommodating of the complainant’s 
impairment would be passed on to other students and that this was not fair to them.29 
It should be noted, however, that a similar argument, that the cost of accommodating 
students with impairment would be passed on to the school community in terms of 
extra fees, did not succeed in the Finney case.30 
B Covert Limits 
A significant finding of the thesis is that it is possible to extrapolate, in addition to the 
overt limits outlined above, a series of more covert limits at work in the cases.  It can 
be argued that courts and tribunals have been less inclined to protect a student’s 
 
26 K (1997) 1QADR 620, 624. 
27 Finney v Hills Grammar School (2000) EOC 93-087 (HREOC) (‘Finney’). 
28 I v O’Rourke and Corinda State High School and Minister for Education for Queensland [2001] 
QADT 1 (Unreported, Copelin P, 31 January 2001) (‘Corinda’). 
29 See ibid [11.2.2.3].  See also Part V E 2, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
30 Finney (2000) EOC 93-087 (HREOC) [7.5]. 
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educational opportunities when the cost of inclusion is prohibitive for the education 
institution.  This statement appears to contradict the statement made, above, that such 
a limit applies only in narrow circumstances.  While tribunals have been reluctant, 
openly, to identify excessive cost of inclusion as justifying exclusion, close analysis 
of many failed cases reveals that the outcomes are consistent with the suggestion that 
cost is nevertheless a factor impacting on the actions of respondents, and a factor that 
is being avoided in courts’ and tribunals’ express reasoning.  It can be argued, for 
example, that the overt health and safety limit and detriment to the educational 
environment limit are really all about money.  It can be argued that if enough support 
– support which may well be expensive – were made available many more students 
could be placed in mainstream schools.  In the Purvis case, for example, the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) found at first instance that 
more could have been done to support the inclusion of the complainant, Daniel 
Hoggan.31 Commissioner Innes was of the clear view that if more support were 
provided, in the form of staff training in particular, Daniel’s behaviour would have 
been appropriately managed within the school environment and he would not have 
been excluded.32 This view of the facts was supported by the minority of the High 
Court in Purvis33 but not addressed by the majority judges.  In cases such as L34 and 
P35 it was also clear from the facts that more teacher aide and specialist teacher 
support would have reduced both the stress to staff and the disruption to the learning 
environment which accompanied the inclusion of the complainants.   
 
31 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75172-5 
[6.4].    
32 Ibid. 
33 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 127-8, [106]-[107]. 
34 L [1995] 1 QADR 207, 217. 
35 P (1996) 1 QADR 755, 787. 
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The link between the spending of money on resources, on the one hand, and the 
avoidance of threats to safety and of disruption of the learning environment, on the 
other, is made plain, however, in the case of K. In that case Commissioner Holmes 
conceded that K ‘could be properly educated in a regular classroom setting’36 but that 
the provision of resources by the school needed to facilitate her inclusion would have 
caused unjustifiable financial hardship to the school.37 It is also relevant to this 
argument that there is good evidence that it is more cost effective for Education 
Queensland, the largest provider of education services in Queensland, to ‘cluster’ 
students with particular disabilities at particular, often special, schools or units.38 If, 
therefore, ‘problem’ students are relocated from a mainstream school to a special 
school or unit it may relieve the stress and disruption faced by other students and staff 
in mainstream classes, but it is also more cost effective for the State.  In this context it 
is useful to reiterate the point that stress and disruption caused by ‘problem’ students 
to other students and staff in special school settings has not motivated Education 
Queensland to seek a legal remedy.39 One inference is that staff and students in 
special schools are expected to tolerate a stressful and disruptive learning 
environment, while staff and students in mainstream schools are not.  Alternatively, 
the inference may be drawn that arguments relating to stress and disruption are a 
convenient and successful strategy for convincing a tribunal of unjustifiable hardship 
when cost arguments will not succeed.  
 
36 K (1997) 1QADR 620, 623. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See Part III B, Chapter 5: The Impact of the Legislation. See, particularly, Education Queensland, 
Action Plan: Educational Provision for Students with Disabilities 1998-2002 (1998) 6; Glenis Green, 
‘Taylah’s mum just wants a fare go’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 22 August 2000, 8; Evidence to 
Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Committee, Brisbane, 6 September 2002, 409 
(Phillip Tomkinson, Vice-President, Queensland Parents for People with a Disability). 
39 See Part V E 3 and Part VI, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
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There has also been a reluctance to find discrimination when the student, or the 
student’s family, has been uncooperative. It is fair to say that many complainants in 
cases involving disability discrimination in education are regarded as ‘troublemakers’ 
by the respondents.40 In some cases the acrimony between the complainant family 
and the respondent education institution has escalated to the extent that formal 
complaints of harassment have been made.41 In some cases the ‘troublemaking’ has 
been defended by tribunals as amounting, simply, to a legitimate assertion of a 
legitimate complaint.42 Other cases suggest, however, that ‘troublemaking’ may 
damage a complainant’s claim of discrimination.  In Hurst and Devlin,43 for example, 
the respondent invited Lander J, of the Federal Court, to hold that Tiahna Hurst’s 
mother had abused the complaint and court processes to secure an Auslan education 
for her daughter.44 Lander J, found that there had been no abuse of process but was 
nevertheless critical of the use of anti-discrimination law as a ‘vehicle to introduce 
changes into the education system and, in particular, into that part of the education 
system which impacts upon persons with disabilities’.45 Lander J also found that 
Tiahna had not been the victim of any unlawful discrimination, a decision that was 
later overturned on appeal.  Other cases suggest that ‘troublemaking’ in the form of a 
refusal, or even a failure, to take what the court sees as reasonable steps to mitigate 
disability may cost a complainant his or her case.  In Cowell,46 the complainant 
refused to change her school ‘house’ to one which was located in a more accessible 
 
40 In Travers v New South Wales (2001) 163 FLR 99 (Federal Magistrates Court), for example, after 
hearing disputed evidence of altercations between the parties, Raphael FM found, at [52], ‘that the 
school felt that Mr and Mrs Travers were “high maintenance”’. 
41 See, for example, Murphy and Grahl v The State of New South Wales [2000] HREOC NoH98/73 
(Unreported, Commissioner Carter, 27 March 2000) (‘Grahl’). 
42 The facts of and findings in the Grahl case, ibid, are a good example. 
43 Hurst and Devlin v Education Queensland [2005] FCA 405 (Unreported, Lander J, 15 April 2005) 
(Hurst and Devlin). 
44 Ibid [389]. 
45 Ibid [424]. 
46 Cowell, Mrs and Fleur Cowell v A School [1998] HREOC No. H97/168 (Unreported, Wilson P, 23 
March 1998). 
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part of her school.  In Minns,47 the complainant refused to take medication which may 
have allowed him better to control his own behaviour.  In Sluggett48 the complainant 
failed to alert the respondent to her mobility impairment and of potential access 
problems it would create.  All of these cases were lost; Cowell and Sluggett expressly 
on the basis that their own actions had caused their detriment. 
 
Finally, there is some suggestion that it may be more difficult to prove discrimination 
when there is no objective ‘benefit’ for the complainant in the inclusion.  Such a limit 
is implicit, perhaps, in the argument, raised in cases like Purvis and L and P, that a 
mainstream school is not the ‘best’ school for the complainant students and that a 
‘special school’ environment will deliver better educational outcomes for the 
complainant.49 This argument is related, of course, to a view which values the 
‘benefit’ of a student’s intellectual development over and above his or her social 
development.  Such an argument would, perhaps, strike a chord with many of the 
parents of students with impairments who presumably choose to send their children to 
special schools because they believe the programs at those schools are better 
structured to meet the particular educational needs of their children.  It has been 
argued in the thesis, however, that views on the appropriate education of students with 
impairment are highly contested and that, in some of the more bitterly fought cases, 
those views have shaped the legal argument of the parties.50 In some cases the views 
of the tribunal or court on the appropriate education of students with impairment may 
 
47 Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002). 
48 Sluggett v Flinders University of South Australia [2000] HREOC No H96/2 (Unreported, 
Commissioner McEvoy, 14 July 2000). 
49 See Part I D, Chapter 11: Less Favourable Treatment. 
50 See Part III B, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy.  
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also be inferred from the text of their decisions.51 . Arguments that ‘special’ education 
was ‘more favourable’ and the ‘best’ treatment for students with impairment were 
rejected by QADT in P,52 and by HREOC in Purvis,53 and a prima facie right to 
attend a mainstream school suggested in those cases,54 It may nevertheless be 
speculated that this kind of argument – whether expressly made or merely implied by 
the circumstances of the case – is still influential for some judges and tribunal 
members.  
 
II  LEGITIMACY OF THE LIMITS ON EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 
A Communitarian Education 
A communitarian framework has been adopted against which to test the legitimacy of 
the limits on equality of opportunity in education for people with impairments which 
are apparent from the developing case law in the area.  The communitarian school is 
inclusive.  It is an ‘enclosure within a neighbourhood, a special environment within a 
known world where children are brought together as students exactly as they will one 
day come together as citizens’.55 The communitarian school is inclusive, not just 
because democratic society is inclusive, but for practical reasons.  It is inclusive so as 
to ensure that all students have access to the lessons they need to prepare them for 
citizenship in the wider community.  It is inclusive so as to model the tolerance which 
must underpin an inclusive society.  Moreover, the inclusive school, by providing the 
opportunity for others to learn the key value of tolerance, allows even students with 
 
51 See Part II B, Chapter 4: Queensland Education Policy, and Part I B, Chapter 11: Less Favourable 
Treatment. 
52 P [1995] 1 QADR 755, 782. 
53 Purvis obo Hoggan v New South Wales (Department of Education) [2001] EOC ¶ 93-117, 75154 
[5.14], 75163 [5.21], 75172-5 [6.4].   
54 P [1995] 1 QADR 755, 783; Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 137 [141].  See also L [1995] 1 QADR 207, 
211. 
55 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 198, 225. 
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severe impairments to contribute to the good of the community and, as such, to earn  
an entitlement to the respect of the community.  It is not going too far, therefore, to 
state that communitarians would acknowledge a prima facie right for all citizens to 
education in a mainstream community school.   
 
Communitarians are, however, suspicious of ‘rights talk’ when such talk jeopardises 
the wellbeing of the community as a whole.56 Individual rights survive and thrive only 
when they are compatible with a strong community.  As Etzioni has declared, 
‘individual rights are limited by the rights of others and the needs of the 
community’.57 Individual rights are tied also to the notion of individual 
responsibility.  Those who take from the community must also give and sometimes 
what must be given up is an individual choice or opportunity.  To take without giving 
is ‘an amoral, self-centred predisposition that ultimately no society can tolerate’.58 It 
may be accepted, therefore, that communitarians would be comfortable with a ‘thick’ 
set of limits on the education opportunities of people with impairments.  The thesis 
sets out a set of limits that are consistent with communitarian theory, and which it is 
appropriate, at this point, to summarise and reiterate.59 
First, as the community needs ‘experts’, there is a place for specialised education for 
the production of experts.  There is, as a corollary, a limited place for the provision of 
classes ‘streamed’ according to ability within mainstream education institutions.  It 
may be appropriate, for example, to exclude students with intellectual impairments 
 
56 See, for example, Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 
(1991) and Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community (1993) 6-8. 
57 Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community (1993) 7. 
58 Ibid 10. 
59 For a more detailed explanation of these limits and specific reference to the communitarian theory 
which underpins them see Parts III and IV, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education.  
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from classes which require advanced intellectual ability.  Generally speaking, 
however, the ‘streaming’ of classes, should not justify the complete exclusion from a 
mainstream institution of students with impairments.  An exception, however, arises 
in respect of tertiary institutions which have the responsibility of certifying to the 
community that students have met the legitimate requirements of their courses. 
 
Secondly, where the inclusion of a student with an impairment in a mainstream 
education setting compromises the ability of the majority of students to learn, it may 
be necessary for that student to be excluded from the mainstream setting.  This is 
consistent with the basic tenet of communitarian philosophy that, in a competition 
between what is good for the community and what is good for the individual citizen, 
community prevails.  
 
Thirdly, and similarly, where the inclusion of a student with an impairment 
compromises the safety of other members of the school community the exclusion of 
that student is warranted.   
 
Fourthly, and more controversially, at least one writer, Walzer, has suggested that the 
exclusion from a school altogether may be allowable where a student, by reason of 
impairment, demonstrates a ‘total incapacity to learn’.60 
B Communitarian Limits Compared with the Legal Limits  
A review of the communitarian limits on the right to an inclusive education suggests 
that there is a high degree of correlation between those limits and the overt limits to a 
 
60 Michael Walzer, above n 50, 221. 
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‘right’ to education developed in Australian anti-discrimination case law and 
described above.  Both communitarians and courts accept that failure to meet course 
requirements may warrant exclusion from a tertiary institution.61 Indeed, 
communitarians may even be prepared to accept such ‘streaming’ out of 
opportunities, but not the mainstream environment, even at the compulsory levels of 
education.62 Further, it may be speculated that communitarians, like the courts, would 
accept that a student may be excluded where their impairment related problem 
behaviour damages the learning environment or compromises the safety of others.63 
There is even some correlation between the more covert limits developed in the cases 
and communitarian theory.  Walzer’s suggestion that exclusion may be justified when 
a student displays a ‘total incapacity to learn’64 echoes the rhetoric of those 
respondents who have argued that it is objectively the ‘best’ course for some students 
to complete their education out of the mainstream setting.  Walzer’s view is, however, 
at odds with the more dominant communitarian position that an inclusive school 
models the democratic nature of society, teaches tolerance and gives students with 
impairments the opportunity to give through the teaching of others.  Communitarians 
would encourage the inclusion of all students with impairments unless some detriment 
to the community flows from the inclusion.  Communitarians, perhaps, have not given 
up on achieving the attitudinal change that courts appear reluctant to impose on the 
community.  
 
61 See Part I C, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
62 Ibid; Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship (1998) 68. 
63 See Part IV, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
64 See above n 60. 
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The notion of mutual responsibility, which is the cornerstone of the communitarian 
society, may, however, be sufficient to justify some of the other covert limits detected 
in the case law.  Communitarians are critical of citizens who expect the bald assertion 
of a right to trump all competing claims.65 Thus, communitarians may have some 
sympathy for the view that citizens must be prepared to compromise to achieve 
inclusion.  Citizens who fail to take ‘reasonable’ steps to mitigate their own disability 
are likely to lose the sympathy and support of communitarian theorists. 
 
Whether mutual responsibility and the preference for community over individual good 
are enough to justify exclusion where inclusion imposes a financial burden on the 
education provider is, however, less clear.66 Courts and tribunals have refused to 
extrapolate from the legislation a general limit on educational opportunities where 
their provision is costly.  It has been argued, above, however, that cost concerns are 
nevertheless implicit in the fact that courts have refused to compel the inclusion of 
‘problem’ students even where there is expert evidence that the problems could be 
solved by extra staff training and support.  Perhaps it is not possible to articulate a 
firm communitarian position on whether or when the expenditure of money on 
inclusion will compromise community.  Perhaps the communitarian view would be 
that whether the expenditure should be mandated would depend on the circumstances 
of the individual community.  At present, such an approach would appear to accord 
with the flexible approach to the issue taken by courts and tribunals.  While courts and 
tribunals have been coy about acknowledging the relevance of financial pressures, 
however, communitarians, with a plain preference for community over individual, 
 
65 See above nn 56-8. 
66 See Part II, Chapter 2: Communitarian Education. 
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would tolerate an open acknowledgment that excessive cost to the community is 
sufficient to justify exclusion.  
 
III LEGITIMACY OF THE METHODS EMPLOYED TO DELIVER THE LIMITS ON 
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 
An issue separate from the legitimacy of the limits on equality of opportunity in 
education for people with impairments is the legitimacy of the methods employed by 
courts and tribunals to deliver those limits.  An assessment of the legitimacy of these 
methods requires consideration of how each method aligns with the social model of 
disability which underpins the policy of anti-discrimination legislation such as the 
QADA. The thesis has analysed a variety of successful and unsuccessful strategies for 
exclusion developed by respondents from the terms of anti-discrimination legislation.  
Among the successful strategies the comparator approach adopted by the majority of 
the High Court of Australia in Purvis stands out as particularly problematic in terms 
both of disability theory and preservation of the protective scope of the legislation. 
 
A The Comparator 
Since the decision in Purvis, in determining whether direct discrimination is proved, a 
court is authorised to look at whether the complainant was treated less favourably 
than a comparator with the complainant’s behaviour but without the complainant’s 
impairment.  This is despite the fact that the complainant’s behaviour is caused by or, 
even, part of his or her impairment.  This comparison plainly offends the aim of the 
legislation to prohibit discrimination on the basis of a protected attribute.  It is plainly 
inconsistent with the definition of direct discrimination as ‘less favourable treatment’ 
on the basis of a protected attribute.  It is, moreover, plainly offensive to people with 
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impairments in that it does not distinguish between their unwilled and involuntary 
behaviour and the deliberate behaviour of a person without impairment.  As Gleeson 
CJ, somewhat disingenuously, admitted of Daniel Hoggan, the complainant in the 
Purvis case, ‘[w]hat, for him, was disturbed behaviour, might be, for another pupil, 
bad behaviour’.67 
Although detailed analysis is beyond the scope of the present study, the thesis has 
canvassed a variety of employment cases which have attempted to tease out the 
comparator approach in Purvis to encompass a wider variety of ‘problem’ behaviours 
in the workplace and to authorise termination on the basis of those behaviours.  
While, to date, no employment discrimination case has failed directly on the 
comparator point, a threat to the protective scope of the legislation is dormant in the 
following chilling sample of statements of employment discrimination law since 
Purvis:
If the employer would treat any employee the same who was absent from work for 
some weeks (whether or not the employee had a disability or not) then this would not 
constitute discrimination under the DDA.68 
Even if a preference for part-time work and a practical inability to work full-time 
could be regarded as so bound up in the attributes of parental status and family 
responsibilities as to be part of them, the complainant’s direct discrimination claim 
would still not succeed because the appropriate comparison is with another person 
who prefers not to, and practically cannot, meet the respondents’ requirement to work 
full time, but who is not a parent with family responsibilities. This was the reasoning 
of the majority in Purvis v New South Wales.69 
67 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 101 [11].   
68 Power v Aboriginal Hostels Limited (2003) 133 FCR 254, 259 [8]. 
69 Edwards v Hillier and Educang [2006] QADT 34 (Unreported, Dalton P, 11 August 2006) [87]. 
416
Several past and present Justices of the High Court70 have warned that allowing a 
comparator with the complainant’s impairment induced behaviour would undermine 
the function of anti-discrimination legislation, but the words of Sir Ronald Wilson are 
most often quoted and, perhaps, most powerful and most prescient:  
It would fatally frustrate the purposes of the Act if the matters which it 
expressly identifies as constituting unacceptable bases for differential 
treatment … could be seized upon as rendering the overall circumstances 
materially different, with the result that the treatment could never be 
discriminatory within the meaning of the Act.71 
B Exemptions 
The approach of the majority in Purvis was doubtless affected by what the Justices 
saw as the desirable outcome of the case.  Each majority judgment made it plain that 
an interpretation of the DDA which mandated the inclusion of Daniel Hoggan and his 
‘very violent behaviour’72 could not be tolerated.73 The Court was, perhaps 
understandably, concerned about potential problems with the intersection of 
discrimination law and tort law, workplace health and safety law and criminal law. 
How could a school forced by its obligations under anti-discrimination law to include 
a ‘violent’ student also discharge its obligation to protect its staff and students against 
the actions of that ‘violent’ student?  There is little doubt that the majority of the High 
Court felt forced to construct a ‘radical’ solution to this problem because they 
 
70 See below nn 73. 
71 Dopking & Thomas v Department of Defence [1992] HREOCA 5 (Unreported, Wilson P, 13 March 
1992).  Extract available at (1992) EOC ¶92-421, 79005.  Note this case is also known as Sullivan v 
Department of Defence. Sir Ronald Wilson’s words were cited with approval in the High Court in IWv 
City of Perth (1997) 146 ALR 696, 719 (Toohey J), 748 (Kirby J) and in Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 
131 (McHugh and Kirby JJ). The words were also cited with approval in the Federal Court cases 
Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1993) 46 FCR 191, 209 and in 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission v Mt Isa Mines Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 301, 327. 
72 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 97 [2], (Gleeson CJ), quoting the principal of South Grafton State High 
School. 
73 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 101 [12] (Gleeson CJ), 161-2 [227]-[228] (Gummow, Hayne and 
Heydon JJ), 172-3 [266]-[267] (Callinan J). 
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believed no appropriate exemption was available under the DDA at that time.74 An 
unjustifiable hardship exemption or, perhaps, even a workplace health and safety 
exemption would have allowed the Court to keep an interpretation of the comparator 
consistent with disability theory and sensitive to the warnings of other justices of the 
High Court and still authorise the exclusion of Daniel Hoggan.  The Queensland 
cases, L, K and P showed how the unjustifiable hardship exemption could be relied 
upon in similar circumstances.75 
Thus the Purvis case also illustrates the importance of a properly considered and 
drafted scheme of exemptions which explicitly acknowledges the situations where 
discrimination will not be ‘unfair’ and will be tolerated.  It has been argued in the 
thesis that such a scheme of exemptions is consistent with communitarian theory in 
that it is consistent with a fundamental entitlement to inclusion which yields only 
when there is an irreconcilable contest between community interests and individual 
interests.  It is, however, also reflective of a problem identified with the social model 
of disability in that the facts of many discrimination cases demonstrate that not all of 
the disadvantage flowing from impairment can be removed or even mitigated by 
social adjustment to accommodate the impairment.  There will be cases, such as those 
involving intellectual impairment, where no amount of adjustment will neutralise all 
disability attaching to the impairment.  There will be cases, such as those where the 
good of a community is jeopardised by the inclusion of a person with impairment, 
where adjustment should not be required.  
 
74 But note that the minority did not exclude the availability of an exemption under Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) s 55.  See Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 129 [111] (McHugh and 
Kirby JJ).  See Part IV, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
75 See Part V D, Chapter 6: Exemptions.   
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To this end, the thesis has suggested the reworking of the unjustifiable hardship 
exemption,76 and the creation of a new exemption in relation to the inability to meet 
the legitimate course requirements of tertiary education institutions.77 A scheme of 
exemptions which allows the weighing of competing community and individual 
interests enhances the fair application of the legislation to the education of people 
with impairments. 
 
C Changing the Comparator 
With a scheme of appropriate exemptions there is, arguably, no need for the 
problematic reading of the comparator mandated in Purvis to be maintained.78 As 
noted above, under the QADA similar cases to the Purvis case were resolved without 
manipulation of the characteristics of the comparator.  In L, K and P, for example, it 
was held by the QADT that the inclusion of students with behaviour problems related 
to their impairment would impose unjustifiable hardship on the respondent education 
institution.79 Similarly, United Kingdom courts interpreting the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) have, in contrast to the High Court of Australia, 
concluded that the comparator should not have the disability or behaviour of the 
complainant.80 This ‘generous’ reading of the comparator was, no doubt, facilitated by 
the existence in the UK legislation of an overarching obligation to take ‘reasonable 
steps’ to facilitate the inclusion of people with disabilities in the protected areas 
recognised in the legislation, including education and employment.81 As discussed 
 
76 See Part V E, Chapter 6: Exemptions. 
77 See Part I C, Chapter 10: Causation. 
78 Please note that consideration of whether further exemptions are needed in respect of protected 
attributes other than impairment and protected areas other than education is beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
79 See Part V D, Chapter 6: Exemptions.   
80 See Part III C, Chapter 9: The Comparator. 
81 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) ss 6 and 28C. 
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earlier in the thesis, a duty of reasonable accommodation, like a scheme of 
exemptions, allows for the weighing of competing interests in order to determine 
whether appropriate limits should be placed on a prima facie duty not to 
discriminate.82 
Since Purvis, however, the QADT has acknowledged that the majority decision in that 
case now represents the current state of the law in Queensland on the comparator 
point.83 It would, however, reinforce the stated policy and purpose of the QADA if it 
were amended to clarify that the comparator for the purpose of determining less 
favourable treatment does not have the complainant’s protected attribute or behaviour 
caused by or part of that protected attribute.84 Amendments should also clarify that 
behaviour related to the protected attribute may not be considered as a relevant 
circumstance for the purpose of determining whether the complainant has been treated 
less favourably than a comparator.  The introduction of such amendments would set 
the example for other Australian jurisdictions and would be an important step towards 
reinvigoration of the protective scope of anti-discrimination legislation for people 
with impairments. 
 
III  EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN EDUCATION?
The thesis has demonstrated that there are some complainants with impairments who 
will continue to have difficulty claiming equality of opportunity in education in 
Queensland.  It is clear from the Queensland cases, and from cases in other Australian 
 
82 See Chapter 7: An Implied Duty of Reasonable Accommodation. 
83See GL v Legal Aid Queensland [2006] QADT 25 (Unreported, Member Rangiah,13 June 2006) 
(‘GL’) [46]-[52]; Edwards v Hillier Educang Ltd t/as Forest Lake College [2006] QADT 34 
(Unreported, President Dalton, 11 August 2006) [87]-[90]; Cockin v P N Beverages Aust Pty Ltd Ors 
[2006] QADT 42 (Unreported, Member Rangiah, 13 December 2006) [63]-[66].  
84 See Part IV, Chapter 9: The Comparator. 
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jurisdictions, that many students with behavioural and intellectual impairments are 
guaranteed fewer educational opportunities than students with other impairments or 
without impairments.85 To this extent, it appears that a hierarchy of impairments may 
be postulated with students with physical and sensory impairment having a greater 
range of options than students with intellectual and behavioural problems.86 
Students with behavioural and intellectual impairments have fewer opportunities 
principally because their inclusion in the mainstream class room is perceived to 
interfere with majority rights.  Some commentators have suggested that the problem is 
community ‘intolerance’ rather than individual ‘interference’ and that all that is 
required to effect full inclusion of students with impairments is a change of ‘attitude’ 
on the part of staff and students.87 The courts, however, have been concerned by what 
they regard as tangible threats to community safety and to the viability of the learning 
environment posed by students who cannot, because of impairment, conform to 
school rules and standards of behaviour.  Moreover, objective analysis suggests that 
there are some aspects of disability, and particularly of disability related to intellectual 
and behavioural impairment, that the most liberal and accepting of attitudes cannot 
mitigate or remove.  Community attitude cannot neutralise the effects of 
 
85 See particularly Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, L [1995] 1 QADR 207, K [1996] 1 QADR 620, P [1995] 
1 QADR 755, Minns [2002] FMCA 60 (Unreported, Raphael FM, 28 June 2002), M & C [2001] 
NSWADT 43 (Unreported, Judicial Member Britton, Members McDonald and Mooney,  21 March 
2001).  
86 Education Queensland statistical data also support the conclusion that there is such a hierarchy.  See 
Part III B, Chapter 4: The Impact of the Legislation.  
87 See, for example, Carol Christensen, ‘Disabled, handicapped or disordered: “What’s in a name?’” in 
Carol Christensen and Fazal Rizvi (eds), Disability and the Dilemmas of Justice and Education (1996) 
63 and Roger Slee, ‘Special education and human rights in Australia: how do we know about 
disablement and what does it mean for educators?’ in Felicity Armstrong and Len Barton (eds) 
Disability, Human Rights and Education: Cross-cultural Perspectives (1999) 121. 
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uncontrollable violence.  Community attitude cannot deliver a valid university degree 
to a student with profound intellectual impairment.   
 
It has been reiterated throughout the thesis that communitarians will tolerate a thick 
set of limitations on what they acknowledge as each citizen’s right to inclusion.  It is 
to be hoped, however, that the similarly thick regime of limitations acknowledged and 
constructed by Australian courts and tribunals does not permit education institutions 
in Queensland and other parts of Australia to avoid making adjustments that would 
allow schools and universities to operate more inclusively.  While uncontrollable 
violence cannot be neutralised, that situation should be distinguished from the 
situation where a student reacts ‘violently’ to an inflexible and unsympathetic 
environment.  While a valid university degree should not be awarded to a student 
without the intellectual capacity to achieve it, that situation should be distinguished 
from the situation where a student fails because of an inflexible and unsympathetic 
environment.  The QADA aims to eliminate ‘unfair’ discrimination.  Care must be 
taken that discrimination which is not ‘fair’, but which is ‘convenient’ or ‘expedient’ 
or ‘cost effective’, is not allowed to flourish under an inflexible and unsympathetic 
regime which accords more respect to the letter of the law than to the interests of 
people with impairments. 
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Western Australia 
 
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 
 
European Community 
 
Council Directive (EC) No 78/2000 of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General 
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation [2000] OJL 303/16 
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New Zealand 
 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Human Rights Act 1993 
United Kingdom 
 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
 
Education Act 1996 
Special Education Needs and Disabilities Act 2001 
United States of America 
 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 USC §12101 
 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 1990 20 USC § 1400 
 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 2004 20 USC § 1400 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 29 U.S.C. § 701 
 
